TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2004 (2) TMI 300
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....14 days, i.e., 18th March, 2002, onwards. It was also noticed that a total expenditure of Rs. 1,94,42,849 has been claimed by the assessee during the said period. The assessee-trust, therefore, was required by the learned CIT to furnish the details and evidence of incurring such expenditure as well as the details of activities carried out by it. Meanwhile, during the course of these investigations by the Department in the affairs of the trust, large number of donees denied of having given any donations to the assessee-trust and revised the returns for asst. yr. 2002-03, withdrawing the claim for exemption under s. 80G. Further, some of the donors who were issued refund vouchers by the Department on account of their claim for donations made to the assessee-trust returned the said refund vouchers to the assessee-trust as they had not given any such donations and Shri Girish Mishra, President of the assessee-trust, handed over the same to the concerned ITO having jurisdiction over the donors. On the basis of these findings of fact, the learned CIT was of the view that the assessee-trust is engaged in the activity of issuing bogus receipts of donations and since such activity was in no....
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....ng the registration granted on 15th Oct., 2001, under s. 12A of the IT Act, when no application for registration was pending before the CIT. (3) That the order impugned is conspicuously silent as to what material was taken by the learned CIT into consideration; it amounts to violation of rule of natural justice. (4) That the order impugned is silent as to what documents specifically were asked for by the assessee to put up its defence in the matter, other than what were supplied to it. Thus, the cancellation or withdrawing the registration in the absence of confrontation of documents collected behind the back of appellant is against all fairness and principles of natural justice and as such it has no legal force and is invalid. (5) That the learned CIT cancelled the registration without confronting the documents to the appellant. By not confronting the enquiries made by the Department, the learned CIT has not followed the dictates of established law and as such the cancellation of registration is illegal. (6) That the order passed under s. 12A of the Act be quashed inasmuch as no opportunity of being heard was allowed before rejecting application under s. 12A as require....
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....h the remedies are creature of statutes. 7. Now, we may directly refer to the case law dealing with the powers of review. In S.J.S. Fernades vs. V. Ranganayakulu AIR 1953 Mad 236, the Hon'ble Madras High Court ruled as under: 'So far as the invocation of the inherent powers of Court is concerned, it has been held repeatedly and has now become well-settled law that the power to review is not an inherent power of judicial officer but such a right must be conferred by statute. This is based upon the common sense principle that prima facie a party who has obtained a decision is entitled to keep it unassailed unless the legislature has indicated the mode by which it can be set aside. A review is practically the hearing of an appeal by the same officer who decided the case. Therefore, the course of decisions in this country has been to the effect that a right to review is not an inherent power. See David Nadar vs. Manicka Vachaka Desika Gmuna Sambanda Pandara Sannathi (1910) ILR 33 Mad. 65, Lala Prayag Lal vs. Jai Narayan Singh (1895) ILR 22 Cal 419, Baijnath Ram Goenka vs. Nand Kumar Singh (1895) LR 34 Cal 677 and Anantharaju Shetty vs. Appu Hegade (1919) 37 MLJ 162.' Further, ....
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....Act or regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanctions and conditions (if any) to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued.' The perusal of the above section shows that the word 'order' is coupled with other words "notifications, rules and bye-laws". The word 'order' is of widest amplitude and would include all kinds of orders including administrative orders, judicial orders and legislative orders. It is not clear whether the word 'order' was used by the legislature in widest sense or in restrictive sense. Therefore, to resolve such issue, the Courts/Tribunals have restored to the rules of interpretation. In such cases, rule of noscitur a sociis is applied. As per Black's Dictionary (Sixth Edition p. 1060) this rule is stated thus: 'It is known from its associates. The meaning of the word is or may be known from the accompanying words. Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other ....
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.... the registration certificate under the Citizenship Act had, by virtue of s. 21 of the General Clauses Act, and apart from s. 10(2) of the Citizenship Act, the power to cancel it. We are entirely unable to agree that s. 21 conferred on the Collector any such power. The orders mentioned in that section are not orders of the kind contemplated in s. 5 of the Citizenship Act.' In Bherumal vs. Motumal AIR 1956 Ajmer 67, it has been held that the word 'orders' in s. 21 of GCA refers to subordinate legislation and not to judicial orders. The jurisdictional High Court in the case of Bachchu Lal Gupta vs. Rex AIR 1951 All 404 has held that the word 'order' must be limited to non-judicial orders. 10. In view of the above discussion, it is held that s. 21 of GCA would include only those orders which are in the nature of subordinate legislation and would not include other orders, particularly judicial or quasi-judicial orders. Consequently, the order of CIT passed under s. 12A, in 1974 could not be rescinded/withdrawn by the impugned order by virtue of s. 21 of GCA. Hence, the impugned order was without jurisdiction." 5. The Tribunal thus has held in the case of Kailashchand Mission T....