TaxTMI Updates e-Newsletter
Feb 17,2026

Stay of Demand - conditional stay of recovery of the demand - Tribunal, after noting that a refund directed that such refund should be adjusted to the extent of 20% of the outstanding demand

HELD THAT:- The condition prescribed for the stay was that the refund for Assessment Year 2005-06 should be adjusted only to the extent of 20% of the outstanding demand for Assessment Year 2020-21, and the balance demand, i.e. 80% of the demand for the Assessment Year 2020-21, is stayed for a period of 180 days or the disposal of the Appeal, whichever is earlier.

Tribunal has clearly erred (while passing the impugned Order in not directing the Respondents to refund the amount along with interest as per law. We note that the Tribunal has not given any valid reason for refusing to direct the Respondents to refund the illegal adjustment of refund for the Assessment Year 2005-06 against the demand for the Assessment Year 2020-21, even though the Tribunal has accepted the fact that there has been no change in the legal and factual position and that the stay should be extended on the same terms as granted earlier. Hence, we set aside the impugned Order of the Tribunal to this limited extent and direct the Respondents to refund the amount of Rs. 28,55,26,240/- for Assessment Year 2005-06, along with interest as per law. The said refund shall be granted to the Petitioner within a period of three weeks from the date of uploading of this Order.

The impugned Order of the Tribunal in so far as its grants stay of recovery of the outstanding demand of the Assessment Year 2020-21, would continue to operate with the above modification.

Directions by the Dispute Resolution Panel u/s 144C - Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) directions or record findings after a final assessment order u/s 144C(4)

HELD THAT:- After analyzing the provisions of Section 144C as well as the law laid down by this Court in Undercarriage and Tractor Parts Pvt.Ltd. [2023 (9) TMI 759 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] we are of the view that the DRP ought to have simplicitor dismissed the objections of the Petitioner on the sole ground that a final assessment order has already been passed and ought not to have given any finding in relation to any matters relating thereto. We, accordingly, direct that the findings given in relation to whether the objections filed by the Petitioner before the DRP were intimated to the AO, or otherwise, were wholly unwarranted in the facts of the present case.

We, accordingly, direct that those findings of the DRP shall not be considered when the CIT (Appeals) decides the Appeal filed by the Petitioner against the final assessment order - CIT (Appeals) shall decide the Appeal filed by the Petitioner without being influenced by any of the observations made by the DRP in the impugned order.

Reopening Notice issued by non jurisdictional officer - objections to the draft assessment order were not intimated and/or filed before the AO - Section 148A notice was issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer instead of the Faceless Assessing Officer - first contention raised by the Respondent Revenue is that the above Writ Petition is barred by the principles of res judicata because the two earlier Petitions were not entertained, though the grounds of Hexaware Technologies Ltd. [2024 (5) TMI 302 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] were raised therein. HELD THAT:- We find absolutely no merit in the aforesaid contention. In the earlier two Writ Petitions, though the same were not entertained, the Petitioner was permitted to avail of the alternate remedy and raise the issue of Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (supra) before the DRP. This is clear not only from the orders passed in the first Writ Petition [2025 (4) TMI 1699 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] but also in the second [2025 (9) TMI 1317 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT].

Despite the issue of the Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (supra) being raised before the DRP, the DRP refused to follow the decision rendered by this Court in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (supra). It is in these circumstances that the Petitioner has been constrained to approach this Court by filing the third Writ Petition [the present Petition]. In these circumstances, we do not believe that the principles of res judicata would bar the filing of this Petition. This contention of the Revenue is therefore rejected.

Contention raised by the Revenue is that the Petitioner has an alternate remedy to approach the ITAT to challenge the assessment order dated 23rd January 2026 - It is true that the Petitioner does have an alternate remedy to challenge the said assessment order. However, we find, and it is well settled that when a jurisdictional issue is raised, the Court can entertain a Writ Petition and need not relegate the party concerned to avail of the alternate remedy. In the facts of the present case, clearly a jurisdictional issue is raised, namely, that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer had no power or jurisdiction to issue the notice u/s 148 - DRP also refused to follow the decision of this Court in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (supra). Once these are the facts, we are of the clear opinion that there is no question of relegating the Petitioner to avail of the alternate remedy. This argument is therefore also rejected.

According to the Revenue, the Petitioner has suppressed in the Writ Petition that an interim order was passed by this Court - We fail to understand as to what is the sequitur to this argument. The interim order dated 11th March 2025 would no longer survive, as the same has merged in the final order disposing of the Writ Petition on 7th April 2025. It is not even the case of the Revenue that the order dated 7th April 2025 has been suppressed from this Court. We, therefore, find the above submission on suppression is clearly an argument of desperation to somehow try and ensure that this Writ Petition is not entertained by us. It is therefore rejected.

Notice issued u/s 148A(b) set aside. Assessee appeal allowed.

Reassessment order passed/issued in the name of a non-existent entity - assessment against entity that had ceased to exist due to scheme of amalgamation - HELD THAT:- It is not a case where the Income Tax Department was not aware about the amalgamation of the entity. Thus, we find force in the submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner that the Impugned Notice u/s 148 of the I.T. Act, issued in the name of the erstwhile entity cannot stand. This has now been consistently held not only in the case of Pr. CIT v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd [2019 (7) TMI 1449 - SUPREME COURT] but several other decisions of this Court.

Rejection of application u/s 197 - certificate at ‘nil’ rate - as submitted domain name registration charges are essentially for granting the right to use the petitioner’s services and are not exigible to income tax as per the provisions of the Act of 1961 read with the terms of the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement - HELD THAT:- The Authority deciding application u/s 197 of the Act of 1961 has an obligation of deciding the application as per the provisions of the Act of 1961, while having due regard to the treaties between the two countries. He should not be driven or swayed by the Revenue targets/considerations.

For what we have stated hereinabove and following the reasoning which we have given in our order of even date in AECOM International Holdings UK Ltd. [2026 (2) TMI 711 - DELHI HIGH COURT] we hereby allow the present writ petition; quash and set aside the impugned order dated 06.03.2025 so also the consequential certificate dated 21.08.2025.

We hereby direct the Competent Authority to issue a certificate at ‘nil’ rate within a period of fifteen days from today with the additional directions, as below:

(i) The competent officer or any other authority who is supposed to consider the petitioner’s application under Section 197 of the Act of 1961, shall issue a certificate of nil rate of tax not only for the Financial Year 2025-26 (AY 2026-27), but also for the subsequent years in case an application is filed. The certificate(s) shall be issued within 30 days of the day when application is filed.

(ii) The competent authority dealing with petitioner’s subsequent application(s) under Section 197 of the Act of 1961 shall not be bound by direction given in clause (i) above, if he comes to a conclusion and records a finding that the petitioner is having a PE in India and the transactions which the company has carried out in India are liable to be taxed in India. However, before recording such finding, a notice in this regard shall be issued to the petitioner.

(iii) It will also be required from the petitioner-company to disclose truly and fully all facts in its applications to be filed each year. It shall be required of the petitioner to extend full cooperation when any such notice (as provided in clause (ii) above) is issued for the subsequent year(s).

Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Reassessment on basis of the return of income, tax audit report or annual report - notice beyond a period of four years - whether there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts?

HELD THAT:- In a subsequent decision by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society [1979 (8) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] held that the opinion on law rendered on the basis of audit report cannot be the basis for re-assessment rather it has to be the Ld. AO who should apply his mind not merely on the information by external agency but by evaluation of law, else it could lead to grave consequence of the external agencies taking the power of re-assessment rather than the Ld. AO.

Note put up by the internal audit party cannot be termed to be “information” within the meaning of section 147(b) of the Act per se where the provision emphasizes that the AO should first have information in his possession and in consequence of which he must have reason to believe that income has escaped assessment. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee after duly considering various decisions of the Hon’ble High Courts and also the earlier decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself.

As in the recent decision in the case of Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd [2026 (1) TMI 376 - SC ORDER] upheld the finding of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court that reopening was merely on the basis of audit party opinion and not on the basis of the Ld. AO’s own conviction lacking in subjective satisfaction while issuing notice u/s 148 of the Act. It further held that reopening on the basis of the same materials tantamounts to change of opinion which is impermissible in law. Decided against revenue.

