TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1999 (12) TMI 103
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....olved in almost all the block assessments all over the country numbering hundreds. There is a possibility of difference of opinion amongst different Benches of the Tribunal and, therefore, he requested to constitute a Special Bench to decide the issue, so that uniformity of decision be achieved. He further stated that the decision will have far reaching consequences. He suggested formation of the Special Bench to answer the following questions : (1) (a) Whether the Commissioner while approving the order of Assessing Officer under section 158BC of the Act is required by law to necessarily give an opportunity of hearing to the assessee ? (b) Whether the approval of an order by the Commissioner without giving an opportunity of being heard to the assessee, would render the order of Assessing Officer void ab initio or would be only an infirmity curable in law ? (2) (a) Whether the provisions of section 158BG require the Commissioner to record his reasons in writing for approving the order of Assessing Officer passed under section 158BC of the Act. (b) Whether the approval of Commissioner without recording his reasons in writing for approving the order would render the order ....
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.... the appeals contains several other grounds also which are to be decided independently. The learned Advocates appearing for the assessees as well as the Counsel for the department, Shri S.D. Kapila agreed and permitted us to give our decision on the above questions. We sought their permission and consent, because we are aware of the provisions of section 255(3) of the Income-tax Act, which gives powers to the President of the Tribunal to constitute a Special Bench consisting of three or more members, one of whom shall necessarily be a Judicial Member and one an Accountant Member for disposal of any particular case. Now, ordinarily, the case means (sic) involving entire appeal. The question whether a particular ground of appeal can constitute the subject-matter of decision before a Special Bench falls for our immediate consideration. If it is permissible under law, then there will not be any legal impediment for the validity of this Special Bench order. Fortunately, we came across a decision ofGoa, Daman & Diu Judicial Commissioner's Court clarifying the meaning of the word 'case', in Communidade of Velguem of Bicholim through Yeshwant Vishnu Sahastrabudhe v. Vassant Vithal Govekar ....
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....nding on the date of the transfer, and also includes all proceedings under the Act which may be commenced after the date of transfer in respect of any year." Therefore, any proceedings involved in the case can also be considered to be a case. As we have already observed that ground No. 8 was specifically taken and in other two cases, the Tribunal permitted amendment of ground No. 1 and allowed the appellants to agitate the validity of the approval granted by the Commissioner. The Karnataka High Court in United Breweries Ltd. v. ACIT [1995] 211 ITR 256/83 Taxman 263, while considering the validity of the transfer order made under section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, considered the meaning of the word 'case' and they held as per the Head Note at page 256 as follows : "In section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the word 'case' is used in a comprehensive sense for pending proceedings as well as for proceedings to be instituted in future. Consequently, an order of transfer can be validly made even if there is no proceeding pending and the purpose of transfer in such an event will simply be that all future proceedings have to take place before the officer to whom the case of t....
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....ions or hearing after the enquiries are completed on the basis of seized material and before passing of the order of assessment of the block period, though such person/assessee is likely to be affected by the final order of assessment of the block period after the enquiries conducted and completed by him. After the enquiry is completed by the Assessing Officer he has to apply his mind and then frame an order of assessment of the block period under section 158BC or under section 158BD and at that stage the assessee or any other person cannot enter the mind of the Assessing Officer and discern or find out the result of the enquiry, i.e., to say whether he is going to pass a favourable or an adverse order. It is for this reason the Legislature in its wisdom thought that a Senior Officer of the Department of the rank of Commissioner should give approval to the proposed draft order of assessment of the block period framed by the Assessing Officer pursuant to enquiry conducted by him as provided in the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act, 196l." The Bombay Bench of the Tribunal in ITA (SS) No. 85/MUM/96 decided on9th March, 1999had taken a contrary view. They have taken the view....
