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Proceedings against non-existent entity - Scope of liability in amalgamation or merger - Void ab initio - Principles of natural justice - Jurisdictional defect - Going concern - HELD THAT: - Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court[2026 (5) TMI 162 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] wherein held that 'the GST proceedings initiated against the amalgamating company after its merger were void ab initio, as they were taken against a non-existent entity. It further held that Section 87 of the CGST Act did not authorize such proceedings, and accordingly allowed the petition by setting aside the impugned order'
The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether the substituted pre-deposit proviso in Section 107(6) applies to appeals arising from show-cause notices issued before 01.10.2025; (ii) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appeal, including on the alleged incompetence of the officer initiating Section 122 proceedings.
Issue (i): Whether the substituted pre-deposit proviso in Section 107(6) applies to appeals arising from show-cause notices issued before 01.10.2025.
Analysis: The conditions governing a statutory appeal are governed by the law prevailing when the adjudicatory proceedings commence. Every show-cause notice in the batch had been issued before 01.10.2025, when the substituted proviso was brought into force. The amended pre-deposit condition therefore could not govern the resulting appeals.
Conclusion: The substituted proviso to Section 107(6) does not apply to the appeals; they are governed by the pre-deposit provision in force on the respective dates of the show-cause notices, in favour of the petitioners.
Issue (ii): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appeal, including on the alleged incompetence of the officer initiating Section 122 proceedings.
Analysis: The proper-officer objection required construction of the function-specific definition in Section 2(91), the powers under Sections 3 and 5, Notification No. 02/2017-Central Tax, Notification No. 14/2017-Central Tax and the subsequent Circular dated 27.10.2025. The notifications investing DGGI officers with powers corresponding to their rank prevented the objection from establishing a patent lack of jurisdiction. The remaining challenges concerning evidence, natural justice, individual roles, quantification and multiple penalties involved extensive disputed factual material suitable for the appellate forum. The statutory appeal was efficacious because the amended pre-deposit requirement was inapplicable.
Conclusion: No exceptional ground justified bypassing the alternative remedy under Section 107; the jurisdictional and other challenges may be raised before the Appellate Authority, against the petitioners.
Final Conclusion: The appellate forum must determine the parties' factual and legal objections independently, while applying the pre-amendment pre-deposit regime to these appeals.
Pre-deposit in GST appeals-law applicable on commencement of adjudication - Proper officer for Section 122 penalty proceedings - Alternative statutory remedy and writ jurisdiction
Pre-deposit in GST appeals-law applicable on commencement of adjudication - Applicability of the substituted pre-deposit requirement to appeals arising from adjudicatory proceedings initiated before its commencement - HELD THAT: - The conditions governing the statutory appeal are governed by the law in force when the adjudicatory proceedings commenced. Since all the relevant show-cause notices had been issued before 01.10.2025, the substituted proviso to Section 107(6) could not govern the resulting appeals merely because the Orders-in-Original were passed after that date. [Paras 32, 33, 56]
The appeals shall be governed by Section 107(6) as applicable on the respective dates of the show-cause notices, and shall not be rejected by applying the substituted proviso.
Proper officer for Section 122 penalty proceedings - Alternative statutory remedy and writ jurisdiction - Exercise of writ jurisdiction against original adjudication imposing penalties for alleged fraudulent input tax credit despite the statutory appellate remedy - HELD THAT: - The status of a proper officer is function-specific; however, the statutory notifications investing Directorate General of GST Intelligence officers with powers corresponding to their rank and assigning functions under the Act did not disclose a patent or self-evident absence of authority to initiate the proceedings. The effect of the subsequent Circular, the officer's competence, and the interrelated objections concerning evidentiary material, hearing, cross-examination, penalty quantification and the role of each noticee require examination on the record. Such questions of fact and law are amenable to the complete and efficacious appellate remedy under Section 107. The question whether Section 122(1) applies to a person who is not a taxable person was left open. [Paras 51, 52, 53, 54, 55]
The writ petitions were disposed of with liberty to pursue statutory appeals, in which all objections, including the challenge to the officer's competence, may be raised and determined on their merits.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of on the ground that the statutory appellate remedy is efficacious. Appeals arising from show-cause notices issued before 01.10.2025 remain governed by the pre-deposit provision then in force.
Issues: Whether the adjudication order was sustainable despite failure to address the reply, including the claimed SEZ exemption.
Analysis: The detailed reply and the specific claim for benefit of the exemption applicable to an SEZ were not dealt with. The order merely stated that the contentions were unacceptable and that the scope of service was wide, without disclosing consideration of the material contentions or reasons for rejecting them. Such cryptic and non-speaking treatment did not satisfy the requirement of a reasoned adjudication.
Conclusion: The adjudication order was invalid for want of reasoned consideration, and a fresh determination after hearing is required with all contentions remaining open.
Failure to consider material submissions - Speaking adjudication order
Validity of the GST adjudication order where the assessee's plea for exemption applicable to an SEZ and its detailed reply to the show-cause notice were not considered - HELD THAT: - The adjudicating authority did not advert to the SEZ exemption contention or the other contentions in the detailed reply, and merely stated that the contentions were unacceptable and that the scope of service was wide. Such cryptic disposal rendered the order non-speaking. See TATA ENGINEERING & LOCOMOTIVE CO. LTD. [2006 (9) TMI 185 - SUPREME COURT][Paras 6]
The impugned order was quashed and the matter remitted for fresh consideration after hearing the petitioner; all contentions were kept open.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the non-speaking adjudication order and remitting the matter for a fresh order in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether an ex parte adjudication under Section 74, founded solely on electronic service of a show-cause notice after cancellation of GST registration, could be sustained.
Analysis: The notice was uploaded to the Common Portal more than three years after cancellation of registration. The binding departmental circular requiring physical service of notice in proceedings initiated after such cancellation recognised that a deregistered person may not access or be required to access the portal. Electronic-only service in those circumstances denied an effective opportunity to participate in the adjudication.
Conclusion: An ex parte adjudication founded on electronic-only service after cancellation of registration cannot be sustained; the noticee must receive an effective opportunity to reply, seek necessary documents or cross-examination, and be heard before fresh adjudication.
Service of GST show-cause notice after cancellation of registration - Ex parte GST adjudication
Electronic service after cancellation of GST registration - Opportunity of hearing in GST adjudication - Validity of an ex parte GST adjudication where the show-cause notice was issued only on the Common Portal after cancellation of the taxpayer's registration. - HELD THAT: - After cancellation of registration, the taxpayer may not be obliged to access the Common Portal and may consequently remain unaware of proceedings initiated through that portal. The departmental circular requiring physical service of notice in such cases was held to rest on sound common sense; the revenue did not dispute the proposition. [Paras 5, 6]
The ex parte adjudication order was set aside and the matter was restored for reply, consideration of any request for cross-examination or relied-upon documents, personal hearing on advance notice, and fresh reasoned adjudication.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the ex parte adjudication and directing fresh proceedings after affording the petitioner a proper opportunity to respond and be heard.
Issues: Whether the authorities must consider and decide the contractor's pending representations claiming payment of GST after examining the tender terms, bills, invoices and payments.
Analysis: The GST component payable in respect of taxable services requires examination of the applicable rate, invoices, tender conditions and whether the final bills already included GST. Since the representations with supporting material remained undecided, the competent authorities were required to undertake that examination and communicate reasoned decisions. No adjudication of the contractor's actual entitlement to the claimed GST amounts was undertaken.
Outcome: The authorities were directed to independently decide the respective representations by reasoned and speaking orders within six weeks.
Non-consideration of representation seeking GST payment - Consideration of pending representations seeking payment of GST in respect of road construction and improvement works
HELD THAT: - The claim required examination of the tender conditions, individual bills and invoices, payments already made, and the applicable GST liability. The respondents' assertion that the final bills already included GST had to be supported by a proper and intelligible breakup of the amounts paid. As the representations with supporting material remained undecided, the competent authorities were obliged to examine the records and communicate a reasoned decision. The Court did not adjudicate the petitioner's actual entitlement to the claimed GST. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11]
The respondent-authorities were directed to independently consider the respective representations, examine the relevant records and pass reasoned speaking orders within the stipulated period, without any expression of opinion on the merits of the GST claim.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was partly allowed by directing consideration and reasoned disposal of the pending GST-payment representations. The substantive claim was left open for determination by the competent authorities in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether an adjudication order confirming GST demand exceeding the demand proposed in the show cause notice is sustainable under Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: The confirmed demands on both discrepancy counts substantially exceeded the amounts proposed in the single show cause notice. Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of a demand beyond that proposed in the notice. This defect was fundamental and incurable.
Conclusion: The adjudication order was unsustainable for confirming demand beyond the show cause notice, in favour of the assessee.
Demand exceeding show cause notice - Statutory limitation on adjudication under Section 75(7) of the UPGST Act
Validity of an adjudication order confirming demands exceeding those proposed in the single show cause notice - HELD THAT: - Section 75(7) mandates that the demand confirmed in adjudication cannot exceed the demand proposed in the show cause notice. Since the demands confirmed on both counts exceeded the proposed demands, the adjudication order suffered from a fundamental and incurable defect. [Paras 4, 5, 7]
The impugned order was set aside and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication, without permitting issuance of a fresh notice.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the adjudication order for violation of Section 75(7) of the UPGST Act and remitting the matter for fresh adjudication.
Issues: Whether interim protection against coercive recovery should operate pending the petitioner's recourse to the statutory appellate remedy.
Analysis: As the impugned order was appealable and an efficacious remedy before the GSTAT was available, the petitioner was directed to file a statutory appeal within the stipulated period. The period during which the writ petition remained pending was directed to be excluded in computing limitation. Pending disposal of that appeal, protection against coercive recovery was granted. No final adjudication on the validity of the impugned order took place.
Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to pursue the statutory appeal, accompanied by interim restraint on coercive recovery until disposal of that appeal.
Alternative statutory remedy under GST law - interim protection from coercive recovery pending filing of such statutory appeal
Availability of interim protection from coercive recovery where the challenged GST order is appealable before the GSTAT - HELD THAT: - As the impugned order was appealable and an efficacious statutory remedy was available, the writ petition was not entertained on merits. To preserve the appellate remedy, the period during which the writ petition remained pending was directed to be excluded in computing limitation, and coercive recovery was stayed pending disposal of the statutory appeal. [Paras 7, 8, 9]
The petitioner was directed to file an appeal before the GSTAT within four weeks; until disposal of that appeal, the authorities were restrained from giving effect to the recovery notice or taking coercive action. Failure to file the appeal within that period would leave the GSTAT at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by relegating the petitioner to the statutory appellate remedy, with exclusion of the writ-pendency period for limitation and interim protection against coercive recovery pending the appeal.
Issues: (i) Whether accumulated input tax credit attributable to higher-taxed packaging materials used for supply of packaged tea is refundable under the inverted duty structure; (ii) Whether Circular No. 135/5/2020-GST dated 31.03.2020 bars such refund where bulk tea and packaged tea attract the same rate of tax.
Issue (i): Whether accumulated input tax credit attributable to higher-taxed packaging materials used for supply of packaged tea is refundable under the inverted duty structure.
Analysis: Section 54(3)(ii) permits refund where credit accumulates because the rate of tax on inputs exceeds that on output supplies. The expression "inputs" encompasses multiple inputs and does not distinguish between principal and ancillary inputs. Under Section 2(59), goods used in the course or furtherance of business, other than capital goods, are inputs. Packaging materials indispensable to marketing packaged tea qualify as inputs, and their eligibility for input tax credit is also recognised by Circular No. 79/53/2018-GST dated 31.12.2018. Treating bulk tea alone as the input while disregarding packaging materials would improperly introduce a restriction absent from the statute.
Conclusion: Refund of accumulated input tax credit arising from higher-taxed packaging materials is admissible under Section 54(3)(ii), in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether Circular No. 135/5/2020-GST dated 31.03.2020 bars such refund where bulk tea and packaged tea attract the same rate of tax.
Analysis: Paragraph 3 of the Circular concerns accumulation caused by reduction of GST rate on the same goods at different points in time. Its reference to inputs and outputs attracting different rates at different times confines its application to that situation. No such rate reduction occurred here, as bulk tea and packaged tea were both taxable at 5%. Further, a circular issued for uniform implementation cannot curtail a refund entitlement conferred by Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Conclusion: Circular No. 135/5/2020-GST dated 31.03.2020 does not bar the refund claim, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The statutory refund scheme covers unutilised credit accumulated from eligible higher-taxed packaging inputs, and the relied-upon circular does not apply to this factual situation.
Ratio Decidendi: Where multiple eligible inputs are used for output supplies, refund under the inverted duty structure cannot be denied by disregarding higher-taxed ancillary inputs or by applying a circular limited to rate-reduction cases contrary to the statutory scheme.
Refund of accumulated input tax credit under inverted duty structure - Packing materials as eligible inputs - Applicability of circular concerning reduction in GST rate
Refund of accumulated input tax credit under inverted duty structure - Packing materials as eligible inputs - Refund of accumulated input tax credit on packaged tea where packing materials, taxed at a higher rate, are used along with bulk tea - HELD THAT: - Section 54(3)(ii) permits refund where credit accumulates because the rate of tax on inputs exceeds that on output supplies. The statutory expression "inputs" is plural and draws no distinction between principal and ancillary inputs. Packing materials used for marketing packaged tea are inputs used in the course or furtherance of business and are eligible for input tax credit; their exclusion merely because bulk tea and packaged tea attract the same rate would be contrary to the statutory scheme. [Paras 9, 11, 15]
The respondent was entitled to refund of the accumulated input tax credit attributable to eligible packing materials under the inverted duty structure.
Applicability of circular concerning reduction in GST rate - Statutory refund not curtailed by circular - Applicability of Circular No. 135/5/2020-GST to refund of input tax credit accumulated on packing materials used for packaged tea - HELD THAT: - The circular concerns accumulation of credit caused by a reduction in the GST rate on the same goods at different points of time. Since bulk tea and packaged tea attracted the same rate and the accumulation arose from higher-taxed packing materials, the circular did not apply. A circular issued for uniform implementation cannot curtail a refund otherwise admissible under the Act.
We find merit in the submissions made by the respondent as in this case, the rate of tax on both bulk tea at the time of purchase and sale in small packages attract same rate of GST i.e., @ 5% and does not fall under the purview of the said circular No. 135/5/2020 GST. [Paras 13, 14, 15]
Revenue's reliance on the circular was misplaced and could not defeat the refund claim.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was dismissed, and the order upholding refund of accumulated input tax credit was sustained.
Issues: Whether actual-cost recovery of electricity charges, including HVAC and common-area consumption, from unit holders qualifies as recovery by a pure agent and is excluded from GST.