Disallowance of expenses claimed towards contract charges - expenditure towards MIS reporting AND marketing services - Non rejection of books of accounts - Allowable business expenses - HELD THAT:- We observed that assessee has employed SP Jindals Financial Services Limited for internal audit/MIS reporting and we noticed that they were employed to services of stock verification and to submit the detailed MIS reports on monthly basis. Assessee has submitted details of stock inventory certificates.

Services rendered by the independent Chartered Accountant who were engaged in providing above said services for a stock verification on assignment basis. They also filed stock verification report. The above said entity is an unrelated and independent entity, the same are on the basis of contract between the parties involved, there is no measurement for dealing with such engagement. Since the assessee is involved on the basis of distribution of various kinds of alcohol and non alcohol beverages and it has several stores in order to control them they need an independent agencies. Accordingly they employed the services of unrelated and independent parties. Therefore, we cannot wear a cap of a businessman to determine disallowance of expenses particularly it is incurred for the purpose of business. Therefore, we are inclined to allow the same

Disallowance of payment made to Bigthink Media Pvt Ltd, in our considered view the issue involved is similar to the issue of payment of Rs. 18.5 lakhs made to SP Jindal. Therefore we observed that these payments were made towards providing market services to two outlets/HCRs and the same was disallowed on the basis of unreasonableness. Since these parties are unrelated and independent parties. We observed similar payments were made to the other parties who also provided similar services

We observed that assessee has paid to Shimpi Marketing Pvt Ltd of Rs. 1.80 crores for providing services in 13 shops/HCRs and the same amount was found to be reasonable. Even on comparison in the case of Shimpi Marketing a cost per shop comes to Rs. 13.85 lakhs per location whereas SP Jindal Marketing has claimed only Rs. 9.25 lakhs per location. We cannot apply same logic to compare the reasonableness of the expenses. Since, we do not know the location, nature and complexity involved in each assignments, it is only the assessee who is in this line of business for several years.

Thus, allow the grounds raised by the assessee on the basis of payment to independent and unrelated parties. Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

Deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) - cooperative societies and mutuality - treatment of interest income as income from other sources versus business income - HELD THAT:- Deduction u/s 80P (2) (a) (i) of the act is directly decided in favour of the assessee in the decision of Guttigedarara Credit Co-operative Society Ltd.[2015 (7) TMI 874 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit Cooperative Ltd. [2015 (2) TMI 995 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] and Totagars Co-operative Sale Society [2017 (7) TMI 1049 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] - Therefore the disallowance made by the learned assessing officer treating the bank interest as income from other sources is not sustainable.

Addition u/s 68 - CIT (A) has not passed any order, we restore the appeal back to the fil of the CIT (A) with a direction to the assessee to furnish the requisite details, which may be considered and appeals on the grounds raised may be decided afresh.

Addition of gifts receipts from relatives - HELD THAT:- Assessee has received gifts from her father, mother, brother in law and sister in law. We do not subscribe to the view that gifts from parents received by the Assessee could be subjected to any documentary evidence. The Assessee has submitted that the mother of the Assessee who also has a PAN number and after all the Assessee is also having the PAN number regularly assessed to tax have confirmed gift to the Assessee. Similarly, the brother in law and sister in law also confirmed the gift to the Assessee.

Lower authorities have merely rejected the gift deeds without any enquiry. It is also immaterial that when the Assessee received gift from her near relatives, the same can be disregarded on technical grounds. This cannot be the reason that as Assessee has not received any gifts in past, the gifts would not be genuine. Anyway, the Assessee would be receiving gifts at certain time in the first instance only. In view of the above facts, where the name, address, relationship, quantum of the gift and that too from the parents and near relatives is shown have no hesitation in directing the AO to delete the addition.

Addition of professional receipts received in cash - addition made as lower authorities stating that such sum cannot be accepted as a professional fee received by the Assessee because there is no receipt issued by the Assessee in cash and the name of the people from whom the same is received is not available - HELD THAT:- When the professional CA is showing the cash receipt as her professional fees giving the name and copies of the income tax return, so far as the professional services are concerned and further for the purpose of tuition fees received from CA students, ID numbers of the students are also submitted, such small amount of professional fees could not have been disbelieved. Accordingly, we direct the Ld. Assessing Officer to delete the addition and allow ground no. 3 of the Appeal.

Amount withdrawal from the partnership firm - During the survey, Assessee submitted the ledger extract of cashbook evidencing amount withdrawal from partnership firm during the time of survey itself - HELD THAT:- Before the Ld. CIT(A), complete details of withdrawal from partnership firm were shown wherein he confirmed the addition that the above sum would have been spent on household withdrawal. I find that Assessee has submitted the details of cash withdrawal from the partnership firm where she is a partner. Undoubtedly, the revenue accepted that the above amount is withdrawn by the Assessee from the partnership firm. It is not the case of the revenue that partnership firms were not having available cash as on the date of the withdrawal. Accordingly, have not hesitation in deleting the addition in the hands of the Assessee which is shown by the Assessee but have been withdrawn in cash from the partnership firm where she is a partner. Accordingly, ground of the Appeal is allowed.

Denial of deduction u/s 80IB(11A) - delayed filling of audit report in Form No.10CCB - assessee has not filed the audit report in Form No.10CCB one month prior to the due date for furnishing the return of income u/s 139(1) however, the same has been filed before processing of the return.

HELD THAT:- As in the case of Sahyadri Farmers Producer Company Limited [2025 (10) TMI 1361 - ITAT PUNE] where the Tribunal allowed the claim of deduction u/s 80IB(11A) of the Act on the ground that since the audit report in Form No.10CCB was furnished prior to the furnishing of return

Since, admittedly the assessee has filed the audit report in Form No.10CCB prior to processing of the return, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the assessee cannot be denied deduction u/s 80IB(10) of the Act. Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

Validity of order passed by a non-jurisdictional Assessing Officer - Defect in chronology of proceedings - transfer of jurisdiction u/s 127 - order passed u/s. 144 by ITO, Ward-2, Tiruvannamalai v/s ITO, Ward-2, Vellore

HELD THAT:- PAN jurisdiction of the assessee has undergone multiple transfers over a period of time. The detailed history of jurisdiction clearly demonstrates that, as per the transfer memo dated 15.05.2018 in relation to notice issued u/s. 148 for AY 2011-12, the jurisdiction vested with ITO, Ward-2, Vellore. Further, the assessee’s address throughout all proceedings has remained within the territorial jurisdiction of Vellore.

The chronology of proceedings also reveals serious inconsistencies. While the original return for AY 2017-18 was filed with ITO, Ward-2, Vellore, the assessment order u/s. 144 dated 08.12.2019 was passed by ITO, Ward-2, Tiruvannamalai. Interestingly, the subsequent rectification order u/s. 154 r.w.s.144 dated 21.07.2020 was again passed by ITO, Ward-2, Vellore, which further fortifies the assessee’s contention that jurisdiction, in fact, lay with Vellore.

Revenue has not been able to place on record any valid order passed u/s. 127 of the Act transferring jurisdiction from ITO, Ward-2, Vellore to ITO, Ward-2, Tiruvannamalai prior to the passing of the assessment order. In absence of such an order, the Assessing Officer at Tiruvannamalai could not have assumed jurisdiction merely on the basis of earlier proceedings or participation by the assessee.

It is a settled proposition of law that an order passed by a non-jurisdictional Assessing Officer is void ab initio. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, acquiescence, or participation of the assessee.

Thus, we hold that the assessment order passed u/s. 144 by ITO, Ward-2, Tiruvannamalai is without jurisdiction and void in law. Consequently, the impugned order of the ld. CIT(A) sustaining such assessment cannot be upheld. Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

Disallowance u/s 14A r.w.r.8D - sum suo moto disallowed by the Appellant - HELD THAT:- This issue is squarely covered by the decision of M/s. Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. [2020 (3) TMI 942 - ITAT MUMBAI] wherein it was held that a suo motu disallowance of expenditure relatable to exempt income can be withdrawn during the assessment proceedings. Respectfully following the said decision, the addition accepted by the Ld. AO is deleted.

