TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1989 (1) TMI 222
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....of by this judgment. 2. Appellant was charged before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Valsad, by the Food Inspector, Navsari Municipality, with the offence of selling "Kesari coloured sweet supari sali" alleged to have been adulterated with "Yellow basic coal-tar dye". The learned Magistrate found the appellant guilty of the offence and imposed a sentence of an year's simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000/-, both of which were the statutorily compulsory minimum sentences under Section 16 (1) (A) (i) of the Act. Learned Sessions Judge, Valsad, by his judgment, dated 14.3.1980, in Criminal Appeal 32 of 1979 preferred by the appellant, however, set-aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted the appellant of the charge. On further appeal by the Stale against the said acquittal, the High Court of Gujarat allowed the State's appeal and, in reversal of the judgment of acquittal of the learned Sessions Judge, restored the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. 3. Appellant is a tradesman carrying on business within the limits of Navsari Municipality. On 7.12.1978, respondent No. 2, the Food Inspector of Navsari Municipality, purchased f....
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....he "Supari" concerned in this case was a "Fruit-product" or, alternatively, a "Flavouring-Agent" within the meaning of Rule 29(f) or (m) respectively and, accordingly, the use in it of permitted coal-tar dyes or food-colours was not prohibited and, secondly, whether, even if, after an elaborate enquiry, it was held that "Supari" was not a "Food-product" appellant having acted bonafide on a possible and not an unreasonable view of the nature and classification of the goods, was, at all events, entitled to the benefit of the doubt. 5. It was not disputed that supari was an article of food. It was so held in Pyarali K.Tejani v. M.R. Dange [1974 (2) SCR 154]. It was also not disputed that if "supari" did not admit itself of being classified under "Fruit-products" or under "Flavouring-Agents" under Rule 29(f) or 29(m) respectively, the use in "supari" of even a coal-tar food-colours permitted under rule 28 would amount to adulteration; The argument that "Supari" or "Betel-nut" is a "Flavouring-Agent" has clearly no substance. The first contention, therefore, narrows itself down to whether "Supari" in the form in which it was offered for sale though vegetative in origin and is deri....
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....that having regard to the accepted cannons of construction appropriate to penal-statutes, "Supari" or "Betel-nut" which was derived from the usufruct ofAreca-palm admits of being classified amongst "Fruit-Products" in Rule 29(7). At all events, says learned counsel, such a construction, being a plausible one, the appellant who had conducted his affairs on such a plausible meaning of the statute should be entitled to the benefit of the doubt. In Encyclopaedia Britannica (Vol. 3, p. 551) with reference to "Betel-nut" it is mentioned : "The name betel is applied to two different plants which in the east are very closely associated in the purposes to which they are applied. The betel nut is the fruit of the areca or betel palm (Areca catechu)..." "For chewing, the fruits are annually gathered between the months of August and November, before they are quite ripe, and deprived of their husks. They are prepared by boiling in water, cutting up into slices and drying in the sun, by which treatment the slices assume a dark brown or black colour..." "...Betel-nuts are used as a source of inferior catechu (g.v.); its chief alkaloid is arecoline, to which anthelmintic properties are....
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....btle evasion and foil its artful circumvention..." (Emphasis Supplied) The construction appropriate to a social defence legislation is, therefore, one which would suppress the mischief aimed at by the legislation and advance the remedy. 8. The offences under the 'Act' are really acts prohibited by the police-powers of the State in the interests of public-health and well-being. The prohibition is backed by the sanction of a penalty. The offences are strict statutorly offences. Intention or mental-state is irrelevant. In Goodfellow v. Johnson [1965 (1) All E.R. 941] [at 944] referring to the nature of offences under the Food and Drugs Act, 1955, it was said : "As is well known, S. 2 of the Food and Drugs Act, 1955, constitutes an absolute offence. If a person sells to the prejudice of the purchaser any food, and that includes drink, which is not of the nature or not of the substance or not of the quality demanded by the purchaser he shall be guilty of an offence. The forbidden Act is the selling to the prejudice of the purchaser..." Smedleys Limited v. Breed [1974 All ER 21] is a case, both interesting and illustrative. Smedleys Ltd. were manufacturers of canned peas o....
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.... have consumed the caterpillar without injury to herself, and even, perhaps, with benefit..." [para 24] "Thereafter, the caterpillar achieved a sort of posthumous apotheosis. From local authority to the Dorchester Magistrates, from the Dorchester Magistrates to a Divisional Court presided over by the Lord Chief Justice of England, from the Lord Chief Justice to the House of Lords, the immolated insect has at length plodded its methodical way to the highest tribunal in the land. It now falls to me to deliver my opinion on its case." [para 24] Referring to the nature of the penalties under laws against food adulteration, Lord Chancellor said: "My Lords, as has been pointed out by my noble and learned friend, Lord Diplock, the expression 'absolute offence' is imprecise. Clearly the offence contemplated in S. 2(1) of the Food and Drugs Act, 1955 is an absolute offence if all that is meant by that is an absence of mens rea. It is one of those offences described by Wright J in Sherras v. De Rutiizen which are not criminal in any real sense, but are acts which in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty'." [para 26] Confirming the conviction, Lord Chancellor held : ....
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....l by this court. [See : Ramavatar Budhai Prasad v. The Assistant Sales Tax Officer (XII STC 286)] Shri Girish Chandra says that in the context of the Indian House-holder we may, with justification, add Betel-nut to the list of salted pea-nuts, cashew-nuts etc. 10. The distinction between literal and legal meaning of statutory language lies at the heart of the problem of interpretation of statutes. The court is not entitled to decline to determine the legal meaning of a statute on the principle 'non-liquet'. In the present case, a wider construction of "Fruit-Products" in clause (7) which is in the nature of exception to Rule 29 results automatically in a corresponding narrower construction of the substantive provision in Rule 29. This is not a case of a relieving provision excepting from the definition of an offence where the Rule of construction against doubtful penalisation operates. The offence is really a violation of a prohibition imposed on a penalty as a social-defence mechanism in a socio-economic legislation. No form of words have ever yet been framed, with regard to which some ingenious counsel could not suggest a difficulty. But in the context of the present statute, ....
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....h law..." [p. 68] 12. The plea in the last analysis reduces itself to one of ignorance of the law. This would be no justification. Ten thousand difficulties, it is said, do not make a doubt. As the learned authors (supra) put it. "One who, being ignorant of the law, sells goods at a price in excess of the maximum fixed by the statue, could hardly be said to have been led astray by his conscience while the 'harm prescribed' lacks objective wrongness". The Statute we are concerned with prescribes a strict liability, without need to establish mens rea. TheActus Reus is itself the offence. There might be cases where some mental element might be a part of the Actus Reus itself. This is not one of those cases where anything more than the mere doing of the prescribed act requires to be proved. There is thus no merit in the second point either. The appeal would, therefore, require to fail. The sentence, which is the statutory minimum, cannot also be lightended by the court. But there is one poignant aspect on which learned counsel made an impassioned plea. 14. Shri Ganatra pointed out the hardship of a small-time tradesmen who, as here, purchase the goods from big manufacturers....