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Issues: Whether the applications filed by the personal guarantors under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 were barred by limitation, and whether pendency of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 or the principle applied in Sesh Nath Singh entitled them to exclusion of time.
Analysis: The applications under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 are subject to the three-year period prescribed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the present case, the relevant defaults and invocation of guarantees had occurred between 2013 and 2017, whereas the applications were filed only on 05.04.2023. The pendency of recovery proceedings before the DRT under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 did not extend limitation for the personal guarantors' insolvency applications, and the exclusion principle under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was held inapplicable on the facts.
Conclusion: The limitation objection was upheld. The applications under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 were time-barred, and the reliance on Sesh Nath Singh did not assist the appellants.
Final Conclusion: The tribunal affirmed dismissal of the guarantors' insolvency applications because they were instituted beyond the prescribed limitation period and no exclusion of time was available on the facts.
Ratio Decidendi: An application by a personal guarantor under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and pendency of parallel SARFAESI or DRT proceedings does not, by itself, justify exclusion of time.