TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2010 (1) TMI 562
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.... filed by the respondent herein. The respondent-M/s. Kalyanpur Cement Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as, "the Company"), is a public sector company incorporated in the year 1937 as a lime-producing company. It is engaged in the business of cement manufacturing and marketing operations since 1946. It had commenced production with a capacity of 46,000 metric tonnes. It underwent a series of expansion in 1958, 1968 and 1980. Nowadays, the company is operating a one-million tonne cement plant. In view of the changes in technology worldwide, it has set up a brand new state of the art "dry process" plant in 1994 at a capital cost of Rs. 250-260 crores. This was made possible with financial assistance of the World Bank and the All India Financial Institutions. Its advisor and financial collaborator is Holder Bank (HOLCIM) at Switzerland. The company claims to be one of the very few large scale surviving industrial units in the State of Bihar. It is the only large scale industry in the central part of the State. Over 2000 persons are in the employment of the company. The company claims that due to circumstances beyond its control such as recession in the cement industry as well as Govern....
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....ny was that notification under clause 24 of the Industrial Policy, 1995 ought to have been issued within one month of the release/publication of the Policy in September, 1995. Voluminous record was produced before the High Court in support of the submission that the company is entitled to exemption under the 1995 Policy. The State of Bihar contested the writ petition by filing a counter-affidavit. Supplementary counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the Government through the Secretary-cum-Commissioner, Department of Commercial Taxes (respondent No. 4 in the writ petition) on December 5, 2000. In paragraph 5 of the aforesaid affidavit it is stated as under: "5. That the honourable Minister, Department of Commercial Taxes has approved the proposal along with draft notification regarding extension of sales tax related incentives to sick industrial units." In paragraph 8 of the affidavit it is averred "That the deponent states that it shall be possible to issue necessary notification after approval of the proposal of the relevant notification by the honourable Chief (Finance) Minister of the Cabinet". It is also stated in the affidavit "That the deponent has further requested ....
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....2, 2001. In this affidavit it was brought to the notice of the court that the decision taken on January 6, 2001 was considered by the cabinet in its meeting held on March 5, 2001 wherein it was decided not to issue any notification for granting any concession/facility to sick industrial units in the State. This decision was duly conveyed by letter dated March 5, 2001 to the IDC Bihar, Patna. In view of the aforesaid decision, the Secretary, Industries Department, rejected the company's application and communicated the decision to the company on May 14, 2001. Both the decisions were sought to be justified by the State Government. The High Court considered the entire issue. The company as well as the State made detailed reference to the documents which were placed on the record. Ultimately, the writ petition has been allowed. The decisions dated January 6, 2001 and March 5, 2001 have been quashed. Further directions issued to the State Government are as follows: "The concerned Departments and organizations are hereby directed to issue follow up notification to give effect to the provisions of the policy within one month from today. After the notification is issued a committee h....
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....ement Ltd., shall provide information of such bank account to the circle where he is registered. (c) M/s. Kalyanpur Cement Ltd., shall submit the details regarding amount of payment in the bank account as mentioned in para (a) above along with brief abstract each month." Thereafter the appellant requested the company to comply with the directions of this court. The company, however, informed the appellant that it was unable to comply with the directions because of its "sickness". Since the company failed to comply with the aforesaid order, a prayer was made for recalling the same. The company in its reply elaborately explained the efforts being made by the financial institutions to ensure the survival of the company. It reiterated that the company had acted honestly and in good faith on assurances/ approval given by the appellant at various stages. The company continued with its operation in anticipation of receiving the appellant's approval at some point of time. Had the appellant not given the assurances, the company could have suspended its operation. The Government gave assurances and granted approval on January 7, 1998, January 23, 1998, March 12, 1998, January 21, 19....
