TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2009 (12) TMI 697
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.... of 2008. 2. Leave granted in SLP (Civil) No. 1982 of 2007, SLP (Civil) No. 3624 of 2007, SLP (Civil) Nos. 13462-13463 of 2007, SLP (Civil) No. 20206 of 2007, and SLP (Civil) No. 9600 of 2008 3. Two concurrent judgments of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, one written by Hon'ble J.N. Patel and Hon'ble Roshan Dalvi, JJ. and a separate but concurrent judgment authored by Hon'ble Deshmukh, J. have fallen for consideration. The reference to Full Bench was occasioned on account of the two Learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, principally not agreeing with another Division Bench Judgment reported in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra [2000 II CLR 279] in its interpretation of the term "unprotected worker" provided by Section 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'Mathadi Act') and term "worker" provided by Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act. The referring Bench was of the opinion that the interpretation given to those two terms in the decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) was in conflict wit....
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....before us. While arguments on the side of appellants were led by Shri J.P. Cama, Learned Senior Counsel, the arguments on behalf of respondents were led by Shri K.K. Singhvi and Ms. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel. 6. Before taking up the issue, the short history of the legislation is a must. 7. A Bill was introduced in the Maharashtra Legislature, being Bill No. XCIX of 1968 for regulating the employment of unprotected manual workers employed in certain employments in the State of Maharashtra to make provision for their adequate supply and proper and full utilization in such employments and for matters connected therewith. This Bill was first introduced in the Winter Sessions of Maharasthra Legislature at Nagpur. It was then referred to the Joint Committee for its report. The basic idea behind bringing this legislation, as it is reflected in Statement of Objects and Reasons, was that persons engaged in occupations like mathadi, hamals, fishermen, salt pan workers, casual labour, jatha workers and those engaged in similar manual work elsewhere, were not receiving adequate protection and benefits within the ambit of existing labour legislation. Therefore, with a view to....
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....these employments and (where necessary) in the different areas of the State and to provide for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid. Ultimately, the Act came on the legal anvil vide Act No. XXX of 1969 after it received assent of the Vice President, acting on behalf of the President on 5.6.1969. It was extended to the whole State of Maharashtra. It was clarified in Section 1 that it applies to the employments specified in the Schedule and that it shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different areas, and for different provisions of the Act. The Act was amended from time to time by Maharashtra Act Nos. 27 of 1972, 40 of 1974, 27 of 1977, 62 of 1981, 28 of 1987 and 27 of 1990. To begin with, it came into force in Thane District in various areas. (Emphasis supplied) 9. It will be better to see a few provisions of the Act. Section 2, which is the definition clause, defines "Board" in sub-Section (1), to mean a Board established under Section 6. Some other sub-Sections of Section 2 runs as under:- 2(2) "contractor", in relation to an unprotected worker....
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.... defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment; or (v) any gratuity payable on discharge." Some other Sections of the Act, which were referred to by the Learned Senior Counsel during the arguments are as under:- 3 (1) For the purpose of ensuring an adequate supply and full and proper utilization of unprotected workers in scheduled employments, and generally for making better provision for the terms and condition of employment of such workers, the State Government may by means of a scheme provide for the registration of employers and unprotected workers in any scheduled employment or employments and provide for the terms and conditions of work of registered unprotected workers and make provision for the general welfare in such employments. 3 (2) In particular, a scheme may provide for all or any of the following matters that is to say:- (a)-(c) x x x x x x (d) for regulating the employment of registered unprotected workers, and the terms and conditions of such employment, including rates of wages, hours of work, maternity benefit, overtime payment, leave with wages, provision for gratuity and conditions as to ....
