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Issues: Whether reversal of input tax credit could be sustained solely because the supplier was subsequently treated as non-existent, without due consideration of the purchaser's documentary evidence.
Analysis: The burden to establish eligibility for input tax credit rests on the claimant, and the assessing authority was entitled to seek evidence that the supplies were genuine. The claimant had produced bank statements, tax invoices, e-way bills, ledger extracts and GSTR-2A and GSTR-2B records. Such material required due consideration; if it was insufficient, a reasonable opportunity to furnish further evidence was required. Confirmation solely on the supplier's subsequent cancellation as non-existent was untenable, particularly where the notice referred to Section 73 while the order was made under Section 74.
Conclusion: The input tax credit reversal could not be sustained on the stated basis; the assessment required fresh consideration after affording reasonable opportunity.
Input tax credit on supplies from a supplier subsequently treated as non-existent - Failure to consider documents supporting genuineness of supplies - Inconsistency between show cause notice and assessment provision - Burden of Proof - Principles of Natural Justice - Reasonable Opportunity - HELD THAT: - Although the burden to establish entitlement to input tax credit rests on the claimant, the petitioner had furnished bank statements, tax invoices, e-way bills, ledgers and GSTR 2A and 2B returns. These materials required due consideration and, if found deficient, the petitioner was required to be afforded an opportunity to furnish further documents. Confirmation of the proposal solely because the supplier was declared non-existent from a later date was unsustainable, particularly when the show cause notice repeatedly referred to assessment under Section 73 whereas the order was made under Section 74. [Paras 6]
The assessment order was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration after reasonable opportunity to the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the assessment order and remanding the input tax credit claim for reconsideration and a fresh order.
Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in a prosecution alleging fraudulent availment and passing on of input tax credit.
Analysis: The investigation stood completed and a complaint had been filed; the prosecution rested substantially on documentary evidence. No charge had been framed, the trial before the Magistrate was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time, and the maximum punishment under the invoked offence was five years. The applicant had remained in custody since 12.02.2026 and had no criminal antecedents. No exceptional circumstance, risk of absconding, witness intimidation, evidence tampering, or subversion of justice was shown. Pending assessment proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 had not been initiated, though criminal proceedings could independently continue. Presumption of innocence, personal liberty, and the requirement that pre-trial detention not become punitive supported release on bail.
Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to bail, subject to conditions safeguarding the trial and investigation.
Entitlement to bail -Presumption of innocence and speedy trial - Documentary evidence and pre-trial detention - wrongful availment and passing on of input tax credit through non-existent firms - HELD THAT: - Pre-trial detention is not punitive; its object is to secure the accused's attendance at trial. Though criminal prosecution is independent of assessment proceedings, the absence of proceedings under the assessment provisions may bear upon the prosecution if no contravention is ultimately found. The investigation stood completed and the complaint had been filed; the evidence was documentary, no criminal antecedents or exceptional circumstance was shown, and there was no material indicating a likelihood of absconding, tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses or subverting justice. Having regard to the limited maximum punishment, trial by a Magistrate, continued custody and the unlikelihood of an early conclusion of trial, continued detention was not justified. [Paras 13, 15, 16, 17, 18]
The applicant was directed to be released on bail, subject to conditions safeguarding the trial and the prosecution evidence.
Final Conclusion: Bail was granted in the GST prosecution, subject to conditions, as continued pre-trial custody was unwarranted on the material before the Court.
Issues: Whether delay beyond the period condonable by the appellate authority in filing a GST appeal could be condoned in writ jurisdiction where the assessee showed that the delay was caused by circumstances beyond its control.
Analysis: Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 limits the appellate authority's power to condone delay. The stated circumstances showed that the assessee lacked timely knowledge of the assessment order and acted promptly after communication. Denial of a merits hearing in those circumstances would cause grave prejudice. The established approach permits writ relief to secure merits adjudication where sufficient cause exists beyond the assessee's control.
Conclusion: The delay of 114 days was condoned in favour of the assessee, and its appeal was required to be entertained and adjudicated on merits.
Condonation of delay in GST appeal - Non-communication of adjudication order -HELD THAT: - Though the Appellate Authority was bound by the statutory limitation under section 107 of the RGST/CGST Act, non-adjudication on merits, in the circumstances that prevented timely filing of the appeal, would cause grave injury and prejudice. Following the consistent view of the Court in the decisions in M/s M R Traders [2026 (2) TMI 99 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT], M/s Molana Construction Company [2024 (8) TMI 384 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT], the delay was condoned after allowing the statutory relaxation. [Paras 6, 7, 8]
The delay of 114 days was condoned, and the Appellate Authority was directed to entertain and decide the appeal on merits, subject to its filing within the stipulated period.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed to the extent of condoning the delay in filing the GST appeal. The Appellate Authority was directed to adjudicate the appeal on merits, subject to the condition stipulated by the Court.
Issues: Whether delay in filing the statutory GST appeal, resulting in its dismissal as time-barred, could be condoned in writ jurisdiction to restore adjudication on merits.
Analysis: The petitioner had not received a merits determination from the Appellate Authority because its appeal was rejected on limitation. In the peculiar circumstances, and with no objection from the respondents to a merits remand, exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 to restore the statutory remedy was considered necessary to serve the ends of justice. The delay of 87 days was therefore condoned without examining the underlying tax controversy.
Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was condoned, and the statutory appeal was restored for fresh decision on merits by the Appellate Authority.
Condonation of delay in statutory GST appeal - Restoration of appellate remedy - HELD THAT: - Having regard to the peculiar facts, the absence of an adjudication on merits before the Appellate Authority, and the respondents' no-objection to remand, the Court held that the ends of justice required restoration of the statutory remedy. The delay of 87 days in filing the appeal was therefore condoned, without entering into the merits of the underlying controversy. [Paras 5]
The order dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation was quashed, and the appeal was remanded to the Appellate Authority for fresh decision in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed by condoning the delay in filing the statutory appeal and restoring it for fresh adjudication on merits by the Appellate Authority.
Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration based solely on a notice uploaded on the common portal, without service through an additional prescribed mode, was valid.
Analysis: Section 169 permits communication through the common portal, but, where cancellation of registration entails civil consequences affecting business and livelihood, fair procedure requires that portal publication be supplemented by personal service through at least one other prescribed mode. As no notice was served by e-mail or registered post, the cancellation action was inconsistent with the requirement of fair notice. A fresh proceeding must afford sufficient opportunity to respond, a personal hearing where an adverse order is contemplated, and a reasoned order.
Conclusion: The cancellation order was invalid and was set aside; fresh proceedings must be undertaken after proper service of notice and observance of hearing requirements.
Service of show-cause notice for cancellation of GST registration - Principles of natural justice in cancellation of GST registration - notice made available only on the common portal and was not additionally communicated by e-mail, registered post or another prescribed mode drawing the registered person's attention to the proposed adverse action. - HELD THAT: - The co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Shree Ram Sales [2025 (2) TMI 1979 - PATNA HIGH COURT] held that mere uploading of the notice on the GST portal would not be a complete compliance with the requirement of Section 169 of the CGST/BGST Act.
Mere availability of the notice on the GST portal was held insufficient where cancellation would entail civil consequences. A purposive construction of the statutory modes of service requires that, in addition to portal upload, the registered person be personally served through any other prescribed mode so as to afford a real and fair opportunity to respond. The department could not reiterate a stand already rejected in earlier decisions of the Court without showing any basis for a contrary view. [Paras 10, 11]
The cancellation order was set aside and the matter was remitted for issuance and service of a fresh show-cause notice, adequate opportunity of response and personal hearing, followed by a reasoned order in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ application was allowed to the extent indicated. The cancellation order was set aside, fresh proceedings consistent with natural justice were directed, and the pre-cancellation status quo was ordered to continue meanwhile.
Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging assessment orders could be entertained despite an efficacious statutory appellate remedy and substantial unexplained delay in approaching the Court.
Analysis: Where a statute creates a right or liability and provides a specific remedial mechanism, that statutory remedy ordinarily must be exhausted before invoking discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar, but writ intervention requires extraordinary circumstances, such as manifest arbitrariness or a sustainable exception warranting exercise of judicial review. The petition disclosed an available statutory appeal and was instituted about one and a half years after the impugned orders without explaining the delay. The discretionary writ jurisdiction could therefore also be declined on the ground of laches.
Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained; the petitioner must pursue the available statutory remedy.
Exhaustion of statutory remedy - Writ jurisdiction and delay and laches - Principles of Natural Justice
Maintainability of a writ petition challenging GST assessment orders where a statutory appeal to the GST Tribunal was available - HELD THAT: - Where the statute creates the right and prescribes a remedy for its enforcement, the statutory remedy must ordinarily be exhausted before invoking writ jurisdiction. Availability of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar, but writ intervention requires extraordinary or exceptional circumstances; no such circumstance was established despite the plea of breach of natural justice.
The writ petition was not entertained, leaving the petitioner to pursue the statutory remedy available in law.
Delay and laches in writ jurisdiction - HELD THAT: - Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary, and a party that does not approach the Court promptly may be denied relief on the ground of laches. The petition, filed after about one and a half years from the impugned orders, contained no explanation for the delay.
The unexplained delay was an additional reason for declining to entertain the petition.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed for availability of an efficacious statutory appellate remedy, with liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedy in accordance with law. Unexplained delay in approaching the Court also militated against exercise of writ jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether the challenge to the tax demand and recovery action should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite the available statutory appellate remedy.
Analysis: The petitioner was granted liberty to invoke the statutory appeal with an application for condonation of delay and the prescribed pre-deposit. The merits of the demand, including factual and legal grounds, were left for determination by the appellate authority, which was directed to consider delay and, if satisfied, decide the appeal on merits.
Conclusion: The writ challenge was not adjudicated on merits; the petitioner was relegated to the statutory appellate remedy.
Statutory appeal - Condonation of delay and the prescribed pre-deposit - HELD THAT:- The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the statutory appeal with an application for condonation of delay and statutory pre-deposit. Coercive action pursuant to the garnishee notice was restrained for the period allowed for filing the appeal.
Issues: Whether an adjudication order may confirm tax and penalty exceeding the amounts proposed in the show-cause notice.
Analysis: Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of tax and penalty beyond the proposal contained in the show-cause notice. The adjudication order confirmed substantially enhanced CGST and SGST tax demands and corresponding penalties compared with those proposed in the notice. The excess confirmation was therefore beyond jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The adjudication order, insofar as it confirmed tax and penalty beyond the show-cause notice, was without jurisdiction and was set aside.
Adjudication beyond show-cause notice - Jurisdictional limit on confirmation of GST demand and penalty - Principles of Natural Justice - HELD THAT: - Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of tax and penalty beyond what is proposed in the show-cause notice. Since the adjudication order confirmed enhanced tax and penalty demands, it was without jurisdiction to that extent. [Paras 2]
The adjudication order was set aside, with liberty to the petitioner to submit a final reply and for fresh reasoned adjudication after affording personal hearing.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the impugned adjudication order and directing fresh proceedings on the show-cause notice in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether an adjudication order demanding tax, interest and penalty exceeding the aggregate amount specified in the show-cause notice is sustainable under Section 75(7) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: Section 75(7) limits the demand in an order to the amount specified in the notice and prohibits confirmation on grounds other than those stated in the notice. The notice specified an aggregate demand of Rs. 57.60 crore towards tax, interest and penalty, whereas the impugned order raised an aggregate demand of Rs. 59.20 crore. The excess demand was ex facie inconsistent with the statutory limitation.
Conclusion: The demand order was unsustainable for contravention of Section 75(7) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, in favour of the assessee.
Demand exceeding show-cause notice - Statutory limitation on confirmation of GST demand - Validity of a GST demand for tax, interest and penalty exceeding the aggregate amount specified in the show-cause notice - HELD THAT: - Section 75(7) expressly prohibits an order from demanding tax, interest and penalty in excess of the amount specified in the notice, and also prohibits confirmation on grounds other than those in the notice. As the impugned demand exceeded the amount stated in the show-cause notice, it was ex facie contrary to that provision. [Paras 7, 8, 9]
The impugned order was quashed for violation of Section 75(7), and the matter was remanded for a fresh order after permitting a response to the show-cause notice and affording a hearing.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The demand order was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether penalty for failure to maintain books of account and records may be imposed notwithstanding the levy of late fee for belated filing of returns.