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.... on record); (iii) the decision of March 5, 2001 was wrong, even though not on record and not challenged. According to Dr. Dhawan the High Court has wrongly quashed the order dated January 6, 2001 on the basis that it was an arbitrary somersault after December 5, 2000. This conclusion is erroneous as the aforesaid order had given four cogent reasons in support of the decisions which have been duly noticed by the High Court. The aforesaid reasons could not be said to be extraneous to the decision dated January 6, 2001. Thereafter, it is submitted that the relevant rule/clauses 22 and 24 were wrongly interpreted because it stated "clause 22.2 of the Policy would come into force after a notification under clause 24 is issued". The High Court has wrongly held that the precondition of revival under clause 22 came into effect after the final decision under clause 24. According to the learned senior counsel the High Court failed to notice that clause 22.2 was about revival of the company and not just granting sales tax exemptions. Furthermore, clause 22.3 barred exemption/deferment to be given to such sick and closed industrial units which have once availed of such facilities....
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....: Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [1956] 1 All ER 256, Kasinka Trading v. Union of India [1995] 1 SCC 274, Sales Tax Officer v. Shree Durga Oil Mills [1998] 1 SCC 572 [1998] 108 STC 274 (SC)., Bakul Cashew Co. v. Sales Tax Officer [1986] 2 SCC 365 [1986] 62 STC 122 (SC)., Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P. [2002] 2 SCC 188, Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer [2005] 1 SCC 625 [2005] 139 STC 86 (SC). at 637, Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat [1987] 1 SCC 31 [1987] 64 STC 304 (SC)., Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [1979] 2 SCC 409 [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC)., D.C.M. Ltd. v. Union of India [1996] 5 SCC 468 [1997] 104 STC 590 (SC)., Shrijee Sales Corporation v. Union of India [1997] 3 SCC 398 and Pawan Alloys & Castings (P) Ltd. v. U.P. State Electricity Board [1997] 7 SCC 251. Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, senior advocate, submitted that there are two categories of cases, where incentive is given: (i) to set up or start an industry; (ii) benefits to improve the industry. The incentive in the second category can be withdrawn as it is only an enabling provision. In such circumstances, the executive is permitted....
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....xemption had lapsed on August 31, 2000. Therefore, no exemption notification could have been issued thereafter. He further submits that the Industrial Policy, 1995 was only a temporary scheme, therefore, no benefit could be given after expiry. He relied on State of U.P. v. Dinkar Sinha [2007] 10 SCC 548, Velji Lakhamsi and Co. v. Benett Coleman and Co. [1977] 3 SCC 160 and District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. [2001] 7 SCC 358. Mr. Ravi Shankar Prashad, senior advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1, submitted that the company is the only large scale industry left in the State of Bihar. In the 1990s, the cement industry was in a bad state, as the expectations of the Government of increase in demand did not fructify. The company is a viable unit. It has been made sick by the inaction of the Government. He further submitted that the exemption has been duly recommended by the committee under clause 22.2(i). It cannot be denied the benefit on the basis of clause 22(3). At the time when earlier benefits were given the company was not sick. It would be entitled to the benefit in view of clause 22(1)(vi). According to the learned senior counsel, the company has gone....
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....as 526 (SC); [1985] 4 SCC 369, State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. [2004] 6 SCC 465 [2004] 136 STC 35 (SC)., Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector & ETIO [2007] 5 SCC 447, MRF Ltd., Kottayam v. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), Sales Tax [2006] 8 SCC 702 [2006] 148 STC 225 (SC). and Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab [1992] 2 SCC 411 [1992] 85 STC 493 (SC).. Relying on the aforesaid judgments, it is submitted that the High Court has estopped the appellant-State Government from hiding behind the technicality and denying the sales tax exemption to respondent No. 1 under the Industrial Policy, 1995. It is further submitted that during the pendency of appeal before this court the company had submitted a modified package to the State Government in October, 2006. This was rejected by the Government vide order dated 12th March, 2007, the proposal was rejected only on the ground that the company has huge liability amounting to Rs. 314.12 crores. According to Mr. Ranjit Singh, the aforesaid figure is not a correct present figure of the financial status of the company making detailed figures to certain facts and figures. He further submitted that th....