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....of any scheme and may define the limits of their jurisdiction. 15(2) Subject to any rules made by the State Government in this behalf, an Inspector may- (a) enter and search at all reasonable hours, with such assistants as he thinks fit, any premises or place, where unprotected workers are employed, or work is given out to unprotected workers in any scheduled employment, for the purpose of examining any register, record of wages or notices required to be kept or exhibited under any scheme, and require the production thereof, for inspection; (b) examine any person whom he finds in any such premises or place and who, he has reasonable cause to believe, is an unprotected worker employed therein or an unprotected worker to whom work is given out therein; (c) require any person giving any work to an unprotected worker or to a group of unprotected workers to give any information, which is in his power to give, in respect of the names and addresses of the persons to whom the work is given, and in respect of payments made, or to be made, for the said work; (d) seize or take copies of such registers, records of wages or notices or portions thereo....
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.... any time, for reasons to be specified, rescind the aforesaid notification. 10. It is in the backdrop of these provisions generally that it has to be seen as to whether the interpretation put forward by the Full Bench in two separate but concurrent judgments, is correct or not. Though the question referred to the Full Bench was restricted to the correctness of the interpretation of the term 'unprotected worker' in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act as given in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), in our opinion, the scope of the question has to be properly understood. In that case, it was held by the Division Bench of that Court that the workers who were working in the factory of the petitioner could not be termed as 'unprotected workers'. It was held specifically that the Mathadi Act did not deal with the employees engaged on monthly basis, as such workers were protected under the Shops and Establishments Act and other enactments. It was further held that it was only the casually engaged workmen, who would come within the purview of the Mathadi Act. The High Court further said that where the material produced on record clearly sho....
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...., would fall outside the purview of the Mathadi Act? The Division Bench in this case did not agree with the judgment in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra). The referring judgment clearly goes on to show that it did not agree with the narrower judgment in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), but it cannot be forgotten that the two questions framed by it clearly show that the consideration could not be restricted to the narrower question as to whether the view taken in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) was correct or not, instead the question which arose for consideration on account of the two Benches not agreeing was as to what was the true scope of the definition of the expression 'unprotected worker' in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. Considering the clear language and the questions considered in the referring judgment by Hon'ble F.K. Rebello and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ., we feel that the Learned Single Judge did not exceed the question referred in considering the full scope of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and the te....
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.... Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra [Misc. Petition No. 150 of 1973] pronounced on 19.4.1974 and S.B. More & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [Misc. Petition No. 414 of 1973] pronounced on 24.4.1974 and four other Division Bench Judgments in Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. [Writ Petition No. 119 of 1979] pronounced on 16.1.1980, Irkar Sahu's & Anr. Vs. Bombay Port Trust [1994 I CLR 187], Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) including this Court judgment in Maharashtra Rajya Mathadi Transport and Central Kamgar Union Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [1995 Supp. 3 SCC 28]. C. The Learned Senior Counsel further relied on the Rule of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the Full Bench should have considered how the authorities themselves construed and understood the law. In that behalf, the ruling in Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. [2004(7) SCC 68] was relied upon heavily. Reference was made by the Learned Senior Counsel to few letters to show as to how the authorities themselves understood the term 'unprotec....
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....or the respondents contended that in the absence of any ambiguity, no harm can be caused to the plain language of the Statute. According to all the Learned Counsel, impugned judgments of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court were in accordance with the plain language of the Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act. Numbers of authorities for this proposition were relied upon. Reliance was also placed on Sections 21 and 22 of the Mathadi Act and Clauses 4(c), 11(3), 16(3), 16(4), 16(5), 33, 35(6) and 36 of the Scheme framed under the Mathadi Act. In short, it was contended that under Section 21, the workmen could retain the privileges and benefits under any Act, Award or Contract, if such privileges were better than the ones offered by the Act and in that sense, even if the manual worker was protected under the various labour laws, he could still be governed by the Mathadi Act. Same argument was in respect of Section 22 of the Mathadi Act, providing that a manual worker, who is in receipt of better benefits from his employer either on the date of commencement of this Act or at any time thereafter, he could seek exemption from all or any of the provisions of the Mathadi Act. Ref....
