TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1992 (2) TMI 322
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....ard, has been notified vide Notification of even number, dated the 24th July, 1981, as Chairman, H.P. State Electricity Board for a period of five years, with effect from 25th July, 1981. Detailed terms and conditions of his appointment has already been issued separately. This is in supersession of this deptt. Notification of even number, dated the 24th July, 1981. By Order K.C. Pandeya Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh" On 12.5.86, the term as Chairman was extended for another period of three years in the following terms :- "No. 8-155/73 - DP (Apptt. II), dated Shimla 2, the 12th May, 1986. Notification In continuation of this Department's Notification of even number, dated 13.8.1982, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to extend the appointment of Shri Kailash Chand Mahajan as Chairman of the H.P. State Electricity Board for a further period of three years with effect from 25th July , 1986, on the existing terms and conditions of his appointment as Chairman. By Order (P.K. Mattoo) Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh". There was a further extension on 12.6.89 for a period of 3 years and that notific....
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....t requested the court that th judgment may not be pronounced since he desired to seek instructions from the Government to reconsider the impugned order in CWP No. 123 of 1990. On 11.6.90, the learned Advocate General submitted to the court that both the notification dated 6.3.90 and 30.3.90 would be withdrawn. An undertaking to that effect was given. Accordingly the writ petition was disposed of. Consequent to this undertaking, by notification dated 11.6.90, the Government of Himachal Pradesh withdrew both the notifications dated 6.3.90 and 30.3.90. However, the matter did not rest there. On 11.6.90, a show cause notice was issued to the first respondent for having abused his position as Chairman, H.P. State Electricity Board and also ex-offico Secretary, M.P.P. & Power. He was also asked to submit his explanation within 21 days as to why action should not be taken under Section 10 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Simultaneously, it was also ordered that the shall be placed under suspension with immediate effect by virtue of power under Section 10 of the said Act. Consequent upon the suspension of the first respondent, the notification dated 16th July, 1990 came to be issued ....
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....l Pradesh. Whereas the Legislative Assembly of the State of Himachal Pradesh is not in session and the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action; And whereas instructions from the President of India to promulgate the Ordinance have been obtained; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Himachal Pradesh is pleased to promulgate the following Ordinance :- 1. This Ordinance may be called the Electricity (Suppy) (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Ordinanc,1990. 2. In Sub-section (6) of section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, for the words "if he is a member of parliament", the words "if he has attained the age of 65 years or is a member of Parliament" shall be substituted. 3. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, rules, regulations or bye-laws made thereunder or in any judgment, decree or order of the Court, any appointment, made before the commencement of the Electricity (Supply) (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Ordinance, 1990, whereby a person has a r....
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....onsent of the President of India with regard to a subject falling under the Concurrent List, it was not even let known that a writ petition was actually pending concerning the petitioner. There had been a deliberate concealment of facts. In any event, the Chief Minister (who was the fourth respondent) was activated by malafides. He was determined to remove the writ petitioner, as he held out in the election meeting. The State filed a detailed counter affidavit. The court respondent (the Chief Minister) specifically denied the allegations of malafides and urged that the ordinance came to be issued since a policy decision had been taken to introduce age of superannuation fixing the limit at 65. During the pendency of the writ petition, the ordinance came to be replaced by the Electricity (Supply) (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1990 (H.P. Act of 10 of 1990). Therefore, an application for amendment was taken out challenging the validity of the amending act. Before the High Court, the following points were urged :- (i) malafides - (a) against the Chief Minister; and (b) against the legislature. (ii) the act was unconstitutional and arbitrary. In that it had been passed....