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....num at Rohtas District of the State. It is further pointed that the main reason for the sickness of the company has been the industry and region specific externalities. It is submitted that the viability studies conducted by the specialized agencies have confirmed the company's viability and ability to convert its net worth into positive and repay back Government due another term loan within eight to 10 years. It is further submitted that any change in the sales tax exemption would adversely affect the implementation of the proposed scheme. However, the modified revival package which was given to the Government has been arbitrarily rejected. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We have considered the detailed facts and relevant documents which are on the record. However, in our opinion, before we consider the submissions made on the factual situation of this case, it would be appropriate to consider the primary issue as to whether the company could have invoked the principle of "promissory estoppel" in support of its claim. It is well-known that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been recognized and enforced in the cou....
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.... party to whom the promise was made, and have in fact been so acted on. In such cases the courts have said these promises must be honoured. . . . . . I am satisfied that the promise was understood by all parties only to apply in the conditions prevailing at the time of the flats being partially let, and the promise did not extend any further than that. . ." The doctrine of promissory estoppel as developed in the administrative law of this country has been eloquently explained in Kasinka Trading v. Union of India [1995] 1 SCC 274 by Dr. A.S. Anand J., in the following words: "11. The doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel is well established in the administrative law of the country. To put it simply, the doctrine represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. The basis of the doctrine is that where any party has by his word or conduct made to the other party an unequivocal promise or representation by word or conduct, which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing as well as intending that the representation, assurance or the promise would be acted upon by the other party to whom it has....
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.... the future, (c) a clear foundation has to be laid in the petition, with supporting documents, (d) it has to be shown that the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the promise, (e) it is possible for the Government to resile from its promise when public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise, (f) the court will not apply the doctrine in abstract. However, since the judgments have been cited, we may notice the law laid down therein. In Sales Tax Officer v. Shree Durga Oil Mills [1998] 1 SCC 572 [1998] 108 STC 274 at page 283.it was held that: "Moreover, as it has been noted earlier that the I.P.R. itself had not granted any exemption but had indicated that orders will be issued by various Departments for granting the exemptions. The exemption order under sales tax could only be issued under section 6 which could be amended or withdrawn altogether. This is expressly provided by section 6. If the respondent acted on the basis of a notification issued under section 6 it should have known that such notification was liable to be amended or rescinded at any point of time, if the Government f....
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.... v. State of U.P. [1979] 2 SCC 409 [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC)., it is held that: "We do not think it is necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promisee, acting in reliance on the promise, should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the promisee should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. . . But it is necessary to point out that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that, having regard to the facts as they have subsequent transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that, in view of the facts which have transpired since the making of the promise, public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to ....
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....the promise is so overwhelming that it would be inequitable to hold the Government bound by the promise and the court would insist on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of this burden. . ." It is further held that See page 76 of 44 STC.: ". . . Lastly, a proper reading of the observation of the court clearly shows that what the court intended to say was that where the Government owes a duty to the public to act differently, promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent the Government from doing so. This proposition is unexceptionable, because where the Government owes a duty to the public to act in a particular manner, and here obviously duty means a course of conduct enjoined by law, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. This doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law." In D.C.M. Ltd. v. Union of India [1996] 5 SCC 468, this court reiterated that: ". . . It is well-settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and, though commonly....
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....raw this incentive rebate even prior to the expiry of three years as available to the appellants concerned. It has also to be held that even if such withdrawal of development rebate prior to three years is not based on any overriding public interest, if it is shown that by such premature withdrawal the appellant-promisees would be restored to status quo ante and would be placed in the same position in which they were prior to the grant of such rebate by earlier notifications the appellants would not be entitled to succeed. . ." In Shrijee Sales Corporation [1997] 3 SCC 398, it is also held that: "However, in the present case, there is a supervening public interest and hence it should not be mandatory for the Government to give a notice before withdrawing the exemption." In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer [2005] 1 SCC 625 [2005] 139 STC 86 at page 100. it is observed that: ". . . We find no substance in the plea that before a policy decision is taken to amend or alter the promise indicated in any particular notification, the beneficiary was to be granted an opportunity of hearing. Such a plea is clearly unsustainable. While taking policy decision, the Go....