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....ield. The cases relied upon by the appellants were distinguished on various grounds. This was especially done in the case of Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sangathana Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. [2008(10) SC 166]. It was also pointed out that the scheme of Security Guards was different from the scheme of the Act, as in the scheme of the Act, a directly recruited Security Guard was specifically excluded from the provisions of the Security Guards Act. C. As regards the doctrine of stare decisis relied upon by the appellants, it was pointed out that in both the judgments of Hon'ble Rege, J. in C. Jairam Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) and S.B. More & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra), the Learned Judge has called upon the constitutionality of the certain provisions of the Cotton Merchants Unprotected Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 1972 and in that sense, the question of interpretation of Section 2(11) did not fall for consideration in those cases. Similarly in the matter of Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) decided by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court on 16.1.1....
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....e expression "worker" was defined, the Bench further held that when the Legislature uses the 'means and includes' formula, the intention of the legislature is to provide an exhaustive definition, and in such a case, the inclusive part of the definition brings within the fold of the expression objects or activities which would ordinarily not fall within the purview of the definition. Carrying the logic further, the Bench held that by the inclusive part, the definition included a person who is not employed by any employer or a contractor, but who works with the permission or under agreement with the employer or contractor. On the same logic, the Bench went on to hold that:- "Once the Act defines the expression 'unprotected worker', the definition in the Act provides a statutory dictionary which the Court is under the bounden duty to apply in construing the provisions of the Act. It is not open to the Court to adopt a meaning of the expression 'unprotected worker' at variance with what has been legislated by the competent legislature." It was pointed out further that if the legislature intended that the benefit of Act could not be available to workers who were otherwise go....
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....pe of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. Therefore, insofar as the language of Section 2(11) is concerned, it is plain, unambiguous and clear. It means that every worker, who is doing manual work and is engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, would be covered by that definition and would become an unprotected worker. The question is whether we should accept this plain language. The appellants take strong exception to this approach. 15. Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contended in no uncertain terms that the reliance on the plain meaning of the Section, as it appears, would not only be hazardous, but would also lead to absurdity. According to him, while interpreting Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act, it cannot be done bereft of the context of the legislation. Our attention was invited to Statement of Objects and Reasons, as also the legislative history of the legislation. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the acceptance of such plain meaning would result in rendering some other provisions of the Act, otiose. Further, such interpretation would also hit doctrine of stare decisis, as the interpretation of this doctrine p....
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....lative scene, particularly in view of the clear cut meaning, which could be attached because of the plain and unequivocal language of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. At any rate, the Learned Senior Counsel contended that the doctrine of stare decisis was not an absolute doctrine. 18. Even as regards the rule of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege, the Learned Senior Counsel argued that there was no evidence that the law makers, or as the case may be, the Government, understood the scheme in a particular manner. 19. We have already pointed out that the plain meaning of the language is almost a rule and it is only by way of an exception that the external aids of interpretation can be used. In the case of Bhaiji Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla & Ors. [2003(1) SCC 692], this Court has reiterated that where the language of the Statue is clear and unambiguous, the external aids for interpretation should be avoided. In Cable Corporation of India Vs. Addl. Commissioner of Labour [2008 (7) SCC 680], this Court observed in Para 16 that when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, f....
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....o the statute, from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, from the legislative debates, reports of committees and commissions which preceded the legislation and finally from all legitimate and admissible sources from where they may be allowed. Reference may be had to legislative history and latest legislation also. But, the primary rule of construction would be to ascertain the plain language used in the enactment which advances the purpose and object of the legislation............" (Emphasis supplied) 20. However, Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that in this case, unless the context is taken into account, it would lead to absurd and unintended result. The Learned Senior Counsel urged that the definition cannot and should not be mechanically applied. He has relied on the decision in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. [1994 (2) SCC 434]. About the principles to be borne in mind while interpreting a definition, the Learned Senior Counsel has relied on the decision in K.V. Muthu Vs. Angamuthu Ammal [1997(2) SCC 53], wherein in para 11, this Court has observed that the interpretation placed on a definition should ....