Analysis: Section 47 concerns late fee for delayed furnishing of specified returns. Section 122(1)(xvi) separately penalises failure to keep, maintain or retain books of account and documents as required by the GST enactments and rules. The penalty was imposed for non-maintenance of production and manufacturing records, inward and outward supply records, stock records, input tax credit details and output taxable details, rather than for delayed return filing.
Conclusion: Penalty for non-maintenance of prescribed books and records is independently sustainable and is not barred by the levy of late fee for belated returns; the issue is against the assessee.
Penalty for failure to maintain books of account and documents under GST law - Imposition of penalty for non-maintenance of records relating to production, manufacture, supplies, stock, input tax credit and output tax details. - HELD THAT: - The late-fee provision for belated filing of specified returns operates in a field distinct from the penalty provision for failure to keep, maintain or retain books of account and documents. Penalty for non-maintenance of records was independently authorised and was not rendered impermissible by the levy of late fee.
The penalty order disclosed no infirmity warranting interference.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed, and the penalty for failure to maintain the prescribed records was sustained.
Issues: Whether input tax credit for March 2020 was available where the return was furnished on 04.01.2021 within the period prescribed under Section 16(5).
Analysis: Section 16(5) preserves entitlement to input tax credit where the relevant return is furnished on or before 30.11.2021. The return for March 2020 was filed on 04.01.2021, which fell within that prescribed period. The denial of credit on the basis of an earlier cut-off date was therefore inconsistent with the statutory benefit under Section 16(5).
Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to consideration for input tax credit under Section 16(5), subject to satisfaction of other applicable requirements.
Input tax credit-statutory time-limit for furnishing return - Entitlement to input tax credit for March, 2020 where the return was filed before 30.11.2021. - HELD THAT: - The return for the relevant month was filed on 04.01.2021, which was within the period contemplated under section 16(5). The rejection of the claimed input tax credit on the basis of the earlier cut-off date could not therefore be sustained. [Paras 2]
The assessment order was quashed and the matter was remitted for reconsideration and grant of the benefit under section 16(5), if the petitioner was otherwise eligible, after hearing the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by quashing the order denying input tax credit and directing fresh consideration of the claim in accordance with section 16(5).
Issues: Whether a consolidated show-cause notice for multiple financial years is legally sustainable.
Analysis: A composite notice covering distinct assessment years is not legally sustainable under the governing principles. Proceedings for separate financial years must be initiated through separate notices. The interval between issuance of the composite notice and receipt of the certified copy of the judgment is excluded for computing limitation for fresh proceedings.
Conclusion: The consolidated show-cause notice is quashed, with liberty to issue separate notices for the relevant assessment years.
Composite show cause notice for multiple financial years - Separate Assessment-Year Notices - HELD THAT: - Following the decisions of M/s. Lakshmi Mobiles Accessories [2025 (2) TMI 666 - KERALA HIGH COURT] and Tharayil Medicals [2025 (4) TMI 1152 - KERALA HIGH COURT]. A composite notice covering more than one assessment year is not legally sustainable, in view of the principles laid down in the earlier decisions of the Court Proceedings, if initiated, must therefore be commenced through separate notices for the respective assessment years. [Paras 2]
The consolidated show cause notice was quashed, with liberty to issue separate notices; the period specified by the Court was directed to be excluded in computing limitation for fresh proceedings.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by quashing the composite show cause notice and preserving the respondents' liberty to initiate fresh proceedings through separate notices, subject to the directed exclusion of time for limitation.
Issues: Whether a contractor engaged under a pre-GST works contract is entitled to reimbursement of GST paid on works executed after introduction of GST.
Analysis: The contractor had been liable to compounded tax under the pre-GST regime and had no service-tax liability. The GST rates applicable to the post-GST execution were materially higher. The Government circular recognising reimbursement of service tax paid by contractors, upon proof of payment, embodied a principle equally applicable to GST. Production of statutory returns for the invoiced periods was treated as sufficient verification of the GST liability.
Conclusion: The contractor is entitled to reimbursement of the GST component reflected in the relevant invoices upon production of the filed GST returns.
Reimbursement of GST on pre-GST works contract - Tax component payable to contractor on production of statutory returns - Entitlement of a contractor under a works contract awarded before introduction of GST to reimbursement of GST on work executed after GST was introduced. - HELD THAT: - The distinction based on the contract having been awarded before GST was not accepted. The contractor had been liable to compounded tax under the VAT regime and had no service-tax liability before GST, whereas GST became payable on the work executed thereafter. The Government circular recognising reimbursement of service tax paid by a contractor upon proof of payment reflected the governing principle that the tax component borne by the contractor is reimbursable; the same yardstick was held applicable to GST. Production of returns for the invoiced periods was directed as proof of the GST liability. [Paras 5, 6]
The contractor was held entitled to disbursement of the GST component covered by the invoices upon producing the relevant CGST/SGST returns before the awarder.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed to the extent that, upon production of the statutory returns for the invoiced periods, the concerned respondents shall consider them and disburse the GST component claimed.
Issues: (i) Whether Section 159 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 validates reassessment proceedings initiated against an assessee who had died before initiation. (ii) Whether a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 issued to a deceased assessee is curable under Section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (iii) Whether the legal representative waived the jurisdictional objection through filing a return or participating in proceedings under Section 292BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (iv) Whether reassessment proceedings may be sustained on equitable grounds despite non-fulfilment of statutory jurisdictional requirements. (v) Whether quashing the invalid reassessment notice constitutes a finding or direction permitting a fresh notice beyond limitation under Section 150 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Issue (i): Whether Section 159 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 validates reassessment proceedings initiated against an assessee who had died before initiation.
Analysis: Section 159(2)(a) permits continuation against a legal representative only where proceedings were validly commenced during the assessee's lifetime. Section 159(2)(b) permits proceedings that could have been initiated against the deceased to be initiated directly against the legal representative, who is deemed to be an assessee; it does not authorise initiation in the name of a dead person. No statutory duty requires legal representatives to intimate the Department of the assessee's death.
Conclusion: Section 159 does not validate proceedings initiated against a deceased assessee; a fresh notice had to be issued directly to the legal representative within the prescribed limitation. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 issued to a deceased assessee is curable under Section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: A valid notice under Section 148 is the foundational condition for assumption of reassessment jurisdiction and must be addressed to a legally existing person. A notice issued to a deceased person is not a technical mistake, defect, or omission in substance conforming to the Act, but an inherent jurisdictional defect. Section 292B cannot cure such a defect or permit substitution of the legal representative after initiation.
Conclusion: The notice issued to the deceased assessee was void ab initio and was not curable under Section 292B; all consequential proceedings were null and void. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the legal representative waived the jurisdictional objection through filing a return or participating in proceedings under Section 292BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: Section 292BB applies where the assessee has appeared or cooperated without timely objecting to defective service. Here, the assessee was already dead, and the legal representative raised the jurisdictional objection from the outset rather than furnishing material in response to the inquiry notices. In any event, participation, waiver, acquiescence, or consent cannot confer statutory jurisdiction or create an estoppel against law.
Conclusion: Section 292BB did not validate the notice or constitute a waiver of the jurisdictional objection by the legal representative. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether reassessment proceedings may be sustained on equitable grounds despite non-fulfilment of statutory jurisdictional requirements.
Analysis: Tax liability and reassessment jurisdiction must arise strictly from the statutory language. Equitable doctrines, including estoppel, waiver, acquiescence, approbate and reprobate, cannot supply a jurisdictional condition omitted by the statute. Although filing and electronic verification of the deceased's return was contrary to the statutory scheme, that conduct could not confer jurisdiction upon the Revenue; action regarding that conduct remains governed independently by law.
Conclusion: Reassessment proceedings cannot be sustained on equitable considerations where the mandatory statutory conditions for jurisdiction are absent. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (v): Whether quashing the invalid reassessment notice constitutes a finding or direction permitting a fresh notice beyond limitation under Section 150 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: Section 150(1) removes the ordinary limitation only where reassessment is necessary to give effect to a finding or direction in a qualifying proceeding. An order merely declaring the initiation against a deceased person void ab initio neither directs reassessment nor supplies a finding requiring a fresh notice. Section 150 cannot be used to revive proceedings where the period for valid issuance of notice to the legal representative under Section 149 has expired.
Conclusion: The quashing order is not a finding or direction under Section 150(1), and the Revenue cannot issue a fresh notice to the legal representative beyond limitation on that basis. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: A reassessment jurisdiction can be exercised against the estate of a deceased assessee only through a valid and timely statutory initiation against the legal representative; an initiation addressed to the deceased has no legal foundation.
Ratio Decidendi: A notice initiating reassessment must be issued to a legally existing assessee or, after death, directly to the legal representative within limitation; a notice to a deceased person is a non-curable jurisdictional nullity that cannot be validated by statutory deeming provisions, participation, equity, or a subsequent court order.
Reassessment notice issued to deceased assessee - Legal representative's liability for deceased assessee - Incurable jurisdictional defect in reassessment notice - Limitation for fresh reassessment notice
Reassessment notice issued to deceased assessee - Legal representative's liability for deceased assessee - Incurable jurisdictional defect in reassessment notice - HELD THAT: - A notice u/s 148 is the foundational jurisdictional notice for reopening an assessment and must be issued to a living, correct person. Section 159(2)(a) permits continuation of proceedings validly commenced during the assessee's lifetime; Section 159(2)(b) permits fresh proceedings only by issuing notice directly to the legal representative within the prescribed limitation.
Madras High Court speaking through in Alamelu Veerappan [2018 (6) TMI 760 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] while concluding that the notice issued against a dead person is wholly without jurisdiction that cannot be enforced in law, has observed that proceedings can be continued against the legal heir if the proceedings were initiated during the lifetime of the deceased assessee and permitted for proceeding against the legal heir.
A notice issued to a deceased person is void ab initio, and cannot be validated by substituting the legal representative or by Section 292B, which does not cure a foundational jurisdictional defect. In the absence of a statutory obligation, failure of legal representatives to intimate death does not alter that result. [Paras 48, 49, 50, 51, 52]
The notice issued to the deceased assessee and all proceedings founded upon it were held null and void.
Statutory estoppel on participation in reassessment - Waiver of jurisdictional objection - Effect of the legal representative's filing of return and responses in relation to the deceased assessee upon the jurisdictional objection to the reassessment notice - HELD THAT: - Section 292BB applies where the assessee has appeared or co-operated in the inquiry and addresses defects in service of notice. The assessee having died before issuance of the notice, the statutory condition for its application was absent. The legal representative had objected to jurisdiction from the inception and had not supplied documents in response to the inquiry notice. In any event, participation, waiver or acquiescence cannot confer jurisdiction where the initiating notice itself is void. [Paras 59, 60, 61, 62, 63]
The legal representative was not precluded by Section 292BB from challenging the void reassessment notice.
Strict construction of jurisdictional conditions in taxing statutes - Equity in tax administration - Whether reassessment proceedings void for want of a valid jurisdictional notice could be sustained on equitable considerations arising from the legal representative's conduct? - HELD THAT: - Tax liability and jurisdiction must arise strictly from the statute; equitable doctrines cannot supply a statutory deficiency or validate proceedings initiated contrary to mandatory jurisdictional conditions. Though filing and electronic verification of the return in the deceased assessee's name was contrary to the statutory scheme and could invite action under the Act, such conduct could not confer jurisdiction upon the Revenue to proceed on a notice issued to a dead person. The jurisdictional conditions of Section 148, including the identity of the noticee, require strict compliance. [Paras 73, 74, 81, 82, 83]
Equitable considerations could not sustain the reassessment proceedings.