Additional disallowance of expenses - It is an undisputed fact that the assessee did not earn any exempt income during the relevant assessment year. Therefore, the provisions of section 14A read with Rule 8D(2) of the Rules are not applicable in the assessee’s case. In this regard, we respectfully follow the decision of M/s. HDFC Bank Ltd. [2016 (8) TMI 1415 - ITAT MUMBAI] Accordingly, the additional disallowance is hereby deleted.

Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - difference of opinion on the manner of taxation of the interest income and commitment fees -applicability of the India-Germany DTAA - whether 'malafide' was involved or not? - HELD THAT:- We do not find any merit in the submissions of DR that since the assessee filed the return of income only after the notice issued u/s 148 the penalty is impossible, in terms of the provisions of Explanation-3 to section 271(1)(c) of the Act.

Commitment fees earned by DZ Bank AG were claimed as exempt under Article 5 read with Article 7 of the India-Germany DTAA. However, the AO vide order passed under section 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act disagreed with the submissions of the assessee and taxed the entire income at the rate of 40% by treating DZ Bank-India Representative Office as the Permanent Establishment of DZ Bank AG in India. In further appellate proceedings, the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal held the aforesaid two receipts to be taxable under Article 11 of the India-Germany DTAA at the rate of 10%. Therefore, we agree with the findings of the learned CIT(A), vide impugned order, that the penalty levied is entirely on account of a difference of opinion on the manner of taxation of the interest income and commitment fees.

We find that while examining the meaning of the term “particulars” in section 271(1)(c) of the Act, in CIT v/s Reliance Petroproducts (P) Ltd. [2010 (3) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT] held that mere making of the claim, which is not sustainable in law, by itself, will not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars regarding the income of the assessee.

As regards the income from fees for technical services, it is also evident that the same was voluntarily disclosed by the assessee before the learned CIT(A), and the assessee duly explained the circumstances for the delay in reporting the said income.

It is pertinent to note that the entire addition made by the AO, on the basis of which the impugned penalty was levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Act, was only pursuant to the assessee’s own disclosure. Further, the basis of not declaring the income in the original return filed on 29/09/2008 has already been accepted by the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal, and no fault was found in the claim of the assessee.

Therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the findings of the learned CIT(A) that no penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act is warranted in the present case on the income voluntarily disclosed by the assessee during the reassessment proceedings as well as the appellate proceedings. Assessee appeal allowed.

Validity of notice u/s.148 - notice issued without proper sanction in terms of section 151 - assessment was beyond the period of three years - PCIT while granting approval u/s.151 of the Act simply wrote “Yes”, without specifically noting his approval - Bogus LTCG - Denial of deduction or exemption u/s.10(38)

HELD THAT:- As per the provisions of section u/s.151 of the Act relevant for the A.Y.2013-14 when an assessment proposed to be reopened u/s.148 of the Act beyond the period of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the competent authority to grant sanction u/s.151 of the Act is PCIT/CIT. In the case of the assessee it is observed that the Ld. PCIT who is the competent authority to grant sanction u/s.151 of the Act had simply signed without recording any satisfaction as to why he is granting sanction for issue of notice u/s.148 of the Act. It is further observed that such a sanction is also undated which means it is not known whether the sanction was granted prior to issue of notice u/s. 148 of the Act or after the issue of notice u/s.148.

Notice issued u/s.148 was without obtaining valid sanction u/s.151 of the Act and, therefore, such notice u/s. 148 and also the consequential assessment made u/s. 144B r.w.s. 147 pursuant to such notice is bad in law, nonest and void ab initio. Thus, the assessment order is hereby quashed.

Even on merits it is observed that the purchase transaction of the assessee was added as income of the assessee even though neither there was sale nor there was any gain to the assessee. The assessee did not claim any exemption u/s. 10(38) of the Act. Therefore, even on merits the addition cannot be sustained.

Appeal of the assessee is allowed.

Addition u/s. 68 - long-term capital gain alleged to be a penny stock - Addition based on the Investigation Report of the Directorate of Investigation, Kolkata and SEBI action - addition on account of commission u/s. 69C towards the 2% on the total consideration of the sale of shares - lower authorities held that the transactions to be a pre-arranged method to evade tax with the connivance of the accommodation entry providers

HELD THAT:- As decided in Manisha Narpatkumar Chopra [2024 (8) TMI 1078 - ITAT MUMBAI] where on identical facts which was related to the same penny scrip CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition of value of sale consideration arising on sale of shares of M/s. Pine Animation Ltd. Since we have confirmed the decision of Ld. CIT(A) in holding that the sale transactions of shares cannot be doubted with, the addition made by the AO with regard to estimated commission expenses is also liable to be deleted. Assessee appeal allowed.

Benami transaction - definition of ‘Benami Transaction’, subject to the exemption (ii) to Section 2(9)(A) - fiduciary exemption under clause (ii) of Section 2(9)(A) - transactions for purchasing of lands - Section 165(6) Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code - Relationship between the benamidar and the alleged beneficial owner - prohibition on non tribal acquisition of tribal land - Provisional attachment u/s 24(4) and confirmation u/s 26(3) of PBPT Act - Application of Section 88, Indian Trusts Act - fiduciary/trust relationship - HELD THAT:- The present case does not fall under the ‘fiduciary relation’ and is thus not liable to be exempted under clause (ii) of Section 2(9)(A) of the PBPT Act. There was no Special or General Power of Attorney executed by Sh. Dwarika Gupta in his favour. Hence, in absence of the same, question of execution of the sale deed in favour of Sh. Dwarika Gupta was not possible. The impugned sale deed is silent that Vendee Laxmi Chand Maravi purchased the land for the benefit of Sh. Dwarika Gupta or tendered the sale consideration on his behalf. Also, the appellant no.2 should have been present in-person at the time of execution of sale-deed, in absence of Power of Attorney, however, he was not present.

No permission from competent authority was taken before execution of said sale deed for granting permission in favour of Sh. Dwarika Gupta i.e., by a tribal in favour of non-tribal. Further, the details of the transactions in the bank account of the benamidar made by the beneficial owner and subsequent transfer made by the benamidar, to various sellers/ vendors of the tribal lands is clearly evident. Also, it is on record that only the appellant Late Laxmi Chand Maravi, had moved an application on 29.09.2021 seeking permission of the District Collector, Janjgir Champa (C.G.) for sale of certain parcels of lands in the name of Sh. Dwarika Gupta, a non-tribal person.

Thus, it fortifies our view that the matter is that of benami transaction and is covered under ‘Benami Transaction’ as the appellant Sh. Dwarika Gupta purchased the land through Benamidar with an end view to ultimately transfer it in the name of Dwarika Gupta, the beneficial owner for his future business use.

Further, the appellant no.1 cannot be considered as a trustee because he was an employee working as labourer with the beneficial owner. He was merely used for the task of purchasing the property on his behalf, to circumvent the stringent provisions of Section 165(6) under the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code for taking prior permission for purchasing the land of a tribal by a non-tribal. Mere entrustment of sale consideration does not give rise to the ‘trust’ and cannot be protected by invoking Section 88 of the Indian Trusts Act. Moreover, if the fiduciary capacity is taken to mean and include all persons who trust each other or hold a position of trust, all benami transactions would come into the ambit of exception (ii) to section 2(9)(A) of the Act. Hence, the term fiduciary relationship cannot be interpreted in a manner to frustrate the very purpose of the Act.

Moreover, the nature of said relation the fiduciary relationship was not notified by the Central Government and its nature is not akin to the relationship included in the statute. Further, section 56(1) of the PBPT Act, specifically states that Sections 81, 82 & 94 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and section 281A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 are hereby repealed. The repeal of the provisions vide section 56(1) is aimed at ensuring that trust relationships, even though property may appear to be held in a fiduciary capacity does not provide an automatic exemption from the provisions concerning benami transactions.