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.... Enquiry Committee, Greater Bombay, 1963", Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to para 2 thereof, which refers to "such labourers", who are deprived of regular wage-scales, permanency, earned leave, bonus, provident fund, gratuity, medical benefits, compensation, pension etc. It was argued by Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that in Chapter 6 thereof, under the heading "Employer and Employee relationship", there is expression "the real difficulty is that there is no 'employer' as such". It was also pointed out that the difficulty, which was felt was that the employment of the worker was only through the contractor and technically, there was no direct relationship of employer and employee, as between the Mills of Factories and the Mathadi workers. Similar was the case with the merchants, traders and other concerns as they engage the labour through Mukadam or Toliwala and such Mukadam or Toliwala engaged his men or the workers with him and paid wages to them and, therefore, technically, there was no direct relationship of the employer and employee, as between the merchants or concerns and the workers. It was also argued....
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....rent persons on one and the same day. In view of the peculiar nature of work and the system of payment, the application of the various labour laws to such workers has become difficult. The rickshaw pullers who are not self employed are also pulling the rickshaw taken on hire. The question of regulation of the working and other conditions of such persons, therefore, is not possible by introducing amendments to the existing labour laws. The object can be achieved if a special legislation is prepared for the purpose by incorporating beneficial provisions of the important labour enactments applicable to similar workers employed in regular establishments and factories." From this, the argument was tried to be developed by Shri Cama and Shri Singh that the objective was very clear and under the same what was contemplated was only the cases of those workers who were not directly engaged and as such, the term "unprotected worker" should be interpreted to exclude all the directly appointed workers employed in the factories, even if they are working in the scheduled employments. 24. We were also taken through the Objects and Reasons and Preamble and a very strong argument was advanced ....
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....al Chand Singhvi & Ors. [2004 (5) SCC 409 (Paras 27 and 28)], wherein it was held that the definition is not to be read in isolation and it must be read in the context of the phrase which would define it. It should not be vague or ambiguous and the definition of the words must be given a meaningful application; where the context makes the definition given in the interpretation clause inapplicable, the same meaning cannot be assigned. We must point out here that this ratio will not apply for the simple reason that the definition given in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is extremely clear and there is no vagueness or ambiguity about it. We have already pointed out that even if it is read in the context, we cannot ignore the fact that the legislature had deliberately deleted the words "but for the provisions of this Act is not adequately protected by legislation for welfare and benefits of the labour force in the State". The other decision in U.P. State Electricity Board Vs. Shiv Mohan Singh & Anr. [2004(8) SCC 402 (Para 11)] would be of no consequence in the present controversy. The omission of the words as proposed earlier from the final definition is a deliberate and conscious act....
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....f unprotected manual workers, such as, Mathadi, Hamal etc., engaged in certain employments, to make better provision for their terms and conditions of employment, to provide for their welfare, and for health and safety measures where such employments require these measures; to make provision for ensuring an adequate supply to, and full and proper utilization of, such workers in such employments to protect avoidable unemployment; for these and similar purposes, to provide for the establishment of Boards in respect of these employments and (where necessary) in the different areas of the State; and to provide for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid; It is hereby enacted in the Twentieth Year of the Republic of India as follows:-................" Great stress was led on the words "such as" and it was tried to be suggested that the Preamble carves out a class of the unprotected manual workers. Further, it was stressed that the object of the law is to provide for the welfare, health and safety measures, where such employments require those measures. From this, it was suggested that it is only where the other legislations are unable to provide for the welfare and the better c....