Finding or direction for reassessment beyond limitation - Statutory bar to fresh reassessment notice - Whether quashing the void notice under Section 148 constituted a finding or direction enabling a fresh notice to the legal representative beyond limitation under Section 150? - HELD THAT: - Section 150(1) relaxes limitation only where reassessment is necessary to give effect to a finding or direction in the specified proceedings, subject to Section 150(2). An order declaring the initiation of reassessment against a deceased person void ab initio is not a finding or direction requiring reassessment. The Revenue was required to initiate proceedings directly against the legal representative within the limitation prescribed under Section 149 and could not use the order quashing the void notice to revive a time-barred proceeding. [Paras 99, 100, 102, 103, 104]
Section 150 could not be invoked to issue a fresh notice to the legal representative after expiry of the limitation period.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The notice issued under Section 148 in the name of the deceased assessee, together with all consequential proceedings, assessment and demand, was quashed.
Issues: Whether reassessment initiated after four years of the relevant assessment year was valid where the assessee had disclosed interest expenditure and investments during the original scrutiny assessment and the proposed disallowance was based on re-examination of the same records.
Analysis: The original assessment was completed after scrutiny, during which the disallowance issue had been specifically examined. The recorded reasons did not identify any failure by the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts, nor did they rely on tangible material obtained subsequent to the original assessment. The proposed reassessment rested on a fresh examination of the disclosed interest expenditure and investments and was therefore founded on a change of opinion.
Conclusion: The reassessment notice was invalid and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.
Reassessment beyond four years - Change of opinion - Failure to disclose fully and truly material facts - Disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income u/s 14A -HELD THAT: - The original scrutiny had specifically examined the disallowance under Section 14A and the assessee had furnished the relevant particulars. The revenue neither alleged failure to make a full and true disclosure nor identified any tangible material obtained after completion of assessment indicating escapement of income. Reopening founded on a re-examination of the same assessment record was therefore a change of opinion and could not sustain reassessment beyond four years. [Paras 6]
The notice for reassessment and consequential orders were quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the reassessment notice, together with consequential orders, was quashed.
Issues: Whether a revenue appeal against an order concerning revision under Section 263 was maintainable despite being below the prescribed monetary threshold where the tax effect was quantifiable.
Analysis: The applicable departmental circulars permit an appeal below the monetary threshold in a revision matter only where the tax effect is not quantifiable or is not involved. Reference to revision orders in the illustrative exception does not exempt every such order irrespective of whether the tax effect can be determined. The tax effect arising from the proposed addition was ascertainable.
Conclusion: The exception for unquantifiable tax effect did not apply; the revenue appeal was not maintainable.
Monetary limits for Revenue appeals concerning revision u/s 263 - Quantifiable tax effect in revisionary proceedings -exceptions available for filing an appeal u/s 260A
Maintainability of the Revenue's appeal against an order arising from revisionary proceedings where the tax effect was quantifiable and below the prescribed monetary limit - HELD THAT: - Clause 3.1(f) of Circular No. 5/2024 permits an appeal despite the monetary limit only where the tax effect is not quantifiable or is not involved. The reference to an order u/s 263 is illustrative and does not exempt every such order from the monetary-limit requirement. Since the alleged unexplained investment made the tax effect quantifiable, the exception was inapplicable. [Paras 8, 9, 10]
The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable under Circular Nos. 5/2024 and 09/2024.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was dismissed as not maintainable because the tax effect in the revisionary proceedings was quantifiable and did not satisfy the prescribed monetary threshold for an appeal.
Issues: Whether reassessment of a scrutiny assessment beyond four years was valid where the property-sale transaction and material facts had been disclosed during the original assessment.
Analysis: The first proviso to Section 147 permits reopening, after expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year where an assessment was completed under Section 143(3), only if escaped income is attributable to the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The sale transaction, stated consideration, stamp-duty valuation component, and explanation for that component had been specifically sought and furnished during the original scrutiny. The recorded reasons identified no material fact withheld by the assessee. Reappraisal of the same disclosed material, including a subsequent view on applicability of Section 50C, could not satisfy the statutory jurisdictional condition.
Conclusion: The reassessment notice issued beyond four years was invalid for want of failure by the assessee to make full and true disclosure of material facts; the finding is in favour of the assessee.
Reassessment beyond four years - Failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts - Change of opinion
Validity of reopening a completed scrutiny assessment beyond four years on the basis of the stamp-duty value of immovable property where the sale transaction and the explanation for the additional stamp-duty component had been disclosed in the original assessment HELD THAT: - The first proviso to Section 147 permits reopening after four years of an assessment completed under Section 143(3) only where escapement is attributable to the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The property transaction had been specifically examined in the original scrutiny, and the assessee had furnished the sale consideration and its explanation concerning the additional value considered for stamp-duty purposes.
The recorded reasons did not identify any material fact withheld by the assessee. A subsequent different view on the same disclosed material, including on the applicability of Section 50C, could not satisfy the jurisdictional condition for reopening beyond four years. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
The reassessment notice and consequential proceedings were held unsustainable and were quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The notice issued for reassessment and the consequential proceedings were quashed as the statutory condition for reopening a completed assessment beyond four years was not met.
Issues: Whether appellate and consequential assessment proceedings could continue after acceptance of settlement under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 and issuance of Form No. 4.
Analysis: The acceptance of the settlement application, payment of the determined amount, and issuance of Form No. 4 made the assessment for the relevant year conclusive and final under the Scheme. Upon being notified of issuance of Form No. 2 and the pending settlement application, the appellate authority ought not to have remanded the assessment; it should have deferred disposal until the final settlement certificate and then disposed of the appeal consistently with the settlement. Continuation of the remand and consequential proceedings produced unwarranted multiplicity of litigation.
Conclusion: The settlement certificate in Form No. 4 remains conclusive under the Scheme, and the appellate, Tribunal and consequential proceedings founded on the remand order cannot survive.
Conclusive settlement under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 - Disposal of pending appeal after issuance of settlement certificate
Effect of acceptance of settlement under the VSV Scheme and issuance of Form No.4 on the pending appellate proceedings for Assessment Year 2018-19 - HELD THAT: - Upon acceptance of the application under the VSV Scheme, payment of the determined amount and issuance of Form No.4, adjudication and assessment for the relevant year became conclusive and final. Once the appellate authority had been informed of issuance of Form No.2 and of the pending settlement, it ought not to have decided the appeal by remanding the assessment; it should have awaited the final settlement and disposed of the appeal accordingly. The remand resulted in avoidable multiplicity of proceedings and was contrary to the spirit of the Scheme. [Paras 7, 9, 10, 12]
The appellate remand order, the Tribunal's orders and consequential proceedings were quashed; Form No.4 was held conclusive in terms of the Scheme.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The settlement certificate issued under the VSV Scheme governs the assessee's liability for Assessment Year 2018-19, and the revived assessment proceedings cannot continue.
Issues: Whether registration under Section 12AB could be granted where the Trust's objects were alleged to be confined to the welfare and business interests of its members rather than the public at large.
Analysis: The main objects provided for educational, cultural, social, medical, developmental, disaster-relief, agricultural, women-empowerment, water-conservation and sports activities for the public at large, including the poor, needy and backward classes, without discrimination. The objects also prohibited distribution of profits or dividends to members and commercial operation. The incidental objects concerning industry-related committees and public facilities did not displace the charitable character of the principal objects. Isolated incidental objects could not justify treating the Trust as a members-only welfare association when its principal purposes were directed towards public benefit.
Conclusion: Registration under Section 12AB was rightly granted to the Trust; no substantial question of law arose. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Registration of charitable trust u/s 12AB - Charitable objects for benefit of public at large - Entitlement to registration u/s 12AB where the trust's incidental objects contemplated benefits for members but its main objects were directed to public welfare - HELD THAT: - The main objects provided for educational, social, medical, developmental and other welfare activities for the public at large, including aid to the poor and needy, without discrimination. The incidental or ancillary objects relied upon by the Revenue did not concern religious activity and did not displace the public character of the main objects.
Tribunal's grant of registration was consequently consistent with CIT Exemption Vs. Bayath Kutchhi Dasha Oswal Jain Mahajan Trust [2016 (9) TMI 8 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] [Paras 5, 7]
No substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order granting registration under section 12AB.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was dismissed, as the trust's main objects were for the benefit of the public at large and no substantial question of law arose.
Issues: Whether the Tribunal could dismiss an assessee's appeal because its authorised representative was not dressed in accordance with the standard operating procedure for virtual hearing.
Analysis: Rule 24 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 required the Tribunal, upon non-appearance of the appellant, to dispose of the appeal on merits after hearing the respondent. The Rules contained no provision authorising dismissal merely because the authorised representative was not in proper dress for a virtual hearing.
Conclusion: The dismissal on the stated ground was impermissible; the appeal was restored to the Tribunal for disposal on merits.
Dismissal of an income-tax appeal - authorised representative was not in prescribed dress during virtual hearing - HELD THAT: - Rule 24 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 required the Tribunal to proceed with and decide the appeal notwithstanding the appellant's non-appearance. There was no provision permitting dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the authorised representative was not in proper dress under the SOP for virtual hearing. [Paras 2, 3]
The dismissal order was set aside and the appeal was restored to the Tribunal's file for expeditious disposal.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the Tribunal's non-merits dismissal and restoring the appeal for adjudication.
Issues: (i) Whether beer sold before 01.06.2003 was excluded from tax collection at source as Indian Made Foreign Liquor under the relevant entry in Section 206C(1); (ii) Whether the Revenue could sustain default and interest by invoking Section 206C as a continuation of the erstwhile presumptive scheme under Section 44AC.
Issue (i): Whether beer sold before 01.06.2003 was excluded from tax collection at source as Indian Made Foreign Liquor under the relevant entry in Section 206C(1).
Analysis: The pre-amendment Table entry covered alcoholic liquor for human consumption "other than IMFL"; the exclusion formed an integral limitation on the taxable category. Since IMFL was undefined in the Income-tax Act, its meaning was to be determined in its commercial and statutory context. The applicable excise definition included beer within Indian Made Foreign Liquor. State excise classifications and contemporaneous explanatory materials could operate only as contextual aids and could not displace the statutory text.
Analysis: Deletion of the words "other than IMFL" with effect from 01.06.2003 was a deliberate prospective expansion of the entry. The classification of beer as IMFL for the earlier period was a reasonable view, and no perversity, misapplication of law, or substantial question of law was established.
Conclusion: Beer was IMFL for the relevant pre-01.06.2003 period and was excluded from the TCS entry under Section 206C(1), in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the Revenue could sustain default and interest by invoking Section 206C as a continuation of the erstwhile presumptive scheme under Section 44AC.
Analysis: Section 206C operated as a collection mechanism triggered only when the goods fell within the specified Table entry. Following the omission of Section 44AC, its presumptive or deeming approach could not be imported into the collection provision. As beer was outside the applicable entry, the statutory trigger for collection did not arise.
Conclusion: The Revenue could not fasten default or interest by treating Section 206C as reviving the omitted presumptive scheme under Section 44AC, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: For the relevant period, sales of beer did not attract TCS, and the asserted liability for default and consequential interest had no statutory basis.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxing entry expressly excludes an undefined commercial category, its contextual commercial meaning governs; a later deletion of that exclusion operates as a prospective enlargement and cannot be rendered redundant.
Tax collection at source on beer sales u/s 206C -Indian-made foreign liquor exclusion - Interpretation of undefined commercial expressions - definitions of “liquor”, “foreign liquor”, and “Indian Made Foreign Liquor/IMFL” as defined in the Andhra Pradesh / [Telangana] Excise Act, 1968
Liability to collect tax at source on sales of beer before 01.06.2003 under the entry for alcoholic liquor for human consumption other than IMFL - HELD THAT: - Statutory provisions of Section 206C of the Act of 1061 which itself fastens an obligation to collect tax at source only when the transaction involves goods that fall within the specific descriptions set out in the statutory Table. So, the main question is simply whether the goods sold fit that Table description. For the years in question, the relevant entry was framed as “alcoholic liquor for human consumption (other than IMFL)”. The words in parentheses are not decorative or incidental, but they are part of the definition of the taxable category and operate as an inbuilt limitation. The entry covers only that subset of alcoholic liquor which is not IMFL.