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....mmissioner : Provided that no such order shall be passed without the previous approval of the Commissioner." After the amendment by the above two Acts, some changes occurred and therefore, the section as well as Proviso thereunder are extracted as per the amendment : "158BG. Authority competent to make block assessment. The order of assessment for the block period shall be passed by an Assessing Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner or an Assistant Director or Deputy Director, as the case may be : Provided that no such order shall be passed without the previous approval of --- (a) the Commissioner or Director, as the case may be, in respect of search initiated under section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets requisitioned under section 132A, after the 30th day of June, 1995 but before the 1st day of January, 1997; (b) the Joint Commissioner or the Joint Director, as the case may be, in respect of search initiated under section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets requisitioned under section 132A, on or after the 1st day of January, 1997." The word 'approval' is defined to mean as ....
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....ement of such search or, as the case may be, the date of such requisition. Under section 158BA, undisclosed income should be assessed by the Assessing Officer in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XIV-B and such undisclosed income is liable to tax at the rate of 60% under section 113. In the Explanation given under section 158BA, it is clearly stated that the assessment under this Chapter shall be in addition to regular assessment in respect of each previous year included in the block period and it is also stated that the total undisclosed income relating to the block period shall not include the income assessed in any regular assessment as income of such block period. Under section 158BB, method of computation of undisclosed income for the block period is given. Section 158BC sets out the procedure for making block assessment. It states that where any search has been conducted under section 132 or books of account, other documents or assets are requisitioned under section 132A, in the case of any person, then the Assessing Officer shall serve a notice to such person requiring him to furnish within such time not being less than fifteen days but not more than forty-five days,....
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.... after30-6-1995, but before the 1st day of January, 1997, assessment would be completed within one year from the end of the month in which the last of the authorisations for search under section 132 or for requisition under section 132A was executed. But if it is a search conducted after1-1-1997, the time was enlarged to two years for completion of the block assessment. Ordinarily, for completing the assessments, it is well-known that two years period is prescribed, but for the block assessment, the period was purposely reduced to one year in order to complete such cases as early as possible. The utility of completing such assessments as quickly as possible particularly in lesser time than the time allowed for completion of ordinary assessment may also be known by the fact that Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is made the first appellate authority in all block assessment cases, instead of the CIT(A) in ordinary type of assessments. Thus, in ordinary type of assessments, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal used to be the second appellate authority and the assessee used to have three-tier hearings, first before the Assessing Officer, second before the CIT(A)/Dy. CIT(A) and third before th....
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....aking assessment, is obliged to be brought to the notice of the assessee and his explanation must be sought for and obtained before making an assessment by the Assessing Officer. Now, unless the assessment order is prepared and produced before the Commissioner for his approval, it would not be known to the assessee. In such circumstances, how is it possible for the assessee to know that certain contentions raised by him were not dealt with, certain deductions were not considered, certain legal submissions made were not considered by the Assessing Officer, in which case only giving second chance for hearing to the assessee would be of any use. However, the assessment made by the Assessing Officer would be valid assessment order only when the Commissioner approves it; and before approval of the said draft order, if any, is not expected to be served on the assessee. If the draft order is served on him, then only he would be knowing what are the omissions and commissions and errors committed by the Assessing Officer while framing the assessment. Therefore, one thing is very clear that before valid assessment order is passed, with the approval of the Commissioner, the assessee is alread....
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....process of a fair hearing need not, however, conform to the judicial process in a court of law, because judicial adjudication of causes involves a number of technical rules of procedure and evidence which are unnecessary and not required for the purpose of a fair hearing within the meaning of audi alteram partem rule in a quasi-judicial or administrative inquiry." Their Lordships also held that though the two rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram pattern, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-jacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adapted and modified by statutes and statutory rules and also by the constitution of the Tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such Tribunal is governed. There is no difference in this respec....
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.... have to read section 158BG proviso which we have already extracted above. In the whole of the proviso, nowhere it is found that before previous approval was granted by the Commissioner or Director, they should give opportunity to the assessee, invite objections and then dispose of their objections before granting approval. Had it been the intention, the Legislature would have clearly come out that opportunity to the assessee before approval should be granted by the Commissioner. However, no such words, either expressly or impliedly or contextually, can be read into the proviso to section 158BG. According to us, the Legislature is well aware that even while preparing the draft assessment order to be put before the Commissioner, the assessee is completely and fully heard, allowed to make submissions, and arguments, to raise objections, produce all documents in his favour and therefore, they must have felt that principles of natural justice were already complied with before competing the assessment and there is no need for the Commissioner once again to give a similar chance to the assessee to make his submissions on the assessment order which came up for approval of the Commissioner....