Analysis: Electricity supplied with maintenance services ordinarily forms part of a composite supply, even if billed separately. Rule 33 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 excludes expenditure incurred by a pure agent from the value of supply where its conditions are met. Clause 3.3 of Circular No. 206/18/2023-GST dated 31.10.2023 creates a deeming treatment where electricity charges recovered from occupants are the same as those charged by the electricity board or distribution company. The proposed billing mechanism recovered electricity charges at the DISCOM rate for metered HVAC and non-HVAC consumption and apportioned the balance common-area consumption without markup, while separately identifying such charges from common-area maintenance charges. This attracted the circular's deeming provision.
Conclusion: Recovery of actual electricity charges without markup, including HVAC and common-area electricity charges, is deemed recovery in the capacity of a pure agent; it is excluded from the value of supply and GST is not leviable on it. The ruling is in favour of the assessee.
Pure-agent treatment of actual electricity - charge recovery - Composite supply of maintenance services and electricity
Whether recovery of electricity charges by the applicant at actual cost based on consumption, as charged by the electricity distribution company without any mark up including electricity attributable to Heating Ventilation and Air conditioning (HVAC) operations and common area consumption, qualifies as reimbursement in the capacity of a pure agent and whether GST would be leviable on the same, more specifically in terms with Circular No. 206/18/2023-GST dated 31.10.2023 issued in this regard by Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue (TRU)? - HELD THAT: - Electricity supplied as part of maintenance and management of premises is ordinarily ancillary to the principal maintenance service and forms part of a composite supply, notwithstanding separate billing. However, clause 3.3 of Circular No. 206/18/2023-GST creates an exception: where electricity charges are recovered on an actual basis at the same amount charged by the electricity distribution company, the supplier is deemed to act as a pure agent. Although the applicant did not satisfy the independent pure-agent test on the factual matrix, the proposed separate recovery of actual metered HVAC and non-HVAC consumption and proportionately allocated common-area consumption, without markup or profit, attracted the circular's deeming provision. [Paras 4]
The actual electricity charges recoverable under the proposed billing pattern are deemed to be recovered in the capacity of a pure agent, are excluded from the value of the maintenance supply, and are not liable to GST.
Final Conclusion: The application was allowed on the basis of the proposed billing pattern. Actual electricity-charge recovery without markup, including HVAC and common-area consumption, was held not liable to GST.
Issues: Whether an advance-ruling application can be admitted when the questions raised have already been decided in enforcement proceedings concerning the applicant.
Analysis: The first proviso to Section 98(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prohibits admission where a question raised is already pending or decided in proceedings under the Act in the applicant's case. The classification and tax-rate questions had been decided in prior enforcement proceedings, and adequate opportunities of hearing were provided to the applicant.
Conclusion: The questions having already been decided in prior proceedings, the advance-ruling application was barred from admission.
Bar on advance ruling where question already decided in proceedings - Admissibility of the application seeking classification and rate determination for dried and cured tobacco leaves when the same questions had been decided in enforcement proceedings concerning the applicant
HELD THAT: - The first proviso to section 98(2) precludes admission where a question raised has already been pending or decided in proceedings under the GST Act in the applicant's case. On verification of the Revenue's information, the Authority concluded that the questions raised had undergone and been decided in prior proceedings under the Act.
Thus, as first proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 98 ibid clearly bars the admission of application where the question raised in the application is already pending or decided in any proceedings in the case of an applicant under any of the provisions of this Act, thus application for advance ruling is hereby rejected. [Paras 1]
The application for advance ruling was rejected as barred from admission.
Final Conclusion: The application was rejected because the classification and applicable-rate questions concerning the goods had already been decided in prior proceedings against the applicant.
Issues: (i) Classification of ruled/lined and cut uncoated paper under Heading 4802 or Heading 4820; (ii) Availability of the end-use exemption for ruled/lined paper supplied to notebook manufacturers; (iii) Tax treatment of uncoated paper reels supplied by paper mills to an intermediate processor, recipient liability, and input tax credit.
Issue (i): Classification of ruled/lined and cut uncoated paper under Heading 4802 or Heading 4820.
Analysis: Chapter 48 covers qualifying uncoated paper in rolls and sheets. Chapter Note 10 excludes loose sheets or cards cut to size, whether or not printed, embossed, or perforated, from Heading 4820. Ruling or lining and cutting paper into sheets do not convert loose sheets into finished stationery articles such as notebooks or exercise books.
Conclusion: The goods are classifiable under Heading 4802: under tariff item 48026190 when supplied in rolls and tariff item 48026290 when supplied in sheets. This is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Availability of the end-use exemption for ruled/lined paper supplied to notebook manufacturers.
Analysis: Serial No. 128 requires actual use of uncoated paper under Heading 4802 for exercise books, graph books, laboratory notebooks, or notebooks. The expression "used for" imposes an actual-use condition, rather than an intended-use condition, and fulfilment is established when the recipient is a manufacturer using the paper for the specified products. Each supply in a multi-stage chain remains distinct for taxation.
Conclusion: Supply of the qualifying paper directly to an established manufacturer of the specified books is exempt under Serial No. 128; the exemption cannot be claimed by every upstream supplier merely because the goods will ultimately be used for such books. This is in favour of the assessee in respect of its direct supplies to such manufacturers.
Issue (iii): Tax treatment of uncoated paper reels supplied by paper mills to an intermediate processor, recipient liability, and input tax credit.
Analysis: A supply from a paper mill to an intermediate processor is an independent supply, and the actual-use condition is not established merely by the processor's onward supply to notebook manufacturers. Tax on an intra-State supply is ordinarily payable by the supplier. The paper goods in question have not been notified for reverse charge under Section 9(3); input tax credit remains subject to Section 16 and the applicable rules and notifications.
Conclusion: The paper mill's supply to the intermediate processor is not entitled to the Serial No. 128 exemption solely on eventual end use; the recipient has no tax liability as recipient, and input tax credit is governed by Section 16. This is partly against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The exemption operates at the supply made to the manufacturer that actually uses qualifying paper for the specified books, not throughout an intermediate supply chain.
Ratio Decidendi: An end-use exemption for paper applies only where actual use by the recipient in manufacturing the specified goods is established; each preceding supply is independently taxable unless it separately satisfies the exemption conditions.
Classification of ruled/lined loose paper sheets - End-use-based exemption for uncoated paper used in manufacture of notebooks - Recipient's tax liability and input tax credit on uncoated paper reels - Advance ruling jurisdiction over documentary requirements for exemption
Classification of ruled/lined loose paper sheets - Classification of uncoated paper reels converted into ruled or lined loose sheets - under Heading 4802 or Heading 4820 - HELD THAT: - Ruling or lining and cutting uncoated paper into loose sheets do not take the goods outside Heading 4802. Ruled or lined sheets are not excluded from that heading, while Chapter Note 10 to Chapter 48 excludes loose sheets or cards, cut to size, whether or not printed, from Heading 4820, which covers finished stationery articles. [Paras 4]
The goods are classifiable under tariff item 48026190 when supplied in rolls and under tariff item 48026290 when supplied in sheets.
End-use-based exemption for uncoated paper used in manufacture of notebooks - Availability of the exemption for uncoated paper supplied for exercise books, graph books, laboratory notebooks and notebooks - HELD THAT: - The exemption is governed by actual use of the paper under Heading 4802 and not by an intended downstream use. Actual use can be established at the point where the recipient manufactures the specified books. Each limb of the supply chain is an independent and distinct supply; consequently, the exemption cannot be claimed by every intermediary merely because the goods will ultimately be used for manufacture of notebooks. [Paras 4]
Supply of uncoated paper to an established manufacturer for actual use in manufacture of the specified books is exempt; supplies at intermediary stages are taxable independently.
Recipient's tax liability and input tax credit on uncoated paper reels - Tax liability of the recipient of uncoated paper reels supplied by paper mills and availability of input tax credit - HELD THAT: - Tax is ordinarily payable by the supplier on the incidence of supply. Since uncoated paper and paperboard have not been notified for reverse-charge payment by the recipient, the applicant does not incur liability as recipient. Input tax credit is governed by the statutory conditions for credit. [Paras 4]
The applicant is not liable to pay tax as recipient of the paper reels, and input tax credit is subject to section 16 of the CGST Act and the applicable rules and notifications.
Advance ruling jurisdiction over documentary requirements for exemption - Maintainability of questions seeking prescription of declarations, undertakings and documentary evidence for satisfaction of the exemption end-use condition - HELD THAT: - The notification did not refer to documentary mechanisms or prescribed evidentiary requirements. The authority could not extend an application concerning notification applicability by importing matters not specified in the notification or statute. [Paras 1]
The questions concerning documentary evidence and declarations were not admitted.
Final Conclusion: Ruled or lined loose paper sheets remain classifiable under Heading 4802. The exemption is confined to supplies to manufacturers establishing actual use in the specified books, while intermediary supplies are independently taxable and the recipient bears no reverse-charge liability on the paper reels.
Issues: (i) Whether supply of uncoated paper under tariff heading 4802 to a manufacturer exclusively using it for exercise books qualifies for 0% GST; (ii) Whether GST rate classification of such paper is determined by actual use rather than paper grade or specification; and (iii) Whether ambiguity exists concerning supplies made around the rate-transition date.
Issue (i): Whether supply of uncoated paper under tariff heading 4802 to a manufacturer exclusively using it for exercise books qualifies for 0% GST.
Analysis: Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 exempts uncoated paper and paperboard of the specified description under tariff heading 4802 when used for exercise books, graph books, laboratory notebooks and notebooks. The corresponding taxable entry under Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 excludes such specifically used paper from its scope. The exemption applies where the recipient's status as a manufacturer of the specified books and the exclusive stipulated use are established.
Conclusion: Such supply qualifies for exemption at 0% GST where the recipient is established to be a manufacturer using the paper exclusively for the specified books, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether GST rate classification of such paper is determined by actual use rather than paper grade or specification.
Analysis: The notification entries create two categories of uncoated paper and paperboard under tariff heading 4802: paper actually used for exercise books, graph books, laboratory notebooks and notebooks, and paper used for other purposes. The expression "used for" requires actual use, which is ascertainable at the manufacturing stage; intended use alone is insufficient. Subject to the described nature and form of the paper, no separate criterion based on grade or specification governs the rate distinction.
Conclusion: The applicable rate is determined solely by actual use: paper used for the specified books is exempt, while paper used for other purposes attracts 18% GST, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether ambiguity exists concerning supplies made around the rate-transition date.
Analysis: Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 and Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 expressly take effect from 22.09.2025.
Conclusion: No ambiguity exists regarding the transition date, which is 22.09.2025, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The revised notification scheme grants exemption to the specified tariff-heading 4802 paper only upon its actual use for the enumerated books, and fixes the amended rate treatment from 22.09.2025.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a rate notification expressly carves out goods by their use, eligibility for exemption depends on established actual end use rather than the goods' tariff heading, grade or intended use alone.
Scope of advance ruling on applicability of notification - End-use-based GST exemption for uncoated paper - Actual use as basis of GST rate classification - Effective date of GST rate notifications
Scope of advance ruling on applicability of notification - Admissibility of questions concerning the supplier's verification of end use, documentary requirements and liability for the purchaser's subsequent misuse of exempt uncoated paper - HELD THAT: - The notification did not address the proposed requirements for verification, documentation or supplier liability. An advance ruling on the applicability of a notification cannot import concepts or mechanisms not expressed in that notification; those questions were therefore outside the permissible scope. [Paras 1]
The questions relating to verification, documentation and supplier liability were not admitted.
End-use-based GST exemption for uncoated paper - Actual use as basis of GST rate classification - GST treatment of uncoated paper and paperboard under tariff heading 4802 supplied for manufacture of exercise books, graph books, laboratory notebooks and notebooks - HELD THAT: - The exemption entry carves out uncoated paper and paperboard of the specified kind, in the prescribed forms, when used for exercise books, graph books, laboratory notebooks and notebooks, from the taxable entry for other uses. The classification is determined solely by actual use, not by intended use, paper grade or specifications. Actual use can properly be ascertained at the stage of manufacture, and the recipient's status as a manufacturer of the specified books must be established. [Paras 4]
Supply to a manufacturer established to have used the goods for the specified books is exempt; the same goods used for other purposes fall under the taxable entry.
Effective date of GST rate notifications - Existence of ambiguity concerning the rate transition for supplies of uncoated paper and paperboard under tariff heading 4802 - HELD THAT: - The relevant Central and corresponding State notifications expressly made the revised entries effective from 22.09.2025. Their stated commencement left no ambiguity concerning the date of rate transition. [Paras 4]
There is no ambiguity regarding the effective date of the revised rate notifications.
Final Conclusion: The application was partly admitted. The Authority held that the exemption for the specified uncoated paper depends upon its established actual use in manufacture of the specified books, while the questions concerning supplier compliance obligations were not admitted.
Limitation for reassessment notice for pre-2021 assessment year - Validity of reassessment notice issued for AY 2017-18 after expiry of the six-year period prescribed under the erstwhile reassessment regime
HELD THAT:- There is an inordinate delay in filing the Special Leave Petition which has not been satisfactorily explained by the petitioner.
Even otherwise, we find no good ground to interfere with the impugned order(s) passed by the High Court [2024 (12) TMI 1797 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
Validity of Penalty notice - vagueness - Defective show-cause notice as foundation for penalty - Validity of penalty founded on a cyclostyled show-cause notice in which irrelevant particulars were not struck off
HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order [2025 (11) TMI 2061 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed and the accompanying interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposedof.
Issues: Whether approval obtained under Section 151(i) for revival of reassessment proceedings and issuance of notice after expiry of the extended three-year period was valid.
Analysis: The three-year period from the end of Assessment Year 2016-17 expired during the period covered by Section 3(1) of the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The extension enabled the authority under Section 151(i) to grant approval only until 30 June 2021. For the order under Section 148A(d) and notice under Section 148 issued on 29 July 2022, approval of the authority specified under Section 151(ii) was mandatory. Approval by the Principal Commissioner under Section 151(i) beyond the extended period did not satisfy the statutory requirement and vitiated jurisdiction to revive reassessment.
Conclusion: The sanction under Section 151(i) was invalid, and the reassessment revival was without jurisdiction; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Validity of reassessment sanction under extended limitation - Jurisdiction to revive reassessment proceedings - Sanction by competent specified authority for reassessment
HELD THAT: - Where the three-year period from the end of the relevant assessment year expired during the period covered by TOLA, the authority specified under section 151(i) could grant sanction only up to 30th June 2021. The order under section 148A(d) and consequential notice having been issued thereafter, sanction from the authority specified under section 151(ii) was mandatory. Sanction by the Principal Commissioner under section 151(i) therefore vitiated the jurisdiction to revive reassessment proceedings. Case followed RAMESH BACHULAL MEHTA [2025 (8) TMI 1322 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] [Paras 8, 9]
The impugned order reviving the reassessment proceedings was quashed and set aside.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the impugned order reviving reassessment proceedings was quashed and set aside for want of valid sanction from the competent specified authority.