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....bout it. In relation to applicability of Section 3(1) of the amending act to the petitioner, the High Court construed that Section 3(1) will apply only to an appointment where a person has a right to continue after the attainment of 65 years. If, therefore, the petitioner had been appointed after he had attained the age of 65 years, he would not be affected by Section 3(1). Any contrary inference would not be justified by its language. It was also held that when Section 5(6) precluded the petitioner from "being a member" of the Board after he had attained 65 years of age, would not help the State as it would apply only prospectively. We may also refer to that particular argument advanced on behalf of the State that Mr. R.S.S. Chauhan having been appointed as Chairman, he ought to have been impleaded as a party. The court rejected the plea not only on the ground that he was not a necessary party, but also on the ground that his appointment was only "until further orders." In the result, the notification dated July, 17 1990 was quashed. It is under these circumstances, Special Leave Petition was preferred to the court. By an order dated 5th August, 1991, special leave was granted. He....
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.... in Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh specifying an age of superannnuation. This court upheld such a prescription in several cases. Hence, the first respondent cannot complain that he could continue indefinitely and others be retired at the age of 65. Section 3 of the amending Act was given retrospective effect from 13.7.90. This Section presupposes an appointment prior to amendment, namely, prior to 13.7.90. In this case, the appointment gives a right to continue after attaining the age of 65 years. If, therefore, the two tests are answered, the appointment is rendered void irrespective of the fact when the appointment tool place. The "Objects & Reasons" of the Act put the matter beyond doubt. In our country, the concept of age of superannuation is entrenched both in administrative as well as constitutional systems. Public policy requires to prescribe the age of 65 years for retirement of the members of Electricity Board as in the case of High Court Judges, members of tribunal and other high functionaries. The High Court had gone wrong as though the appointment of the first respondent was not covered by Section 3(1) since the right to continue as Chairman was pursuant to an appo....
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....n. To the similar effect are S.P. Mittal etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 729 and in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lakshmi Ice Factory & Ors., [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 59. Again, in Lalit Narayan Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna etc. v. State of Bihar & Ors. etc., [1988] 3 S.C.R. 311, even though the Act was general in terms and applied to only one of the institutions at the relevant time, having regard to the policy of nationalisation, it was upheld. The case of D.S. Reddy v. Chancellor, Osmania University & Ors., [1967] 2 S.C.R. 214, has no application to the facts of the case because though the Act was general in its application, yet, it applied to only one individual who was when occupying the post of Vice Chancellor of Osmania University. Thus, it is submitted as read from the statement of `Objects and Reasons' of the amending Act, if the policy to superannuate at the age of 65 is in order to give full effect to the policy, provision will have to be made for those who have attained the age of 65 also. This is what Section 3(1) aims at. Looking it form that point of view this is a legislation which applies to all. The chance that ....
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....otification whereby the right to continue as Chairman was interfered with. That was questioned in W.P. 123/90. Finding the judgment was going against the State, the State withdrew the notifications. Thereafter, the State came forward with charge memo under suspension order. They are pending in writ proceedings and an interim stay of suspension is in operation. At this stage, the ordinance is brought in because the executive method failed to bring about the termination of his services. At the relevant date of the ordinance no person other than the first respondent was affected. In fact, the State while writing for sanction for issue of ordinance specifically mentions about this respondent by name. But at the same time it would conceal from Govt. of India the fact of the matter being sub judice. Though the Govt. of India would request exploration of the possibility of amending the rules under Section 78 of the Electricity (Supply) Act because the rule could not have restrospective operation and the first respondent could not be reached by such an amendmentof the rules resort is had to the ordinance making power under Article 213 of the Constitution. Section 3(1) was aimed at only aga....
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....owledge that only experienced persons even after retirement are appointed as Chairman, having regard to the vast experience and wide knowledge. On the factual aspect, it is submitted by the learned counsel, though the notifications dated 12.5.86 and 12.6.89, use the word "extension" it is nothing but reappointment. As a matter of fact the counter affidavit of the State makes it clear that the order of reappointment came to be passed under Section 5 read with Section 8 rule 4. The statement of `Objects and Reasons' also makes a reference to Section 8. Thus, both legally and factually Section 5(6) cannot help the State. Much cannot be made of the words "or begin" brought in by way of amendment of Section 5(6). This only connotes the attainment of age of 65 subsequent to the appointment. When the Constitution uses similar language both under Articles 102 and 191, it made it clear that under both the Articles 101 as well as 190, the seat falling vacant retrospectively on the incurring of such a disqualification there is no automatic cessation provided under Section 10. Thus the words "has attained" occurring under Section 5(6) assumes great importance because there is no provision unde....