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....ted by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public authority to make. . ." The learned senior counsel also relied on the decision in State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements [2005] 1 SCC 368 [2005] 139 STC 74 at page 84., in support of his submission that promissory estoppel applies only where a person is eligible consistent with the purpose for which the policy was made. In that case, it was held that: "In our view, the conditions prescribed by the authorities for grant of exemption are mandatory for availing of the exemption and the High Court exercising jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution cannot direct the grant of exemption in favour of the respondent overlooking the statutory conditions prescribed for such grant and that too in the absence of any challenge to the validity of such conditions." In addition Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel relied on a number of other decisions which we may notice. In M.P. Mathur [2006] 13 SCC 706, wherein this court reiterated that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must be made in the petition itself by the party....
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....ry thereof. The 1980 Rules do not contain any repeal and saving clause. The provisions of the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act will, thus, have no application. Once a statute expires by efflux of time, the question of giving effect to a right arising thereunder may not arise. . ." In Benett Coleman [1977] 3 SCC 160, this court held that: "This pivotal point canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants though it looks attractive at first sight cannot stand a close scrutiny. It is true that the offences committed against a temporary statute have, as a general rule, to be prosecuted and punished before the statute expires and in the absence of a special provision to the contrary, the criminal proceedings which are being taken against a person under the temporary statute will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires. But the analogy of criminal proceedings or physical constraint cannot, in our opinion, be extended to rights and liabilities of the kind with which we are concerned here for it is equally well-settled that transactions which are concluded and completed under the temporary statute while the same was in force often endure and continue in....
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....l Policy, 1995 the sales tax exemption on finished products can be granted to M/s. Kalyanpur Cement Ltd. for a period of five years from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2002 to improve liquidity of the company for its rehabilitation and sound financial position and decided to put up the case in the meeting of the High Empowered Committee under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary for final decision." In a meeting held on January 23, 1998 it was noticed that the company has been provided the facility of deferment of commercial taxes on two earlier occasions. The deferred amount is being repaid even though payment of the unit is not up to date. It was also accepted that the benefits under the Industrial Policy, 1995 which are to be given to the new units are also to be given to sick and closed units. However, it was observed that the opinion of the Advocate-General should be taken as to whether any amendment is required in the sales tax rules. In an another meeting held on the same date, i.e., on March 12, 1998 the reconstruction proposal of the company was again considered in a meeting of the High Level Authorisation Committee (HLAC) held under the chairmanship of the Chief Se....
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....anting the sales tax exemption and renewal/revalidation of the mining leases for the proposed restructuring packages, as and when sanctioned. " Thereafter, the representatives of the company were invited to join the meeting held between the Government of Bihar and financial institutions on October 29, 1999. Reference was made, in this meeting, to the deliberations at the previous meeting held on July 12, 1999, when it was decided to undertake revised restructuring exercise in respect of the company. Accordingly, a revised restructuring proposal was formulated by the Industrial Finance Corporation of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as, "IFCI"). In this meeting of the representative of the State Government mentioned that the legal opinion of the Advocate-General, Bihar has been obtained. However, decision of the sales tax exemption proposal had been held up due to the election. It was now expected to be taken up in December, 1999. The financial institutions stated that they would consider granting reliefs only after grant of sales tax exemptions by the State Government of Bihar. Thereafter by letter dated October 2, 1999, the State Government informed the financial institut....
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....mong the financial institutions and the banks that if the Government implements the Industrial Policy, 1995 in its true spirit particularly on the issue relating to deferment/ exemption sales tax, the financial institutions and banks will give their full cooperation. A number of very important decisions were taken in the aforesaid meeting. Decision No. 4 was that "State Government will ensure that the notification regarding sales tax exemption is issued by the second week of January, 2000". On January 25, 2000, the State Government informed the lead institution (IFCI) that the matter was discussed in the cabinet sub-committee and draft notification was approved therein. It was further pointed out that due to ensuing assembly elections, it was being examined whether it was a violation of model code of conduct or not. Once it is sorted out, action will be taken in this regard. Again vide letter dated March 31, 2000, the State Government informed the IFCI that the matter was delayed due to election and the necessary notification shall be issued soon. There was another meeting held on May 29, 2000 under the chairmanship of the Minister of Industries on problems faced by the company.....