The object behind incorporating Section 165(6) under the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code is to provide social justice to the members of the backward tribe and save them from the harsh clutches of the socially and economically well-off persons. Further, sections 170A of the CLR Code provides for setting aside transfers made in violation of section 165(6) of the CLR Code, meaning thereby that the sale which is violative of section 165(6) of the code is absolutely barred under the law. In support of this contention, the Respondent has cited Pooran Singh [2015 (2) TMI 1425 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT] decided by the High Court of Chhattisgarh which held that section 170 of the CLR Code provides for avoidance of transfer in contravention of Section 165 of the CLR Code.

Thus, we are of the view that the present appeals need to be dismissed on merits, as the appellants do not fall within the exemption clause of the Section 2(9)(A) of the PBPT Act. Further, since the matter already falls under Section 2(9)(A) of PBPT Act, the properties are rightly attached given that the same are benami properties, which the appellant (benamidar) has bought using the money given by the beneficial owner, Mr. Dwarika Gupta to defeat the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code.

Thus, the present appeals are hereby dismissed being devoid of any merits and thereby the Provisional Attachment Order dated 28.12.2023 passed by the Initiating Officer and confirmation order dated 24.10.2024 passed by the Adjudicating Authority, qua the properties mentioned in para no.1 above, is hereby upheld.

Special leave petitions - Seizure of gold - Show cause notice - Right to be heard / participation in adjudicatory proceedings - Validity of show cause notice - HELD THAT:- We do not find any infirmity in the impugned order [2025 (7) TMI 1977 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] calling for our interference. Hence, the special leave petitions are dismissed.

However, it is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion with regard to the show cause notice which is said to be now pending before the jurisdictional High Court and it is open for the High Court to consider the issues raised therein without being influenced by the observations made under the impugned order.

Imposition of redemption fine and penalty - import of J3 grade Cold Rolled Stainless Steel - ministerial certificate permitting particular grade binding on other importers - identification of goods by declared grade - HELD THAT:- The advocate for the party is seeking to place reliance on the decision of Commissioner of Customs Mundra vs Shree Khatu Shyam Sales and Tubes LLP [2026 (2) TMI 302 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] which though dealing with grade J2 but by seeking reliance on the certificate issued by the concerned Ministry that J2 Grade are not objectionable for import had allowed the benefit. The Division Bench after considering that the restriction cannot be allowed to be proceeded with, once the concerned Ministry, inter alia has agreed that the grade mentioned was permissible and has permitted the same to be imported by same or any other party, then it is to be applied for other parties as well, in this case also the same ratio applies.

Further the goods in this case have been also been identified by the customs as being J-3 grade as declared.

This court following the substance of ruling above is in agreement with the appellant that the appeal on aspects of Redemption Fine and Personal Penalty is allowable.

Revocation of customs broker's license - Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 - time limit for passing order under Regulation 17(7) - non-compliance with statutory time limit - absence of saving clause for delayed orders - HELD THAT:- As per the timeline chart, we find that the Inquiry Report was submitted by the Assistant Commissioner Customs on 28-03-2022. The Adjudicating Authority at Para 11 of the impugned clearly states that Shri M. K. Rehman, Assistant Commissioner of Customs Calcutta and Inquiry Officer has submitted the Inquiry Report on 28-03-2022.

A careful reading of Regulation 17 (7) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations 2018, shows that the Principal Commissioner is required to pass the Order of suspension / revocation within 90 days from the date of submission of the Inquiry report by the Deputy Commissioner. Admittedly, the Deputy Commissioner of the Assistant Commissioner has filed his report on 28-03-2022 as noted by the Principal Commissioner in the impugned order. Therefore, the OIO should have been passed within 90 days from 28-03-2022. We find that the present OIO has been passed on 16-08-2022, that is after more than 130 days from the date of inquiry report being submitted by the Assistant Commissioner. This is clear time-violation on the part of the Adjudicating authority. From the CBLR 2018, we do not find that there exists any saving clause if the time limit of 90 days is exceeded.

Thus, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal.

Abetment -Penalty u/s 112(a)(i) - Admissibility of statements recorded u/s 108 - Section 138B(1)(b) - requirement of examination before the adjudicating authority and formation of opinion for admission in evidence - Irrelevance of statements not admitted in accordance with statutory procedure -Whether the appellant abetted the doing or omission of an act resulting in imposition of penalty u/s 112(a)(i) of the Customs Act - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, there is no allegation against the appellant that he had knowledge of mis-declaration. Penalty under section 112(a)(i) could not have been imposed upon the appellant under the Customs Act.

Section 108 of the Customs Act deals with power to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents. It provides that any Gazetted Officer of customs shall have the power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry which such officer is making under the Customs Act.

A Division Bench of this Tribunal in Surya Wires [2025 (4) TMI 441 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] after examining the aforesaid decisions of the High Court held that the statements made under section 108 of the Customs Act during the course of an inquiry under the Customs Act shall be relevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the facts contained in them only when such persons are examined as witnesses before the adjudicating authority and the adjudicating authority forms an opinion that the statements should be admitted in evidence.

Both section 138B(1)(b) of the Customs Act and section 9D(1)(b) of the Central Excise Act contemplate that when the provisions of clause (a) of these two sections are not applicable, then the statements made under section 14 of the Central Excise Act or under section 108 of the Customs Act during the course of an inquiry under the Acts shall be relevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the facts contained in them only when such persons are examined as witnesses before the adjudicating authority and the adjudicating authority forms an opinion that the statements should be admitted in evidence. It is thereafter that an opportunity has to be provided for cross-examination of such persons.

The provisions of section 138B(1)(b) of the Customs Act and section 9D of the Central Excise Act have been held to be mandatory and failure to comply with the procedure would mean that no reliance can be placed on the statements recorded either under section 108 of the Customs Act or under section 14D of the Central Excise Act. The Courts have also explained the rationale behind the precautions contained in the two sections. It has been observed that the statements recorded during inquiry/investigation by officers has every chance of being recorded under coercion or compulsion and it is in order to neutralize this possibility that statements of the witnesses have to be recorded before the adjudicating authority, after which such statements can be admitted in evidence.

As seen from the show cause notice and the order impugned, penalty upon the appellants has been imposed only on the basis of the statement made by the appellants under section 108 of the Customs Act. A statement made under section 108 of the Customs Act cannot be considered as relevant as the procedure contemplated under section 138B of the Customs Act was not followed.

Thus, the impugned order dated 31.03.2013 passed by the Commissioner insofar as it imposes penalty upon the appellant under section 112(a)(i) of the Customs Act cannot be sustained and is set aside and the appeal is allowed.

Maintainability of appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) Customs - effect of prior adjudication by Development Commissioner on the same cause of action - non-fulfilment of NFE obligations - consequential relief - HELD THAT:- We find that prima facie the appellant cannot be faulted for having filed the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) Customs, since the duty demanded was that of Customs Duty. Therefore, the Commissioner (Appeals) Customs is in error in dismissing the appeal. He should have decided the issue on merits. Since all the details towards closure of NFE issue has been provided by the appellant before us, we do not see any necessity to remand the matter to the Commissioner (Appeals) Customs.

We observe that the issue of non-fulfilment of NFE norms has already been taken up by the office of the Development Commissioner vide Order in Original dated 16.3.2017.

Thus, it is seen that the Dy Development Commissioner has adjudicated the issue of NFE and has imposed penalty of Rs.96,000/-, which has been paid by the appellant by way of the Demand Draft. After this, one renewal LOP was given vide letter dated 6.6.2014 till 30.11.2018 and second renewal LOP was given vide letter dated 29.11.2018 till 30.11.2023. These letters show that the Development Commissioner has given due consideration to the non-fulfilment of NFE and has imposed penalty, which has been paid by the appellant. Subsequently the appellant’s LOP has been renewed till 30.11.2023. Therefore, we find that the Revenue had no case to interfere in the issue of NFE and adjudicate the same demanding Customs Duty.

Thus, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal. The appellant would be eligible for consequential relief.