Issues: Whether an order fastening a company's tax liability upon its director under Section 179, without considering the director's reply and supporting documents, is sustainable.
Analysis: The impugned order was passed without considering the reply and documents furnished in response to the show-cause notice. This undisputed omission breached the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: The order under Section 179 was unsustainable for violation of principles of natural justice and was quashed; the matter was directed to be decided afresh in accordance with law.
Order fastening a company's tax liability upon its director under Section 179 - Denial of Natural justice - non-consideration of reply in director's liability proceedings
HELD THAT: - The respondent did not dispute that the reply and accompanying documents furnished by the petitioner were overlooked while passing the order. An order determining a Director's liability for company tax dues without considering the response and material produced is in breach of the cardinal principles of natural justice. [Paras 7]
The impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the matter was remanded for fresh decision in accordance with law and the principles of natural justice within 12 weeks.
Final Conclusion: The petition was allowed to the extent that the impugned order was quashed for breach of natural justice and remanded for fresh consideration.
Issues: Whether an assessee whose interest-waiver application had been rejected, and whose writ petition challenging the interest demand and rejection was pending on the specified date, qualified as an "appellant" eligible to seek settlement of disputed interest under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024.
Analysis: Sections 89(1)(a), 89(1)(h) and 89(1)(o) of the Finance Act, 2024 were read harmoniously to hold that a person with a pending writ petition challenging an interest determination on 22.07.2024 is an appellant, and the challenged interest constitutes disputed interest and tax arrears. FAQ 15 of Circular No. 12/2024 applies only where a waiver application itself remained pending before the competent authority on the specified date; it does not exclude a person whose waiver application had already been decided and whose challenge to that decision and interest demand was pending before a High Court. A purposive construction of the dispute-resolution scheme requires inclusion of such a genuine pending dispute.
Conclusion: The assessee was an appellant under Section 89(1)(a) of the Finance Act, 2024 and was entitled to have the case considered under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Eligibility for Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 in respect of disputed interest - Pending writ challenging interest and rejection of waiver application - Scope of FAQ on interest waiver applications
Eligibility under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 for disputed interest under sections 220(2) and 234B, where the waiver application had been rejected and a writ petition challenging the interest demand remained pending on the specified date - HELD THAT: - A harmonious reading of the definitions of "appellant", "disputed interest" and "tax arrear" establishes that a person who has challenged an interest demand by a pending writ petition on the specified date is an appellant and the disputed interest constitutes tax arrears. FAQ 15 concerns only a waiver application pending before the competent authority; it does not exclude a person whose waiver application has already been rejected and whose challenge to that rejection and the interest demand is pending before the High Court. A purposive construction of the Scheme, intended to resolve pending tax disputes, requires inclusion of such a genuine disputant. [Paras 19, 21, 22, 23, 24]
The petitioner was held to be an appellant under section 89(1)(a) of the 2024 Act; the rejection of the application under the Scheme was set aside and the authorities were directed to reconsider it accordingly.
Final Conclusion: The rejection of consideration under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 was set aside, with a direction to reconsider the case by treating the petitioner as an appellant. The pending challenge to the interest determination was consequently disposed of as infructuous.
Issues: Whether expenditure disallowed under Section 14A, computed under Rule 8D, can be added to book profit under Section 115JB.
Analysis: The settled jurisdictional position is that a disallowance calculated under Section 14A cannot, merely on that basis, be adjusted to book profit under Section 115JB. The adjustment permissible under the Explanation to Section 115JB is confined to expenditure relatable to exempt income as determined for that computation and does not incorporate the Section 14A/Rule 8D calculation.
Conclusion: No addition to book profit under Section 115JB can be made on the basis of the Section 14A disallowance computed under Rule 8D; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Section 14A disallowance in computation of book profit - Minimum Alternate Tax u/s 115JB computation - HELD THAT: - The settled legal position as relying on GUJARAT URJA VIKAS NIGAM LTD. [2020 (3) TMI 232 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] is that no addition to book profit can be made merely on the basis of the disallowance computed under Section 14A. [Paras 5, 6]
The Tribunal's deletion of the addition from book profit was upheld; no substantial question of law arose.
Final Conclusion: The Tax Appeal was dismissed, as the Tribunal's view that a Section 14A disallowance cannot be added to book profit under Section 115JB was in conformity with the settled legal position.
Issues: (i) Whether Section 54F applies where both the transferred original asset and replacement asset are residential properties; (ii) Whether exemption under Section 54 is available where the replacement residential property is purchased solely in the assessee's wife's name.
Issue (i): Whether Section 54F applies where both the transferred original asset and replacement asset are residential properties.
Analysis: Section 54F applies only where capital gain arises from transfer of a long-term capital asset other than a residential house. Since both the asset sold and the replacement asset were residential properties, the statutory conditions for Section 54F were not met. The applicable provision was Section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Conclusion: Exemption under Section 54F was unavailable to the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether exemption under Section 54 is available where the replacement residential property is purchased solely in the assessee's wife's name.
Analysis: Section 54 requires both the transfer of the original residential asset and the purchase or construction of the new residential asset within the stipulated period to be undertaken by the same assessee. Spouses are distinct legal entities, and a purchase made solely in the wife's name cannot be clubbed with the husband's sale for claiming the exemption. The governing jurisdictional precedents supported strict construction of this tax exemption and did not extend its benefit to property purchased in a spouse's sole name.
Conclusion: Exemption under Section 54 was unavailable to the assessee where the new residential property was purchased solely in his wife's name.
Final Conclusion: The capital gain remained chargeable to tax because the claimed reinvestment did not satisfy the requirements of either Section 54F or Section 54.
Ratio Decidendi: A capital-gains exemption requiring purchase of a new asset by the assessee cannot be claimed where that asset is purchased solely by or in the name of a distinct legal person, including the assessee's spouse.
Section 54F exemption for transfer of residential house - Section 54 exemption for investment in spouse's name
Section 54F exemption for transfer of residential house - Availability of capital-gains exemption u/s 54F where both the original asset and the new asset are residential properties - HELD THAT: - Section 54F applies where the long-term capital asset transferred is not a residential house. Since both the asset sold and the asset acquired were residential properties, the appellant could not claim exemption under that provision; the authorities had failed to notice this distinction. [Paras 8]
The claim for exemption u/s 54F was held unavailable.
Section 54 exemption for investment in spouse's name - Exemption u/s 54 for capital gain from a residential house reinvested in a residential property solely in the spouse's name - HELD THAT: - For exemption under section 54, the same assessee must execute both the sale of the original residential asset and the purchase or construction of the new residential asset within the stipulated period. Husband and wife are distinct legal entities, and a transaction undertaken by the husband cannot be clubbed with a purchase made solely by the wife.
The judgment of the Delhi High Court in Kamal Wahal’s case [2013 (1) TMI 401 - DELHI HIGH COURT] was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Kamal Kant Kamboj’s [2017 (8) TMI 285 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] and disagreed with. Having gone through both the afore referred judgments, we respectively agree with the view taken in Kamal Kant Kamboj’s case (supra).
Gurnam Singh’s case [2008 (4) TMI 28 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT], was also considered and distinguished in Kamal Kant Kamboj’s case (supra), which distinction, on facts, would also apply to the present appeal.
Jangpal Singh Tanwar’s case [2023 (8) TMI 1736 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] is a Division Bench judgment of this Court which is also distinguishable on facts because in the case in hand, the reinvestment of the capital gain is solely in the name of the assessee’s wife whereas in Jangpal Singh Tanwar’s case (supra), the reinvestment was jointly in the name of the assessee, his wife and his son, and that the joint owner(s) had also invested at the time of reinvestment of the capital gain arisen from the sale of the original asset.[Paras 11, 17, 19, 20, 21]
The appellant was held ineligible for exemption under section 54, and the appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed. The claim under section 54F was inapplicable, and exemption under section 54 was unavailable because the new residential property was acquired solely in the spouse's name.
Issues: Whether consideration under a composite media-rights agreement for live and non-live telecast of cricket matches constituted royalty, and the extent of disallowance for failure to deduct tax at source.
Analysis: Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 treats consideration for use of copyright as royalty, while Section 40(a)(i) read with Section 195 disallows a payment chargeable to tax where tax was required but not deducted. Live telecast of a sporting event does not involve a pre-existing copyrighted work or transfer of copyright and therefore consideration attributable to live-feed rights is not royalty. The agreement was composite, also conferring rights relating to non-live or repeat telecasts, for which the attributable consideration is royalty. The record established a 93:7 live-to-non-live viewership ratio; hence allocation on that basis was appropriate.
Conclusion: Ninety-three per cent of the composite payment attributable to live broadcast is not royalty, whereas seven per cent attributable to non-live broadcast is royalty and is disallowable for non-deduction of tax at source.
Live sports broadcasting rights as royalty - Apportionment of composite media-rights consideration
Live sports broadcasting rights as royalty - Copyright in live telecast - Characterisation of consideration for live telecast rights of cricket matches under a composite media-rights agreement as royalty - HELD THAT: - Live telecast of a sporting event does not involve a copyright in a work capable of being transferred for the purpose of royalty. The Revenue having failed to dislodge the finding that the live broadcast rights did not carry copyright, the consideration attributable to live feed could not be treated as royalty; however, repeat or non-live telecast rights remained within the scope of royalty. [Paras 7, 10]
Consideration attributable to live broadcasting was held not to be royalty, while consideration for non-live broadcasting was held taxable as royalty.
Apportionment of composite media-rights consideration - Disallowance for non-deduction of tax on royalty - HELD THAT: - The composite consideration was apportioned according to the established viewership data, which showed 93 per cent live and 7 per cent non-live viewership. Since the payment allocable to non-live rights was royalty and tax had not been deducted, disallowance was sustainable only to that extent. [Paras 8, 10]
The allocation was modified to 93:7, and disallowance was confirmed in respect of 7 per cent of the composite payment, with consequential recomputation directed.
Final Conclusion: All three Revenue appeals were partly allowed. The disallowance was confined to the consideration allocable to non-live broadcasting rights in the ratio of 7 per cent.
Issues: Whether the assessee could be treated as an assessee in default for non-deduction of tax on External Development Charges without verification of the conditions in the first proviso to Section 201(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The External Development Charges paid to Haryana Urban Development Authority were treated as payments attracting tax deduction under Section 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. However, where the payee has furnished its return, accounted for the relevant receipts in computing income, and paid the tax due, the deductor cannot be treated as an assessee in default upon furnishing the prescribed accountant's certificate. Verification of these statutory conditions had not been undertaken.
Conclusion: The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to verify compliance with the first proviso to Section 201(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; if fulfilled, no liability under Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) can be imposed on the assessee.
Non deduction of TDS of payment of EDC charges to HUDA - demand u/s 201(1) and the levy of interest u/s 201(1A) - Deductee-paid-tax exception under first proviso to section 201(1) - Availability of relief from liability for non-deduction of tax on External Development Charges paid to HUDA, where the payee may have accounted for the receipts and paid tax thereon
HELD THAT:- This issue is covered by the decision of the coordinate Bench in the case of M/s. M3M India Pvt. Ltd. [2026 (3) TMI 795 - ITAT DELHI] the Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer must verify whether the conditions in the first proviso to section 201(1), including the payee's furnishing of return, inclusion of the relevant receipt in income and payment of due tax, were fulfilled. The Tribunal did not adjudicate the underlying liability on merits and directed verification of the statutory conditions. [Paras 7]
The impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded to the Assessing Officer; if the conditions of the first proviso to section 201(1) are satisfied, the assessee cannot be saddled with liability under sections 201(1) and 201(1A).
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes by setting aside the order and remanding the matter for verification under the first proviso to section 201(1).
Issues: Whether the enhanced stamp valuation prevailing at registration could be adopted under section 50C where the consideration had been fixed and partly received through banking channels substantially before registration.
Analysis: The statutory rehabilitation process, contemporaneous resolutions of both transferor and transferee, advance payments through banking channels, and subsequent sale deeds reflecting the identical aggregate consideration constituted a continuous chain establishing that consideration had been fixed and acted upon before the increase in guideline value. The beneficial proviso to section 50C(1), having retrospective application, addresses hardship caused by an increase in stamp valuation between the date of agreement and registration. A formal bilateral agreement was not indispensable in the peculiar facts, where the substance and contemporaneous conduct conclusively established the prior fixation of consideration. The later valuation determination could not retrospectively enhance the deemed consideration.
Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to apply the stamp valuation relevant to the date when consideration was fixed and acted upon; the addition towards differential long-term capital gains under section 50C was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Addition towards difference in Long-Term Capital Gains by invoking section 50C - adoption of enhanced stamp valuation prevailing at registration - Stamp valuation on date of agreement for land transfer
Applicability of the proviso to section 50C(1) to land transferred under a rehabilitation arrangement where the consideration was fixed and partly acted upon before registration - HELD THAT: - The proviso to section 50C(1) is intended to prevent artificial enhancement of deemed consideration where stamp valuation increases after the consideration has been fixed and before registration. Though no conventional bilateral agreement for sale was executed, the statutory rehabilitation proceedings identifying the property and consideration, corresponding resolutions of the transferor and transferee, receipt of advance through banking channels, and the final sanctioned scheme constituted a continuous and contemporaneous chain establishing that the consideration had crystallised before registration. The subsequent enhancement of guideline value and the later determination by the stamp authority could not retrospectively alter that agreed consideration; nor was there independent valuation material establishing a higher actual fair market value.
The Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. Vummudi Amarendran [2020 (10) TMI 517 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] has held that the proviso to section 50C(1), which enables adoption of the stamp valuation as on the date of agreement where the date of agreement and registration are different, is a beneficial provision intended to relieve hardship and is to be given retrospective effect. The said principle supports the assessee's contention that the substance of the transaction and the date on which the consideration was fixed and acted upon are material considerations while applying section 50C of the Act.[Paras 70, 71, 72, 73, 74]
The assessee was entitled to adoption of the stamp valuation relevant to the date on which the consideration was fixed and acted upon, and the addition to long-term capital gains made under section 50C was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed on merits and the addition to long-term capital gains under section 50C was deleted. The challenge to the reopening was left unadjudicated as academic.
Issues: (i) Whether the interest paid on fixed-rate masala bonds was correctly benchmarked using an internal comparable uncontrolled price; (ii) Whether the transfer-pricing adjustment for technical consultancy and intra-group services could be determined at nil on the ground that the services were shareholder activities or inadequately evidenced.