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....Poona & Anr., [1982] 1 S.C.R. 729, it was a case of mismanagement of industrial project. The case of Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan and Others, [1964]1 S.C.R. 561, Nathdwara Temple where there was misapprobation of jewellery, likewise in the case of Jagannatha Temple. Thus, it is clear but for mismanagement or subserving a public cause or a social or economic obligation, such pieces of single person's legislation would not have been upheld. Certainly, there may be a legislation in general application and it may apply to an individual; but that is not the case here. On the date of the coming into force of the Act this responent alone was affected. The amending Act itself makes a discrimination without any justification or rationale. If the respondent is treated alongwith others, it would amount to treating unequals as equals. Thus, it is submitted two principles will have to be applied (1) the respondent having been appointed under Section 8 constitutes a class; and (2) if the appointment of the respondent is sought to be brought out under Section 5 it will bring a discrimination treating unequals as equals. Therefore, the law will have to be struck d....
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....(6), the Section alone would be enough to deprive the first respondent of his office after attaining the age of 65. In this regard the learned counsel cites American Jurisprudence (2nd Ed) vol 63, para 42. The purpose of Section 3 is two-fold-one, by way of abundant caution it provides for cessation of office, though Section 5(6) itself would be enough. Secondly, it takes away the right to emoluments after attaining the age of 65 and substituting by compensation, not withstanding the contract to the contrary. Section 10(1)(d) is only an enabling provision. That does not, in any manner, effect the operation of Section 5(6). It is incorrect 947 to submit that this is a single person's legislation. It is of general application and it so happened on the relevant date that the first respondent came to be affected. Lastly, it is submitted on the basis of B. Prabhakar Rao and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, [1985] Supp. S.C.C. 432, that there is no need to dislodge Chauhan from office, after all, he had been continuing so long. He may be allowed for the remaining period of the tenure of the first respondent. The court itself could fix the compensation instead of even r....
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....sideration of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. This was because if a Bill containing similar provision after having been passed by the State Legislature required to be so reserved for the consideration of the President of India. However, it is important to note that in this letter it was categorically stated that in most administrative systems of the world an outer age limit is provided. Such a provision is found with reference to judicial officers and civil posts and is entrenched in administrative and constitutional systems. Having regard to the desirability of providing for a terminal point of time beyond which a Chairman and the Members of the State Electricity Board must cease to hold office by operation of the statute, it was proposed to prescribe the age limit at 65 for retirement of the Chairman/Members of the Board. The same point is reiterated as seen from the statement of `Objects and Reasons' for the Bill No. 6 of 1990, which later on became Act 10 of 1990. We will now quote the relevant portion of the said statement of Objects and Reasons. "Section 8 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Act No. 54 of 1948) provides that the Chairman and othe....
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....n age of retirement in public services. The point of the peak level of efficiency is bound to differ from individual to individual but the age of retirement cannot obviously differ from individual to individual for that reason. A common scheme of general application governing superannuation has therefore, to be evolved in the light of experience regarding performance levels of employees, the need to provide employment opportunities to the younger sections of society and the need to open up promotional opportunities to employees at the lower levels early in their career. Inevitably, the public administrator has to counterbalance conflicting claims while determining the age of superannuation. On the one had, public services cannot be deprived of the benefit of the mature experience of senior employees; on the other hand, a sense of frustration and stagnation cannot be allowed to generate in the minds of the junior members of the services and the younger section of the society. The balancing of these conflicting claims of the different segments of society involves minute questions of policy which must, as far as possible, be left to the judgment of the executive and the legislature. T....