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....hat every definition has to be read in the context of the phrase, which would define it. We have again pointed out that even the context does not require us to restrict the meaning of Section 2(11). The third mentioned case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Indian Medical Association (cited supra) is of no consequence, as the phraseology therein was entirely different. As regards decision in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. (cited supra), we do not think that the case is helpful to the appellants. Therein, the controversy was about the definition of "goods" in Section 8(3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act and the controversy was as to whether the word "goods" could be read in a different manner. Such is not the controversy here. 29. We also find no absurdity, inconsistency or any contradiction with the other provisions of the Act. Shri Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents alongwith his colleagues Ms. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel, Ms. Lata Desai, Ms. Pallavi Divekar and Shri Vimal Chandra S. Dave, Shri Nitin S. Tambwekar, Shri B.S. Sai, Shri K. Rajeev, Ms. Bharathi, Ms. Mehak G. Sethi, Shri Naveen R. Nath, Shri Arun R. Pende....
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....Objects and Reasons, firstly urged that it was because the workers in various employments were not receiving adequate protection and benefits within the ambit of existing labour legislation that this Bill was introduced alongwith Statement of Objects & Reasons. Our attention was also invited to read clause 2. From this, it was pointed out that the adequacy of the protection was the main issue. Now, if inspite of this, the legislature went on to delete those words, which we have already quoted, the intention of the legislature must be loud and clear and we cannot persuade ourselves to hold that there is anything contradictory to the definition in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. In our opinion, even if that was so, when the legislature consciously deletes certain words, then there will be no question of relying and insisting upon those words. 31. We were taken through some alleged inconsistencies, for example, Section 15 of the Mathadi Act. It was expressed that Section 15(2)(b) would become redundant if we accept the interpretation put forward by the respondents. Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 provides for the appointment of Inspectors, possessing prescribed qualifications f....
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....74 and under that, these words deemed always to have been substituted for the original terminology of "unprotected workers". We do not, therefore, see any reason to take any different view in the light of these Sections. 33. Shri Sudhir Talsania, Learned Senior Counsel arguing on behalf of the appellants also argued about the nature of Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act. He contended that while Section 2(12) is a general provision, Section 2(11) is a specific provision. We have no quarrel with that. We would only observe that so long as that language of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is clear enough, there will not be any question of cutting the scope of the term "unprotected workman". He further argued that this interpretation would lead to absurd results, whereby Sections 2(11) and 2(12) would be identical. We have already explained that such is not the possibility. This is true that the Sections have to be read together. Section 2(12) specifies the worker, which in turn is used in Section 2(11) further. Therefore, they would not be identical under any circumstances. 34. It was argued by Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that as per Secti....
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....ording to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word in grammatical or literal meaning unmindful of consequence of such interpretation. It was only when such grammatical and literal interpretation leads to unjust results which the legislature never intended that the said rule has to give place to the "rule of legislative intent". We have already pointed out that in this case, the golden rule of interpretation would not lead to any injustice. Therefore, this ruling is more helpful to the respondents than the appellants. Another ruling, which was relied upon was Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. Vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group & Ors. [2006(3) SCC 434]. Reliance was placed on the observations made in para 176. Hon'ble Sinha, J. therein had quoted paras 1392, 1477 and 1480 of Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), Vol. 44(1) (Reissue). Those paras are as under:- "1392. Common-sense construction rule: It is a rule of the common law, which may be referred to as the commonsense construction rule, that when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment would give effect to the legislative intention, the Court should pre....
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....hri C.U. Singh in this behalf. Once we accept the literal construction, there will be no further question of holding otherwise on the basis of the intent of the legislature. We have already pointed out that there would arise no absurdity of any kind if the literal interpretation is given. 36. That takes us to the next argument regarding stare decisis. Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants urged that under this rule, where a particular enactment has received a consistent interpretation by Courts of law for a considerable period of time, that interpretation must be respected because the rights and obligations by parties covered by such interpretation have remained settled thereby during the long period of time involved. It was urged by him that if the settled interpretation is upset, then it would do a greater injustice to all the parties concerned. The Learned Senior counsel went to the extent of saying that the rule of stare decisis should be honoured even in case where the earlier interpretation, though consistently upheld for a long time, may not strictly be correct or may produce two possible views. Our attention was invited to the decisions in Mishri Lal (Dead....