Issue (i): Whether the interest paid on fixed-rate masala bonds was correctly benchmarked using an internal comparable uncontrolled price.
Analysis: Rule 10B recognises both internal and external uncontrolled comparables. Where a reliable uncontrolled transaction of the same enterprise is available, it ordinarily affords a higher degree of comparability than an external comparable. The bonds were issued at fixed rates, while the benchmarking adopted by the revenue authorities relied on floating external lending rates. The internal comparable, based on the borrower's bank borrowings in the years in which the bonds were issued, was consistent with the fixed-rate terms and the relevant credit profile.
Conclusion: The internal comparable uncontrolled price was the appropriate benchmark, and the adjustment for interest on masala bonds was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the transfer-pricing adjustment for technical consultancy and intra-group services could be determined at nil on the ground that the services were shareholder activities or inadequately evidenced.
Analysis: The specialised operational and maintenance support, technical advice, knowledge-sharing, systems support and related assistance rendered to the power plants did not constitute shareholder activities merely because the service provider was an associated enterprise. The material established the business need, actual rendition and receipt of the services, and the relevant costs and mark-up. Having adopted the comparable uncontrolled price method, an arm's length price of nil could not be fixed without uncontrolled comparables supporting that conclusion. Acceptance of services only to the extent of expenses subjected to GST and TDS was also unsustainable.
Conclusion: The services were not shareholder activities and their arm's length price could not be determined at nil; the adjustment for technical consultancy and intra-group services was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing additions relating to masala-bond interest and technical and intra-group services do not survive, while the claim for tax deducted at source credit requires verification in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: A reliable internal uncontrolled comparable must be preferred over an external comparable, and intra-group services demonstrably received for business purposes cannot be assigned a nil arm's length price without supporting comparable evidence.
TP Adjustment - Internal CUP for benchmarking interest on Masala Bonds - Arm's length price of intra-group technical consultancy services - Interest u/s 234C on returned income
Internal CUP for benchmarking interest on Masala Bonds - Fixed-rate unsecured borrowings - Benchmarking of interest paid on fixed-rate Masala Bonds by reference to internal comparable uncontrolled transactions - HELD THAT: - Where data concerning an internal comparable uncontrolled transaction is available, it has a higher degree of comparability and should be preferred to an external comparable. The fixed-rate Masala Bonds were issued in the same period in which the comparable borrowings were undertaken, and the adoption of a floating external benchmark was inconsistent with the strict comparability required under the CUP method. [Paras 20, 21]
The Internal CUP adopted for benchmarking the interest on Masala Bonds was accepted and the transfer-pricing adjustment was deleted.
Arm's length price of intra-group technical consultancy services - Shareholder activities - Nil ALP determination - Transfer-pricing adjustment for technical consultancy and intra-group services received from the associated enterprise - HELD THAT: - The specialised technical services relating to operation and maintenance of the power plants did not constitute shareholder activities. The assessee established the need for, rendition of, and receipt of the services through agreements and supporting material. Having accepted the CUP method, the Transfer Pricing Officer could not determine the ALP at nil without bringing comparable uncontrolled transactions on record; once services were received, their ALP could not be fixed at nil. [Paras 34, 35]
The transfer-pricing adjustment in respect of technical consultancy and intra-group services was deleted.
TDS credit subject to factual verification - Claim for credit of tax deducted at source - HELD THAT: - The grant of TDS credit required factual verification. [Paras 37]
The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer to grant TDS credit in accordance with law after verification.
Interest under section 234C on returned income - Levy of interest for deferment of advance tax on assessed income. - HELD THAT: - Interest under section 234C is chargeable only on the returned income and not on the assessed income. [Paras 38]
The ground concerning interest under section 234C was disposed of accordingly.
Prematurity of challenge to initiation of penalty proceedings - Challenge to the initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A. - HELD THAT: - A challenge to the mere initiation of penalty proceedings was premature at this stage. [Paras 39]
The challenge to initiation of penalty proceedings was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing adjustments relating to interest on Masala Bonds and technical consultancy and intra-group services were deleted. The claim for TDS credit was restored for verification, while interest under section 234C was directed to be computed only on returned income.
Issues: (i) Whether an appeal filed with an unexplained delay of 87 days could be admitted; (ii) Whether a former director of a struck-off company could maintain an appeal in his individual name against an assessment and appellate order passed against the company.
Issue (i): Whether an appeal filed with an unexplained delay of 87 days could be admitted.
Analysis: Admission of a delayed appeal under Section 253(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires sufficient cause for the delay. No condonation application, affidavit, explanation, or supporting material was furnished despite notice of the defect.
Conclusion: The unexplained delay was not condoned; this issue was against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether a former director of a struck-off company could maintain an appeal in his individual name against an assessment and appellate order passed against the company.
Analysis: The right under Section 253(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is available to an assessee aggrieved by the challenged order. The assessment and appellate order concerned the company, while no order imposed personal liability upon the former director. The striking-off provisions under Sections 248(6), 248(7) and 250 of the Companies Act, 2013 preserve liabilities but do not independently confer a right upon a former director to challenge the company's assessment personally. No authority to represent the company or foundational assessment order was produced.
Conclusion: The former director lacked locus standi and the appeal was not maintainable; this issue was against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The challenge could not proceed because it was time-barred and was instituted by a person not shown to be legally entitled to contest the company's assessment.
Ratio Decidendi: A delayed tax appeal cannot be admitted without sufficient cause, and an appeal against an assessee's assessment may be maintained only by a person against whom the order operates or who is duly authorised to act for that assessee.
Condonation of delay- unexplained delay of 87 days - sufficient cause - Locus standi of former director to appeal against company's assessment
Condonation of delay-sufficient cause - Maintainability of an appeal filed beyond limitation without an application or material showing sufficient cause for delay - HELD THAT: - The statutory power to admit a delayed appeal is exercisable only upon satisfaction that sufficient cause prevented timely filing. As no condonation application, explanation or supporting material was furnished despite notice of the defect, the delay remained unexplained. [Paras 3]
The appeal was held barred by limitation.
Locus standi of former director to appeal against company's assessment - Assessee aggrieved - Maintainability of an appeal by a former director in his individual capacity against an appellate order passed in the company's case - HELD THAT: - A right of appeal belongs to an assessee aggrieved, namely, a person against whom the challenged order operates or whose enforceable liability it determines. A former director acquires no independent right to contest the company's assessment merely because the company was struck off; personal liability must arise under a separate statutory order. No such order, nor any authority to prosecute the appeal for the company, was produced. The absence of the underlying assessment order and requisite clarifications further left the appeal fundamentally defective. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 8]
The appellant lacked locus standi, and the appeal was held not maintainable without examination of the assessment on merits.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed in limine as time-barred, fundamentally defective and not maintainable.
Issues: (i) Whether the revisionary notice and order under Section 263 were without jurisdiction because the officer, after assuming charge as Chief Commissioner, issued the notice and acted in the capacity of Principal Commissioner without a Central Board of Direct Taxes authorisation; (ii) Whether revision under Section 263 was sustainable on the allegation that the Assessing Officer failed to examine the annual letting value of the assessee's properties.
Issue (i): Whether the revisionary notice and order under Section 263 were without jurisdiction because the officer, after assuming charge as Chief Commissioner, issued the notice and acted in the capacity of Principal Commissioner without a Central Board of Direct Taxes authorisation.
Analysis: Although Section 263 permits a Chief Commissioner to exercise revisionary power, the notice was issued by an officer holding formal charge as Chief Commissioner while using the designation and signature of Principal Commissioner. Principal Commissioner and Chief Commissioner are distinct income-tax authorities under Section 116. Exercise by one authority of the functions assigned to another required an express authorisation under Section 120(2), which was absent. A statutory power required to be exercised by a specified authority must be exercised in the prescribed manner.
Conclusion: The revisionary notice was without jurisdiction and the consequential revisionary order was void in law, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether revision under Section 263 was sustainable on the allegation that the Assessing Officer failed to examine the annual letting value of the assessee's properties.
Analysis: The assessment record showed inquiries into the properties, their ownership, use, and annual letting value. Properties genuinely used for the assessee's professional activities did not attract annual letting value under Section 22, and gifted properties were no longer owned by the assessee. The Assessing Officer's acceptance of the disclosed treatment was a plausible view. Explanation 2 to Section 263 did not apply merely because the Principal Commissioner preferred further inquiry; no failure of inquiry, specific error, or material demonstrating prejudice to revenue was established. The revision rested on a change of opinion.
Conclusion: The conditions for revision under Section 263 were not satisfied, and the revision on the annual-letting-value issue was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The assessment order remained legally valid, and the revisionary proceedings had no legal foundation.
Ratio Decidendi: Revisionary jurisdiction cannot be exercised by an authority acting under an incorrect designation without statutory authorisation, and an assessment reached after inquiry on a plausible view cannot be revised merely for further inquiry or change of opinion.
Jurisdictional validity of revision notice issued in incorrect official capacity - Revision for notional annual letting value of professionally used properties
Jurisdictional validity of revision notice issued in incorrect official capacity - Statutory exercise of power by designated authority - Validity of revision proceedings where the show-cause notice was issued in the capacity of Principal Commissioner after the officer had assumed formal posting as Chief Commissioner - HELD THAT: - Though a Chief Commissioner is empowered to exercise revisional power, the notice was issued under the designation of Principal Commissioner after the officer had ceased to hold that charge. An officer of a higher rank could perform the functions of the Principal Commissioner only pursuant to an express Board order under section 120(2), which was absent. Where the statute designates the authority and manner for exercise of power, the power must be exercised accordingly. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12]
The notice was without jurisdiction and the consequential revisional order was quashed.
Revision for notional annual letting value of professionally used properties - Erroneous and prejudicial assessment order - Change of opinion in revision - Validity of revision of the assessment on the allegation that notional annual letting value had not been assessed in respect of properties claimed to have been used for professional purposes - HELD THAT: - The Assessing Officer had made specific inquiries into the disclosed properties, their use and their treatment under the head income from house property, and had adopted a plausible view that the properties were genuinely used for business or professional purposes. The properties transferred by gift were no longer owned by the assessee. The revisional authority neither conducted independent inquiry nor identified material showing why the Assessing Officer's view was erroneous or what further inquiry was required. Explanation 2 to section 263 could not be invoked where inquiry and verification had in fact been made; the revision was founded on a mere change of opinion. [Paras 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]
Independently on merits, the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, and the revision was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the revisional order was quashed for want of jurisdiction. It was also found unsustainable on merits because the assessment had been made after inquiry on a plausible view.
Issues: (i) Whether a further disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income could be made without recording satisfaction regarding the assessee's suo motu disallowance; (ii) Whether the addition for excess share premium could be sustained by rejecting a contemporaneous discounted cash flow valuation on comparison with subsequent actual financial results.
Issue (i): Whether a further disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income could be made without recording satisfaction regarding the assessee's suo motu disallowance.
Analysis: Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 permits determination of disallowable expenditure under the prescribed method only after examination of the accounts and recorded dissatisfaction with the correctness of the assessee's computation. The assessment order did not identify any defect in, or record dissatisfaction with, the suo motu disallowance. Mere computation of a different amount does not fulfil this statutory precondition.
Conclusion: The further disallowance was impermissible and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the addition for excess share premium could be sustained by rejecting a contemporaneous discounted cash flow valuation on comparison with subsequent actual financial results.
Analysis: For valuation under Section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, a discounted cash flow valuation is to be assessed with reference to information and estimates available on the valuation date. Valuation is not an exact science, and subsequent variation between projections and actual results, without a demonstrated material error in the inputs or valuation methodology, cannot justify rejection of the valuation or substitution of the net asset value method. The historical growth and subsequent performance also did not establish that the projections were arbitrary or aggressive.
Conclusion: Rejection of the discounted cash flow valuation and substitution of the net asset value method were unjustified; the addition for excess share premium was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The assessee's suo motu disallowance was accepted, and the share valuation based on the contemporaneous discounted cash flow method was restored for determining the tax consequences of the share issue.
Disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income-recording of satisfaction - Share valuation under discounted cash flow method
Disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income u/s 14A -recording of satisfaction - assessee's suo motu disallowance rejected without recording dissatisfaction from examination of the accounts - HELD THAT: - Recourse to the prescribed method for computing disallowance is available only after the Assessing Officer examines the accounts and records satisfaction that the assessee's computation of expenditure attributable to exempt income is incorrect or inadequate. Mere computation of a different disallowance does not constitute the statutory satisfaction. As no such satisfaction was recorded, the assessee's suo motu disallowance was required to be accepted. [Paras 9, 10, 11]
The further disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was deleted.
Addition for excess share premium u/s 56(2)(viib) - Share valuation under discounted cash flow method - Share premium addition based on subsequent actual results - Addition of share premium on conversion of share warrants by rejecting the discounted cash flow valuation on the basis of subsequent actual financial results and substituting the net asset value method - HELD THAT: - A valuation under the discounted cash flow method must be tested with reference to material and projections available on the valuation date; subsequent actual performance, by itself, cannot justify rejection of the valuation. Valuation is not an exact science and a valuation report cannot be displaced without identifying a specific discrepancy in the data or factors adopted. The past growth and later actual results also showed that the projections could not be treated as inherently aggressive or unrealistic. The Assessing Officer was therefore not justified in rejecting the discounted cash flow valuation and substituting the net asset value method.
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of PCIT vs. A.H. Multisoft (P.) Ltd [2025 (6) TMI 245 - DELHI HIGH COURT] has held that the report of an expert cannot be rejected on the basis of general disclaimers without pointing out any material error in data as used by experts. It has further been held that DCF method of determining valuation of share is not an exact science and can never be done with arithmetic precision and therefore the valuation by the valuer has to be accepted unless specific discrepancy in the figures and factors taken are found.
Also in the case of PCIT v. Cinestaan Entertainment Pvt. Ltd.[2021 (3) TMI 239 - DELHI HIGH COURT] the attempt by the revenue to compare the projections made in the valuation report when compared with the actual results leading to additions u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act was specifically rejected.[Paras 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]
The addition under section 56(2)(viib) was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed. The disallowance relating to exempt income and the addition of share premium were deleted.
Issues: Whether MEIS duty credit scrips received under the Foreign Trade Policy, 2015 are taxable as revenue receipts under Section 2(24)(xviii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 from assessment year 2016-17.
Analysis: The purpose test distinguishes assistance intended to enable profitable conduct of business, which is revenue in character, from assistance tied to setting up or expansion of capital assets, which is capital in character. MEIS rewards offset export-related infrastructural inefficiencies and recurring costs, are computed with reference to export turnover, are available to qualifying exporters generally, and are freely transferable or usable without any mandatory capital application. They are therefore operational assistance for carrying on export business rather than capital assistance.