To put in simple language, the Revenue is only partly right where TCS is mandatory only if the sale falls within the table entry and the entry applies only when the goods match the description completely including the words in brackets that exclude IMFL. So unless it is first shown that ‘Beer’ is not IMFL for that period Revenue cannot say TCS was automatic just because ‘Beer’ is alcoholic liquor for human consumption.
Moreover, the term IMFL is not defined anywhere in the Income-tax Act when a tax law uses a common commercial term but does not define it, Courts generally do not invent a new meaning on their own. Instead, they try to understand the term in the way it is normally understood by people who deal with that product in real life, such as traders, sellers and those in the liquor business.
The parenthetical exclusion of IMFL formed an integral limitation upon the relevant Table entry and tax collection at source could arise only if beer was shown not to be IMFL. As IMFL was undefined in the Income-tax Act, its meaning had to be determined in its commercial and statutory context.
The Tribunal's view that beer could fall within IMFL was a reasonable classification view, State excise classifications were only collateral aids and could not control the Income-tax Act. Contemporaneous explanatory material could permissibly assist in understanding the undefined expression.
The subsequent deletion of the words "other than IMFL" with effect from 01.06.2003 was deliberate and broadened the entry prospectively; an interpretation rendering that amendment ineffective was impermissible.
Once the ITAT’s view is accepted as a reasonable view on classification for the pre-amendment period, the Revenue’s further arguments become consequential and cannot independently sustain the appeal. Issues about whether the APBCL is a “seller”, whether the APBCL should be treated as an assessee in default u/s 206C(6) of the Act of 1961, and whether interest u/s 206C(7) of the Act of 1961is payable, all arise only if the goods sold fall within the relevant Table entry in the first place.
For the pre 01.06.2003 period, if ‘Beer’ is treated as falling within IMFL, therefore within the excluded class, the statutory trigger for TCS does not operate and the alleged defaults and interest do not survive. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the Revenue has not shown that the ITAT’s classification finding is perverse or based on a wrong legal test so as to raise a substantial question of law under Section 260A of the Act of 1961.[Paras 39, 40, 42, 43, 44]
Beer was held to fall within the excluded class of IMFL for the pre-01.06.2003 period; consequently, no obligation to collect tax at source, default liability, or consequential interest arose, and no substantial question of law was made out.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were dismissed. The Tribunal's classification of beer as IMFL for the period before 01.06.2003 was sustained, excluding the sales from the relevant tax-collection-at-source entry.
Issues: Whether the reassessment order and notice issued on 29.07.2022 for Assessment Year 2014-15 were valid where issued after expiry of the surviving limitation period.
Analysis: The original reassessment notice, issued on 24.06.2021, was deemed to be a notice under Section 148A(b). The applicable surviving period, calculated under the limitation regime preserved by the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 and after excluding the period stipulated for supply of information and the assessee's response, expired on 16.06.2022. The reassessment order and fresh notice dated 29.07.2022 were consequently issued beyond that period.
Conclusion: The reassessment notice, order under Section 148A(d), and consequential reopening proceedings were invalid and time barred, in favour of the assessee.
Reassessment notice beyond surviving limitation period - Validity of deemed notice under reassessment regime - Validity of the reassessment notice for AY 2014-2015 issued after expiry of the surviving time available under the Income-tax Act read with TOLA - HELD THAT: - The original reassessment notice, deemed to be a notice under the new reassessment procedure pursuant to Union of India Vs. Ashish Agarwal, was issued within the TOLA extension. Applying the principle in Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal [2024 (10) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] the reassessment notice under the new regime had to be issued within the limitation period surviving after exclusion of the deemed stay and the period allowed for reply. The surviving period expired on 16.06.2022, whereas the order and consequential notice were issued thereafter. [Paras 7, 9]
The order u/s 148A(d), the notice u/s 148 and all consequential reassessment proceedings were quashed as time barred.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The reassessment order and notice, having been issued beyond the surviving limitation period, and all consequential proceedings were quashed.
Issues: (i) Whether a notional journal entry transferring outstanding salary liability to partners' capital accounts, without any actual inflow of funds, could be taxed as unexplained cash credit; (ii) Whether disallowance of part of the salaries paid to relatives of partners as excessive was justified; (iii) Whether capital introduced by identifiable partners could be assessed as unexplained income of the firm.
Issue (i): Whether a notional journal entry transferring outstanding salary liability to partners' capital accounts, without any actual inflow of funds, could be taxed as unexplained cash credit.
Analysis: The partners confirmed that no actual capital of the disputed amount had been introduced. The entry was an internal accounting adjustment, subsequently reversed at the beginning of the following financial year; no evidence established receipt of money, assets, or any equivalent benefit by the firm. Reclassification of salary payable as partners' capital changes one liability into another and does not require a corresponding increase in assets. An accounting error or unqualified audit report cannot convert a non-existent inflow into taxable income. The subsequent reversal was relevant corroboration of the entry's true character, not an attempt to alter the tax position of the relevant year.
Conclusion: The notional entry did not constitute an unexplained cash credit, and the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether disallowance of part of the salaries paid to relatives of partners as excessive was justified.
Analysis: The related employees managed and supervised operations at multiple locations, including recruitment, administration and day-to-day activities. Their responsibilities supported the remuneration paid. No material, comparables, or stated basis established that any part of the salary exceeded the fair market value of the services.
Conclusion: The salary disallowance was unjustified and was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether capital introduced by identifiable partners could be assessed as unexplained income of the firm.
Analysis: The partners admitted the capital contribution and their identities were undisputed. Where identifiable partners confirm capital introduction, any doubt concerning their source or creditworthiness is examinable in their individual assessments, rather than as unexplained income of the firm. The addition was also unsupported by reasons showing why the contribution was unsubstantiated.
Conclusion: The capital contribution could not be assessed as unexplained income of the firm, and the Revenue's challenge failed in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The additions relating to the notional capital entry and alleged excess salary were unsustainable, while the deletion of the addition relating to confirmed partner contributions remained intact.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 68 applies only to a real credit involving money, money's worth, or an actual financial inflow; a merely notional accounting entry, unsupported by evidence of any actual receipt, cannot be treated as unexplained income.
Unexplained cash credit - real credit requirement - Excessive payment to related persons - fair market value of services - Partners' capital contribution - assessment of source in partners' hands
Unexplained cash credit - real credit requirement - Notional journal entry - Addition for the notional credit to partners' capital accounts arising from transfer of salary and wages liability - HELD THAT: - Section 68 applies where a credit represents a real receipt, money's worth or inflow requiring explanation; it cannot be invoked merely because a book entry exists. The partners confirmed that no capital was actually introduced, and the Revenue produced no material showing receipt of money, asset or equivalent benefit by the firm. Conversion of salary payable into partners' capital was a change in the form of liability, with no corresponding effect on assets; its reversal in the succeeding year was relevant corroborative evidence of the erroneous entry. Defective accounting treatment, without proof of a real unexplained credit, could not give rise to taxable income. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
The addition u/s 68 in respect of the notional capital credit was deleted.
Excessive payment to related persons - fair market value of services - Disallowance of salary paid to relatives of partners as excessive - HELD THAT: - The employees performed managerial, recruitment, administrative and supervisory functions at multiple business locations. AO neither established that the payments exceeded the fair market value of their services nor supplied a basis or comparable instance for the ad hoc disallowance. The salaries could not therefore be regarded as excessive merely because they were paid to related persons. [Paras 16]
The disallowance of salary paid to related employees was deleted.
Partners' capital contribution u/s 40A - assessment of source in partners' hands - addition relating to actual capital contribution by identifiable partners - HELD THAT: - The partners admitted the capital contributions and their identity was not in dispute. Where identifiable partners confirm introduction of capital, any doubt regarding their creditworthiness or source is to be examined in their individual assessments and not by treating the contribution as unexplained income of the firm. The principle stated in PCIT Vs. Vaishnodevi Refoils & Solves [2018 (1) TMI 861 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] supported the deletion. [Paras 18]
The deletion of the addition relating to the partners' actual capital contribution was upheld and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The assessee's appeal was allowed, with deletion of the additions for the notional capital entry and related-party salary payments. The Revenue's appeal against deletion of the addition for actual partners' capital contribution was dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether the notice issued under Section 148 was without jurisdiction or invalid; (ii) Whether deduction for the claimed political donation was allowable notwithstanding the investigation material, statements and fund-layering evidence.
Issue (i): Whether the notice issued under Section 148 was without jurisdiction or invalid.
Analysis: The reassessment proceedings were initiated in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions. No jurisdictional defect invalidating the notice was established.
Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 was valid. This issue was decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether deduction for the claimed political donation was allowable notwithstanding the investigation material, statements and fund-layering evidence.
Analysis: The investigation material, statements recorded during search proceedings, bank-trail analysis and established modus operandi showed that the recipient political party was used to provide accommodation entries through systematic layering of funds and return of cash to donors. Applying the test of human probabilities and preponderance of probabilities, banking-channel payments and donation receipts did not establish a genuine contribution where the cumulative circumstances showed that the apparent transaction was not real.
Conclusion: The claimed contribution was not a genuine donation eligible for deduction under Section 80GGC. This issue was decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment and the disallowance of the political-donation deduction were sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: Documentary banking evidence and receipts do not establish entitlement to a tax deduction where surrounding circumstances, investigation material and fund-layering evidence demonstrate on a preponderance of probabilities that the transaction is an accommodation entry rather than a genuine contribution.
Validity of reassessment notice - Deduction for political contributions u/s 80GGC - genuineness of donation - Accommodation entries-test of human probabilities
Validity of reassessment notice - Validity of the notice issued under section 148 for reassessment of the assessee's claim of deduction for political donation - HELD THAT: - The reassessment proceedings were found to have been initiated in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The notice u/s 148 could therefore not be regarded as issued without jurisdiction or as invalid. [Paras 6]
The challenge to the reassessment notice was dismissed.
Deduction for political contributions - genuineness of donation - Accommodation entries - test of human probabilities - Allowability of deduction u/s 80GGC for contribution to a political party alleged to be an accommodation entry - HELD THAT: - Documentary evidence of payment through banking channels and donation receipts does not preclude examination of the surrounding circumstances. Applying the test of human probabilities, the investigation material, statements recorded under section 132(4), bank-trail analysis and the established fund-layering arrangement of the recipient political party constituted an overwhelming chain of circumstances showing that the contribution was an accommodation entry rather than a genuine donation. The assessee failed to establish eligibility for the deduction. [Paras 10, 11]
The disallowance of deduction under section 80GGC was upheld and the grounds on merits and natural justice were dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed. The reassessment notice was sustained and the claimed deduction for the political contribution was rightly disallowed.
Issues: Whether registration granted to the trust under section 12AB could be applied to earlier assessment years whose appeals were pending before the Tribunal, and whether its income for those years was exempt under sections 11 to 13.
Analysis: The first proviso to section 12A(2) is a beneficial and curative provision intended to relieve genuine charitable institutions from hardship caused by absence of registration in earlier years. Appellate proceedings are a continuation of assessment proceedings; therefore, an appeal pending before the Tribunal is deemed to be an assessment proceeding pending before the Assessing Officer for applying the proviso. The trust's objects and activities remained unchanged, and there was no prior refusal or cancellation of registration. Its accounts further showed application exceeding 85% of total receipts in every year under appeal.
Conclusion: The subsequently granted registration applies to assessment year 2016-17 and the subsequent years under appeal. The trust is entitled to exemption under sections 11 to 13, and the additions are liable to be deleted.
