TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2009 (3) TMI 526
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....tted that the High Court has taken note of the applicable legal position and, therefore there is no scope for interference. 5. The crucial question that remains to be adjudicated is whether principles of natural justice have been violated; and if so, to what extent any prejudice has been caused. It may be noted at this juncture that in some cases it has been observed that where grant of opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice do not improve the situation, "useless formality theory" can be pressed into service. 6. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 7. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a w....
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....are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi- judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. 11. What is meant by the term `principles of natural justice' is not easy to determine. Lord Summer (then Hamilton, L.J.) in Ray v. Local Government Board (1914) 1 K B 160 at p.199:83 LJ K B 86) described the phrase as sadly lacking in precision. In General Council of Medical Education & Registration of U.K . v. Sanckman (1943 AC 627: (1948) 2 All E R 337), Lord Wright observed that it was not desirable to attempt `to force it into any procusteam bed' and mentioned that one essential requirement was that the Tribunal should be impartial and have no personal interest in the controversy, and further that it should give `a full and fair opportunity' to every party of being heard. 12. Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on the subject. The most important of them is the Board of Education v. Rice (1911 AC 179 : 80 LJ K B 796), whe....
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....at sort done contrary to the essence of justice". 14. Lord Selbourne also added that the essence of justice consisted in requiring that all parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound, such considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him. All these cases lay down the very important rule of natural justice contained in the oft-quoted phrase `justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be done'. 15. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natu....
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....ir- play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is `nemo judex in causa sua' or`nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua' as stated in (1605) 12 Co.Rep.114 that is, `no man shall be a judge in his own cause'. Coke used the form aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa quia non potest esse judex at pars' (Co.Litt. 1418), that is, `no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party'. The form `nemo potest esse simul actor et judex', that is, `no one can be at once suitor and judge' is also at times used. The second rule is `audi alteram partem', that is, `hear the other side'. At times and particularly in continental countries, the form `audietur at altera pars' is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely `qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita alteram actquam licet dixerit, haud acquum facerit' that is, `he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been wh....
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.... R 274) stating that there are always `open and shut cases' and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the `useless formality theory' is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that `convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms'. More recently, Lord Bingham\ has deprecated the `useless formality theory' in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p. Cotton (1990 I R L R 344) by giving six reasons (see also his article `Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?" 1991 PL. p.64). A detailed and emphatic criticism of the `useless formality theory' has been made much earlier in `Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL.pp.27- 63) contending that Malloch (supra) and Glynn (supra) were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn. 1996, p.323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn. P.596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5 th Edn. 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says cour....