Analysis: Section 2(24)(xviii) employs inclusive and expansive language covering governmental assistance in specified forms and assistance by whatever name called, subject only to stated exclusions. The phrase cannot be confined through ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis where the legislative intent to cover assistance irrespective of nomenclature is clear. MEIS rewards fall within the descriptions of grant, cash incentive or residuary governmental assistance, and neither exclusion applies because the rewards are not adjusted against the actual cost of a depreciable asset and are not corpus grants to trusts or institutions.
Conclusion: MEIS rewards received under the Foreign Trade Policy, 2015 are taxable as revenue receipts under Section 2(24)(xviii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 from assessment year 2016-17.
MEIS rewards under the Foreign Trade Policy, 2015 - nature of benefit received - revenue or capital receipts - Scope of government assistance "by whatever name called" - Purpose test for export incentives
Taxability of duty credit scrips received as rewards under the Merchandise Exports from India Scheme under the amended definition of income - HELD THAT: - Under the purpose test, MEIS rewards offset costs and infrastructural inefficiencies incidental to export activity and enable exporters to carry on their business more profitably. The rewards are computed with reference to exports already made, are recurring, freely transferable and usable, and are neither linked to capital investment, establishment or expansion of a unit nor subject to mandatory application towards a capital purpose. Further, the expression "assistance ... by whatever name called" in section 2(24)(xviii) is deliberately wide and is not confined by ejusdem generis where the legislative intent is clear. A MEIS reward falls within the statutory descriptions of governmental assistance, including grant or cash incentive, and does not attract either specified exclusion. [Paras 80, 81, 82, 83, 84]
MEIS rewards are taxable as revenue receipts and form part of income under section 2(24)(xviii) from assessment year 2016-17.
Final Conclusion: The question was answered in the affirmative: MEIS assistance received under the Foreign Trade Policy, 2015 is taxable as a revenue receipt from assessment year 2016-17. The appeals were directed to be placed before the regular Bench for disposal according to law.
Issues: Whether a Mono Ethylene Glycol Reclamation Plant, classified under Chapter 84 and used for offshore and onshore petroleum operations, qualified for exemption under Serial No. 404 read with Serial No. 4 of List 33 of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs for the period before creation of a specific entry in 2024.
Analysis: Serial No. 404 grants exemption to goods described in column 3 of List 33, provided they fall within the chapters, headings, sub-headings or tariff items specified in column 2 of the main notification and satisfy the prescribed conditions. The notification does not require the goods also to conform to the heading stated in column 2 of List 33. The relevant condition was met because the plant fell within Chapter 84, was imported by a specified person, and was used for petroleum operations under the New Exploration Licensing Policy.
Analysis: The description at Serial No. 4 of List 33, covering equipment or units for specialised services for offshore and onshore petroleum operations, has a scope wider than tariff heading 8430. Reading the List 33 heading as a restrictive condition would render the separate description of specialised-service equipment ineffective. The sector regulator's certification of the plant's end use and the Tax Research Unit clarification addressing mismatches between listed descriptions and tariff headings supported this construction.
Analysis: The later insertion of a specific entry for the plant operated prospectively and did not exclude goods otherwise covered by the pre-existing general description. As the exemption entry was unambiguous and served the beneficial purpose of facilitating petroleum exploration, production and processing, the rule favouring Revenue where an exemption notification is ambiguous was inapplicable.
Conclusion: The plant was eligible for the exemption under Serial No. 404 read with Serial No. 4 of List 33 of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs for the relevant pre-amendment period, in favour of the assessee.
Customs exemption for specialised petroleum-operation equipment - Construction of exemption entry by description of goods
Eligibility of MEG Reclamation Plant for petroleum-operation exemption - Relevance of tariff heading in List 33 - Eligibility of a Mono Ethylene Glycol Reclamation Plant, imported for offshore and onshore petroleum operations, for exemption exemption in terms of S.No.4 of list 33 of Notification No. 50/2017-Cus dt.30.06.2017 (S.No.404), as amended or otherwise.
HELD THAT: - The exemption under Serial No. 404 extends to goods described in column 3 of List 33 which also fall within the chapters, headings, sub-headings or tariff items specified in column 2 of the main table. It does not require conformity with the heading shown in column 2 of List 33. The plant, falling within Chapter 84 and admittedly imported by a specified person for petroleum operations, answered the description of equipment or units for specialised services for offshore and onshore petroleum operations. The regulatory certification and the TRU clarification supported this construction. The subsequent creation of a specific entry for the plant did not exclude its earlier coverage under the general entry; nor was there any ambiguity attracting strict construction against the importer. The entry, intended to promote petroleum and natural-gas exploration, production and processing, was also held to be a beneficial exemption.
Reliance placed by the Original Authority as well as the department in the present appeal in the case of CC (Import), Mumbai Vs Dilip Kumar & Company [2018 (7) TMI 1826 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] is also not applicable to the facts of the case. [Paras 34, 35, 39, 42, 50]
The plant was eligible for the claimed exemption during the relevant period, and the departmental appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The departmental appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's entitlement to exemption for the imported MEG Reclamation Plant under Serial No. 404 read with List 33 was sustained.
Issues: Whether Bills of Entry may be amended after clearance to claim preferential customs-duty exemption on production of a retroactively issued Certificate of Origin under the India-Japan CEPA.
Analysis: Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 must be read harmoniously with the Customs Tariff (Determination of Origin of Goods under CEPA between the Republic of India and Japan) Rules, 2011. Sl. No. 3(c) of Appendix-A to Annexure-2 expressly permits an importer who did not possess a Certificate of Origin at importation to seek refund of excess duty by subsequently presenting a Certificate of Origin issued in accordance with the prescribed procedure. A certificate validly issued retrospectively under the CEPA framework supports the preferential tariff claim and requires consideration for reassessment of the Bills of Entry.
Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to have the retroactively issued Certificate of Origin considered and to claim the benefit under Notification No. 34/2018-Customs dated 27.03.2018; the matter requires reassessment by the adjudicating authority.
Post-clearance amendment of Bills of Entry for preferential tariff benefit - Retroactively issued certificate of origin under India-Japan CEPA - entitlement to benefit of the Notification No.34/2018-Customs dated 27.03.2018.
Whether amendment to Bills of entries can be allowed to extend the benefit of exemption Notification if the certificate as required under the exemption notification is produced at a belated stage? - HELD THAT: - Appendix-A to Annexure-2 of the CEPA Rules permits an importer who did not possess a Certificate of Origin at importation to seek refund of excess duty upon producing the certificate and relevant documents. Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 must be read harmoniously with those Rules, which permit submission of the Certificate of Origin with retrospective effect from the date of clearance. [Paras 16, 17]
The matter was remanded to the adjudicating authority to consider the Certificate of Origin, reassess the Bills of Entry, and allow the claim for concessional duty under the exemption notification, if admissible.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of by remanding the matter for reassessment after consideration of the retroactively issued Certificate of Origin and the claimed preferential tariff benefit.
Issues: Whether the Director Identification Number could be shown as disqualified under Section 164(2)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013 without complying with Rule 11 of the Companies (Appointment of Directors) Rules, 2014 and without affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.
Analysis: Section 164 of the Companies Act, 2013 prescribes disqualifications for appointment or reappointment of directors; it does not authorise deactivation of a Director Identification Number. Deactivation is governed by Rule 11 of the Companies (Appointment of Directors) Rules, 2014. The authorities did not establish compliance with Rule 11. Their reliance on an internal communication asserting disqualification under Section 164(2)(a) was unsubstantiated, as it had neither been supplied to the petitioner nor uploaded on the Ministry's website. The website reflected disqualification under Section 164(2)(b), and no opportunity of hearing had been afforded before recording that status. Principles of natural justice required such opportunity.
Conclusion: The website notice recording the Director Identification Number as disqualified under Section 164(2)(b) was invalid and was quashed.
Status of Director Identification Number - deactivation under section 164 - Natural justice denied - hearing before DIN deactivation
Validity of showing the petitioner's DIN status as disqualified under section 164(2)(b), without notice or an opportunity of hearing and without compliance with the prescribed grounds for DIN deactivation - HELD THAT: - The website notice expressly reflected disqualification under section 164(2)(b). The authorities' assertion that the action was under section 164(2)(a) rested on an internal communication which was neither supplied to the petitioner nor uploaded on the Ministry's website. Section 164 concerns disqualification for appointment as director and does not provide for deactivation of DIN; such deactivation is governed by Rule 11 of the Companies (Appointment of Directors) Rules, 2014, compliance with which was not established. In the absence of a hearing, the impugned action could not be sustained.
In the case of Imraj Ali Molla [2020 (3) TMI 1060 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] and Jai Shankar Agrahari [2020 (4) TMI 354 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] the Coordinate Bench and the Hon’ble Division Bench of Allahabad High Court held that an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner is required but in the present case admittedly no opportunity of hearing has been provided and it is the specific case of the respondent authorities that the opportunity of hearing is not required as the respondent authorities have invoked the provision of Section 164(2)(a).[Paras 13, 15, 16, 17, 18]
The impugned website notice showing the DIN status as disqualified under section 164(2)(b) was quashed, without prejudice to lawful action by the authorities.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by quashing the impugned DIN-disqualification notice, while leaving the authorities free to proceed in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether the CIRP could be brought to an end in the exceptional circumstances where all creditors' claims stood settled or were agreed to be settled, but withdrawal under the prescribed Section 12A mechanism was impracticable because the CIRP costs remained undetermined and Form FA with the requisite bank guarantee could not be furnished.
Analysis: Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 read with Regulation 30A of the Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons Regulations, 2016 ordinarily requires a withdrawal proposal through the initiating applicant in Form FA, supported by the prescribed approval and security towards CIRP costs. The earlier withdrawal request did not fulfil those requirements. Subsequently, however, the sole financial creditor was paid in full, the operational creditor agreed to accept an enhanced full-and-final settlement, no resolution plan was available, and the appellant gave a binding undertaking to pay CIRP costs as determined in the pending cost-determination proceedings. The uncrystallised CIRP costs and the operational creditor's unwillingness to provide the bank guarantee created a procedural stalemate, making the statutory withdrawal route infeasible. Continued CIRP in those circumstances would not advance the insolvency resolution objective and would only increase CIRP costs.
Conclusion: In the peculiar circumstances, the inability to complete the formal Section 12A withdrawal process did not warrant continuation of the CIRP after settlement of creditor claims and protection of the Resolution Professional's entitlement to CIRP costs through their adjudication and payment.
Closure of CIRP where statutory withdrawal procedure is infeasible - Determination of CIRP costs - Closure of the CIRP where withdrawal u/s 12A read with Regulation 30A could not be effectuated because CIRP costs remained uncrystallised and the prescribed Form FA and bank guarantee could not be furnished
HELD THAT: - Though the statutory requirements for withdrawal could not ordinarily be disregarded, all creditor claims had been settled or were subject to an accepted full and final settlement, and the appellant had undertaken to pay the CIRP costs as determined by the Adjudicating Authority. As the operational creditor would not furnish the bank guarantee and the CIRP costs were pending determination, the statutory withdrawal mechanism was not feasible. In the absence of a resolution plan, continuation of the CIRP would serve no insolvency-resolution purpose and would only increase costs. [Paras 29, 30, 32, 33]
The CIRP was closed subject to payment of the agreed settlement to the operational creditor and payment of CIRP costs after their determination by the Adjudicating Authority.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of by closing the CIRP on the agreed settlement terms, while preserving determination and payment of the CIRP costs by the Adjudicating Authority.
Issues: Whether the personal guarantor's application under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was a bona fide invocation of the personal insolvency resolution process or an abuse of the interim moratorium to obstruct enforcement proceedings.
Analysis: Section 94 permits a personal guarantor in default to initiate an insolvency resolution process and submit a repayment plan, while Section 96 provides an interim moratorium. The process is intended for genuine resolution and cannot be used merely as a device to impede a financial creditor's lawful enforcement of security. The first application was withdrawn after the guarantor had received the benefit of interim moratorium for about two years. The second application was filed immediately after a fresh possession notice was issued following cessation of that moratorium, and no genuine repayment effort was made during the intervening period. The timing and conduct established that both applications were intended to stall possession and recovery proceedings rather than resolve the guarantor's insolvency.
Conclusion: The Section 94 application was rightly rejected as an abuse of the insolvency process and interim moratorium, against the personal guarantor.
Personal guarantor's insolvency resolution application - Misuse of interim moratorium to stall secured-asset enforcement
Bona fides of the personal guarantor's applications for insolvency resolution filed following possession notices for enforcement of secured assets - HELD THAT: - An application by a personal guarantor is intended to initiate a structured insolvency resolution process through a repayment plan, and cannot be used as a device to obtain an interim moratorium for frustrating creditor enforcement. The appellant had not attempted repayment after the demand notice or during the subsistence of the interim moratorium under the first application; both applications were filed immediately upon steps for taking physical possession. The timing and conduct established that the applications were intended to stall the secured creditor's recovery proceedings, rather than to secure genuine insolvency resolution.
The Appellant/Personal Guarantor has not attempted repayment in the two years after the demand notice sent by financial creditor, nor in the proceedings of first PIRP and It was only upon receipt of the possession notice, he rushed to file the Section 94 petitions on both occasions. This clearly shows that the petitions are not a bona fide attempt of resolution but an attempt to misuse the interim moratorium under Section 96 to stall SARFAESI proceedings and shield the secured asset.
Therefore, in our considered opinion, it has been rightly held by the learned adjudicating authority that the purpose of filing both the petitions under Section 94 of the Code by the applicant was not for repayment of the loan, rather, the same was for obtaining an interim moratorium to frustrate the possession-taking process initiated by the financial creditor and the Learned Adjudicating Authority has rightly held that the ratio of Syed Sirajis Salikin Khadari [2025 (4) TMI 1545 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI - LB] is squarely applicable to the facts of this case.
We recall that section 94 of the Code has been enacted for the benefit of those personal guarantors who are genuinely interested in the PIRP and in submitting repayment plan. However, the said process may not be allowed to be misused by those personal guarantors who are using the same only as a shield to frustrate the recovery proceedings initiated by the financial creditors for enforcement of their security interest. [Paras 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]
The rejection of the second application was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, the applications having been found to be a misuse of the interim moratorium mechanism to obstruct enforcement of the secured assets rather than a bona fide attempt at insolvency resolution.
Issues: Whether a woman accused of money laundering is exempt from the twin conditions for bail under the first proviso to Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and whether regular bail should be granted on the facts of the case.