Retrospective application of trust registration - registration granted to the trust u/s 12AB - Appeal as continuation of assessment proceedings - Exemption of charitable trust income
Availability of exemption u/ss 11 to 13 to a trust for assessment years preceding registration u/s 12AB where the appeals against those assessments remained pending and the objects and activities continued unchanged - HELD THAT: - The first proviso to section 12A(2), introduced to alleviate hardship to genuine charitable institutions, applies to prior assessment years where the trust's objects and activities remain the same. Proceedings pending in appeal are a continuation of assessment proceedings and are consequently deemed to be proceedings pending before the Assessing Officer for the purpose of the proviso. Since the trust's objects and activities remained unchanged and its application of income exceeded the prescribed threshold in the years under appeal, its income was held exempt under sections 11 to 13. [Paras 16, 18, 19, 20, 22]
The registration benefit was extended to A.Y. 2016-17 and subsequent assessment years under appeal; the additions were directed to be deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed. The trust was held entitled to exemption under sections 11 to 13 for A.Y. 2016-17 and the substantially similar subsequent assessment years under appeal.
Issues: (i) Whether a transfer-pricing adjustment could be made for captive inter-unit transfer of power where no deduction under section 80-IA was claimed due to returned losses, and, alternatively, the appropriate market value of such power; (ii) Whether export commission paid to non-resident agents for procuring orders outside India was disallowable for failure to deduct tax at source.
Issue (i): Whether a transfer-pricing adjustment could be made for captive inter-unit transfer of power where no deduction under section 80-IA was claimed due to returned losses, and, alternatively, the appropriate market value of such power.
Analysis: The deduction under section 80-IA was not claimed because the assessee returned losses, and the transfer-pricing adjustment had been quantified only protectively. In the absence of a claimed deduction, no adjustment arose under the normal provisions. Independently, market value for electricity captively transferred was determined by reference to the tariff charged by the distribution company to industrial consumers.
Conclusion: The deletion of the transfer-pricing adjustment was sustained in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether export commission paid to non-resident agents for procuring orders outside India was disallowable for failure to deduct tax at source.
Analysis: The non-resident agents procured export orders outside India, had no permanent establishment in India, and rendered no services in India. The commission therefore was not chargeable to tax in India, with the consequence that no deduction of tax at source was required.
Conclusion: The deletion of the disallowance of export commission was sustained in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: No taxable adjustment survived in respect of either the captive-power transfer or the foreign export commission.
Ratio Decidendi: Where no section 80-IA deduction is claimed, a protective adjustment relating to eligible-unit profits cannot be made; commission to non-resident agents for services wholly rendered outside India, absent an Indian permanent establishment, is not subject to tax deduction at source.
Protective transfer-pricing adjustment for captive power transfers - Market value of electricity for captive consumption - Export commission to non-resident agents-tax withholding
Protective transfer-pricing adjustment for captive power transfers - Market value of electricity for captive consumption - TP adjustment in respect of electricity transferred from captive power units to the paper manufacturing division, where no deduction for eligible power-unit profits was claimed owing to returned losses - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that, as no deduction under section 80-IA was claimed and the Transfer Pricing Officer had quantified the adjustment only protectively, no adjustment under the normal provisions was warranted. Independently, it held that the market value of electricity transferred for captive consumption is the rate at which the distribution company supplies electricity to consumers, following the earlier order in the assessee's case [2023 (11) TMI 1361 - ITAT CHENNAI] for AY 2016- 17 and CIT v. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. [2023 (12) TMI 417 - SUPREME COURT]. [Paras 7]
Deletion of the transfer-pricing adjustment was upheld.
TDS u/s 195 - Export commission to non-resident agents - tax withholding - Disallowance of export commission paid to non-resident agents for procuring export orders outside India, without deduction of tax at source - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the agents had no permanent establishment in India and rendered no services in India. The commission was therefore not chargeable to tax in India and did not attract tax deduction at source, the issue being covered by the jurisdictional High Court's judgment in the assessee's own case.[Paras 8]
Deletion of the disallowance under section 40(a)(i) was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was dismissed. The deletion of the protective transfer-pricing adjustment and of the disallowance of export commission was sustained; the book-profit grounds did not survive after rectification.
Issues: Whether deduction under Section 54F was allowable where the assessee purchased a residential property from her husband.
Analysis: The purchase was a registered transaction for market-value consideration, supported by payment through disclosed funds and payment of stamp duty. The sole basis for denial was the alleged arrangement to enable the spouse to set off capital gains against business losses. The spouse's business losses arose after the property transaction and could not have been anticipated on the purchase date. A related-party purchase is not, by itself, a colourable device where the transaction is genuine and falls within the statutory framework. Legitimate tax planning does not invalidate an otherwise lawful transaction merely because it results in a tax benefit.
Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 54F; the disallowance was deleted.
Deduction for investment in residential house u/s 54F - Genuine tax planning and colourable device - Purchase of residential property from spouse - HELD THAT: - The deduction was denied solely because the spouse set off a part of the short-term capital gain arising on the sale against business losses. The business loss arose after the purchase and sale of the property and, therefore, could neither have accrued nor been anticipated when the transaction was undertaken.
A transaction between spouses, made within the legal framework, cannot be treated as a colourable device merely because it results in a tax benefit; nor can the deduction be denied on suspicion or surmise in the absence of any legal flaw or material dislodging the transaction.
We observed that identical issue has been addressed in the case of Nidhi siddharth Kejriwal [2026 (5) TMI 447 - ITAT MUMBAI] wherein held 'Deduction could not be denied merely because the purchase was from relatives or because the Revenue suspected that the arrangement resulted in tax advantage'.
Also held in Kavita Manoj Damani [2025 (7) TMI 117 - ITAT MUMBAI] considering the ratio of the decisions of McDowell & Co. Ltd. [1985 (4) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT] and various other decisions like Kalawati Vijaykumar Agarwal [2024 (9) TMI 1957 - ITAT PUNE], ITO v. Rajesh Sharma [2016 (4) TMI 342 - ITAT JAIPUR] Surjeet Singh [2022 (9) TMI 454 - ITAT CHANDIGARH] exemption u/s 54/54F is to be granted with respect to the residential property purchased by the assessee from his relative/family member, held that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s 54 of the Act.[Paras 12, 14, 13, 15]
The assessee was held entitled to deduction under section 54F, and the disallowance was directed to be deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed. The disallowance of deduction under section 54F was deleted.
Issues: Whether an addition for alleged suppression of professional receipts can be sustained solely on estimated consultation fees derived from third-party hospital data and an uncorroborated statement.
Analysis: The estimated receipts were founded on data collected by a hospital manager who lacked personal knowledge of the actual fees charged and whose figures were estimates unsupported by physical verification. The hospital's out-patient records included non-billed and non-charged categories, including review patients and patients covered by schemes. No independent material established receipt of income beyond the disclosed professional receipts; no incriminating material was found from the assessee, the books and bank accounts were not rejected, and no discrepancy in them was identified.
Conclusion: The addition for alleged suppression of professional receipts was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Suppression of professional receipts - Uncorroborated third-party statementrelied upon - Burden of proof - Addition for alleged suppression of a consultant doctor's professional receipts based solely on estimated consultation charges derived from hospital out-patient data and a third-party statement - HELD THAT: - The third-party statement did not establish the consultation fees actually charged or received by the assessee and was founded on estimated data. The hospital out-patient database included non-billed and non-charged patients, while the assessee's books and bank accounts had neither been rejected nor shown to contain any discrepancy. In the absence of independent corroborative material or incriminating material establishing receipts beyond those disclosed, an addition based merely on estimated consultation charges was unsustainable. See Dr. Sreenivasalu Reddy Ponnaluru [2022 (9) TMI 1441 - ITAT CHENNAI] and G. Ananthasubramaniam [2025 (1) TMI 1846 - ITAT CHENNAI] [Paras 7]
The addition towards alleged suppression of professional receipts was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the addition for alleged suppression of professional receipts was deleted. The grounds challenging reopening and assumption of jurisdiction were left open.
Reduction of Government Litigation and Monetary Threshold for Filing Appeals before Tribunals -Appeals reported to be beyond time by 611 day - HELD THAT:- Appeals dismissed as barred by limitation for want of satisfactory explanation for delay.
Issues: Liability for cost recovery charges at an inland container depot where the prescribed benchmark volume of trade was not achieved, and the treatment of charges for subsequent periods.
Analysis: The controversy between two State instrumentalities was resolved through judicially facilitated mediation. The accepted terms distinguished the period in which the benchmark was admittedly not achieved from later periods requiring verification of benchmark compliance. Waiver for later periods was made contingent upon the customs authority's assessment under the applicable law, with reciprocal adjustment and release of amounts due.
Conclusion: CONCOR is liable to bear cost recovery charges for 2009-10. For subsequent periods, waiver shall be granted where benchmark compliance is established on verification, and any amounts due shall be adjusted and released in accordance with law.
Liability for cost recovery charges at an inland container depot - Benchmark Volume of Trade - Waiver of Charges - Judicially Facilitated Mediation - HELD THAT:- Considering the nature of the dispute and the status of the parties, this Court deemed it appropriate to encourage an amicable resolution of the controversy, which pertains to the levy of cost recovery charges. It was noticed that exemption/waiver from such charges was dependent upon fulfillment of the prescribed benchmark volume of trade and, in the event the benchmark was not achieved, the liability to pay such charges would fall upon CONCOR.
The batch of matters was disposed of on the partie's consensus: cost recovery charges for 2009-10 shall be borne by CONCOR, while liability for subsequent periods shall be determined after verification of the prescribed benchmark, with applicable waiver considered in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence and customs authorities have jurisdiction to investigate and adjudicate alleged breach of EPCG licence conditions, notwithstanding issuance of an export obligation discharge certificate by the licensing authority.
Analysis: The allegations concerned use of unconnected third-party shipping bills and false declarations for obtaining discharge of export obligation, resulting in alleged loss of customs duty. This was distinct from an allegation of misrepresentation in obtaining the licence. A discharge certificate issued by the licensing authority does not bar customs authorities from investigating breach of conditions attached to a duty-exempt import where fraud, concealment, misrepresentation or misdeclaration is alleged. No statutory bar to the customs proceedings was shown. The challenge to a show-cause notice was therefore not fit for interference in writ jurisdiction, while the petitioners could place their defence before the adjudicating authority.
Conclusion: The customs authorities have jurisdiction to continue proceedings from the show-cause-notice stage concerning the alleged violation of EPCG licence conditions; the issue is against the assessee.
Customs jurisdiction to investigate breach of EPCG licence conditions - Interference with show-cause notice in writ jurisdiction - Jurisdiction of Customs Authorities - Violation of Duty Exemption Conditions - Fraud and Misdeclaration
Jurisdiction of the customs authorities to proceed on allegations that the EPCG licence holder used unconnected third-party shipping bills and made false declarations to obtain export-obligation discharge - HELD THAT: - The allegation concerned breach of the conditions subject to which duty-exempt capital goods were imported, resulting in alleged revenue loss, and not misrepresentation to the licensing authority at the stage of obtaining the EPCG licence. The issuance of an export-obligation discharge certificate did not preclude customs authorities from investigating an alleged fraud, concealment, misrepresentation or mis-declaration in relation to compliance with import conditions. No statutory bar against such proceedings was shown. [Paras 10, 11, 16]
The objection to customs jurisdiction was rejected; the petitioners were relegated to the customs adjudicatory proceedings from the show-cause-notice stage.
Interference with show-cause notice in writ jurisdiction - HELD THAT: - As the jurisdictional challenge was not established and the allegations required adjudication, the Court declined to quash the show-cause notice. The petitioners were permitted to submit an additional response and documents before the adjudicating authority, which was directed to afford a personal hearing and decide the matter in accordance with law. [Paras 16, 17]
The writ petition was disposed of without interfering with the show-cause notice, subject to protection against coercive action until adjudication.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by relegating the petitioners to customs adjudication on the show-cause notice. The Commissioner of Customs was directed to decide the matter after granting opportunity of response and personal hearing, and no coercive action was to be taken until such decision.
Issues: Whether interest on refund of a pre-deposit is payable at 12% per annum from the date of deposit until its realisation.
Analysis: The amount deposited pursuant to the appellate pre-deposit requirement retained the character of a pre-deposit. Applying the precedent governing delayed refund of such deposits, interest was held payable from the date of deposit until refund, and the applicable rate was fixed at 12% per annum.
Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to interest at 12% per annum on the refunded pre-deposit from the date of deposit until its realisation.
Entitlement to interest on the refunded pre-deposit from the date of deposit until its realisation - HELD THAT: - Following its earlier decision in the case of Kumavat Contractors [2024 (3) TMI 1230 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], on refund of a pre-deposit, the Tribunal held that interest was payable from the date of deposit until realisation at 12% per annum. [Paras 8]
The appellant was held entitled to interest at 12% per annum from the date of deposit till realisation.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was modified and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.
Issues: Whether the writ petition concerning alleged disappearance or misappropriation of shares by a private stock broker was maintainable despite contractual arbitration and available exchange grievance-redressal remedies.
Analysis: The dispute arose from the contractual relationship between the petitioner and the stock broker and involved allegations requiring determination of contested facts concerning the shareholding and Demat transactions. The contract note subjected disputes to the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Bombay Stock Exchange Limited, Mumbai jurisdiction and arbitration at Mumbai. The petitioner had not invoked arbitration or the available grievance-redressal mechanisms. Marking a complaint email to the securities regulator did not transform the private contractual dispute into a matter warranting writ jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable because efficacious alternative remedies were available before the competent forum; no opinion was expressed on the merits of the underlying dispute.
Alternative statutory remedy for client-stock broker disputes - Arbitration under stock exchange bye-laws - Maintainability of writ petition in contractual shareholding dispute -HELD THAT: - The dispute arose from the contractual relationship between the petitioner and the stock broker and concerned the petitioner's shareholding and Demat-account transactions. The contract note subjected disputes to the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Bombay Stock Exchange, Mumbai jurisdiction and arbitration in Mumbai. As the petitioner had not invoked the contractual or established regulatory grievance-redressal remedies, merely marking an email to SEBI did not render the writ petition maintainable. The Court did not examine the merits of the allegations concerning the shares. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
The writ petition was dismissed as not maintainable, with liberty to pursue the remedies available in law before the competent forum.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed for availability of efficacious alternative remedies under the applicable stock-exchange framework and grievance-redressal mechanisms. The merits of the dispute were left open.
Issues: Whether the Chapter 11 Trustee could be retained as a defendant in the commercial suit concerning domains and websites already dealt with in United States bankruptcy proceedings.
Analysis: The plaintiffs had participated in the United States bankruptcy proceedings, in which the subject assets were sold pursuant to orders of the competent foreign court. The material orders and the plaintiffs' participation were not fully disclosed. No substantive relief was claimed against the Trustee, whose role was confined to conducting the court-authorised sale. The plaint sought to create a local cause of action despite the foreign incorporation of the entities against whom declaratory relief was effectively sought, their non-joinder, and the absence of a cause of action against the Trustee. Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 did not apply because the application sought striking out of the Trustee through inherent powers, rather than a stay of the suit on account of pendency before a foreign court.
Conclusion: The Trustee was not a necessary party, and the plaint disclosed no cause of action against her; she was directed to be struck off from the party array.
Suppression of material facts and abuse of process - Striking off unnecessary party - Continuation of the commercial suit against the Chapter 11 Trustee despite prior participation of the plaintiffs in the United States bankruptcy proceedings and sale of the subject matter pursuant to orders of that Court. - HELD THAT: - The plaintiffs had participated in the foreign bankruptcy proceedings, in which the subject matter of the declaratory relief had already been sold. Proceeding with the suit for declaration thereafter would be a farcical exercise and an abuse of process. The application was not one for stay under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but invoked inherent power to strike off the suit against the Trustee for suppression of material facts. As no substantive relief was claimed against the Trustee and the plaint was a camouflage to create a cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of the Commercial Court, it disclosed no cause of action against her. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 13, 14]
The order rejecting the application was set aside, and the Chapter 11 Trustee was directed to be struck off from the party array.
Final Conclusion: The original petition was allowed in part and the Chapter 11 Trustee was struck off from the suit. Liberty was reserved to the resolution professional to seek appropriate relief regarding the suit's maintainability under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked to sustain service-tax demand solely on Income-tax Department third-party data, absent evidence of wilful suppression or intent to evade tax.
Analysis: The demand for October 2014 to March 2015 was raised through a show-cause notice dated 28.09.2020 by invoking the extended limitation period. The material relied upon consisted solely of third-party Income-tax data. The assessee had a bona fide belief that its services were exempt under entries 12 and 29(h) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST. Mere non-registration, non-payment, or a discrepancy between Income-tax data and service-tax disclosures did not establish fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or a deliberate intent to evade tax. The Department bore the burden to establish the statutory conditions for the extended period, which was not discharged.
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; the surviving service-tax demand was time-barred and was set aside.
Extended period of limitation for service tax demand based on third-party income-tax data - Wilful suppression and intent to evade tax - HELD THAT: - Following the law laid down by the Tribunal in the case M/s Antares Services (P.) Ltd. [2024 (1) TMI 1120 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH]and the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Uniworth Textiles Ltd.[2013 (1) TMI 616 - SUPREME COURT], wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has examined the statutory pre-requisites for invoking the extended period of limitation and dealt with the issue of whether every nonpayment can be termed as a willful default.
This Court held that, a demand founded solely on third-party income-tax data cannot sustain invocation of the extended limitation period in the absence of evidence of suppression, misstatement, fraud or other positive conduct establishing a deliberate intent to evade tax. Mere non-payment of tax does not by itself constitute wilful suppression; the Department bears the burden of proving mala fides. The appellant's bona fide belief that the services were exempt negatived any intent to evade payment of service tax. [Paras 6, 7, 8]
The demand was held barred by limitation and the impugned order was set aside without examination of the merits.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed on limitation, the service tax demand having been raised beyond the permissible period without proof of wilful suppression or intent to evade tax.
Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked to raise service-tax demand solely on third-party income-tax data without proof of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, or deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax.
Analysis: The demand was founded solely on information received from the Income Tax Department showing a discrepancy between receipts reflected in Form 26AS and the absence of service-tax returns. Such third-party data, without corroborative material establishing the statutory ingredients for the extended limitation period, does not establish deliberate suppression or mala fide intent. Mere non-payment or non-filing does not by itself amount to wilful default; the Department bears the burden to prove a positive act demonstrating intent to evade tax.
Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was unsustainable, and the demand was time-barred. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Extended limitation based on third-party income-tax data - Wilful suppression with intent to evade tax - HELD THAT: - The law laid down by the various Benches of the Tribunal and the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Uniworth Textiles Ltd. [2013 (1) TMI 616 - SUPREME COURT], wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has examined the statutory pre-requisites for invoking the extended period of limitation and dealt with the issue of whether every nonpayment can be termed as a willful default.
Third-party information showing a discrepancy between income-tax data and service-tax disclosures, without evidence establishing fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax, could not sustain invocation of the extended period. Mere non-payment does not by itself constitute wilful default; the burden lay on the Department to establish the requisite mala fides. [Paras 6, 7, 8]
The demand was held barred by limitation and the impugned order was set aside without examination of the merits.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the service-tax demand having been set aside as time-barred.
Issues: (i) Whether miscellaneous income arising from write-off or recovery of advances from defaulting subcontractors was taxable as agreeing to tolerate an act; (ii) whether infrastructure services supplied to HSIIDC qualified for exemption as services provided to a governmental authority; (iii) whether relief for road-work components of composite contracts was proper; (iv) whether the extended period and penalty could be invoked.
Issue (i): Whether miscellaneous income arising from write-off or recovery of advances from defaulting subcontractors was taxable as agreeing to tolerate an act.
Analysis: Taxability of toleration requires an agreement or contractual understanding obliging a person to tolerate an act or situation, with consideration specifically flowing for that tolerance. Recovery, forfeiture, compensation, or adjustment resulting from breach does not constitute consideration without a service nexus. The amounts arose because subcontractors failed to perform or delivered deficient work; there was no contractual clause allowing deliberate default upon payment of charges or any agreement to tolerate deficient performance.
Conclusion: The miscellaneous income was not consideration for agreeing to tolerate an act and was not taxable; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether infrastructure services supplied to HSIIDC qualified for exemption as services provided to a governmental authority.
Analysis: HSIIDC was under complete State governmental control and performed infrastructure and civic-utility functions, including development of industrial areas, roads, bridges, water management and public amenities, substantially corresponding to municipal functions under Article 243W. The contracted works-roads, footpaths, boundary walls, drainage, water supply and electrification-were infrastructure and public-utility works, and no material established predominant commercial exploitation.
Conclusion: HSIIDC qualified as a governmental authority and the infrastructure services were exempt under Notification No. 25/2012-ST; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether relief for road-work components of composite contracts was proper.
Analysis: The composite contracts contained separable components with independent rates. Classification depended upon the nature of each discernible component, and road-construction services enjoyed the applicable exclusion or exemption during the relevant period.
Conclusion: Relief in respect of the road-work components was proper; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether the extended period and penalty could be invoked.
Analysis: The assessee was registered, regularly filed returns, and had disclosed the relevant records that were subject to audit. The dispute was interpretational and arose from audit scrutiny. Suppression requires deliberate intent to evade tax and cannot be inferred merely from a subsequent departmental interpretation of disclosed facts.
Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable and the penalty was unsustainable; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The disputed miscellaneous-income levy, the levy on infrastructure services to HSIIDC, and the extended-period consequences were negated, while the road-work relief was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: Amounts recovered or written off for contractual breach are not taxable as consideration for tolerating an act absent a prior obligation to tolerate the breach for consideration; infrastructure services to a State-controlled body performing municipal functions qualify for the governmental-authority exemption where the works are public-utility infrastructure.
Declared service of agreeing to tolerate an act-consideration and contractual obligation - Construction services to governmental authority-exemption for industrial-estate infrastructure works - Road construction works-exclusion from service tax - Extended period of limitation-suppression and interpretational dispute
Declared service of agreeing to tolerate an act-consideration and contractual obligation - Taxability of advances written off or amounts recovered from subcontractors for non-performance or deficient work as consideration for agreeing to tolerate an act. - HELD THAT: - Section 66E(e) requires an agreement or contractual understanding creating an obligation to tolerate an act, with consideration specifically flowing for such tolerance.
Mere recovery of damages, compensation, forfeiture or adjustment due to breach does not automatically become taxable consideration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt Ltd.[2018 (3) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT] held that service tax can be levied only on consideration for a service i.e., quid pro quo. Amounts without service nexus cannot be taxed. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the M/s Bhayana Builders [2018 (2) TMI 1325 - SUPREME COURT], it was held that “any amount charged which has no nexus with the taxable service and is not consideration for the service provided does not become part of the value which is taxable under the Finance Act”. This Bench in the case of M/s Sembcorp Energy India Ltd. [2023 (4) TMI 919 - CESTAT HYDERABAD] held that “Tax liability – Amounts recovered as charges for breach or non-compliance of contractual terms and conditions could not be construed as ‘consideration’ for ‘refraining or tolerating an act’ and, thus, was not leviable to Service Tax in terms of Section 66E(e) of Finance Act, 1994. The jurisprudence after GST-era interpretation of “tolerating an act” also consistently recognizes that compensation for breach is not consideration unless there is a pre-agreed contractual obligation to tolerate such breach.
In the absence of a contractual clause permitting deliberate default for charges or any agreement to tolerate deficient performance for consideration, the amounts were compensatory and had no nexus with a declared service. [Paras 9, 10, 11]
The demand on miscellaneous income under Section 66E(e) was held unsustainable.
Construction services to governmental authority-exemption for industrial-estate infrastructure works - Eligibility of construction and infrastructure-development services rendered to HSIIDC for exemption available to services provided to a governmental authority. - HELD THAT: - HSIIDC was under the full control and governmental participation of the State Government and performed functions substantially overlapping municipal functions under Article 243W, including development of industrial areas, roads, bridges, water management and civic infrastructure. The contracted works, comprising industrial-estate infrastructure and public-utility facilities, were not shown to be predominantly for commercial exploitation. The exemption was to be determined by the substance of the activity rather than the recipient's nomenclature. [Paras 14, 15]
The services rendered to HSIIDC were held exempt under Notification No. 25/2012-ST.
