TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1998 (12) TMI 557
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.... Hence, they were heard together. 2. Mr. Mundergi who appeared for the petitioners in all these petitions raised three contentions. Firstly, that the directors, i.e., the petitioners of the accused-company had resigned before issuance of the cheque. Secondly, the complainant did not prima facie prove that the petitioner-directors were responsible for the day-to-day business of the company as required under section 141 of the Act. Thirdly, he contended that the complaint was filed without getting acknowledgment from the postal department in respect of the notices served upon the accused under section 138 and hence, there was nothing before the complainant to show that the complaint was filed after the expiry of the 15 days period from the....
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....er the petition was filed before or after the expiry of 15 days period (in the absence of postal acknowledgement with the complainant) is a question of fact which can only be decided by the magistrate at the time of the trial. Secondly, there are allegations in the complaint that the present petitioners were directors of the original accused No. 1 and were in-charge of the day-to-day affairs of the accused-company. The same statement was made by the complainant in his verification statement and, therefore, as rightly argued by Mr. Jagtiani - the complaint as against these petitioners cannot be dismissed on this ground. 5. The crucial question is whether or not the directors' liability under section 138 arises in these cases because of th....
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....rectors at the time of the issuance of the cheque - is of no consequence. So far as this part of the argument of Mr. Mundergi was concerned, Mr. Jagtiani contended that there is a specific reference in the complaint in para 3 (e.g., in Writ Petition No. 1067 of 1998) regarding the agreement dated 17-9-1994, and consequently, the complainant according to Mr. Jagtiani was entitled at the time of trial to produce the said agreement and prove the contents of the agreement in addition to what was stated in the complaint. I find considerable force in this argument. Admittedly, the liability of the accused to pay lease rent to the complainant arose pursuant to that agreement dated 17-9-1994, and since there is a reference to the said agreement in ....
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....ie in the mouth of the petitioner, K.M. Poddar to contend that even though he was a Chairman, he was not in-charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company. 8. Mr. Mundergi in support of his contentions relied upon the judgments in Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi AIR 1983 SC 67 and State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal [1998] 3 Comp. LJ 1 (SC). 9. In Ram Kishan Rohtagi's case (supra), the Supreme Court has consi-dered its earlier judgment in Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi AIR 1976 SC 1947, where while considering the scope of sections 202 and 204 and the powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974, it has laid down guidelines of which proceedings could be quashed. T....
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....is considered, then it cannot be said that the allegations made in the complaint and the statement made by the complainant on oath make out absolutely no case against the accused. It cannot also be said that the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence which is alleged against the accused. As rightly argued by Mr. Jagtiani at the time of issuing the process, the Magistrate has before him the complaint and the statement of the complainant recorded on oath and, therefore, since in the complaint and in the verification statement, the complainant has specifically given the essential ingredients of section 141 and has made a statement on oath in that regard, the complainant succeeds in making out a prima facie case fo....