Analysis: The first proviso to Section 45(1) exempts every woman accused from the statutory twin conditions without permitting sub-classification based on education, status, or professional standing. The expression "may be" makes the proviso enabling and discretionary, not an automatic entitlement to bail. The exemption is confined to the twin conditions; ordinary bail considerations, including the prima facie case, gravity, attributed role, likelihood of absconding, and possibility of witness or evidence tampering, continue to apply. The protective dispensation is consistent with substantive equality and the protection available to women under Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The petitioner had undergone more than seven months of custody; the prosecution complaint had been filed and no further custodial interrogation was shown to be necessary. With 73 proposed witnesses and voluminous documentary material, the trial at the pre-cognizance stage was unlikely to conclude soon. The record did not disclose tangible material establishing flight risk, vulnerable witnesses, or a likelihood of interference with evidence, which was substantially documentary and electronic and already in the investigating agency's custody.
Conclusion: The statutory discretion under the first proviso to Section 45(1) was exercisable in favour of the petitioner, and regular bail was warranted subject to protective conditions.
Regular bail to woman accused under PMLA - First proviso to section 45(1) PMLA - Exemption from twin conditions - Discretionary bail - General bail considerations
What are the parameters for granting regular bail to a woman – accused under the PMLA? - HELD THAT: - The first proviso to section 45(1) exempts every woman accused from the statutory twin conditions, without permitting sub-classification based on education, social standing or professional status. The proviso is, however, enabling and discretionary; it does not create an automatic or indefeasible right to bail.
Upon displacement of the twin conditions, the Court must apply the ordinary principles of bail, including the prima facie case, attributed role, gravity, likelihood of absconding, witness influence and the prospect of trial concluding within a reasonable time. In the present case, the prosecution complaint had been filed, further custodial interrogation was not required, the material was substantially documentary and electronic, and no tangible basis was shown for flight risk or witness influence. The prolonged custody and the remote prospect of an early trial, having regard to the extensive prosecution material and witnesses, warranted release. [Paras 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]
Regular bail was granted subject to conditions intended to secure the petitioner's presence, prevent misuse of liberty or tampering with evidence, and preserve the integrity of the trial.
Final Conclusion: The petition for regular bail was allowed on the basis of the statutory dispensation available to a woman accused, the completed investigation, prolonged custody, and absence of tangible material establishing flight risk or likelihood of witness influence.
Issues: Whether confirmation of the provisional attachment was sustainable when the statutory requirement that the proceeds of crime were likely to be concealed, transferred or otherwise dealt with so as to frustrate confiscation proceedings was not established.
Analysis: The attached properties had been mortgaged to the secured creditors before the provisional attachment. An interim restraint against creation of third-party rights was already operating, and the record disclosed neither an auction notice under the SARFAESI regime nor execution proceedings resulting in attachment or sale of the properties. These circumstances did not support a reasonable apprehension that the properties would be dealt with so as to frustrate confiscation. The pending insolvency proceedings were relevant only to preserve an orderly resolution of competing rights.
Conclusion: The condition under Section 5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was not satisfied; consequently, confirmation of the provisional attachment was unsustainable, with the properties remaining governed by the final outcome of the pending insolvency proceedings.
Provisional attachment - likelihood of concealment, transfer or dealing with proceeds of crime
Validity of provisional attachment of mortgaged properties where an interim restraint against creation of third-party rights was already operative and no recovery action for their sale had been commenced - HELD THAT: - Provisional attachment requires recorded material establishing that the proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or otherwise dealt with so as to frustrate confiscation. The existing restraint against creation of third-party rights, coupled with the absence of any auction notice under the secured-recovery process or execution order for sale in arbitration proceedings, did not support the requisite apprehension. The Tribunal confined its determination to this statutory defect and left the issue whether the attached properties constituted proceeds of crime to the separate appeals of the respondent companies. [Paras 19, 21, 22]
The confirmation order and provisional attachment were set aside, subject to the properties remaining governed by the final outcome of the insolvency proceedings.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of by setting aside the impugned order for non-fulfilment of the statutory condition for provisional attachment, while preserving the effect of the pending insolvency proceedings.
Issues: Whether provisional attachment of the mortgaged property was valid under Section 5(1)(b) where pre-existing judicial and insolvency proceedings prevented its alienation or transfer.
Analysis: Provisional attachment requires a reasonable apprehension that the person concerned is likely to deal with or alienate the property so as to frustrate confiscation proceedings. A pre-existing interim restraint against creation of third-party rights had already been passed in respect of the property before the attachment. Further, insolvency proceedings concerning the secured debt had been admitted, placing the dealing with the property under the applicable insolvency process. These circumstances negated any apprehension of alienation or transfer capable of frustrating confiscation.
Conclusion: The requirement under Section 5(1)(b) was not satisfied; the provisional attachment and its confirmation were unsustainable. The finding is in favour of the appellant.
Provisional attachment of the mortgaged property - apprehension of alienation to frustrate confiscation proceedings
Validity of provisional attachment of the mortgaged property in the absence of apprehension that it would be dealt with or alienated so as to frustrate confiscation proceedings - HELD THAT: - Provisional attachment may be invoked only where there is a likelihood that the person concerned will deal with or alienate the property so as to frustrate confiscation proceedings. A pre-existing interim restraint against creation of third-party rights, followed by admission of proceedings before the NCLT, negatived such apprehension in respect of the property. [Paras 33, 34]
The confirmation of the provisional attachment was set aside; however, the property remains subject to the final outcome of the proceedings before the NCLT.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of by setting aside the impugned order confirming the provisional attachment, subject to the property's continuing subjection to the final outcome of the NCLT proceedings.
Issues: (i) Whether Revenue could challenge the Tribunal's identical ruling after accepting the same ruling in the case of a similarly situated assessee; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the service-tax demand.
Issue (i): Whether Revenue could challenge the Tribunal's identical ruling after accepting the same ruling in the case of a similarly situated assessee.
Analysis: The material particulars, including the show-cause notice, adjudication order, amalgamation date, demand period, computation and basis on which the Tribunal allowed the appeals, were substantially identical. Acceptance of the Tribunal's ruling in the comparable matter while challenging it in the present matter was inconsistent with fairness and equality in revenue administration.
Conclusion: Revenue could not adopt divergent positions on materially identical facts; the issue is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the service-tax demand.
Analysis: Invocation of the extended limitation period requires specific allegations and proof of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. The material did not establish such conduct by the assessee, and the demand-cum-show-cause notice was issued nearly two years after the relevant transaction.
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was unavailable, and the demand was time-barred; the issue is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The time-barred demand cannot be sustained, and the Tribunal's determination remains legally effective.
Ratio Decidendi: Revenue must maintain consistency in cases involving materially identical facts, and an extended limitation period requires specific allegations and proof of suppression or other prescribed conduct coupled with intent to evade duty.
Consistency in Revenue litigation - Extended limitation for service-tax demand
Consistency in Revenue litigation - Revenue challenge to the Tribunal's limitation ruling after acceptance of an identical ruling concerning a similarly situated assessee - HELD THAT: - The material dates, demand period, computation and the Tribunal's ground for allowing the appeals were substantially identical in both matters. Having accepted the Tribunal's decision in the analogous case, the Revenue could not adopt a contrary stand in the present case; such inconsistency would offend fairness and equity in revenue matters. [Paras 10, 12]
The Revenue was not permitted to challenge the identical Tribunal ruling in the present case after accepting it in the analogous case.
Extended limitation for service-tax demand - Invocation of the extended limitation period for service-tax demand arising from manufacture of alcoholic beverages under the arrangement with the brand owner - HELD THAT: - Invocation of the extended period requires proof of fraud, collusion, or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. As the Revenue failed to establish any such conduct by the assessee, the extended limitation period was unavailable and the demand notice was time-barred. [Paras 15, 16, 17]
The Tribunal's finding that the demand was barred by limitation was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue appeal was dismissed, the demand having been held time-barred and the Revenue having impermissibly taken an inconsistent stand in an identical matter. No substantial question of law arose.
Issues: (i) Whether service tax can be levied on sale of goods component as indicated in the impugned orders? (ii) Whether the petitioner in W.P. No. 29162/2025 is entitled to exemption from service tax? (iii) Whether the demands are barred by limitation under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994?
Issue (i): Whether service tax can be levied on sale of goods component as indicated in the impugned orders?
Analysis: A transfer of title in goods and a deemed sale under Article 366(29A) fall outside the definition of service. In a works contract, only the service portion is taxable; Rule 2A requires exclusion of the value of goods transferred, including the value on which VAT or sales tax has been paid. The material showed that the goods component had been subjected to sales tax/VAT and, where a service component existed, service tax had been discharged.
Conclusion: Service tax cannot be levied on the sale-of-goods component of the contracts. The issue is decided in favour of the assessees.
Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner in W.P. No. 29162/2025 is entitled to exemption from service tax?
Analysis: Notification No. 25/2012-ST exempts specified construction and irrigation works provided to a governmental authority. The recipient was a Government-controlled body satisfying the definition of governmental authority. Lift-irrigation works foster economic and social development and relate to functions entrusted to municipalities under Article 243W and the Twelfth Schedule. Once the activity squarely falls within the exemption, the notification receives a workable and liberal application.
Conclusion: Lift-irrigation works executed for the governmental authority qualify for the service-tax exemption. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the demands are barred by limitation under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994?
Analysis: The extended limitation period requires a positive and wilful act of fraud, collusion, misstatement, or suppression with intent to evade tax; it cannot rest upon a bona fide interpretative claim for exemption or on information already disclosed through returns and tax records. The notices for the relevant financial years were issued beyond the normal 30-month period, without the jurisdictional fact of wilful suppression. Following remand in the second matter, the remaining question concerned inclusion of VAT-paid pump value in taxable service value and did not warrant invocation of the extended period.
Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable and the demands are time-barred. The issue is decided in favour of the assessees.
Final Conclusion: The service-tax liability asserted on the impugned basis is unsustainable because goods value is outside the taxable service component, the lift-irrigation works are exempt, and the extended limitation period is inapplicable.
Service tax on sale of goods in works contracts - Exemption for lift irrigation works rendered to governmental authority - Extended limitation for wilful suppression
Service tax on sale of goods in works contracts - Valuation of service portion in works contracts - Levy of service tax on the sale-of-goods component of lift irrigation works and supply-and-installation contracts - HELD THAT: - A transfer of title in goods, including a deemed sale in a works contract, falls outside the definition of service. Service tax is confined to the service portion of a works contract, and the valuation mechanism specifically excludes the value of goods transferred, on which sales tax or VAT is payable. The material showed that sales tax had been paid on the goods component and, where a service component existed, service tax had been discharged; the authorities had ignored the invoices, returns and reconciliation produced by the petitioners. [Paras 8]
The sale-of-goods component could not be subjected to service tax, and the demands founded on inclusion of that component were unsustainable.
Exemption for lift irrigation works rendered to governmental authority - Interpretation of exemption notifications - Eligibility of lift irrigation works for exemption as services rendered to a governmental authority - HELD THAT: - A body established by Government with the requisite Government participation or control, which performs functions entrusted to municipalities under Article 243W, is a governmental authority for the exemption. The notification does not require that such body itself be a municipality. Lift irrigation projects intended to foster economic and social development fall within the relevant municipal functions, including planning for economic and social development and water supply. Once the project was found to fall within the exemption, the notification was to receive a workable and liberal application. [Paras 9]
The lift irrigation works were held exempt from service tax.
Extended limitation for wilful suppression - Limitation for service tax demand - Invocation of the extended limitation period for service tax demands founded on the claimed exemption and information reflected in Form 26AS. - HELD THAT: - A claim to exemption involves an interpretative question and does not, by itself, establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade tax. The extended period requires wilful suppression or another specified positive act; it cannot be invoked merely because the department relied upon Form 26AS or alleged non-payment. In the first petition, the notice was issued beyond the normal period of thirty months. In the second petition, following remand, the surviving question concerned inclusion of the value of pumps on which VAT had been paid, and the ingredients for the extended period were absent. [Paras 9]
The extended period was unavailable, and the show-cause notice and consequential demands were barred by limitation.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were allowed. The impugned service-tax orders and show-cause notice were set aside and quashed.
Issues: (i) Whether the service tax demand confirmed in the impugned order is sustainable on merits? (ii) Whether the extended period and the consequential interest, late fee and penalties are sustainable?
Issue (i): Whether the service tax demand confirmed in the impugned order is sustainable on merits?
Analysis: Under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, service tax liability requires identification and classification of the taxable service and determination of taxable value. Discrepancies between financial statements, income-tax records and ST-3 returns may warrant inquiry but cannot, without correlation to underlying agreements, invoices, work orders and contemporaneous records, establish that receipts are consideration for taxable services. The demand substantially rested on such accounting differences, while the explanations and reconciliation material were not objectively verified. The materially identical earlier decision concerning the same assessee was followed in the absence of any demonstrated distinguishing fact or contrary higher authority. The admitted amount was separately identifiable.
Conclusion: The disputed demand is unsustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee; service tax of Rs.8,96,535, being the admitted liability, is sustained with applicable interest under Section 75 of the Finance Act, 1994, subject to adjustment of amounts already paid.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended period and the consequential interest, late fee and penalties are sustainable?
Analysis: The proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires proof of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax before the extended period may be invoked. The proceedings arose from the assessee's disclosed statutory and financial records, without incriminating material or independent evidence of deliberate concealment. Transitional arrangements for ST-3 returns also meant that delay or discrepancies in return filing could not by themselves establish suppression. The earlier decision on substantially identical facts also precluded invocation of the extended period. As the statutory ingredients for suppression were not established, penalty under Section 78 could not be sustained.
Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period and penalty under Section 78 are unsustainable in favour of the assessee; interest remains payable only on the admitted service-tax liability.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order stands modified so that only the admitted tax liability, with statutory interest, survives, while the unestablished demand and suppression-based penal consequence do not.
Ratio Decidendi: A service-tax demand and extended limitation cannot rest solely on accounting discrepancies in disclosed records; the Department must establish taxable service, taxable value, and, for the extended period, deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax.
Service tax demand based on accounting discrepancies - Extended period for suppression with intent to evade service tax - Penalty for suppression of service tax
Service tax demand based on accounting discrepancies - Identification and classification of taxable service - Sustainability of service tax demand founded on differences between the Balance Sheet, Income Tax records and ST-3 Returns - HELD THAT: - Service tax liability can be confirmed only after identification and classification of the taxable service and determination of its taxable value. Accounting differences may warrant investigation but cannot, without correlation to the underlying agreements, invoices, work orders and contemporaneous records, establish that the receipts were consideration for taxable services.
The earlier decision in the appellant's own case [2023 (11) TMI 15 - CESTAT CHENNAI]on materially identical facts was followed, no material distinction having been shown.
