2008 (5) TMI 491

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....el for the Appellant submits that the Appellants are engaged in the manufacture of 'Narrow Woven Pile Fabrics of Hook and Loop Fastener' and, therefore, they are not liable to pay cess under Section 5A of the Textiles Committee Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as they are not manufacturing any textile or textile machinery. The ld. Counsel brought to our notice the definition of Textile as per Section 2(g) of the Act, wherein Textile is defined as "Textile means any fabrics or cloth or yarn or garment or any other article made wholly or in part of- (i) cotton, or (ii) wool, or (iii) silk, or (iv) artificial silk or other fibre and includes fibre". The material manufactured by the Appellants was placed before the Tribunal. On ....

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....t is found that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard as the determination of the question will depend upon the facts of each case. The Appellants are not manufacturing any textile or any textile machinery and, therefore, they are not liable to pay any cess and the Demand Notice issued after a long time is also not sustainable under law and as such prays to quash the Demand Notice and allow the Appeal. 4. (i) Barnagore Jute Factory - 1992 (57) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.) - By citing this case the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant wanted to bring out the difference between the cess laid down under the Central Excise Act and the Textile Committee Act. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is open to the Central Government to....

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....se. 5. The ld. Counsel for the Respondent countered the argument of the Appellant and submitted that the Appellants are manufacturing textile and, therefore, liable to pay the cess. Further, it is submitted that no limitation is prescribed under the Act and, therefore, the Respondent is not at fault in issuing the Demand Notice. The ld. Counsel has also relied on this Supreme Court judgment as well as the judgment of Supreme Court in a case of France B. Martins and another v. Mafalda Maria Teresa Rodrigues - (1999) 6 SCC 627, wherein it is held that when the legislature thought it appropriate not to prescribe the period of limitation for proceedings under the Act, held, the courts cannot apply the provisions of Limitation Act by imp....