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....e on hand, we will have to take it to mean that since the Legislature did not provide right of making representation to the assessee before an assessment is approved by the Commissioner, it should be taken to mean that such right never existed with the assessee. In connection with the disciplinary proceedings taken against a Government servant and challenging the said disciplinary proceedings under Article 311 of the Constitution of India in the case of Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala AIR 1969 SC 198 their Lordships considered whether the general feeling that a Government servant would get two inquiries, one before issuing a show cause notice to be followed by another inquiry thereafter is correct or not. Holding it to be not correct, at page 204 they held the following : "There seems to be an erroneous impression in certain quarters evidently influenced by the provisions in Art. 311 of the Constitution particularly as they stood before the amendment of that article that every disciplinary proceeding must consist of two inquiries, one before issuing the show cause notice to be followed by another inquiry thereafter. Such is not the requirement of the principles of na....
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....eased with; distinguishable from 'authorize', meaning to permit a thing to be done in future. Therefore, the ordinary meaning of the word approval can never be synonymous to satisfaction which is derived from out of judicial proceedings. On the other hand, it means that the Commissioner is administratively satisfied with the assessment. It means to confirm, ratify, sanction or consent to some act or thing done by another, to sanction officially. The meaning of the word 'approve' does not carry meaning of authorisation. In order to satisfy himself, the Commissioner can go through the assessment and after going through, he can confirm, ratify, sanction or give consent or give sanction officially. Therefore, the intendment of the word 'approve' is only to give official sanction and nothing more. There is no scope that the word 'approve' admit of any judicial proceeding. When there is no judicial proceeding, there is no question of audi alteram partem rule to apply. We are inclined to think that under the facts and circumstances and the set up in which proviso under 158BG was obtaining, 'approve' means exercise of an administrative authority. In Union of India v. J.N. Sinha AIR 1971 SC....
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....action that the relevant facts would constitute the offence and then either grant or refuse to grant sanction. The grant of sanction, therefore, being administrative act the need to provide an opportunity of hearing to the accused before according sanction does not arise." (5) Mahadayal Premchandra v. CTO AIR 1958 SC 667. (6) J.N. Sinha's case. (7)RaipurDevelopment Authority v. Chokhamal Contractors AIR 1990 SC 1426. (8) F.N. Roy v. Collector of Customs AIR 1957 SC 648. This last case is cited for the following proposition, which is to be found at page 649 of the report : "There is no rule of natural justice that at every stage a person is entitled to a personal hearing. Moreover when the appeal against the orders of the Customs authorities was filed beyond limitation, and the appellate authorities dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation without hearing the appellant, there is no violation of the rule of natural justice." (9) Ramesh Chand Industries Ltd. v.UnionofIndia[1999] 143 Taxation 295 (Delhi). In this latest case of the Delhi High Court, when the A.O. asked the assessee to compulsorily get his accounts audited, the assessee challenged the initiation....
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..... (16) Pearlberg v. Varty (Inspector of Taxes) 1972 WLR 534. Copy of this judgment (Sr. No. 16) is provided at pages 146 to 162 of the paper book. This is an English case which considered the requirements of section 6 of the Income-tax Management Act, 1964 under the provisions of which the late assessments to which the section applies can only be raised by leave of a single general or special Commissioner and it makes no reference to a right of audience or to make representations and read grammatically. The question was whether it is proper and tenable. It is held that the only person whose views are to be before the Commissioner is the inspector or other officer of the board. Upholding the validity of the action. the House of Lords held : "I would not attach so much importance to this factor if I thought that the result of excluding the right to a hearing would be to produce a substantial injustice to the taxpayer, which, as I shall show, it does not, or if the contrast between the language of section 6 and the statutory procedures existing before that section was enacted did not make it quite obvious, at least to me, that the draftsman's omission of mention of any right ....