Revenue’s approach is directly contrary to the decision of this Tribunal in CCE & ST, Pondicherry v. A.M. Manickam & Others [2017 (6) TMI 57 - CESTAT CHENNAI] wherein it was held that a Show Cause Notice must clearly identify the taxable services, specify the appropriate taxable category and disclose the basis of computation of the demand. A vague or omnibus demand founded merely on financial statements without proper classification cannot be sustained. The ratio squarely applies here, where the Department has proceeded on consolidated figures derived from the Balance Sheet and Income Tax records without first determining the taxable value relatable to each taxable service. [Paras 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]
The disputed service tax demand was set aside; the service tax liability recorded as admitted was sustained with applicable interest, subject to adjustment of any amount already paid.
Extended period for suppression with intent to evade service tax - Penalty for suppression of service tax - Invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalty for the alleged short-payment of service tax - HELD THAT: - The extended period requires proof of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade tax, the burden of which rests on the Department. As the demand was founded on the appellant's disclosed Balance Sheet, Income Tax records and ST-3 Returns, without independent evidence of deliberate concealment, the statutory ingredients for invoking the extended period were not established. The admitted liability and delay in filing returns did not, by themselves, establish the requisite intent for penalty. [Paras 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]
The extended period was held inapplicable and the penalty under Section 78 was set aside; interest remained payable on the admitted service tax liability.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. The admitted service tax liability with applicable interest was sustained, while the balance demand and the penalty under Section 78 were set aside.
Issues: Whether CENVAT credit is admissible on 1%/2% additional duty of customs paid on imported steam coal under a Customs exemption notification, notwithstanding restrictions applicable to specified Central Excise exemptions.
Analysis: Rule 3(1)(vii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 expressly permits credit of additional duty leviable under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The restriction in the proviso to Rule 3(1)(i) is confined to duty of excise paid under specified Central Excise exemption notifications and does not extend to additional duty of customs. The applicable Customs notification contained no condition prohibiting credit, and conditions from Central Excise notifications cannot be implied into or superimposed upon a Customs notification. The consistent coordinate-bench view on this issue was followed in accordance with judicial discipline and certainty.
Conclusion: CENVAT credit of the 1%/2% additional duty of customs paid on imported steam coal is admissible; denial of such credit by importing Central Excise notification restrictions is unsustainable. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
CENVAT credit of concessional CVD on imported steam coal - Importation of central excise exemption conditions into customs notifications
Eligibility to CENVAT credit of 1%/2% CVD paid on imported steam coal under a Customs notification, notwithstanding restrictions applicable to specified central excise exemptions - HELD THAT: - Additional duty of customs paid on imported steam coal is creditable under Rule 3(1)(vii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The restriction in the proviso to Rule 3(1)(i) is confined to duty of excise paid under the specified central excise notifications; it cannot be imported into a Customs notification which contains no condition prohibiting credit. Following the coordinate-Bench decision M/s Seshasayee Paper and Boards Ltd. [2026 (1) TMI 508 - CESTAT CHENNAI] on the identical issue, in the absence of any material that it had been varied or set aside, judicial consistency required adoption of that view. [Paras 6]
The denial of CENVAT credit was unsustainable; the Department's appeal was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The Department's appeal was rejected, and the cross-objection was disposed of accordingly.
Issues: Whether the principal manufacturer is liable to pay excise duty on waste and scrap generated and retained at the job worker's premises.
Analysis: The material supplied for job work was processed by the job workers, while the resulting scrap was retained at their premises. The applicable Cenvat and Central Excise framework did not require the principal manufacturer either to receive back such scrap or to discharge duty upon it. The person manufacturing, retaining and selling the scrap is the job worker; liability for duty on that scrap cannot be fastened on the principal manufacturer.
Conclusion: The assessee is not liable to pay excise duty on scrap generated at the job workers' premises.
Excise duty on scrap generated at job worker's premises - Liability of the principal manufacturer to pay excise duty on waste and scrap generated during job work and retained by the job worker
HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the CENVAT provisions did not require the principal manufacturer either to bring back scrap generated at the job worker's premises or to discharge duty thereon. Where the job worker retained and sold the scrap, the job worker was its manufacturer; consequently, excise duty could not be demanded from the principal manufacturer. Case followed M/s Rocket Engineering Corporation Ltd. [2005 (6) TMI 184 - CESTAT, MUMBAI] [Paras 9, 10]
The appellant was held not liable to pay excise duty on the scrap generated at the job workers' premises; the impugned order was set aside and the appeal allowed with consequential relief.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, holding that excise duty on scrap retained by job workers could not be recovered from the principal manufacturer.
Issues: Whether Section 84A of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, retrospectively introduced after the GST constitutional amendment to exclude time spent in appellate proceedings for limitation purposes, was within the State Legislature's competence.
Analysis: The binding decision on the identical Gujarat VAT amendment established that, following the deletion of the relevant legislative fields upon the coming into force of the Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016, the State Legislature lacked competence to amend the Gujarat VAT law after 01.07.2017. The earlier decision invalidating the amendment stood confirmed, and the State accepted that decision.
Conclusion: Section 84A of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act is void for want of legislative competence; the challenge succeeds in favour of the assessee.
Legislative competence for retrospective exclusion of revision limitation under the Gujarat VAT Act - Validity of Section 84A of the Gujarat VAT Act, retrospectively excluding the period spent in higher-court proceedings while computing limitation for revision notices
HELD THAT: - The issue stood governed by the Supreme Court decision State of Telangana and others Vs. Tirumala Constructions [2023 (10) TMI 1208 - SUPREME COURT] holding that amendments to the Gujarat VAT Act made after 1 July 2017 were void for want of legislative competence. The Court also noted that the earlier High Court decision on the same issue had been accepted by the State. [Paras 4, 5]
The writ petitions were allowed in terms of the Supreme Court decision, and the impugned revision notices were quashed and set aside.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded in accordance with the binding Supreme Court decision, and the impugned notices were quashed and set aside.
Dishonour of cheque - Inquiry before issue of process against accused residing outside territorial jurisdiction - Non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry u/s 200 and 202 - Statutory presumption on admitted execution of cheque - Quashing of cheque dishonour complaint at pre-trial stage - Presumption of legally enforceable debt or liability - Rebuttable presumption - Inherent jurisdiction
HELD THAT:- The Special Leave Petition was dismissed without interference; the High Court's [2026 (8) TMI 89 - ORISSA HIGH COURT] observations were directed not to affect the trial, and all contentions were kept open.
Issues: (i) Whether the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the cheque and money receipt were rebutted by the challenge to the complainant's financial capacity and alleged breach of loan-acceptance restrictions; (ii) Whether the conviction was vitiated because a successor Magistrate decided the case on evidence recorded by a predecessor.
Issue (i): Whether the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the cheque and money receipt were rebutted by the challenge to the complainant's financial capacity and alleged breach of loan-acceptance restrictions.
Analysis: Admission of the petitioner's signatures on the cheque and money receipt attracted the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The challenge based on the complainant's financial capacity and the alleged violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act did not displace those presumptions, as no cogent and reliable rebuttal evidence was produced.
Conclusion: The statutory presumptions remained unrebutted; the issue is decided against the petitioner.
Issue (ii): Whether the conviction was vitiated because a successor Magistrate decided the case on evidence recorded by a predecessor.
Analysis: The trial record showed that the proceeding was conducted as a summons trial and not as a summary trial. Consequently, the restriction invoked under Section 326(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 did not establish prejudice or illegality.
Conclusion: The conviction was not vitiated on account of the successor Magistrate deciding the case; the issue is decided against the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The concurrent findings of guilt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act disclose no perversity, material illegality, impropriety, or jurisdictional error warranting revisional interference.
Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of a cheque is admitted, the statutory presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability operate unless rebutted by cogent and reliable evidence; an unsubstantiated challenge to the payee's financial capacity does not suffice.
Presumption of legally enforceable debt on admitted cheque execution - Successor Magistrate deciding summons trial
Presumption of legally enforceable debt on admitted cheque execution - Rebuttal of presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act - Conviction for dishonour of a cheque where the accused admitted the signatures on the cheque and money receipt, but questioned the complainant's financial capacity and the loan transaction - HELD THAT: - Admission of execution and signature on the cheque attracted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant's financial capacity and the asserted breach of the income-tax provision concerning cash loans did not dislodge those presumptions, as the accused failed to rebut them through cogent and reliable evidence. [Paras 13, 14, 16]
The concurrent conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was upheld.
Successor Magistrate deciding summons trial - Inapplicability of Section 326(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure - Validity of the judgment delivered by a succeeding Magistrate on evidence recorded by a predecessor in the cheque-dishonour prosecution - HELD THAT: - The trial court record showed that the case had been conducted as a summons trial and not as a summary trial. Consequently, the bar invoked under Section 326(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was inapplicable, and no prejudice or illegality was established. [Paras 15]
The challenge to the mode of trial and the succeeding Magistrate's decision was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The criminal revision was dismissed, as no material illegality, impropriety, perversity, or jurisdictional error was found in the concurrent conviction and sentence. The petitioner was directed to surrender for serving the remaining sentence.
Issues: (i) Applicable Guidelines and sanction of professional fees exceeding prescribed ceilings for distinct valuation assignments; (ii) Entitlement to interest on delayed professional fees and inflation-linked enhancement; (iii) Source of recovery of the sanctioned fees and personal liability of third parties; (iv) Discharge of the Court Receiver and closure of the suit account.
Issue (i): Applicable Guidelines and sanction of professional fees exceeding prescribed ceilings for distinct valuation assignments.
Analysis: The assignment, undertaken in 2004, concerned inspection and valuation of immovable properties for their proposed sale. It was consequently governed by the Guidelines dated 1 February 1994, rather than the 1999 Guidelines relating to royalty or compensation or the subsequently issued 2007 Guidelines. Clause 9 required prior sanction before payment of fees exceeding the prescribed ceiling, not before appointment of the Valuer. The ceiling was ordinarily applicable separately to each distinct valuation exercise. The reports were accepted, the work was neither disputed nor found deficient, and the prolonged non-payment was not attributable to the Valuer.
Conclusion: The revised professional fees of Rs. 6,51,062 were sanctioned in full, including fees exceeding the ordinary ceilings and the higher charge for inspection and the status report.
Issue (ii): Entitlement to interest on delayed professional fees and inflation-linked enhancement.
Analysis: Although the 1994 Guidelines did not expressly provide for interest, reasonable compensation for deprivation of legitimately earned fees could be awarded in exceptional circumstances. Interest compensated for the time value of money during the delay. Granting a further inflation-linked multiplier, particularly on both principal and interest, would amount to double compensation for the same delay period.
Conclusion: The Valuer was entitled to interest of Rs. 8,20,338 up to May 2025 and further simple interest at 6% per annum on Rs. 6,51,062 from 1 June 2025 until payment; the inflation-linked enhancement claim was rejected.
Issue (iii): Source of recovery of the sanctioned fees and personal liability of third parties.
Analysis: Clause 8 of the 1994 Guidelines confined the Valuer's recourse to funds available in the concerned proceedings or with the appropriate insolvency authority. No fund or asset under the Court Receiver's control was available, and payment could not be ordered from the Receiver's general account or public funds. No substantive material established personal liability of an individual associated with the company or liability of separate corporate entities; mere association could not displace separate corporate personality.
Conclusion: The Valuer may lodge the sanctioned claim before the competent Official Liquidator, with the Court Receiver required to forward the relevant material; relief seeking personal liability and freezing of third-party corporate assets was rejected.
Issue (iv): Discharge of the Court Receiver and closure of the suit account.
Analysis: The Court Receiver had substantially completed the assigned functions, the underlying writ proceedings had ended, no funds remained in the suit account, and no further recovery action by the Receiver was warranted after the Valuer was permitted to pursue its claim in liquidation.
Conclusion: The Court Receiver was discharged without passing accounts, and the suit account was permitted to be closed without further costs, charges or expenses.
Final Conclusion: The Valuer's determined dues are enforceable only through the appropriate liquidation process, while no personal or public-fund liability arises merely from the Court-authorised engagement.
Ratio Decidendi: A Court-appointed Valuer may receive post facto sanction for reasonable fees exceeding guideline ceilings where the accepted work was properly performed, but interest for delayed payment precludes overlapping inflation-based compensation for the same period.
Remuneration of Panel Valuer - Post-assignment sanction of professional fees exceeding prescribed ceiling - Interest on delayed payment of professional fees - Recovery of professional fees from assets in liquidation - Personal liability for corporate debts
Applicable guidelines for valuation in aid of sale - Sanction of professional fees exceeding prescribed ceiling - Applicability of the 1994 Guidelines and sanction of a Panel Valuer's fees exceeding the prescribed ceiling for separate valuation reports concerning distinct immovable properties - HELD THAT: - The assignment concerned inspection and valuation of immovable properties in aid of their proposed sale, and not determination of royalty or compensation; consequently, the 1994 Guidelines, being in force when the Valuer was appointed and performed the work, governed the claim. The requirement of prior sanction for fees exceeding the ceiling relates to payment and does not mandate sanction before appointment. Where distinct properties are separately valued, the ceiling ordinarily applies to each valuation exercise. Since the work was accepted without any finding of deficiency, inflation of bills or unreliability of the reports, post-assignment sanction of the higher fees was justified. [Paras 34, 35, 36, 38, 39]
The revised principal professional fees were sanctioned in full.
Interest on delayed payment of professional fees - Overlapping compensation for delay - Entitlement of the Panel Valuer to interest for prolonged non-payment and to a further inflation-linked enhancement for the same period - HELD THAT: - Though the Guidelines contain no express provision for interest, reasonable compensation may be awarded where fees earned under a Court-authorised assignment remain unpaid for an extraordinary period without fault of the professional. Interest at 6% per annum, being the rate claimed, was fair and reasonable. Interest compensates for deprivation of money and its time value; a further enhancement for erosion in purchasing power for the identical period, particularly when calculated on principal and interest together, would amount to overlapping compensation. [Paras 41, 42, 43, 44, 45]
Interest at 6% per annum was awarded on the principal fees, including continuing interest until payment, while the inflation-linked enhancement was rejected.
Recovery of professional fees from assets in liquidation - Discharge of Court Receiver - Manner of recovery of the sanctioned professional fees where the suit account held by the Court Receiver contains no available funds and the company is stated to be in liquidation - HELD THAT: - Under the applicable declaration, a Panel Valuer must claim fees from funds available in the concerned proceedings and cannot look personally to the Court Receiver or the State Government. As no fund or asset under the Court Receiver's control was identified, payment could not be directed from the Court Receiver's general or office accounts or from public funds. The claim was therefore required to be lodged before the competent Official Liquidator; the priority and satisfaction of that claim were left to be decided under the applicable liquidation law. As the assigned functions had substantially been completed, no further action by the Court Receiver was necessary. [Paras 47, 48, 49, 51, 52]
The Valuer was granted liberty to lodge its sanctioned claim before the competent Official Liquidator, with the Court Receiver directed to forward the relevant material and thereafter discharged without passing accounts.