Exemption from integrated tax under Notification No.45/2017-Cus - meaning of "duty of customs" for the purpose of exemption notifications - integrated tax leviable under the IGST Act and its collection under the Customs Tariff Act - clarificatory versus substantive amendment and retrospectivity of Notification No.36/2021-Cus - challenge to vires of Notification No.36/2021-Cus - HELD THAT:- After analysing the definition of duty under the Customs Act and the definition of integrated tax under Section 2(12) of the IGST Act and levy and collection under Section 5 of the IGST Act, the Tribunal has concluded that the appellant therein are entitled to exemption under Notification No.45/2017-Cus. dated 30.06.2017 in relation to IGST.

The said judgment was also followed in a recent case viz. Air India Ltd. Vs. CC [2025 (2) TMI 320 - CESTAT NEW DELHI]. Besides, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Interglobe Aviation Ltd. Vs. Principal Commissioner of Customs [2025 (3) TMI 347 - DELHI HIGH COURT] also held that the Notification No.36/2021-Cus dated 19.07.2021 is ultra vires.

Thus, we set aside the respective impugned orders upholding the assessment orders denying benefit of exemption to IGST under Notification No.45/2017-Cus dated 30.6.2017 and consequently, allow the appeals filed by the assessee-appellants; Revenue’s appeals are rejected. Cross objections are disposed of.

Financial debt u/s 5(8) of the IBC - share subscription money - deposit - exclusion of share subscription money from definition of deposit under Rule 2(c)(vii) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 2014 - maintainability of a proceeding u/s 7 - acknowledgement in books as admission of liability - HELD THAT:- Very evidently, the appellant aims at a rear-guard action, but it is not without its fallacies. Is there a subsequent change of character of the money which the appellant had paid the respondent as to bring it within the definition of a financial debt? If the appellant’s payment were to be treated as share- subscription money, he straight away is driven beyond the IBC zone. If he were to give it a colour of deposit, then it would stand excluded in terms of Rule 2(c)(vii) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 2014. The point is how far the trial balance of the respondent referred to earlier will be of use to the appellant? It is true, the respondent goes silent on it in its pleading, but it may have least impact since it will still stand excluded from the definition of deposit in terms of Rule 2(c)(vii) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, which positively excludes share subscription amount from the definition of deposit. Therefore, even if there is no pointed finding of the Adjudicating Authority as to the existence of a financial debt, we have little hesitation in holding that there exists no financial debt which may enable the appellant to invoke IBC.

With the gates of IBC closed for the appellant to seek entry into it, we consider there is hardly any need to consider the point of limitation.

To conclude, we find no merit in the appeal, and accordingly we dismiss it.

Pre existing dispute - Operational debt - Section 9(5)(ii)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Mobilox standard for spurious or moonshine defences - acknowledgement of debt - HELD THAT:- With respect to the issue of maintainability the Appellant claims that the instant application is maintainable as the amounts claimed are ‘Operational debt’ as per laws laid down by various Courts/Tribunals as the Commission for the business transacted during the currency of C & F to the tune of Rs. 2,22,221/- is due till the filing of application as also the rent to the tune of Rs. 3,30,300/- is due till filing of application.

The instant application has been filed on 24.02.2020, i.e. before the increase in the Pecuniary Jurisdiction owing to Covid-19, henceforth, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the matter is to the tune of Rs. 1.00 Lacs, as per which the matter squarely falls within the ambit of IB Code.

Perusal of the email and also the implications of the emails does not indicate that this is an acknowledgement of the debt. The email alongwith the subsequent demand notice indicates existence of pre-existing dispute. During the oral arguments the Appellant also claimed that an information was leaked from his office and Respondent took advantage of that and issued a demand notice. This court is not to look into the issues relating to the existence and the reasons of dispute.

We observe that Section 9(5)(ii)(d) provides that Adjudicating Authority shall reject the Application under Section 9, if notice of dispute has been received by the Operational Creditor or if there is a record of dispute in the information utility. In this case, we find a legal notice has been issued raising various disputes. We further find that the disputes raised are not moonshine or frivolous disputes which have been created to avoid admission of Section 9 Application. And for the above noted reasons, the judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mobilox Innovations Pvt. [2017 (9) TMI 1270 - SUPREME COURT] and M/s Saraswati Wire and Cable Industries Vs Mohammad Moinuddin Khan [2025 (12) TMI 770 - SUPREME COURT] cited by the Appellant will not help his case.

Thus, we find that there is a pre-existing dispute between the Appellant and the Respondent basis which Section 9 proceeding could not have been initiated against the Respondent. We do not find any infirmity in the order of Adjudicating Authority and we find it has rightly rejected Section 9 Application.

Invocation of guarantee - demand notice in Form B under Rule 7(1) of the Personal Guarantor Rules, 2019 - definition of "guarantor" in Rule 3(1)(e) of the Personal Guarantor Rules, 2019 - requirement of default by guarantor at the time of issuance of Form B - interpretation of Section 95(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - continuing/demand guarantee and liability arising on demand

Invocation of guarantee - demand notice in Form B under Rule 7(1) of the Personal Guarantor Rules, 2019 - definition of "guarantor" in Rule 3(1)(e) of the Personal Guarantor Rules, 2019 - Whether a demand notice issued in Form B under Rule 7(1) of the Personal Guarantor Rules, 2019 can be treated as a notice invoking the guarantee for the purposes of initiating proceedings under Section 95 of the Code. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal construed Section 95(4) read with Rule 7(1) and Rule 3(1)(e) of the 2019 Rules in light of the statutory definitions of "debt" and "default". Rule 3(1)(e) contemplates a "guarantor" as one in respect of whom the guarantee has been invoked and remains unpaid. The scheme requires that default by the guarantor exist on the date the Form B demand notice is issued. The terms of the guarantee deed-being a continuing/demand guarantee-make the guarantor's liability arise upon invocation (demand) in accordance with the deed. Reliance on precedents of coordinate Benches (including the decisions reproduced in the judgment) reinforced that a separate act of invocation, as per the guarantee's terms, is necessary and that Form B demand alone cannot be equated to invocation where the deed contemplates a distinct demand. Applying these principles to the facts, the Tribunal found no record of a distinct invocation of the guarantee prior to issuance of the Form B notice and held that Form B cannot be treated as an invocation of the guarantee. [Paras 35, 37, 38, 39, 44]

Notice in Form B under Rule 7(1) is not, by itself, a notice invoking the guarantee; invocation in accordance with the guarantee's terms must exist for a guarantor to be a "debtor" for the purposes of Section 95.

Interpretation of Section 95(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - requirement of default by guarantor at the time of issuance of Form B - consequences of non-invocation on maintainability of Section 95 petition - Whether the Adjudicating Authority erred in admitting the Section 95 application in absence of invocation of the guarantee, and the consequent relief to be granted. - HELD THAT: - Applying the conclusion that invocation must precede or be demonstrable at the time Form B is issued, the Tribunal examined the record and found it admitted by the parties that no separate invocation of the guarantee occurred prior to the Form B notice. Since default on the part of the guarantor had therefore not arisen as required by Section 95(4)(b) and the Rules, the admission of the Section 95 petition was contrary to the statutory scheme. The Tribunal concurred with coordinate Benches that non-invocation renders the insolvency application against the guarantor unsustainable and that the Adjudicating Authority's admission was a mistake. In view of this, the impugned order admitting the petition was set aside. The Tribunal also recorded concern at the Bank officials' conduct in filing the petition without invoking the guarantee and directed that a copy of the judgment be forwarded to the Chairman of the Bank for information. [Paras 45, 46]

Impugned admission of the Section 95 petition is set aside for lack of invocation/default by the guarantor; appeal allowed and the petition admitted by the Adjudicating Authority is quashed. A copy of this judgment is to be forwarded to the Chairman of UCO Bank.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed. The Tribunal held that a Form B demand notice under Rule 7(1) does not, by itself, constitute invocation of a continuing/demand guarantee; invocation in accordance with the guarantee's terms must be shown and default by the guarantor must exist at the time Form B is issued. In the absence of any distinct invocation on the record, the Adjudicating Authority erred in admitting the Section 95 petition; the impugned order is set aside and a copy of this judgment is to be forwarded to the Chairman of UCO Bank.

