TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1999 (3) TMI 592
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....ng in force but subject to the provisions of section 33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than section 27) shall be suspended or remitted or commuted." A plain reading of the above Section is that it prohibits suspension of a sentence awarded under the Act except in the case of an offence under Section 27. To make the aforesaid meaning clearer the legislature has added a non obstante limb to the Section to the effect that such prohibition is operative in spite of any other provision contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code) or under any other law. But the impact of the aforesaid ban is sought to be diluted with the help of Section 36B of the Act which reads thus: "36B. Appeal and revision The High Court may exercise, so far as may be applicable, all the powers conferred by Chapters XXIX and XXX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on a High Court, as if a Special Court within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court were a Court of Session trying cases within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court." Chapter XXIX of the Code contains a fasciculus of pr....
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....e Act, and not the power of the High Court to suspend sentence. If the intention of Parliament in enacting Section 32A of the Act is only to curb Governments powers under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code the Parliament would, instead of using the present all covering words in the non obstante clause (notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or in any other law) have employed the words notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter XXXII of the Code. Precision and brevity are generally the hallmarks of legislative draftsmanship. Hence lesser words for achieving the purpose would have been employed by the legislature while framing a provision in the statute. That apart, could parliament have laboured so much if its only object was to bridle the powers of the Government under Section 432 and 433 of the Code because even apart from those provisions a Government could achieve it by exercising the constitutional powers. Article 72 of the Constitution of India confers power on the President of India to suspend, remit or commute sentence in all cases where punishment or sentence is for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which executive power of the Union extends.....
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....ommutation or suspension of sentence, but the main concern focussed was on the need to further strengthen the bail provisions. That apart, we are not aware of any criticism from any quarter that Government have been remitting or suspending or commuting sentences awarded to persons convicted of offences under the Act. It is preposterous to think that a situation was created by which Parliament was forced to step in to curb the executive powers of the Government to suspend sentences passed on the convicts under the Act. At this juncture a reference to Section 37 of the Act is apposite. That provision makes the offences under the Act cognizable and non-bailable. It reads thus: "37. Offences to be cognizable and nonbailable.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless" (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, ....
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....es which are more serious than the offences mentioned in Section 27 of the Act. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Berlin Joseph @ Ravi vs. State (1992 1 Crimes 1221 = 1992 KLT 514) has adopted the view that Section 32A of the Act has curtailed the powers of the court to suspend the sentence passed on a convicted person of offences under the Act, except the offence under Section 27. A Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in Anwar vs. State (1994 2 Crimes 687) and a Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rajendra Singh vs. State of M.P. (1995 Crl. Law Journal 3248) have also adopted the same view. But a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Amarjit Singh vs. State (1993 2 Recent Crl. Reports 466) has taken a different view on Section 32A. Though the Full Bench decision in Berlin Joseph vs. State (supra) was brought to the notice of the Division Bench it was skipped by a curt observation in the following lines: "Mr. Handa strongly relied on a later Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Berlin Joseph @ Ravi v. State (1992 1 Crimes ....