Road construction works-exclusion from service tax - HELD THAT: - Composite contracts may contain discernible taxable and non-taxable components whose classification depends upon the nature of each activity. Road construction enjoyed exclusion or exemption during the relevant period, and no infirmity was found in the appellate relief granted in respect of the road-work component. [Paras 16]
The relief in respect of road works was upheld.
Extended period of limitation-suppression and interpretational dispute - HELD THAT: - The appellant was registered, regularly filed returns and was subject to audit; the dispute emerged from scrutiny of disclosed books and records. Suppression requires deliberate intent to evade duty and cannot be inferred merely because the Department subsequently adopts a different interpretation of law. As the controversy concerned exemption and taxability, it was interpretational and did not justify invocation of the extended period. [Paras 17, 18]
The extended period was held inapplicable; interest and penalty, including penalty under Section 78, were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed with consequential relief. The demand on miscellaneous income was set aside, the HSIIDC services were held exempt, relief for road works was sustained, and the extended period, interest and penalty were held unsustainable.
Issues: Whether a penalty imposed on a co-noticee can survive after the principal noticee has settled the underlying service-tax dispute under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019.
Analysis: The principal noticee settled the demand under the Scheme. The applicable Tribunal precedent recognises that settlement of the demand by the principal noticee carries waiver of penalty not only for that noticee but also for co-noticees, even where the co-noticee did not independently file a declaration under the Scheme. The contrary single-member view could not prevail over the coordinate division-bench decisions.
Conclusion: The penalty imposed upon the co-noticee was unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.
SVLDRS settlement-penalty on co-noticee - Waiver of penalty for co-noticees - Precedential hierarchy of coordinate benches - HELD THAT: - Once the main noticee had settled the dispute under the Scheme, the benefit of that settlement was available to the co-noticee who had pursued the appeal. Following the Tribunal's earlier view in the case of Baba Alloys Pvt Ltd.[2026 (7) TMI 1605 - CESTAT MUMBAI], no proceedings survived for imposition of penalty on the co-noticee after settlement of the demand by the main noticee under SVLDRS, 2019. [Paras 4]
The penalty imposed on the co-noticee was unsustainable; the impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the penalty on the co-noticee was set aside, as the main noticee had settled the underlying dispute under SVLDRS, 2019.
Issues: Whether service tax under reverse charge mechanism is leviable on meeting fees paid to whole-time directors.
Analysis: A whole-time director is in full-time employment of the company, and remuneration paid for duties performed within that employment framework arises from an employer-employee relationship. The statutory exclusion for services provided by an employee to the employer in the course of employment applies to such payments. The character of the payment as meeting fees does not alter the employment relationship.
Conclusion: Meeting fees paid to whole-time directors are not liable to service tax under reverse charge mechanism.
Employee-employer exclusion from taxable service - Service tax on meeting fees paid to whole-time directors - Leviability of service tax under reverse charge on meeting fees paid to whole-time directors in the course of their employment. - HELD THAT: - Following the case of Rent Works India Pvt. Ltd.[2016 (5) TMI 786 - CESTAT MUMBAI], which has been followed subsequently in the case of PCM Cement Concrete Pvt. Ltd.[2017 (9) TMI 1382 - CESTAT KOLKATA] and Maithan Alloys Ltd [2019 (4) TMI 1595 - CESTAT KOLKATA] This Court held that, a whole-time director is in the full-time employment of the company and remuneration paid in that capacity arises from the employer-employee relationship. Meeting fees paid to such directors consequently fall within the exclusion for services provided by an employee to an employer in the course of employment and do not constitute taxable service. The departmental clarification also recognises that amounts paid for duties performed within the framework of employment are not liable to service tax. [Paras 6, 8, 9, 10]
No service tax was leviable on the meeting fees paid to the whole-time directors; the impugned order was held unsustainable and the appeal was allowed.
Final Conclusion: The demand of service tax under reverse charge on meeting fees paid to whole-time directors was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.
Issues: Whether water charges paid to the State Government under an agreement permitting drawal of water for operating a thermal power plant constitute consideration for a taxable service involving assignment of the right to use natural resources.
Analysis: The agreement provided for supply of a specified quantity of water for a stipulated period, payment calculated per cubic metre of water actually drawn, and use confined to the power plant. The applicable irrigation framework contemplated supply of water for industrial purposes at agreed or prescribed rates. The arrangement was therefore one for supply of water, with charges linked to volume consumed, rather than a grant of an independent right to exploit a governmental natural resource. The established Tribunal decisions on materially identical arrangements were applied.
Conclusion: The transaction was a sale of water and not a taxable service; consequently, no service tax was payable under reverse charge. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Supply of water as sale of goods - Assignment of right to use natural resources - Service tax under reverse charge -HELD THAT: - Relying on the Principal Bench in the case of Sasan Power Limited [2024 (5) TMI 326 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] and Radius Water Limited [2017 (9) TMI 83 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], where the assessee was engaged in supply of water to Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation and the Tribunal held that the arrangement for supply of water for fixed tariff and which cannot be termed as service. The said decision has been affirmed by the Apex Court [2018 (7) TMI 1657 - SC ORDER] We also find that the Commissioner, Central Excise, Bharuch on identical facts set aside the demand from NTPC Ltd. and the department has not challenged the same, thereby the decision of the Commissioner has attained finality which is binding on the department.
The agreement, read with the statutory arrangement for industrial supply of water, showed that the appellant paid water charges based on the volume drawn and made its own arrangements for drawal. Its substance was thus supply of water, and not mere access to, or assignment of a right to use, a Government water resource. Supply of water constituted sale of goods and involved no service liable to service tax under reverse charge. [Paras 7, 9]
The service-tax demand on water charges was unsustainable; the impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the Tribunal holding that the agreement concerned sale and supply of water rather than a taxable service involving assignment of a right to use natural resources.
Issues: Whether separately agreed and remunerated goods transport agency services rendered alongside clearing and forwarding agency services can be treated as part of a single clearing and forwarding service for service-tax purposes.
Analysis: The common agreement specifically prescribed distinct rates and remuneration for clearing and forwarding agency services and goods transportation services. The transportation activity was supported by serially numbered goods receipts/consignment notes and was classifiable as goods transport agency service, rather than being absorbed into clearing and forwarding agency service. Since the service recipients were body corporates, liability for tax on the goods transport agency service lay on them under the reverse-charge mechanism.
Conclusion: Amounts received for goods transport agency services cannot be included in the consideration for clearing and forwarding agency services merely because both services were rendered under the same agreement. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Separate classification of clearing and forwarding agency service and goods transport agency service - Reverse-charge liability for goods transport agency service received by body corporates - HELD THAT: - The goods transport agency service cannot be combined with the clearing and forwarding agency services even though the two services were provided under the same agreements. The amounts paid for the two services were given separately in the agreements.
A common agreement did not render the two services a single composite service where it separately stipulated rates and remuneration for clearing and forwarding operations and goods transportation. The transportation activity, supported by serially numbered goods receipts or consignment notes, was classifiable as goods transport agency service. As the service recipients were body corporates, liability for service tax on that service rested upon them under the reverse-charge mechanism and not upon the appellants. [Paras 4, 5, 6]
Amounts collected for goods transport agency service could not be added to the consideration for clearing and forwarding agency service; the impugned order was set aside and the appeals were allowed with consequential relief.
Final Conclusion: The demands treating goods transport agency receipts as consideration for clearing and forwarding agency service were unsustainable. All three appeals were allowed with consequential relief.
Issues: (i) Whether refundable die-development deposits forfeited upon a customer's contractual default form additional consideration and are includible in transaction value; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of duty; (iii) Whether equal penalty was sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether refundable die-development deposits forfeited upon a customer's contractual default form additional consideration and are includible in transaction value.
Analysis: Section 4(3)(d) requires a direct and proximate nexus between the amount sought to be added and consideration for the sale of excisable goods. The deposits were refundable on fulfilment of minimum lifting obligations and were retained only on the customer's breach. Their retention therefore arose from contractual default, not from manufacture, clearance, or sale of the aluminium profiles. They compensated the manufacturer for loss associated with customer-specific dies and retained the character of liquidated damages rather than sale price. Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2000 is a valuation mechanism and cannot independently enlarge transaction value unless the amount first qualifies as consideration under Section 4. The uncontroverted amortisation of die cost in the assessable value also supported the absence of any basis for a further inclusion.
Conclusion: The forfeited deposits are contractual compensation and not additional consideration; they are not includible in transaction value. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of duty.
Analysis: The dispute concerned the legal character and valuation treatment of deposits recorded in the books and statutory records. The Revenue did not establish deliberate concealment, fraud, wilful misstatement, or intent to evade duty. A bona fide interpretational dispute on valuation does not satisfy the requirements for invoking the extended period under the proviso to Section 11A(1).
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation is unavailable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether equal penalty was sustainable.
Analysis: Since the duty demand was unsustainable and the necessary elements of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or intent to evade duty were not established, the statutory basis for equal penalty was absent.
Conclusion: Equal penalty is not sustainable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Forfeited refundable security deposits arising from customer default remain liquidated damages outside the assessable value, and neither the extended recovery period nor penal consequences can be founded on their non-inclusion.
Ratio Decidendi: Amounts retained solely as compensation for breach of contractual obligations, without a direct and proximate nexus to the price of goods sold, do not constitute consideration includible in transaction value.
Forfeiture of refundable die-development deposits - Liquidated damages and transaction value - Additional consideration under Central Excise valuation - Extended limitation for suppression of facts - Penalty for suppression with intent to evade duty
Forfeiture of refundable die-development deposits - Liquidated damages and transaction value - Additional consideration under Central Excise valuation - HELD THAT: - An amount is includible under the transaction-value definition only where it has a direct and proximate nexus with the sale and represents consideration for the excisable goods. The deposits were refundable on contractual performance and were retained only upon the customer's breach; their retention therefore constituted contractual compensation for loss incurred on specialized dies, not price or consideration for Aluminium Profiles. Rule 6 is only a valuation mechanism and cannot enlarge transaction value by converting compensation into consideration. The Tribunal followed Caparo Engineering India (P) Ltd.[2017 (5) TMI 448 - CESTAT NEW DELHI]; Jindal Praxair Oxygen Co Ltd.[2006 (8) TMI 461 - CESTAT, BANGALORE] and Praxair India Ltd.[2007 (11) TMI 106 - CESTAT, CHENNAI] and distinguished Prayag Castings Ltd.[2005 (1) TMI 585 - CESTAT, MUMBAI], where pattern-development charges were directly relatable to manufacture and supply. [Paras 32, 34, 35, 36, 37]
The forfeited deposits were held to be liquidated damages and not additional consideration; their inclusion in assessable value and the resulting duty demand failed on merits.
Extended limitation for suppression of facts - HELD THAT: - The dispute turned on the legal character of the forfeited deposits under the valuation provisions. The contractual terms, deposits and accounting treatment were reflected in the appellant's records, and Revenue produced no evidence of deliberate concealment, fraud, wilful misstatement or intent to evade duty. A mere interpretational difference or short-payment does not establish the conditions for extended limitation. Applying Continental Foundation Jt Venture [2007 (8) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT] and Padmini Products [1989 (8) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT], the Tribunal held that suppression with intent to evade was not made out. [Paras 40, 41, 42, 43]
The demand was also held barred insofar as it rested on invocation of the extended period.
Penalty for suppression with intent to evade duty - HELD THAT: - As the duty demand failed on merits, the penalty could not survive. Independently, the requisite elements of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts or contravention with intent to evade duty were not established. [Paras 44]
The penalty was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside. The duty demand, interest and penalty founded on inclusion of forfeited die-development deposits in the assessable value were held unsustainable, and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.
Issues: Whether refunds already sanctioned pursuant to orders that attained finality could be recovered or rejected on the ground of unjust enrichment.