Pre-existing dispute u/s 5(6) of the Code - admission of CIRP application u/s 9(2) - completeness and absence of pre-existing dispute - liquidated damages not amenable to summary determination in CIRP admission proceedings - completion certificate issued subject to caveats does not preclude raising contractual disputes -

Liquidated damages not amenable to summary determination in CIRP admission proceedings - HELD THAT:- It is the case of the Appellant that since no payment was received by the Appellant, the Appellant issued Demand Notice under Section 8 of the Code on 26.09.2020 which was replied by the Respondent on 08.10.2020 raising issue of imposition of liquidated damages due to alleged delay in completion of work and also raised issue regarding pre-existing disputes. Unsatisfied with the reply of the Respondent, the Appellant filed Section 9 Application before the Adjudicating Authority on 22.12.2020 which was rejected by the Adjudicating Authority vide its Impugned Order dated 24.04.2024.

We note that the Adjudicating Authority has gone through the aspect of liquidated damages and concluded that the issue of liquidated damages cannot be dealt under summary trial under the Code.

Since, the Adjudicating Authority has held that liquidated damages issue cannot be decided in summary proceedings which seems logical. We do not find any error in the Impugned Order on this issue.

Pre-existing dispute under Section 5(6) of the Code - admission of CIRP application under Section 9(2) - completeness and absence of pre-existing dispute - HELD THAT:- The Respondent has been constantly raising issue regarding quality of work which tantamount to pre-existing disputes. It may also be kept in view that the Adjudicating Authority is conducting summary proceedings and is not expected to go in detailed scrutiny of evidence. The Adjudicating Authority should look into whether the dispute tantamount to be substantial, genuine and bona-fide and not spurious, speculative, illusory or misconceived. The Adjudicating Authority at the stage of admission of CIRP is not expected to hold a full trial in the matter and it must be decided whether the ground appears to be substantial. It is also a settled law that if such operational debt are bona-fide disputed on substantial ground, the Adjudicating Authority ought to dismiss the petition and such parties are required to seek other alternative legal recourse.

Above clearly support the cause of the Respondent. The Impugned Order also draws full support from above judgement. We note that the Respondent has indeed sent as many as 89 emails raising several issues or defects, which clearly indicates pre-existing disputes.

By no statute of imaginations, the Adjudicating Authority is expected to look into 89 said e-mail sent by the Respondent to the Appellant, before demand notice by received by the Respondent. Thus, we do not find any error in the Impugned Order on the issue regarding pre-existing dispute.

Completion certificate issued subject to caveats does not preclude raising contractual disputes - Looking into the completion certificate, we are conscious of the fact that completion of project in time, along with requisite quality, is the heart of the contract management. It can be no one’s case that extra-ordinary delay which changes viability of the project can be simply brushed aside and should not be taken into consideration while deciding Section 9 application under the Code by the Adjudicating Authority. Simultaneously, we also need to acknowledge the fact that in commercial world, occasional delay may happen and may be attributable to both parties. We also need to factor into consideration, if finally, project was completed to satisfaction of the Corporate Debtor and whether the same was accepted by the Corporate Debtor without any caveats and qualification. In the instant appeal we note carefully that the Corporate Debtor issued the completion certificate with many caveats. In such background, the alleged completion certificate, cannot be treated as acceptance of work to satisfaction the Corporate Debtor, ignoring 89 emails sent by the Respondent to Appellant on pre-existing dispute prior to receipt of Demand Notice. Thus, the above mentioned completion certificate cannot be treated as without any caveat or clear certification the work, as claimed by the Appellant and therefore, do not support cause of the Appellant.

We do not find any error in above finding by the Adjudicating Authority.

Appeal is devoid of any merit and stand rejected.

Admission u/s 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - financial debt - date of default and limitation - finality and enforceability of arbitral award - ex parte proceedings - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute that MOU was executed between the parties on 24.01.2015 and the CD has acknowledged the entire receipt of amount of 75 lakhs. There is also no dispute that the CD continuously failed to honour the terms and conditions from the very beginning i.e from 10.02.2015 till the matter was referred to the arbitrator and statement of claim was filed on 20.02.2018. The Arbitrator gave his award on 20.02.2019 which is in the nature of a decree and is executable, therefore, if the application is filed on 30.05.2022 from the date of award dated 20.02.2019, the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in Suo Motu Writ Petition No. 3 of 2020 would come to the rescue of the Appellant in so far as the limitation is concerned.

The non-appearance of the CD in the Tribunal in which it was proceeded against ex-parte would also indicate that the CD had scant respect for the judicial process because it was ex-parte before the Arbitrator as well.

The CD cannot be permitted to take the plea that the award dated 20.02.2019 has not attained finality despite the fact that the CD had lost one round of litigation up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court and has failed on merit in appeal before the District Court. Although we will refrain from commenting upon the act and conduct of the CD but suffice it to say that it had no intention, at any time, to make the payment of the Financial Creditor because it was already declared defaulter by the Bank when it obtained loan from the banks and committed default coupled with the fact that the CD at the time when it obtained the loan from the financial creditor and entered into MOU, did not disclose that the it had already been declared defaulter or NPA by the Banks.

Thus, we are of the considered opinion that there is hardly any merit in this appeal for the purpose of interference in the well-considered order of the Tribunal, hence, the appeal is dismissed though without any order as to costs.

Default - operational creditor - debt and default requirement under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code - back-to-back payment obligation - pre-existing dispute - inadmissibility of Section 9 application where default not proved - Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) - HELD THAT:- Since, the parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the agreement in which it has been clearly stipulated that the payment shall be made by the company to the contractor back to back as per the payment received by the company from the Insurer. There is no evidence brought on record by the Appellant that the payment has been received by them from the insurer i.e. NIC except that the information collected under the RTI which is in regard to the payment by the Govt. to NIC but there is no evidence that it was further paid the respondent.

Thus, in view thereof, there was no default on the part of the Respondent and hence, the Tribunal has rightly dismissed the application of the Appellant because the application under Section 7 or 9 of the Code can be admitted only if the debt and default both are proved to be in existence.

We do not find any merit in the present appeal and the same is hereby dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.

Application u/s 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act - invocation of guarantee - proceedings under the SARFAESI Act and exclusion u/s 14 of the Limitation Act - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that all the banks initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 (‘Act, 2002’) by issuance of notice under Section 13(2) of the Act, 2002 and the proceedings initiated at the instance of the consortium banks are pending before the DRT, Chandigarh in which OA. No. 4524 of 2007 is filed by IDBI Bank, OA No. 5546 of 2017 is filed by State Bank of India and OA No. 4494 of 2017 is filed by Indian Bank (earlier Allahabad Bank).

No merit in the present appeals because, firstly, the application under Section 94 is filed when the debtor who had committed a default and is unable to pay the said amount can apply through RP to the AA for initiation of the insolvency but limitation period of three years, as envisaged in Article 137 of the Act, has to apply to the said application as well.

In the present case, not only that the NPA was declared in the year 2013 and 2014 but also the guarantee was invoked in the year 2016 and 2017. At that time, the Appellants who had extended guarantee to the CD which was already in CIRP, knew about the fact that such kind of application can be filed within a period of three years yet they chose to file the same on 05.04.2023 after the expiry of almost of six years.

In such circumstances, the Tribunal had not committed any error in dismissing the application.

Closure of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process - funding of construction by promoter under supervision of Insolvency Resolution Professional - admission of Section 7 application - reverse CIRP - liberty to allottees to initiate fresh proceedings under Section 7 - threshold under proviso to Section 7 - HELD THAT:- As noted, the application under Section 7 filed by Meena Porwal and 65 other applicants. Reply Affidavit has been filed by Meena Porwal and certain other Respondents, as noted above. It is useful to notice the Reply Affidavit which was filed by Meena Porwal, Respondent No.2 herein.