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....tion, that motive cannot render the passing of the law malafide. This kind of `transferred malice' is unknown in the field of legislation". It is in this background, therefore, we propose to determine the above points. 1. The Power of Appointment under Section 5 and Scope of Sections 8 and 10 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act is to provide for rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity and generally for taking measures conducive to electrical department. Chapter III of the said Act deals with the State Electricity Boards, Generating Companies, State Electricity Consultative Councils and Local Advisory Committees. Section 5 read as under :- "5 Constitution and Composition of the State Electricity Boards-(1) The State Government shall, as soon as may be after the issue of notification under sub- section (4) of Section 1, constitute by notification in the Official Gazette a State Electricity Board under such name as shall be specified in the notification. (2) The Board shall consist of not less than three and not morethan seven members appointed by the State Government. (3) Omit....
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....ay be a prescribed. The word `prescribed' has come to be defined under Section 2(9) of the said Act. "Prescribed" means prescribed made by rules under this Act. Nowhere in this Section, in our considered view, an additional power for appointment is conferred. At best it could be said that it merely lays down the eligibility for reappointment. As stated above, that eligibility must be as per conditions prescribed under the rules. As a matter of fact, when it says "shall hold the office for such period" it means the period as prescribed under the rules. Beyond this, we are unable to persuade ourselves to come to the conclusion that there is any separate power for reappointment. It is not even necessary to provide for such a separate power. The reason why we say so is Sections 14 and 16 of Central General Clauses Act provide for such a power. Section 16 deals with the power of appointment carrying with it the power of dismissal, while Section 14 states any power conferred unless a different intention appears could be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Where, therefore, Section 5 provides for a power to appoint, certainly, that power could be exercised from time to time ....
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.... by the State Government under this Act, State Government may remove the Chairman and the members of the Board and appoint a Chairman and members in their places." In our view this Section confers an enabling power on the State Government to take punitive action against a member of the Board who falls under any one of the clauses (a) to (f). The fact that it is punitive is clear because Sub-section (3) contemplates giving an opportunity to offer an explanation and thereafter removing him. Once so removed, he is ineligible for reappointment either as a Member or any other capacity in the Board. As to why after amending Section 5(6) the State has not correspondingly amended Section 10 so as to include cases of Members or Chairman attaining the age of 65 we will consider while dealing with the scope of amendment to Section 5(6). The next Section that has to be looked at is Section 78, i.e. the rule making section. Sub-section (1) of Section 78 as is usual talks of the State Government making rule giving effect to the Act. Sub-section (2), catalogues without prejudice to the generality of this power, as to what all the rules may provide for. Certainly, it cannot be contended that....
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....b na- shall be specified in the me as shall be specified notification. in the notification. (2) The Board shall consist (2) The Board shall co- of not less than three and nsist of not less than th- not more than seven members ree and not more than sev- appointed by the State Govt. en members appointed by t- he State Govt. (3) X X X (3) X X X (4) Of the members- (4) Of the members- (a) one shall be person who (a) one shall be person w- has experience of, and has ho has experience of, and shown capacity in commercial has shown capacity in mat-ters and administration, commercial mat-ters and ad- ministration, (b) one shall be an Electric- (b) one shall be an Electri- al Engr. with wide experience, cal Engr. with wide experi- and ence, and (c) one shall be a person who (c) one shall be a person has experience of accounting who has experience of acco- and financial matters in a p- unting and financial matte- ublic utility undertaking, rs in a public utility und- preferably an electric supply ertaking, preferably an el- undertaking. ectric supply undertaking. (5) One of the members posses- (5) One of the member Pos- sing of the qualifications sp- sessing of the qualific....