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....ndustries Ltd. v.UnionofIndiaAIR 1966 SC 671 (24) State Bank ofPatialav. S.K. Sharma AIR 1996 SC 1669. (25) Managing Director ECIL v. Karunakaran 1993 4 SCC 727. Apart from the above decisions, the learned Departmental Representative/Special Counsel distinguished the decisions cited on behalf of the assessee and the distinguishing factors are furnished at pages 320 to 322 of the paper book. 15. We have heard the arguments of the assessee having been advanced by Shri Anand Prakash, the learned Advocate. He submitted that the principles of natural justice are incorporated into enactment passed by the Legislature. Where no such incorporation is found in any of the provisions of an enactment, it cannot be applied. He further submitted that unless there is clear exclusion prohibiting application of principles of natural justice, principles of natural justice should be taken to be applicable to the provision of an enactment. He next submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has pointed out that in a particular section, natural justice must be read into and in support of this proposition, he relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of In....
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....njraj v. Union of India [1957] 31 ITR 565, which is also a case of transfer of assessment by the Commissioner from the charge of one I.T.O. to the other. While disposing of that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the following dictum : "It would be prudent if the principles of natural justice are followed, where circumstances permit, before any order of transfer under section 5(7A) of the Act is made by the C.I.T. or the Central Board of Revenue, as the case may be, and notice is given to the party affected and he is afforded opportunity of representing his view on the question and the reasons of the order are reduced, however briefly, to writing.Omnibus and wholesale orders of transfer of all proceedings against a particular assessee are saved by the explanation to sub-section (7A) which was added by the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act of 1956 to get over the situation created by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India & Others." In our considered view, these two decisions deal with the transfer of the case but not granting of any approval. Therefore, the facts are very different. Secondly, in the cases before us, when the assessment i....
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....d that the finding given by the I.T.O. and affirmed by the A.A.C. and the Tribunal was based on material and it could not be said that these bodies had acted arbitrarily in this matter. Rejecting the first contention advanced by the learned Solicitor-General, it was held that the power given under Article 136 being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible to fetter the exercise of this power by any set formula or rule. It is however, plain that when the Court reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a Court or Tribunal within the territory of India has not given a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of the exercise of this power, because the whole intent and purpose of this Article is that it is the duty of this Court to see that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of Courts and Tribunals because certain laws have made the decisions of these Courts or Tribunals final and conclusive. Regarding t....
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....hat transfer would not be 'in the interest of the Revenue'. On a Writ petition to quash the order, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court held as follows: "Held, that an enquiry had been made and that material had been used against the assessee without affording him an opportunity to offer any explanation. The impugned order was vitiated because of absence of hearing and recording or reasons. The order was liable to be quashed." The above is a case where no opportunity at all was afforded to the assessee, but the same does not hold good in the facts of our present case. In our present case, before assessment proceedings were taken up and during the assessment proceedings, notices were duly given u/s 142(2) and (3) as well as u/s 143. It is only after affording reasonable opportunity that the assessment orders were drafted put up for approval of the Commissioner. Since we have already held that approval does not mean giving consent etc. which we have already discussed above, approval does not warrant to give an opportunity to the assessee of being heard or for the Commissioner to write a speaking order and therefore, this decision in Devidas's case is neither here nor there. 18. The....
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....ercise of power by the Board. That is to say an opportunity of being heard whether orally or by way of a representation must be given to the assessee by the Board and the Board must dispose of such representation with reasons which must be cogent and sufficient and not 'laconic or nebulous'. It is well-established that discretionary orders will be interfered with, where the orders have been passed arbitrarily or in violation of the principles of law." At page 121, the following para of the Head Note is also important to be noted : "As far as the assessment years 1982-83 and 1983-84 were concerned, the firm had been served with notice under section 139(2). As such it was not entitled to ask for waiver of penalty under sections 271(1)(i) and 273 or waiver of interest under section 139(8), 215 or 217. But the firm could ask for waiver of penalty imposed or imposable under section 271(1)(iii). Admittedly, no notice either under section 139(2) or 148 had been served in respect of the other three assessment years, viz., 1979-80, 1980-81 or 1981-82. The reference by the Commissioner to the Board for approval of the imposition of penalty under sections 273 and 27 1 (1)(i) was not war....