Construction by the fund of Promoter under the supervision of IRP has already been directed by this Tribunal, as noted. A detailed Status Report and Affidavit have been brought on record which indicate that various necessary steps taken towards commencement of construction and obtaining no objection from various authorities. NOC dated 06.05.2025 from Greater Noida Authority has been brought on the record.

We see no reason to continue the CIRP any further. The construction of the project may continue with the funding by the Promoter as submitted before us. The CIRP is closed. We, however, grant liberty to the requisite number of allottees to initiate any fresh proceeding under Section 7, if any cause for initiating the proceeding is made out. IRP shall be paid his fees and reasonable expenses incurred in the CIRP process so far by the Corporate Debtor. With the aforesaid, both the appeals are disposed of.

Provisional attachment of property under PMLA - proceeds of crime and money trail nexus - diverted the home buyer’s funds on non-mandated heads causing wrongful loss to the investors - relevant date for scheduled offence in relation to ECIR - use of forensic audit as guidance and its limitations - value equivalent attachment - distinction between attaching LLP property and attaching shares held by a third party -

Use of forensic audit as guidance and its limitations - HELD THAT:- The limitation indicated in the report shows that the complete record was not provided so as to hold the report to be conclusive and to be applied to address the issues raised by the appellants. The bare perusal of the disclaimer of M/s Grant Thornton makes it further clear that their results of work with respect to review of application of Homebuyer funds and misappropriation of collected amount should be considered as a guide.

The perusal of the report quoted above reveals disclosure to the effect that it is without any guarantee of its reliability or completeness and for that the report should be used for guidance purpose only. It should not form basis for any decision to a potential course of action without independent confirmation and its findings. The appellants have grossly relied on M/s Grant Thornton report ignoring the disclaimer and limitation spelt out therein and has been quoted by us. The reference of the report of M/s Grant Thornton by the respondents may be for the purpose of reference only. The ED has made independent investigation and collected the documents to show transfer of money to M/s KJV Estates and M/s AFPL out of the proceeds of crime which was nothing but the hard-earned money of home buyers cheated by M/s Unitech Ltd. by their deeds and accordingly transferred the amount for non-mandated purpose.

Relevant date for scheduled offence in relation to ECIR - HELD THAT:- The ECIR was recorded finding a case for an offence under Section 3 of the Act of 2002. The relevant time to find out the offence is the date when ECIR was recorded finding an offence under Section 3 of the Act and it can be taken up when there exists a scheduled offence which admittedly was existing at the time of recording the ECIR. The relevant date would not be the date of offence but when the appellants tried to project tainted money to be untainted and even concealed it coupled with the other acts to make out an offence under Section 3 of the Act of 2002. We may refer the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Dyani Antony Paul and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. [2020 (12) TMI 1296 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT]

The argument raised by the appellants in reference to Notification dated 01.06.2009 to add offence under Section 420,120-B IPC in the Schedule so as to question the provisional attachment for the commission of offence prior to it is not acceptable.

Proceeds of crime and money trail nexus - provisional attachment of shares and related assets - HELD THAT:-We find that the home buyers funds were not diverted to M/s Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd under the MOU thus, provisional attachment of the 65% of the land parcel in South Goa acquired by M/s Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd. cannot be said to be proper. It is pertinent to state that the money traveled from M/s Unitech Ltd. to M/s AFPL, M/s CMPL and M/s KJV Estates Pvt. Ltd. but not to M/s Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd under the agreement. It was further alleged by the counsel for the respondents that no shares were transferred by M/s AFPL to M/s Unitech Ltd. in terms of the MOU dated 15.06.2007 and the subsequent agreement dated 15.11.2007. The counsel for the appellant M/s AFPL has argued that physical delivery of 5000 shares belonging to M/s KJV Estates were transferred to M/s Unitech Ltd. We find that documents for share transfer is a part of record for transfer of 5000 shares to M/s Unitech Ltd. by M/s KJV Estates. The document has not been disputed by the respondents thus we find the argument of the appellants as substantiated by documentary evidence for transfer of 5000 shares to M/s Unitech Ltd. and if it was not transferred then could have been attached and not the land at Goa in the name of M/s Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd.

The consequential effect relevant is even the bank account of M/s Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd. which is an amount of Rs. 1.33 lakhs in all. It seems to be connected with the advances and loan alleged to have been extended to M/s Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd. We find that the amount of Rs. 1.8 Crores was paid for completion of formality of the land parcel allotted by Goa Industrial Development Council and, therefore, the material has not been put to show receipt of the amount aforesaid by M/s Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd. The same is the position about the loan amount said to have been credited in the account of M/s Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd. In any case, we are not inclined to cause interference in the provisional attachment of the bank account to the extent of amount lying therein at the time of provisional attachment.

The issue now remains regarding attachment of the property of appellant 5 LLPs. The facts on record shows that those LLPs came into existence in the year 2014 and onwards i.e. much subsequent to the period for diversion of funds by M/s Unitech Ltd. It is coupled with the fact that the alleged diversion of funds was used and consumed by M/s Authentic Finance Pvt. Ltd. and M/s KJV Estates Pvt. Ltd. for the properties much prior to the constitution of the LLPs thus it could not be brought on record that the proceeds of crime was diverted even to the LLPs. The money trail for the aforesaid does not reflect and prove the case. If at all and for the sake of argument it is accepted that there was a diversion of fund by M/s Authentic Finance Pvt. Ltd. to acquire 10% shares of the LLPs what could have been attached is those shares instead of the property of the LLPs may be even to the extent of 10%. Accordingly, we cause interference in the attachment of the property of LLPs also.

In the conclusion, we cause interference in the impugned orders for the land parcel of M/s Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd. in Goa and also the provisional attachment of the properties of 5 LLPs (appellants in these appeals) while we do not find any ground to cause interference in the impugned orders for the properties qua the other appellants.

For the clarity, we have not caused interference in the provisional attachment of shares of M/s Betul Hospitality Parks Pvt. Ltd., rather it is only for the land parcel. The appeals are disposed of with the aforesaid.

Refund of unutilized CENVAT credit - nexus between input service and output service - input service - CENVAT Credit Rules - Rule 5 refund - availment not to be reopened at refund stage - procedural infirmities not to defeat substantive refund claim - Whether the learned Commissioner (Appeals) is right in upholding rejection of refund of CENVAT credit due to absence of nexus and other grounds when the said CENVAT credit, when availed, was not objected. -HELD THAT:- As regards nexus, we find that each of the input service involved in the present case, was held to be ‘input service’ by various decisions of the Tribunal. In this regard, we may refer to the service-wise ‘input services’ and the decisions vide which it has been held to be ‘input service’.

Since the identical input services as involved in the present case, were also involved in the Appellant’s own case [2025 (7) TMI 564 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] for the previous period, wherein this Tribunal has considered various case laws and has held that refund cannot be denied on the ground of nexus as well as minor procedural infirmities such as input service invoices are incomplete as the same are not bearing Service Tax Registration No., PAN based Service Tax Registration Number of the service provider, or not being issued on the address of registered premises of the Appellant etc.

Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order is not sustainable in law; consequently, we set aside the same and allow the appeal of the Appellant with consequential relief, if any, as per law.

Reliance on Form 26AS/Income Tax data for invocation of extended period - burden of corroborative evidence to establish rendition of taxable service - bona fide belief based on contractual work order negating service tax liability - HELD THAT:- Being merely a job worker undertaking fabrication, the appellant can be said to entertain bonafide belief that no Service Tax liability raises on him. Moreover the Work Order itself specifies that Service Tax is not applicable on the appellant but is within the scope of the receiver of the service. Therefore, the benefits of the appellant cannot be doubted. I also observe that the Show Cause Notice has been issued after more than four years after the amount were received by the appellant in 2015-16.

The Tribunals have been consistently holding that extended period provisions cannot be invoked based on the Income Tax Return alone.

This Tribunal in the case of Tabassum Enterprises vs. C, CGST & CX [2025 (9) TMI 1275 - CESTAT KOLKATA] held that " the demand of service tax confirmed in the impugned order, solely relying the data received from CBDT, without adducing corroborative evidence in support, cannot be sustained. "

Following the ratio of the cited case law, set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal filed by the appellant.