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.... is stated as under :- "Article 191 of the Constitution prescribes the disqualifications for membership of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State, on the incurring of any such disqualification a member of a Legislative Assembly or a Legislative Council ceases to be a member thereof." Therefore, it will follow that once this disqualification of attaining the age of 65 years is incurred, there is an automatic cessation from holding office. This is because Section 5(6) contains the same phrascology as is found under Article 102 and 191. In our considered view Section 5(6) applies to initial appointment as well as to those continuing in appointment. We will also usefully refer to American Jurisprudence (Vol. 63), at para 42, it is stated thus:- "Disqualification arising after election and before or during term. - Eligibility to public office is of a continuing nature and must exist at the commencement of the term and during the occupancy of the office. The fact that the candidate may have been qualified at the time of his election is not sufficient to entitle him to hold the office, if at the time of the commencement of the term or during the continuance of....
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....a case of reappointment after attaining the age of 65 is wholly unacceptable to us. First of all, as we have stated earlier there is no question of any seperate power for reappointment under Section 8 and the only power being traceable to Section 5 read with Sections 14 and 16 of the General Clauses Act. Factually we will now consider whether this is a case of reappointment at all. The original order to appointment of the first respondent was on 24.7.1981, first as a Member and as Chairman for a period of 2 years. These two orders of appointment do not concern very much. The next comes the appointment dated 13.8.1982, when the first respondent came to be appointed as Chairman of Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board. Though during the narration of facts we have referred to this order, it is worthwhile to quote it once over again in full as something material turns on this. "GOVERNMENT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL-II No. 8- 155/73 - DP (Apptt. II) Dated Shimla -2, the 13th Aug, 1982. NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the Governor, Himachal Pradeshm, is pleased to appoint Shri Kaila....
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....he post of Chairmanship. It is that which is sought to be prescribed now. The reference to Section 8 means only the "term" and nothing else. We are also unable to accept the arguments advanced on behalf of the first respondent that for a tenure post no period can be fixed. Instances are not wanting in this regard. Therefore, rightly reference is made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan to Article 224 of the Constitution extract of which is given below:- "224. Appointment of additional and acting Judges - (1) If by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to the President that the number of the Judges of that court should be for the time being increased, the President may appoint duly qualified persons to be additional Judges of the Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify. (2) When any Judge of a High Court other than the Chief Justice is by reason of absence or for any other reason unable to perform the duties of his office or is appointed to act temporarily as Chief Justice, the President may appoint a duly qualified person to act as a Judge of that Court until the permanent Judge has re....
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.... anything to the contrary in any provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act; (2) rules and regulations, bye-laws made therein; (3) any judgment, decree or order of the court; and (4) any contract. Once it is so rendered void, the law deems that he has ceased to hold office of the Member of the Board. By a reading of the Section we are unable to conclude how Section 3(1) would fail to apply to a person who on the date of the commencement was already more than 65 years. This line of reasoning adopted by the High Court does not appeal to us. The Section nowhere makes a distinction between those on the date of the enactment are "below" or "over" 65 years of age. Such a distinction is totally unwarranted. The crucial question to be asked is whether the particular incumbent is continuing after the attainment of 65 years of age, if that question is answered in the affirmative there is a cessation of office, in view of the terms of that Section. The contrary conclusion would lead to strange results. Those who are appointed prior to the Act and on the attainment of 65 years on 13.7.90, would vacate the office while a person already 65 on that date and after the passing of the Act notwith....
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....f the incumbent is enable to continue after attaining the age of 65 years such continuing is rendered void. No doubt as we have stated above, Section 5(6) as amended achieves this purpose. Yet if there is another Section which deals with the same it must be regarded as one introduced by way of abundant caution. In short, Section 3(1) is epexegesis. The arguments advanced by Mr. Kapil Sibal remind us of the eloquent words of Dr. Johnson "There is a wicked inclination in most people to supppose an old man decayed in his itellects. If a young or middle-aged man, when leaving a company, does not recollect where he laid his hat, it is nothing; but if the same inattention is discovered in an old man, people will shrug up their shoulders, and say, `His memory is going'." It our opinion such sentiments can be no answer against the operation of law. In might be argued by the tenure of appointment there is a right to continue; the legitimate expectation has come to be interfered with. In a matter of this kind, as to whether legitimate expectation could be pleaded is a moot point. However, we will now refer to Wade's Administrative Law (6th Edition) wherein it is stated at page 52....