Analysis: The entitlement to refund, including the absence of unjust enrichment, had been determined in the assessee's earlier proceedings and that determination stood affirmed upon dismissal of the Revenue's appeal. The assessee had issued credit notes returning the duty component to buyers, and the Chartered Accountant's certificate supported that the incidence of duty had not ultimately been passed on. A subsequent view on unjust enrichment could not reopen a concluded refund entitlement or sustain recovery in executory proceedings. Finality of litigation precludes vexing a person twice on the same cause.
Conclusion: The recovery demand and rejection of the refunds on the ground of unjust enrichment were unsustainable; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Finality of concluded refund proceedings-Unjust enrichment-credit notes and Chartered Accountant's certificate - Entitlement to refund, including the absence of unjust enrichment
Finality of concluded refund proceedings - Recovery of sanctioned refund - HELD THAT: - The refund entitlement had been upheld in the earlier appellate proceedings, and the Revenue's appeal against the Tribunal's order was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Tribunal held that the sanctioned refunds had consequently attained finality and could not be disturbed through protective recovery proceedings merely by taking a subsequent contrary view. [Paras 14, 16]
The recovery proceedings founded on the alleged erroneous sanction of refund were unsustainable.
Unjust enrichment-credit notes and Chartered Accountant's certificate - Refund claims relating to excess duty adjusted through credit notes were not barred by unjust enrichment where the duty incidence had not ultimately been passed on to customers. - HELD THAT: - The earlier final order had found that, owing to fluctuating prices and running accounts, the assessee had credited buyers' accounts with the disputed duty and had neither collected nor retained any extra amount. The Chartered Accountant's certificate supported the position that the duty burden was not passed on. Applying the principle that return of the amount initially charged through credit notes negates unjust enrichment, the Tribunal held that the sole basis for rejecting the refund claims and raising recovery demands failed. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 17]
There being no unjust enrichment, the impugned order was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed with consequential relief. The sanctioned refunds, having attained finality, could not be recovered, and the allegation of unjust enrichment was not established.
Issues: Whether surplus electricity generated during manufacture and sold to an outside electricity distribution company attracts payment of 6% of its value under Rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
Analysis: The identical issue had already been resolved for the relevant period: electricity generated from bagasse and wheeled out to the electricity distribution company was not liable to the amount prescribed under Rule 6(3). The earlier adjudication dropping such demand had been accepted by the departmental committee and had attained finality. No change in the applicable statutory provisions justified a contrary treatment.
Conclusion: Rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 does not require payment of 6% of the value of surplus electricity sold to the outside electricity distribution company. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
CENVAT credit on surplus electricity generated from bagasse - Rule 6(3) payment on electricity wheeled to the grid - Liability to pay an amount equal to 6% of the value of surplus electricity generated from bagasse and sold to MSEDCL under Rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the controversy was covered by its earlier decision in M/s Olam Agro India Pvt Ltd & others [2026 (4) TMI 860 - CESTAT MUMBAI]. That decision had recognised that electricity produced from bagasse and wheeled to MSEDCL did not attract payment under Rule 6(3), consistently with the decisions referred to therein and the accepted adjudication order in the case of M/s Vaidyanath SSK Ltd. & others. As there was no change in the governing statutory provisions during the relevant period, a contrary view could not be taken. [Paras 4, 5]
The demand calculated at 6% of the value of electricity sold to MSEDCL was unsustainable; the impugned orders were set aside and the appeals were allowed.
Final Conclusion: The impugned orders confirming Rule 6(3) demands in respect of surplus electricity sold to MSEDCL were set aside, and the appeals were allowed.
Issues: Whether costs imposed in seizure proceedings could be recovered from the pensionary benefits of officers who were not parties to the writ petition and were not heard.
Analysis: The direction affecting the pensionary benefits of the concerned officers was unwarranted because those officers were neither impleaded in the writ proceedings nor afforded an opportunity of hearing before such recovery was authorised.
Conclusion: The direction permitting recovery of costs from the pensionary benefits of the concerned officers was set aside.
Recovery of costs from pensionary benefits without hearing affected officers - Direction permitting recovery of costs from the pensionary benefits of officers responsible for seizure of mentha oil, though they were not parties to the writ petition. - HELD THAT: - The officers whose pensionary benefits were directed to be subjected to recovery were neither parties to the writ petition nor afforded an opportunity of hearing. Such a direction was, therefore, neither warranted nor correct. [Paras 4, 5]
The direction enabling the State Government to recover the costs from the pensionary benefits of the concerned officers was set aside; the order on the merits of the seizure was left undisturbed.
Final Conclusion: The civil appeal was allowed solely to the extent of deleting the direction for recovery of costs from the pensionary benefits of the concerned officers.
Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings for entry tax arising from invoices raised for alleged meter tampering should be determined in light of the subsequent status of those invoices, including arbitral awards.
Analysis: Subsequent arbitral proceedings concerning the invoices had resulted, in certain cases, in awards favouring the consumers. The appellant was therefore relegated to the Assessing Officer to place, by affidavit, the exact status of every invoice forming the basis of the reassessment notices. The reassessment is to be determined on the amount, if any, actually received against those invoices.
Conclusion: The Assessing Officer shall decide the pending reassessment proceedings in accordance with law after considering the actual amounts received against the relevant invoices.
Entry tax reassessment on invoices arising from alleged meter tampering - Pending entry-tax reassessment founded on invoices raised from consumers for alleged meter tampering, where subsequent arbitration proceedings affected the status of those invoices. - HELD THAT: - In view of subsequent arbitration proceedings initiated by consumers and awards in favour of consumers in some cases, the Court considered it appropriate that the exact status of every invoice forming the basis of the reassessment notices be placed before the Assessing Officer. The reassessment is to be determined in accordance with law on the basis of amounts, if any, actually received against those invoices. [Paras 4, 5]
The appellant was relegated to the Assessing Officer to file an affidavit on the status of the relevant invoices, following which the pending reassessment proceedings shall be decided in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The civil appeals were disposed of by directing consideration of the pending reassessment proceedings after disclosure of the status of the invoices and receipt, if any, of amounts thereunder.
Issues: Whether criminal proceedings for alleged forgery and use of forged documents could continue against a co-accused when identical proceedings against a similarly placed co-accused had been quashed after the underlying VAT liability was conclusively resolved.
Analysis: The only allegation concerned non-payment of VAT. The reassessment creating tax, interest and penalty liability had been set aside in appeal, and the consequent tax liability had attained finality. A coordinate bench had already quashed the proceedings against a similarly placed co-accused on that basis. The petitioner was entitled to equivalent treatment.
Conclusion: The criminal proceedings against the petitioner could not continue and were quashed.
Parity among similarly placed co-accused - Quashing of criminal proceedings - Continuation of forgery-related criminal proceedings against a co-accused after quashing of proceedings against a similarly placed accused on the basis that the underlying allegation of non-payment of KVAT had attained finality. - HELD THAT: - The co-ordinate Bench [2025 (6) TMI 2147 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] had quashed proceedings against another accused because the sole allegation concerned non-payment of KVAT and the tax liability had attained finality through the appellate and consequential proceedings. The petitioner, being similarly placed as that co-accused, was held entitled to the benefit of that order. [Paras 5]
The proceedings against the petitioner were quashed.
Final Conclusion: Applying parity with the order quashing proceedings against the similarly placed co-accused, the criminal proceedings against the petitioner were quashed.
Issues: Whether statutory interest is payable on the tax refund released after withdrawal of the departmental revision under the monetary-limit litigation policy.
Analysis: Section 56 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 provides that every refundable amount shall carry interest at fifteen per cent per annum from the date of its deposit. The refund was admittedly released following withdrawal of the departmental revision, but without interest. The statutory language imposed an unequivocal obligation to pay interest and did not permit withholding it merely because the underlying litigation ended through withdrawal under the State litigation policy.
Conclusion: Statutory interest on the refunded amount is payable to the assessee in accordance with Section 56 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994.
Statutory interest on sales tax refund - Entitlement to interest on the sales tax amount refunded following withdrawal of the Department's revision under the State litigation policy. - HELD THAT: - Section 56 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 mandates that an amount refundable to a dealer carries interest at the prescribed rate from the date of its deposit. Once the refund was granted, the respondents could not avoid this statutory obligation merely because the underlying revision had been withdrawn pursuant to the litigation policy. [Paras 8]
The respondents were directed to pay statutory interest on the refunded amount in accordance with Section 56 within three months.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed, and the respondents were directed to pay statutory interest on the refunded sales tax amount in accordance with Section 56 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994.
Issues: Whether disclosed turnover could be enhanced merely because books of account were not produced during survey, without cogent adverse material supporting undisclosed purchases and sales.
Analysis: Non-production of books of account at the time of survey justified their rejection and a best-judgment assessment, but did not by itself permit enhancement of turnover. No discrepancy or other adverse material was found during the survey to support estimation of undisclosed purchases or sales.
Conclusion: The disclosed turnover was required to be accepted; enhancement based solely on presumption in the absence of cogent material was impermissible, in favour of the assessee.
Best judgment assessment - Enhancement of disclosed turnover - Rejection of Books of Account - Enhancement of the disclosed turnover of a tyre and tube dealer towards alleged undisclosed purchases and sales solely because books of account were not produced at survey, without adverse material or discrepancy supporting the estimation. - HELD THAT: - It is settled law that if the books of account is not found, the same can be rejected but the same will not entitle the assessing authority for enhancing the turnover without there being any cogent material.
The issue in hand is squarely covered by the judgement of this Court in the case of M/s Kamla Trading Company [2026 (7) TMI 1604 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT], which has not been disputed by the learned ACSC.
Non-production of books of account at survey may justify their rejection and a best judgment assessment, but does not by itself authorise enhancement of disclosed turnover. In the absence of any other discrepancy at the survey or cogent material supporting undisclosed purchases and sales, the estimated turnover could not be sustained. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
The disclosed turnover was directed to be accepted; the Tribunal's order restoring the estimated turnover was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The revision was allowed and the questions of law were answered in favour of the revisionist. The disclosed turnover was accepted.
Issues: Whether interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was warranted with the concurrent orders dismissing the private complaint for want of sufficient grounds to proceed.
Analysis: Revisional scrutiny is confined to correctness, legality and propriety of the challenged order, and does not permit substitution of a possible alternate view absent patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error or material irregularity. At the stage of Sections 200 and 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the material need only disclose sufficient grounds for proceeding; where it does not prima facie disclose the alleged offences, dismissal of the complaint is justified. The complaint was instituted about five years after the transaction without satisfactory explanation, and the material concerning the alleged forged communication, shipment valuation and additional commission did not establish a prima facie criminal offence. The dispute was essentially civil in nature.
Conclusion: No ground for interference with the orders dismissing the complaint was made out; the issue was decided against the petitioner.
Interference under Section 482 - scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 - recovery of its service charges - HELD THAT:- It is equally well settled that at the stage of considering a complaint under Sections 200 and 203 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is not required to undertake a meticulous appreciation of the evidence. The Court is only required to ascertain whether the material placed before it discloses sufficient grounds for proceeding against the proposed accused. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake a meticulous appreciation of the evidence. Conversely, where the material placed on record does not prima facie disclose the commission of the alleged offences, the complaint is liable to be dismissed under Section 203 Cr.P.C.
The principal submissions of the petitioner pertain to the genuineness of the communication, the alleged forgery of signatures, the valuation of the shipment and the petitioner's entitlement to additional commission. These were the very issues examined by the learned MM while considering the pre-summoning evidence. Upon appreciation of the material placed on record, the learned MM concluded that no prima facie case was made out and that the dispute was essentially civil in nature. The learned ASJ found no infirmity in the said view. The decisions relied upon by the petitioner lay down settled principles of lawof the Supreme Court in S.W. Palanitkar [2001 (10) TMI 1150 - SUPREME COURT], Nirmaljit Singh Hoon [1972 (9) TMI 147 - SUPREME COURT], Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonka etc,. to submit that the learned MM and learned ASJ failed to appreciate the essence of Sections 200 and 202 of the Cr.P.C.
This Court also finds no patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the impugned orders warranting interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed, the Court finding no patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the concurrent orders dismissing the complaint.
TaxTMI