Personal liability for corporate debts - Freezing of assets of separate corporate entities - Request to fasten personal liability upon an individual associated with the company and to freeze assets of separate companies for satisfaction of the Valuer's claim - HELD THAT: - Mere association with the company, or relationship with a person formerly associated with it, does not establish personal liability for the company's debts or justify proceeding against assets of distinct corporate entities. Such relief requires substantive material, legally sustainable pleadings and an opportunity of hearing to the affected persons or entities. [Paras 50]
The requested personal-liability and asset-freezing reliefs were rejected, without prejudice to independent proceedings permissible in law.
Final Conclusion: The Valuer's revised professional fees and interest were sanctioned, but the further inflation-linked claim was rejected. Recovery was directed to be pursued before the competent Official Liquidator, and the Court Receiver was discharged.
Issues: (i) Whether proceedings for cheque dishonour could continue against a person described as a Joint Managing Director where uncontroverted corporate records established that he was never a director or officer of the accused company and the complaint disclosed no independent role; (ii) Whether corporate complainants in future complaints under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 must furnish documents verifying the accused company and the status of persons sought to be made vicariously liable.
Issue (i): Whether proceedings for cheque dishonour could continue against a person described as a Joint Managing Director where uncontroverted corporate records established that he was never a director or officer of the accused company and the complaint disclosed no independent role.
Analysis: Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 imposes vicarious criminal liability only on persons who were in charge of and responsible for the company's business at the relevant time, or whose consent, connivance, or negligence in relation to the dishonoured cheque is specifically disclosed. A Managing Director or Joint Managing Director may be proceeded against by virtue of that office, but the premise fails where reliable corporate records establish that the person never held such office in the accused company. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may be exercised on unimpeachable evidence beyond doubt where continuation of prosecution would amount to abuse of process. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs records showed that the person was never a director of the accused company; this remained uncontroverted, and neither the complaint nor the material before the Court attributed any actual role in its business or in issuance and dishonour of the cheque.
Conclusion: The complaint and consequential proceedings were unsustainable against the petitioner and were quashed only as against him.
Issue (ii): Whether corporate complainants in future complaints under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 must furnish documents verifying the accused company and the status of persons sought to be made vicariously liable.
Analysis: Incorrect impleadment of persons who were not directors, authorised signatories, or otherwise responsible for the company's affairs causes avoidable harassment and delay. Verification of the company's corporate identity and of the office held by each proposed accused at the relevant time is necessary before criminal process is initiated against persons on a vicarious-liability basis.
Conclusion: Prospectively, every complaint against a corporate accused must annex the company's Corporate Identification Number obtained from Ministry of Corporate Affairs master data and a certified copy of Form DIR-12; registration without these documents is permissible only where their non-availability despite due diligence is specifically affirmed and reasons are recorded before cognizance.
Final Conclusion: Vicarious liability for a corporate cheque-dishonour offence cannot rest on an incorrect designation where incontrovertible corporate material negates the person's connection with the accused company, and future corporate complaints must be supported by verification of corporate status and responsible officers.
Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, uncontroverted corporate records demonstrating that a person never held office in, or responsibility for, the accused company justify quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 where the complaint contains no independent factual basis for liability.
Vicarious liability of company officers for cheque dishonour - Pre-summoning verification of corporate accused
Vicarious liability of company officers for cheque dishonour - Unimpeachable corporate records - Liability of a person impleaded as Joint Managing Director in a cheque-dishonour complaint despite uncontroverted corporate records showing that he was never an officer of the accused company - HELD THAT: - Vicarious liability under Section 141 depends upon the person's actual role in, and responsibility for, the conduct of the company's business at the relevant time, and not merely on the designation attributed in the complaint. The corporate records available from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, showing that the petitioner was never a Director of the accused company, remained uncontroverted; nor did the complaint or the hearing disclose any role played by him in its affairs. Such unimpeachable material could be considered at the threshold, and requiring him to face trial would amount to abuse of process. [Paras 20, 21, 22, 23]
The complaint, summoning order and consequential proceedings were quashed qua the petitioner.
Pre-summoning verification of corporate accused - Corporate records in cheque-dishonour complaints - Prospective procedural safeguards for arraigning officers of a corporate accused in cheque-dishonour complaints - HELD THAT: - To prevent erroneous impleadment of persons who had ceased to hold office or never held responsibility for the company's affairs, the Court directed that a complainant proceeding against a company must annex the corporate identification particulars and a certified copy of Form DIR-12. Registration without those documents is permissible only where their non-availability despite due diligence is specifically affirmed, and the Magistrate records reasons before taking cognizance. [Paras 24]
The directions were made applicable prospectively to complaints under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against corporate accused.
Final Conclusion: The complaint and consequential proceedings were quashed qua the petitioner, as the record conclusively established that he was never connected with the accused company's affairs. Prospective directions were also issued to ensure verification of corporate status and responsible officers before cognizance in cheque-dishonour complaints against companies.
Issues: Whether rejection of the petitioner's tender quotation and award of the catering contract warranted judicial interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: Judicial review in government-contract matters is confined to the legality, fairness and rationality of the decision-making process; it does not permit re-evaluation of bids or substitution of the tendering authority's decision. Interference is justified only where the process is arbitrary, irrational, mala fide, discriminatory, contrary to tender conditions, or detrimental to public interest. The petitioner participated without seeking prior clarification on GST and could not, after rejection, alter the bid through a subsequent offer at a different rate. No unequal treatment, favouritism, mala fides, or procedural infirmity was established. The alleged outstanding dues under the earlier contract were independent of the validity of the fresh tender.
Conclusion: The rejection of the quotation and the concluded tender process did not warrant judicial interference; the issue was decided against the petitioner.
Judicial review of tender decisions - Post-bid alteration of tender quotation - Outstanding contractual dues and fresh tender process - inclusion or exclusion of GST in the base price
Validity of rejection of a catering-services tender quotation based on the bidder's stated GST treatment and subsequent request to alter the quotation - HELD THAT: - The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. [2024 (10) TMI 213 - SUPREME COURT] after considering the earlier decisions in Sterling Computers Limited [1993 (1) TMI 300 - SUPREME COURT] Tata Cellular [1994 (7) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT] ABL International Limited [2003 (12) TMI 584 - SUPREME COURT] Jagdish Mandal [2006 (12) TMI 447 - SUPREME COURT] and other judgments, has reiterated that although the Government and its instrumentalities have freedom of contract, their decision must be free from arbitrariness, bias and mala fides and the bidding process must be fair and transparent. At the same time, judicial interference is warranted only where the decision-making process is shown to be arbitrary, irrational, mala fide or contrary to public interest.
Judicial review in tender matters is confined to the legality, fairness and reasonableness of the decision-making process; the Court cannot sit in appeal over the tendering authority's decision or substitute its assessment of bids. A bidder who participated without seeking clarification regarding the GST treatment could not, after rejection, seek alteration of the quotation or reopening of the concluded process on the basis of a subsequent offer at a different rate. No material established discrimination, favouritism, mala fides, arbitrariness, or departure from the notified tender conditions. [Paras 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]
No ground for interference with the rejection of the quotation or for reopening the tender process was made out.
Outstanding contractual dues and fresh tender process - Effect of alleged dues under an earlier catering contract on the validity of a subsequent tender process - HELD THAT: - Alleged non-payment of dues under an earlier contract is a distinct contractual claim and does not invalidate a fresh tender process or confer a right to be awarded the fresh contract. [Paras 26, 33]
The petitioner was left at liberty to pursue any legally recoverable contractual dues before the competent authority or forum in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed, as no arbitrariness, discrimination, mala fides or procedural infirmity in the tender decision-making process was established. The petitioner may pursue any independent claim for alleged contractual dues in accordance with law.
Issues: (i) Whether refusal to renew an FCRA certificate must disclose reasons notwithstanding reliance on a confidential security-agency report; (ii) Whether alleged financial support for peaceful Vizhinjam Port protests justified refusal under Sections 12(4)(a)(vi) and 12(4)(f)(iii) of the FCRA.
Issue (i): Whether refusal to renew an FCRA certificate must disclose reasons notwithstanding reliance on a confidential security-agency report.
Analysis: Section 16(3) requires reasons where renewal is not completed within the prescribed period, and this requirement necessarily extends to refusal of renewal because refusal adversely affects the applicant's rights. A bare reference to statutory provisions is not a reasoned order. The discretion under the proviso to Section 12(5) does not create an automatic exemption from disclosure merely because a security-agency report is invoked; non-disclosure requires material demonstrating a bona fide national-security justification. The sealed report contained no sensitive material warranting secrecy.
Conclusion: Reasons for refusing renewal were required and were not validly withheld; the cryptic refusal was legally unsustainable.
Issue (ii): Whether alleged financial support for peaceful Vizhinjam Port protests justified refusal under Sections 12(4)(a)(vi) and 12(4)(f)(iii) of the FCRA.
Analysis: The intelligence report recorded no diversion, misuse, statutory contravention, personal gain, threat to public interest, or other adverse finding against the petitioner. Its sole adverse recommendation vaguely referred to support for agitators, without identifying the petitioner as a participant or tracing funds to any protester. Peaceful protest and dissent are protected facets of freedom of speech, peaceful assembly and association under Article 19. An undesirable purpose must rest on legal prohibition or public injury, not administrative or political disapproval of a peaceful protest.
Conclusion: The alleged support did not establish diversion for an undesirable purpose or prejudice to public interest and could not lawfully justify non-renewal.
Final Conclusion: The refusal of renewal was founded on absence of reasons, an unjustified secrecy claim and irrelevant considerations; renewal must be reconsidered consistently with these determinations.
Ratio Decidendi: A regulatory decision refusing renewal of authority to receive foreign contribution must be supported by disclosed reasons unless the State establishes, on cogent material, that non-disclosure is genuinely necessary for national security; peaceful constitutional dissent cannot by itself constitute an undesirable purpose or prejudice to public interest.
Duty to give reasons in FCRA renewal refusal - National-security non-disclosure of reasons - Peaceful protest as an undesirable purpose under FCRA
Reasoned orders in FCRA renewal proceedings - Non-disclosure based on security-agency reports - Refusal of renewal of an FCRA certificate without recording and furnishing reasons, on the basis of a security-agency report claimed to be secret - HELD THAT: - Renewal may be refused only for violation of the FCRA or the rules. The requirement in the proviso to section 16(3) to communicate reasons cannot be confined to delay in disposal while permitting refusal without reasons. A bare reference to statutory provisions is not a reasoned order. Further, the discretion not to communicate reasons under section 12(5) is not automatically attracted merely because a security-agency report is described as secret; the State must justify non-disclosure. The report placed before the Court disclosed no confidential or sensitive material warranting secrecy. [Paras 17, 18, 23, 24, 25]
The refusal and the revisional order were held unsustainable for want of reasons and for unjustified withholding of the material relied upon.
FCRA renewal and peaceful protests - Diversion of foreign contribution for undesirable purposes - Denial of FCRA renewal on the allegation of financial support for protests against the Vizhinjam Port project - HELD THAT: - The security report recorded no violation of the statutory conditions and did not trace any financial support from the petitioner to the protestors. The inference of such support merely from the association of some protestors with the Catholic community or support by the Bishops Council was perverse. In any event, financial support for peaceful protests by persons affected by a project cannot be characterised as diversion of foreign contribution for an undesirable purpose or as conduct prejudicial to public interest, since peaceful protest is protected by the constitutional freedoms of speech, expression and peaceful assembly. [Paras 26, 28, 29, 31, 33]
The refusal of renewal was held arbitrary and illegal; the impugned orders were set aside and the competent authority was directed to pass fresh orders in accordance with the Court's observations.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The orders refusing renewal and dismissing the revision were set aside, with a direction to the competent authority to pass fresh orders in accordance with the observations made.
Issues: Whether an auction purchaser of the premises of a defaulting electricity consumer can be required to clear the previous consumer's electricity arrears as a condition for a fresh electricity connection.
Analysis: The auction conditions placed all liabilities attached to the property on the purchaser; the statement that no encumbrance was known to the secured creditor was confined to its knowledge and did not override the distribution licensee's independent statutory rights. Under the statutory conditions of supply framed under the Electricity Act, 2003, outstanding dues may be required to be cleared before fresh supply is released. Clause 10.19 of the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Supply Code, 2005-08 regulates recovery of arrears and does not extinguish the underlying liability or preclude insistence on payment as a condition for a new connection. The as is where is basis of sale and the doctrine concerning contracts of adhesion did not nullify a statutory condition having force of law.
Conclusion: An auction purchaser may be required to clear the previous consumer's outstanding electricity dues before obtaining a fresh electricity connection; the requirement is legally valid.
Liability of auction purchaser for erstwhile consumer's electricity dues - Statutory conditions for fresh electricity connection
Electricity arrears of erstwhile consumer - Fresh connection to SARFAESI auction purchaser - Liability of a purchaser of property in a SARFAESI auction to clear the erstwhile consumer's electricity dues as a condition for obtaining a fresh electricity connection - HELD THAT: - The liability of an auction purchaser depends upon the governing statutory framework, the conditions of supply and the auction terms. The auction condition placed all liabilities attached to the property upon the purchaser; the secured creditor's statement that no encumbrance was known to it was not an absolute warranty and could not curtail the distribution licensee's statutory powers. The two-year restriction under the Supply Code regulates recovery from the consumer and does not extinguish liability; nor did the appellants establish that the statutory conditions for a fresh connection prohibited insistence on clearance of earlier dues. The requirement, having statutory force, could not be invalidated as an unconscionable contractual term. [Paras 16, 17, 18, 19, 22]
The Distribution Company's insistence on clearance of the outstanding dues before release of a fresh electricity connection was upheld as lawful.
Secured creditor's liability for electricity dues - Liability of the secured creditor conducting the auction for the electricity dues claimed from the auction purchaser - HELD THAT: - The Bank exercised its statutory power to realise its secured debt and neither demanded nor received electricity charges from the appellants. The dispute over electricity dues lay between the purchaser and the distribution licensee. The sale was conducted on "as is where is", "as is what is" and "whatever there is" basis, subject to the conditions incorporated in the auction notice. Consequently, no independent cause of action survives against the respondent-Bank.[Paras 21]
No independent cause of action survived against the Bank.
Final Conclusion: The writ appeal was dismissed, the requirement of clearing the erstwhile consumer's electricity dues for a fresh connection being upheld. No relief was available against the Bank.
TaxTMI