TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1991 (4) TMI 411
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....4. Explanation III was inserted by Act 18 of 1989 with effect from April 1, 1989, defining "industrial machinery" for the purpose of entry 7. The said explanation reads thus: "Explanation III.-'Industrial machinery' for the purpose of entry 7 of the Schedule shall mean such machinery which are generally used by an industrial unit whether or not such unit is a factory as defined under the Factories Act, 1948, for manufacturing or processing of goods and includes earth moving machinery and such other machinery used for mining, building, construction (including laying of roads), fabrication, erection, installation, fitting out, improvement, modification, repair or commissioning of any movable or immovable property." 2.. In the first batc....
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....he assessing authority to levy tax on Vee belts. This is the subject-matter of the writ petition. 7.. That the proposition notices came to be issued on account of the clarification of the Commissioner (annexure E) is not in dispute. This petitioner and the other petitioners have challenged the action taken by the department to levy entry tax on Vee belts. 8.. Several contentions are urged on behalf of the petitioners opposing the levy. It is submitted that Vee belts are not component parts or accessories of the industrial machinery in order to attract levy under entry 7. Support for this argument is taken from the manner in which the similar entry in Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, has been understood by the department. In Karnataka Sa....
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....f Entry Tax Act. The additional argument that is advanced is that the "machinery" referred to in entry 7 being "industrial machinery" Vee belts which are dealt with by the petitioners in all these cases cannot be treated as parts and accessories of the industrial machinery as further described in explanation III. 11.. In support of the contentions, the learned counsel has relied upon several decisions of the Supreme Court and of other High Courts in which similar interpretation was called for. In support of the first proposition, the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in [1973] 32 STC 309 (Ramaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh), [1988] 69 STC 1 (MP) [FB] (Jagdamba Industries v. State of Madhya Pradesh) and [1976] 37 STC 583 (SC) (S....
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.... either as part or accessory of the machinery under entry 20 of the Second Schedule. Even prior to the insertion also, Vee belts were being taxed, as already stated under section 5(1). 13.. In support of the contention that the subsequent amendment, viz., insertion of entry 141(v) should provide a useful guide in understanding the effect of the insertion, the learned counsel has cited the decision in [1979] 44 STC 276 (Kar) (Dani v. State of Karnataka). 14.. The second proposition of the learned counsel is that "Vee belts" at any rate cannot be treated as parts or accessories of industrial machinery. 15.. It is the case of the petitioners as set out in the writ petitions that the Vee belts are not supplied and they do not come alon....
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....ot covered by the term "mill stores and hardware". 17.. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in [1966] 17 STC 96 (Vithal Chhagan & Sons v. State of Gujarat) and an earlier Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in [1971] 28 STC 736 (Commissioner, Sales Tax v. Ram Niwas Puskar Dutt). Their Lordships adopted the reasoning in the said two decisions in holding that rubber beltings cannot be treated as accessories of machinery. While rejecting the contention of the State, their Lordships held that rubber beltings cannot be treated as components of the machineries on which they are used and merely on the basis of the user of the rubber beltings, it cannot be treated as an accessory. 18.. In the other d....