Double taxation - single legal entity and inter-unit tax adjustment - payment of service tax under different registration/accounting code - reverse charge mechanism - extended period of limitation u/s 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 - interest and penalties under Sections 75, 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 - HELD THAT:- The dispute in the present case is that the duty was discharged at Mumbai whereas as per the provisions of the law, the same should have been discharged at Vapi. At this stage, the Learned Advocate seeks to place reliance on the Division Bench decision of Kolkata, in the matter of Indian Oil Corporation Limited vs Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise-[2025 (6) TMI 850 - CESTAT KOLKATA], held that, " it is settled that merely because the service tax paid under different registration but by the same company, cannot tantamount to non- payment of service tax. The law does not permit the taxation authority to recover the tax again where the tax on the same taxable event has already been paid, albeit under a different head or accounting code. Hence, the demand of service tax which was already paid cannot be made twice. Accordingly, we hold that the demand of service tax confirmed in the impugned order is not sustainable and hence, we set aside the same.

Since the demand of service tax is not sustainable, the question of demanding interest under Section 75 and imposing penalties under Section 76, 77, and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 does not arise and accordingly, the same imposed in the impugned order are set aside.”

Confronted with the decision given as the precedent, the Learned AR does not oppose and reiterates the findings of the lower authorities. In view of above stated decision, this court finds that the matter is already covered and appeal deserves to be allowed.

Appeal allowed.

Extended period of limitation - change of opinion - interpretation of law involving conflicting views - invocation of extended period not maintainable where condition precedent is absent - HELD THAT:- The submission of the Learned Advocate was that though on merits, the matter is settled against the appellant but the very fact that the matter had to go right up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court indicates that the issue was contentious in nature and further para 6 of the decision of the Coordinate Bench in their own case, took the view that the duty was not sustainable at least due to extended period and also because legal interpretation was involved.

In view of the foregoing and following the decision in their own case and also the law that where interpretation of law is involved and two contrary views possible, which are taken right up to Supreme Court or Larger Bench, the extended period cannot be invoked. This court following the decision of the Coordinate Bench in their own case in the matter of Nangarjuna Construction Ltd. [2019 (3) TMI 775 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], allows the appeal. Appeal allowed with consequential relief.

Adjustment of duty - provisional assessment under Rule 7 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 - finalisation of provisional assessment - refund mechanism vis-a -vis adjustment of excess duty - principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- Since there was excess paid duty in some of the cases and short-paid in other cases, the appellant had adjusted the short-paid duty from the excess paid duty. Such modus operandi adopted by the appellant was objected to by the Department on the ground that in respect of excess paid duty, they are only eligible for grant of refund by taking recourse of the provisions contained in the Central Excise statute.

With regard to short-paid duty, it was held by the authorities below, that under Rule 7 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, the appellant is required to pay the differential duty along with interest and there is no provision prescribed under the statute for adjustment of the short-paid duty against the excess paid duty during the course of provisional assessment.

Though the refund provisions contained in the Central Excise statute are applicable for claiming the excess duty paid as refund, but the provision regarding adjustment of the excess paid duty vis-à-vis the short-paid duty, there is no restriction in statute to opt for such adjustment mechanism. Since the final assessment order was passed on 24.12.2014 and immediately thereafter the appellant had made the adjustment of the short-paid duty against the excess paid duty, such adjustment, in our considered view, can be termed as proper and justified.

Since the arithmetical accuracy about the computation was raised for the first time by the appellant at this juncture, we are of view that such aspect is required to be considered by the original authority. Therefore, the appeal, to the limited extent of computation of correct duty, is remanded to the original authority for passing of a fresh order.

Thus, the impugned order to the extent it has held that short-paid duty cannot be adjusted against the excess paid duty, is set aside and appeal to that extent is allowed in favour of the appellant. With regard to the limited purpose for computation of the short-paid duty amount as per the above referred work-sheet, the matter is remanded to the original authority for de novo adjudication. The principles of natural justice should be adhered to by the original authority while passing the order afresh.

Condonation of delay - Modification of impugned order - Waiver of costs - Dismissal of special leave petition - HELD THAT:- Delay condoned.

Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, we do not find any error in the impugned order except to the extent of imposition of costs. Hence, we modify the order and waive the costs imposed by the High Court under the impugned order.

Accordingly, the special leave petition stands dismissed.

Limitation for assessment under second proviso to Section 14(1) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 - period of limitation computed from end of relevant tax year - extension of limitation by tax audit report submission - bar of limitation precluding adjudication on merits - HELD THAT:- The assessment order involved in the instant case is of the year 2000-2001. The period of limitation prescribed for assessment of tax under 2nd proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act is one year.

The date of expiry of assessment for the year 2000-2001 or the period for passing the final assessment order gets expired on 31.03.2001. Thereafter, if at all an order under Section 14(1) was to be passed it ought to have been passed within one year from 31.03.2001, i.e., by 31.03.2002. However, no final assessment order was passed during the intervening period by the petitioner. The Assistant Commissioner had passed final assessment order for the Assessment Year 2000-2001 only on 18.03.2003. There was yet another period of limitation available with the petitioner, i.e., passing a final assessment order within (15) days from the tax audit report being submitted. In the instant case, the tax audit report was submitted on 25.01.2002 and in those circumstances the assessment order ought to have been passed within a further period of (15) days thereon, i.e., by 09.02.2002 during which time also the final assessment order was not passed, and ultimately the assessment order was passed on 18.03.2003.

In the absence of which, the findings arrived at by the Tribunal so far as the aspect of limitation is concerned, cannot be found fault, and therefore the order passed by the Tribunal stands affirmed. Since the assessment order, as held by the Tribunal, is hit by the law of limitation and the same being barred by limitation, this Bench does not find any good reason for entering into the merits of the case and test the veracity of the “F” Forms that have been submitted by the respondent-Assessee.

The Tax Revision Case preferred by the petitioner-State stands decided against the petitioner-State and in favour of the respondent-Assessee, by confirming the order passed by the Tribunal by holding that the assessment order passed by the assessing authority to be barred by limitation. Accordingly, the Tax Revision Case stands dismissed. No costs.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Termination and substitution of arbitrator u/s 15 - discretion to repeat hearings and validity of prior hearings on substitution of arbitrator - moratorium u/s 14 and its effect on ongoing proceedings - limited scope of judicial intervention and the self-contained code principle - preservation of continuity of arbitral proceedings and protection of third-party rights - Whether the High Court was justified in saying that the proceedings held by the Arbitral Tribunal on the seven relevant dates, i.e., from 17.03.2022 to 25.08.2022 were liable to be declared as nullity on the premise that those proceedings were undertaken during the period of moratorium u/s 14 of the IBC. - HELD THAT:-There is no doubt that the High Court assumed and exercised power which has clearly not been conferred by the Act, 1996, more particularly, wherein the statute itself envisages minimal judicial intervention.

We are of the view that the proper and legal course for the High Court acting under Section 15(2) of the Act, 1996, should have been to appoint a substitute arbitrator to continue from the existing stage of the proceedings. The impugned part of the judgment rendered by the High Court could be said to have resulted in a situation where the arbitration proceedings would have to be restarted de novo and the same would have a direct impact on the sale of flats made pursuant to the Section 17 orders of the Tribunal. This could be both inequitable and inefficient. This Court has time and again said that the object of speedy resolution of disputes by arbitration would best be subserved by a substitute arbitrator continuing at the point at which the earlier arbitrator has left off.

Thus, we are of the view that the part of the impugned order by which the High Court declared the proceedings undertaken between 17.03.2022 and 25.08.2022 as a nullity deserves to be interfered with.

In the result, this appeal succeeds in part. The impugned order to the extent it says that the proceedings held by the Arbitral Tribunal on the seven dates, i.e., from 17.03.2022 to 25.08.2022, are a nullity is hereby set aside.

Considering the long lapse of time and also the fact that third party rights have been created (home buyers rights have come into play) we, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India declare these transactions to be lawfully valid.

The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.