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....uota system was only one event amongst others in the evolution of the fishing industry, which is characterised by instability and continuous changes in the situation due to a series of events such as the extensions, in 1976, of fishing areas to 200 miles from certain coasts of the community, the necessity to adopt measures for the conservation of fishing resources, which was dealt with at the international by the introduction of total allowable catches, the arguments about the distribution amongst the members states of the total allowable catches available to the Community, which were finally distributed on the basis of a reference period which ran from 1973 to 1978 but which is reconsidered every year. In those circumstances, operators in the fishing industry were not justified in taking the view that the Community rule precluded the making of any changes to the conditions laid down by national legislation or practice for the grant of licences to fish against national quotas or the adoption of new conditions compatible with community Law. Consequently, the answer to this question must be that Community Law as it now stands does not preclude legislation or a practice of a member st....
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....e laws referred to in Art. 14 and the petitioner was not therefore entitled to any relief under Art. 32." In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Others, [1959] S.C.R. 1959 296-299, it has been held thus :- "...It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and, (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different hases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a ....
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.... (i) A statute may itself indicate the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons of things may appear on the face of the statute or may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances known to or brought to the notice of the Court. In determining the validity or otherwise or such a statute the court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class or persons or thing. Where the Court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the court will uphold the validity of the law, as it did in Chiranjital Chowdhari v. The Union of India, The State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal V.M. Sved Mohammad & Company v. The State of Andhra and Bhushan Choudhary v. The State of Bihar. 971. (ii) A ....
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.... administration of the temple properties and for that purpose, a suit under s.92 of the Code had in fact been filed. A Commission of Enquiry had to be appointed to investigate into the removal of the valuables. If the temple is a public temple and the legislature though that it was essential to safe guard the interests of the temple by taking adequate legislative action in that behalf, it is difficult to appreciate how the Tilkayat can seriously contend that in passing the Act, the legislature has been guilty of unconstitutional discrimination. As has been held by this Court in the case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice G.R. Tendolkar, that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself. Therefore, the plea raised under Art.14 fails. In Lalit Narayan Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna, etc. v. State of Bihar & other etc., [1988] 3 SCR 311 @ 312 it is held thus :- "All the institutions which answered the description given in section 2(a) of the Act were....
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.... @ p.325-26 it is held thus :- "It is submitted that this fact demonstrates that the professed object of nationalisation in phases is a mere pretence and a colourable device to single out the Institute for discriminatory treatment. The taking over of the Institute is an act of legislation and not an act of the Government. The question to be considered is whether at the time when the Ordinances were promulgated or the Act was passed, the same suffered the vice of discrimination or not. There can be no doubt that on the date the Ordinances were promulgated and the Act was passed, the same could not be challenged on the ground of non- implementation of the legislative intent in nationalising similar institutes by amending the Schedule. If a legislative enactment cannot be challenged as discriminatory on the date it is passed, it is difficult to challenge the same as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground of inaction of the executive in implementing the purpose of the Act, regard being had to the fact that it was the Legislative which had made the selection for the first phase of nationalisation. If no such selection had been made by the Legislature and the enti....
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....Workmen, [1963] 3 S.C.R. Suppl. 89 @ 103-4, it is held thus :- "Lastly, it is contended that the transfer of the proceedings pending before the old Tribunal to the new Tribunal under the Notification dated October 31, 1957, was invalid and inoperative. Two grounds were urged in support of this contention. One is that Shri A.N. Gujral attained the age of sixty- five on June 4, 1957, and his term of office would have then expired under s.7C. Then the Punjab Legislature enacted Act 8 of 1957 raising the age of retirement under s.7C(b) from sixty-five to sixty-seven. That was with a view to continue Shri A.N. Gujral in office. And this legislation came into force only on June 3, 1957. This Act, it is said offends Art. 14 as its object was to benefit a particular individual, Shri A. N. Gujral, and reference was made to a decision of this Court in Ameeroonissa v. Mehboob as supporting this contention. There is no force in this contention. There the legislation related to the estate of one Nawab Waliudduoula, and it provided that the claims of Mehboob Begum and Kadiran Be gum, who claimed as heirs stood dismissed thereby and could not be called in question in any court of law. And this Co....