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.... made the aforesaid statements in an affidavit before the High Court, the Government has resiled from the unequivocal representations in the decisions dated January 6, 2001 and March 5, 2001. There- fore, strong reliance was placed on clauses 22 and 24 of the 1995 Policy and the doctrine of "promissory estoppel" in support of the plea that the action of the State Government in issuing orders dated January 6, 2001 and March 5, 2001 is wholly arbitrary and unjust. In reply, it was contended that the decision dated January 6, 2001 had been taken for the four reasons stated earlier. It was further stated that the decisions taken in the meeting of the cabinet held on March 5, 2001 was upon thoughtful and due consideration of all the relevant factors. Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstance, a policy decisions had been taken that notification relating to the sales tax incentive be not issued. Therefore, the company was not entitled to any relief. It was on consideration of the entire matter that the High Court concluded as follows: "When the State Government gives an assurance and undertaking, in form of a policy then in fact it allures person/industries to enter in....
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....owever, adjust the same against current dues of the particular year but should pay the tax working out its refunds separately. The situation may well have been such but the snag comes here. If the adjustments made by the appellant in its monthly statements are disallowed, the sales tax payable would be deemed to be in default and would attract a penalty ranging from 1½ per cent to 2½ per cent per month from the date it fell due. That penalty, in the facts of this case, would be very much more than the amounts of refund. 11.. What emerges from the undisputed facts is that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of these adjustments in the respective years. It had done and carried out all that was necessary for it to do and carry out in that behalf. The grant of permission remained pending on account of certain outstanding inter-departmental issues as to which of the departments-the Department of Sales Tax or the Department of Industries-should absorb the financial impact of these concessions. Correspondence indicates that on account of these questions, internal to administration, the request for permission to adjust was not processed. . . . 22.. . ....
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.... of rentfree land, the case would come strictly within the doctrine of estoppel enunciated in section 115 of the Evidence Act. But even otherwise, that is, if there was merely the holding out of a promise that no rent will be charged in the future, the Government must be deemed in the circumstances of this case to have bound themselves to fulfil it . . . courts must do justice by the promotion of honesty and good faith, as far as it lies in their power.' 25.. In other words, promissory estoppel long recognised as a legitimate defence in equity was held to be found a cause of action against the Government, even when, and this needs to be emphasised, the representation sought to be enforced was legally invalid in the sense that it was made in a manner which was not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by statute. 26.. This principle was built upon in Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies Ltd. [1968] 2 SCR 366 where it was said (SCR at page 385): (AIR page 728, para 23) '23. Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of n....
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....romise made by a State to grant inter alia exemption from payment of taxes or charges on the basis of the current tariff. Such a policy decision on the part of the State shall not only be expressed by reason of notifications issued under the statutory provisions but also under the executive instructions. The appellants had undoubtedly been enjoying the benefit of (sic exemption from) payment of tax in respect of sale/consumption of electrical energy in relation to the cogenerating power plants. 122.. Unlike an ordinary estoppel, promissory estoppel gives rise to a cause of action. It indisputably creates a right. It also acts on equity. However, its application against constitutional or statutory provisions is impermissible in law. . . . 130.. We, therefore, are of the opinion that doctrine of promissory estoppel also preserves a right. A right would be preserved when it is not expressly taken away but in fact has expressly been preserved." This court in MRF Ltd., Kottayam [2006] 8 SCC 702 [2006] 148 STC 225 (SC)., considered the legality of a notification withdrawing the exemption granted by an earlier notification. Relying on the representations contained in the earli....
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....ion AIR 1994 SC 988) While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial, review only to the extent that the State must act validly for discernible reasons, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. The meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness is more easily visualised than precisely defined. A question whether the impugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any disce....