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....bsolute rule. Reliance was also placed on the decision in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [2008 (1) SCC 494]. So also Smt. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents repelled this argument relying on the decisions in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) and Danial Latifi & Anr. Vs. Union of India [2001 (7) SCC 740]. Our attention was also invited to treatise by Justice G.P. Singh, (11th Edition). It was urged by Shri Singhvi that in the aforementioned judgments of the Bombay High Court, excepting the judgment in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), this question has not fallen for consideration at all. The Full Bench and more particularly, the Learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Deshmukh, J.) has rejected this argument that this question was not squarely before Hon'ble Rege, J. in his two judgments in C. Jairam Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) and S.B. More & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) nor was it before the Division Benches in Judgments in Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cit....
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....o make; and one is to repeat what I have very often said before - that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." (Emphasis supplied) The Court therein again referred to the decision in Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat [1987 (1) SCC 213] and upheld the observations therein to the effect that:- "18. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it." The Court further relied upon the....
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.... detriment of legal development. The resulting 'jurisprudence of concepts' produces a slot-machine approach to law, whereby new points posing questions of social policy are decided, not by reference to the underlying social situation, but by reference to the meaning and definition of the legal concepts involved. This formalistic a priori approach confines the law in a straitjacket instead of permitting it to expand to meet the new needs and requirements of changing society (Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. At P. 187). In such cases, the Courts should examine not only the existing laws and legal concepts, but also the broader underlying issues of policy......................." In para 114, quoting from the Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., the Court saw the need of the Judge looking at existing laws, the practical social results of any decision he makes and the requirements of fairness and justice. In para 116 again, the Court observed:- "116. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command of the Constitution or jurisprudence. A careful study of our legal system will discern that any deviation from the straight path of stare decisis in our past history has occurred for....
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....he other labour laws and the Committee had identified only those manual workers who were engaged in loading and unloading operations. The reliance was made on a letter No. (c) 20206 dated 7.9.1992, written by one Shri G.K. Walawalkar, Desk Officer, informing that in an establishment till the workers doing Mathadi type work are on their muster roll as direct workers and they are getting total protection and benefits under the various labour laws, till then such establishment shall not be included in the Mathadi Act or the schemes thereunder. Two other letters were also referred to by the Learned Senior Counsel. First Letter was dated 10.5.1990 addressed to the Western India Corrugated Box Manufacturers' Association, authored by one Divisional Officer, informing to the Chairman, Western India Corrugated Box Manufacturers' Association that the provisions of Mathadi Act are not applicable to the directly employed workers (employed no permanent basis) by the company. Another letter was dated 3.10.1991 addressed to the Secretary, Mumbai Timber Merchants Association Ltd., specifying that the direct labourers of the employer doing loading/unloading work would not be covered by the said Act....
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....es Vs. Laird [1883 (8) Appeal Cases 658], Assheton Smith Vs. Owen [1906 (1) Ch 179], Goldsmiths' Co. Vs. Wyatt [1907 (1) KB 95], Senior Electric Inspector Vs. Laxminarayan Chopra [AIR 1962 SC 159], Raja Ram Jaiswal Vs. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 828], J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. Vs. Union of India [AIR 1988 SC 191], Doypack Systems Ltd. Vs. Union of India [AIR 1988 SC 782] that even if the person who dealt with the Act understood it in a particular manner, that does not prevent the Court in giving to the Court, its true construction. It is pointed out in the decision in Doypack Systems Ltd. Vs. Union of India (cited supra) that the doctrine is confined to the construction of ambiguous language used in very old statutes where indeed the language itself have had a rather different meaning in those days. The Learned author Justice Shri G.P. Singh, in his celebrated treatise quoted that:- "Subject to use made of contemporary official statements and statutory instruments the principle of contemporanea expositio is not applicable to a modern statute." Same subject has been dealt with in Punjab Traders Vs. State of Punjab [1991 (1) SCC 86]. Considering this sett....