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....ng rendered by the Council. The Council must, therefore, state the reasons for its finding." In this case also, the right of audi alteram partem was never given to the erring Chartered Accountant and the Council solely depended upon the report of the disciplinary committee. The disciplinary committee's report was held not enjoying the status of a finding. However, the same cannot be said to the assessment order passed by the Assessment Order under section 158BC(c). Further, in the case before us, notices under sections 142(2) and (3) as well as 143 were all issued and all the arguments as well as seized material were all considered alongwith the oral submissions, if any, made by the assessees or their Advocates before preparing the assessment orders. Therefore, the set of facts available before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case are quite different from the set of facts available in the cases before us and this decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not apply and cannot be of any help to the assessees. 21. Another decision cited before us is CIT v. Jai Prakash Singh [1996] 219 ITR 737/85 Taxman 407 (SC). In that case, the original assessee died and only one out of man....
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....owing effect." This decision also does not apply according to us, since 158BG does not contain specific provision enabling the assessee to be given an opportunity of being heard by the CIT before grant of approval, and the approval itself is not a judicial proceeding. We have already held that while approving the assessment, the Commissioner merely exercises administrative function of putting seal of approval to the assessment order. Since before the Assessing Officer himself the assessee was given adequate opportunity, there was no necessity to give a second opportunity before the Commissioner while granting approval. Therefore, this decision does not apply to the facts of the assessee's case. 23. Shri M.S. Syali, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Intervener Shri Niranjan Lal Goyal [IT (SS) A. No. 119/DEL/95] cited before us the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Mansukh Lal Chauhan v. State of Gujarat 1997 7 SCC 622. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered what is meant by "sanction". They held that it implies application of mind in Administrative Law and while taking administrative action, if there is no application of mind or lack of applica....
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....cumstances where the duty to observe natural justice is inapplicable' ('Natural Justice' by Paul Jackson, 2nd edn. page 11). 20. We share the view expressed by Professor Jackson. Fairness, in our opinion, is a fundamental principle of good administration. It is a rule to ensure the vast power in the modern State is not abused but properly exercised. The State power is used for proper and not for improper purposes. The authority is not misguided by extraneous or irrelevant considerations. Fairness is also a principle to ensure that statutory authority arrives at a just decision either in promoting the interest or affecting the rights of persons. To use the time hallowed phrase "that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done" is the essence of fairness equally applicable to administrative authorities. Fairness is thus a prime test for proper and good administration. It has no set form or procedure. It depends upon the facts of each case. As Lord Pearson said inPearlberg v. Varty, fairness does not necessarily require a plurality of hearings or representations and counter-representations. Indeed, it cannot have too much elaboration of procedure since wheels of administ....
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....it was held that merely recording of reasons on the file was not sufficient. It was essential to give reasons to the affected party. The order of transfer in that case was quashed for not communicating reasons to the assessee." In this case, it is clear that under section 5(7-A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 before a transfer of one case from one ITO to another by Commissioner in whose jurisdiction both the ITOs function, hearing of the assessee before transfer order was passed was not essential. However, section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, now enjoins an obligation to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee in the matter before transfer of case from one ITO to the other is ordered. Therefore, the principle enunciated in this judgment would only point out that if it is a mandate of the section itself to give a reasonable opportunity before passing an order, then it should be taken to be the intention of the Legislature to afford a reasonable opportunity to the assessee. However, in this case, we have already pointed out that section 158BG proviso does not contemplate giving of any notice before approval of the Commissioner was granted. Therefore,....