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....se, the claim of the Government is based on a change in policy advocated in the Chief Ministers' conference. These conferences have taken place before the affidavit is filed on December 5, 2001. Therefore, the High Court concluded that the Government has not been candid in disclosure of the reasons for passing the order dated January 6, 2001. In our opinion, the aforesaid decisions with regard to the discontinuance of the sales tax exemptions from January 1, 2000 could not have affected the rights of the company under the Industrial Policy, 1995. Necessary application was made to the Government seeking exemption on November 21, 1997. For more than three years, the company and the financial institutions had been assured by the Government that the notification will be issued forthwith. However, it was not issued. We are of the opinion that the action of the appellants is arbitrary and indefensible. The learned senior counsel for the appellants had also submitted that it was not necessary to issue the notification within one month as stipulated in clause 24 of the Industrial Policy, 1995. In order to appreciate the aforesaid submission, it would be necessary to make a reference to ....
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....and medium sector. The committee will recommend concessions and facilities including those in this policy statement if considered necessary for revival of the unit; these recommendations would be placed before the Government through State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) already constituted under the chairmanship of Chief Secretary for final decision. (ii) Concessions and facilities identified under the Scheme of Rehabilitation prepared by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) or by Inter-Institutional Committee of IRBI, BICICO/ BSFC and bank would be placed before the committee headed by the Industrial Development Commissioner for consideration and recommendation to Government through SLEC for approval. (iii) Rehabilitation measures for sick but potentially viable industrial units may, inter alia, include reliefs and concessions or sacrifice from various Government Departments/organizations and/or additional facilities including allocation of power from BSEB/DVC and any other agency/statutory body/local authority. 22.3 Such closed and sick industrial units which have once availed of the facility of sales tax exemption/deferment under a rehabilita....
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....um sector." The aforesaid definition makes it abundantly clear that the sickness of the company could also be decided by the SLEC headed by the Chief Secretary. The exemption claim of the company was duly considered by the committee constituted under clause 22.2(i). Its recommendations were duly placed before the SLEC under clause 22.2(ii). The recommendations were not implemented only because the Government failed to issue a notification under clause 24 of the Industrial Policy, 1995 within the stipulated period of one month. Even if we are to accept the submissions of Dr. Dhawan and Mr. Dwivedi that the provisions contained in clause 24 was mandatory the time of one month for issuing the notification could only have been extended for a reasonable period. It is inconceivable that it could have taken the Government three years to issue the follow up notification. We are of the considered opinion that failure of the appellants to issue the necessary notification within a reasonable period of the enforcement of the Industrial Policy, 1995 has rendered the decisions dated January 6, 2001 and March 5, 2001 wholly arbitrary. The appellant cannot be permitted to rely on its own lapses....
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....been placed either before the High Court or before this court about the legal enforceability of the resolutions passed at the Chief Ministers' conference. In our opinion the decision making process which culminated in passing of the orders dated January 6, 2001 and March 5, 2001 is seriously flawed, therefore, the same have been justifiably quashed by the High Court. We may now consider the submissions made in IA No. 3 of 2006. On November 18, 2002, this court passed the following order: "As an interim arrangement during the pendency of this appeal, with a view to protect the interests of either side, we direct the respondent to deposit an amount equivalent to the sales tax payable by it as and when it becomes due in an interest hearing account in a nationalized bank. This amount and the amount accrued during the pendency of the appeal, shall not be withdrawn by other side. The amount so kept in deposit shall become payable to the party which ultimately succeeds in this appeal. The appellants are directed to issue the exemption orders and on receipt of such order, the abovesaid amount shall be deposited. The issuance of the exemption order is without prejudice to the case ....
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....itted that the delay in issuance of the exemption notification by the State has crippled the company financially. Even then the company is trying to revive itself through financial restructuring. The survival of the company now depends on the approval of the financial restructuring package prepared by respondent No. 2. This package has been submitted to the Chief Minister of Bihar which is still on the consideration of the Government. With regard to the non-deposit of amount equivalent to the tax due, Mr. Parshad reiterated that the company had made bona fide efforts, but was unable to deposit the amount due to its "sickness". On the one hand the revised rehabilitation package is kept under consideration, on the other the appellants seeks the vacation of the order dated November 18, 2002. The application, according to the learned senior counsel, deserves outright dismissal. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. It would be not possible to accept the submissions of Mr. Parshad that in view of the financial condition of the company it may be permitted to retain the amount collected under the orders of this court. The amount was collected from the consumer....