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....nts that as the term of office had been reduced to 3 years by the first amending Act, the legislature, in order to give effect to this provision and to enable fresh appointments to be made under the Act, had enacted s.13A which had, necessarily, to apply to a person like the appellant who was in office at the time when the provisions came into force. Such provisions could not, in the nature of things, apply to Vice chancellors who were to be appointed in future; the appellant was appointed from a panel submitted by a committee constituted under the unamended s.12(2) whereas future Vice Chancellors were to be appointed by the Chancellor alone; furthermore, the appellant had been the Vice Chancellor for 7 years. Having regard to these circumstances the legislature had chosen to treat the appellant as a class by himself and had differentiated him from persons to be appointed Vice Chancellors in the future; that such classification was reasonable and had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the second amending Act i.e. bringing about uniformity in the tenure of 3 years of office for all Vice Chancellors; that the appellant was not entitled to the benefits of s.12(....
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....y the learned Judges of the High Court, in our opinion, those provisions have no bearing in considering the attack levelled by the appellant on s.13A of the Act. This is a clear case where the statute itself directs its provisions by enacting s.13A, against one individual, viz. the appellant; and before it can be sustained as valid, this Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for grouping the appellant as a class by himself and that such reasonable basis must appear either in the statute itself or must be deducible from other surrounding circumstances. According to learned counsel for the appellant, all Vice Chancellors of the Osmania University come under one group and can be classified only as one unit and there is absolutely no justification for grouping the appellant under one class and the Vice Chancellors to be appointed in future under a separate class. In any event,. it is also urged that the said classification has no relation or nexus to the object of the enactment. @ p. 230-231, it is observed as under :- "We are inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Setalvad, that there is no justification for the impugned legislation resulting in a classifica....
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....a distinction between the then existing Vice Chancellor and the future Vice Chancellors, who are to be treated differently. Further, the existing Vice Chancellor was subject to a disability for which there was no rational basis. As a matter of fact, this ruling had come up for discussion in Lalit Narayan Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna, etc. v. State of Bihar and Others etc., [1988] 3 S.C.R. 311 @ 322 it is ruled :- "The other decision that has been relied upon by the petitioner is B.S. Reddy v. Chancellor, Osmania University, [1967] 2 SCR 214. What happened in that case was that section 5 of the Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act, 1966 introduces into the Osmania University Act, 1959 a new section 13A whereby it was provided that the person then holding the office of the Vice Chancellor of the University could only hold that office until a new Vice Chancellor was appointed, and that such new amendment must be made within 90 days of the commencement of the said amendment Act whereupon the old Vice Chancellor would cease to hold the office. It was held by this Court that there was no justification for the impugned legislation, that is, ....
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....and said in may dissenting opinion : "Legislation based upon mismanagement or other misconduct as the differentia and made applicable to a specified individual or corporate body is not far removed from the notorious parliamentary procedure formerly employed in Britain of punishing individual delinquents by passing bills of attainder, and should not, I think receive judicial encouragements. It has to be carefully noted that this Act was intended to deny the appellant a right to decision by a court of law and that too in a private dispute between the parties. Hence, this ruling again has no application to the facts of the case. As we observed in the beginning of the judgment, if the State is well entitled to introduce an age of superannuation (we have referred to [1985] 2 SCR 579 Nagaraja's case), how could that be called discrimination or unreasonable ? The resultant conclusion is the amending Act, particularly, Section 3 is not, in any way, arbitrary and, therefore, not violative of Article 14. Whether the failure to implead Chauhan would be fatal to the Writ Petition? The contention of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the failure to implead Chauhan will be fatal to the writ pet....