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....he Corporation to consider the pros and cons of the question as to the concessional rate of property tax. If there is no such consultation the Corporation cannot be compelled to fix the rateable value of the building under sub-section (3)." 26. Another decision relied on is again a Supreme Court decision Union of India v. M.L. Capoor AIR 1974 SC 87 a photocopy of which is provided at pages 16 to 33 of the paper book. In this case, question of selection to the I.A.S. and I.P.S. became point of debate and that too its appointment by promotion for which regulations were passed in 1955. Their Lordships interpreted Regulation No. 5(5). The question was whether in a promotion of post a junior may be preferred against a senior. However, while overlooking the claim of a senior, the Selection Committee selected a junior and recorded its reasons. In the Head Note of the decision at page 88, it is held as follows : "It is incumbent on the Selection Committee to state reasons in a manner which would disclose how the record of each superseded officer stood in relation to records of other who were to be preferred. This is in the context of the effect upon the rights of aggrieved persons wh....
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....one case there is a legal impediment to the prosecution if there be no sanction, and in the other case, there is a positive order that the prosecution should be launched. For a sanction, all that is necessary for one to be satisfied about is the existence of a prima facie case. In the case of a direction, a further element that the accused deserves to be prosecuted is involved." Again, the meaning of the word 'approve' is quite different from meaning of the word 'sanction', much more different from the meaning of the word 'direction'. In the cited case, it is clarified that for a sanction all that is necessary for one to be satisfied about is the existence of a prima facie case. However, in the case of a direction, a further element that the accused deserves to be prosecuted is involved. Even in the definition of the meaning of the word 'approval' given in the Black's Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe, 5th Edn. the word 'approve' is distinguishable from authorisation meaning to permit a thing to be done in future. So 'approve' and 'authorisation' are quite different from each other. Now, let us come to 'sanction'. One of the meaning which can be given to the word 'approve' is 'sanc....
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....erally implies knowledge and the exercise of discretion after knowledge, the act of passing judgment or the exercise of judgment, the use of discretion and the determination as a deduction therefrom. In some cases "approval' implies the exercise of judicial action or discretion, while in other cases it implies the exercise of only an administrative function or capacity and not in a judicial sense. The word 'approve' does not necessarily import the exercise of discretion, but from the connection in which the term is used it often involves the idea of discretion and adjudication, and is seldom construed as requiring a mere ministerial act, but rather embraces both direction and confirmation. The term sometimes necessarily implies the exercise of discretion on the part of the person or persons approving, for the power to approve ordinarily implies a power to disapprove, or to withhold approval, but does not give the right of arbitrary rejection. It has been said that the term denotes more than an unexpressed mental acquiescence, implies a revisory proceeding, as the term is only appropriate to such an act, but not necessarily the power to initiate or carry out. 29. The distinction ....
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....on 253, which is as follows : "Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal. 253(1) Any assessee aggrieved by any of the following orders may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order --- (b) an order passed by an Assessing Officer under clause (c) of section 158BC, in respect of search initiated under section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets requisitioned under section 132A, after the 30th day of June, 1995, but before the 1st day of January, 1997." Thus the assessment order passed under Chapter XIV-B is made appealable before the Tribunal. Whether providing appeal against the assessment made can be said to be making up the deficiency while not granting an opportunity to the assessee for making his submissions before the Commissioner while approving the order of assessment under section 158BG proviso ? We have already discussed this matter which is approved by some of the decisions which we have already quoted in the prior paras of our order. However, we want to supplement our view point by quoting the Administrative Law HWR and Shri M. Forsyth, Oxford University Press, at page 566 : "Preliminary and Advisory acts, investigations and reports : ....
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.... because an opportunity of being heard was not given to the assessee by the Commissioner while approving the assessment order would not render the assessment order void ab initio and there is no infirmity in such an order. Even supposing it is taken that there is infirmity, it is curable under law by giving the opportunity to the assessee to advance full-scale arguments in the appeal proceedings against the assessment order under section 158BC. In answer to question No. 2(a), we hold that provisions of section 158BC do not require the Commissioner to record his reasons in writing while approving the order of the Assessing Officer under section 158BG proviso and for that reason, the assessment order passed under section 158BC does not suffer from any infirmity. In answer to question No. 2(b), we hold that the approval of the Commissioner without recording any reasons in writing for approving the order would not render the order of the Assessing Officer void ab initio and would not invalidate the assessment order. Assuming without admitting that some infirmity is there, it is curable under law, since the order of assessment passed under section 158BC is made appealable under section ....