Just a moment...
By creating an account you can:
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Note
Bookmark
Share
Don't have an account? Register Here
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to Refund of IGST
Issue 2: Obligation to Process Refund Despite Technical Mismatch
Issue 3: Remedies for Procedural and Technical Issues
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of administrative efficiency and the need for systems to adapt to ensure compliance with legal entitlements, particularly in the context of automated processes under tax laws.
Refund of IGST paid in regard to the goods exported with interest - Zero Rated Supplies - HELD THAT:- It appears that the petitioner is the victim of computer software. It appears that there is no system to give effect of amendment of the shipping bill in the ICEGATE so as to remove the mismatch between the PAN of GST and ID and Shipping Bills GST ID. The order passed by the respondent no.1 on 21.04.2023 under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 by approving the amendment of shipping bill no.8106393 by modifying the IEC Code and GSTIN ought to have been amended in the ICEGATE. However, there is no mechanism to give effect to the order dated 21.04.2023 by the computer software and as such, the order dated 21.04.2023 has remained on paper only without being reflected in the ICEGATE system and because of such technical glitch, the petitioner is not granted the refund of the IGST paid by the petitioner under Section 16 (3) (b) of the IGST Act read with Section 54 of the GST Act.
Conclusion - The technical and procedural issues should not obstruct the rightful claims of taxpayers under statutory provisions. The respondents to amend the system to reflect the corrected shipping bill details and process the refund within eight weeks, ensuring the petitioner's entitlement is honored.
Petition disposed off.
Issues: Whether the delay in seeking revocation of cancellation of GST registration could be condoned and the petitioner granted consequential relief subject to payment of tax dues and compliance with formalities.
Analysis: The petitioner sought challenge to the cancellation of registration and relied on the coordinate Bench order in a similar matter. The Court followed that course and directed that the petitioner be given the same relief, namely condonation of delay and consideration of revocation, on the condition that all taxes, interest, late fee, penalty and other dues are deposited and other formalities are complied with.
Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the petitioner was granted relief to have revocation considered in accordance with law upon compliance with the stated conditions.
Challenge to SCN - cancellation of client’s registration under Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - client is ready and willing to pay the tax, interest, late fee, penalty and any other sum required to be paid - HELD THAT:- Reliance placed in M/S. MOHANTY ENTERPRISES VERSUS THE COMMISSIONER, CT & GST, ODISHA, CUTTACK AND OTHERS [2022 (11) TMI 1521 - ORISSA HIGH COURT] where it was held that 'the delay in Petitioner’s invoking the proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules (OGST Rules) is condoned and it is directed that subject to the Petitioner depositing all the taxes, interest, late fee, penalty etc., due and complying with other formalities, the Petitioner’s application for revocation will be considered in accordance with law.'
The writ petition is disposed of.
Issues: Whether the demand order was liable to be set aside for want of a proper opportunity of hearing in the show-cause proceedings under the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: The challenge was founded on the notice having indicated a date for filing reply but not a specific date for personal hearing. The absence of an effective hearing opportunity in a demand proceeding was treated as a violation of natural justice. The revenue accepted that time could be granted to enable a reply and, if sought, a personal hearing thereafter.
Conclusion: The impugned demand was quashed. The petitioner was granted two weeks to file a reply to the show-cause notice, with liberty to seek personal hearing in that reply or separately thereafter. If no reply is filed within the time granted, the impugned order stands restored.
Ratio Decidendi: In a demand proceeding, a show-cause notice must afford a meaningful opportunity to respond, and denial of an effective opportunity of hearing vitiates the consequential demand order.
Violation of principles of natural justice - show cause notice - personal hearing - quashing of demand notice - extension of time to file reply - restoration of order on non compliance - show cause notice issued under section 74 of Odisha Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017
Show cause notice - personal hearing - violation of principles of natural justice - quashing of demand notice - Defect in the show cause notice for not specifying date/time for personal hearing vitiated the demand notice and warranted its quashing. - HELD THAT: - The petitioner challenged a demand notice issued under section 74 of the Odisha GST Act on the ground that the antecedent show cause notice, while directing filing of a reply and providing a table of dates, omitted to specify any date for personal hearing. The Court held that omission of the personal hearing date in the show cause notice amounted to a breach of the principles of natural justice insofar as the demand flowed from that defective procedure. In consequence, the impugned demand notice was set aside and quashed to secure compliance with natural justice and fair opportunity to the assessee to respond before final adjudication.
Impugned demand set aside and quashed for breach of natural justice caused by defective show cause notice.
Extension of time to file reply - personal hearing - restoration of order on non compliance - Procedure for fresh consideration: petitioner granted limited time to file reply and seek personal hearing; failure to file reply would restore the impugned order. - HELD THAT: - The Court, while quashing the demand, directed that the petitioner be given two weeks from the date of the order to file a reply to the show cause notice and to request a personal hearing either within that reply or separately thereafter. The Court recorded that if the petitioner availed the opportunity and filed a reply, the authority would afford a personal hearing if sought; conversely, if no reply was filed within the prescribed time, the impugned order would stand automatically restored. Thus the question of merits was remitted for fresh consideration after the petitioner is afforded the procedural opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner given two weeks to file reply and seek personal hearing; impugned order to be restored automatically if no reply is filed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by quashing the impugned demand notice for breach of natural justice and directing limited procedural remediation: the petitioner was granted two weeks to file a reply and seek personal hearing, with the matter remitted for fresh consideration and automatic restoration of the order if the petitioner fails to comply.
Issues: Whether the impugned order was liable to be set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration on the petitioner producing invoice-wise particulars to show that the transactions were below the e-way bill threshold.
Analysis: The dispute turned on the petitioner's contention that the consolidated demand covered multiple invoice bills and that, if the invoices were broken up, the transactions would fall within the exemption limit for e-way bills. The respondents' stand was that the proceedings could have been dropped had the supporting invoices been produced, but no such documents had been placed before the authority. In these circumstances, the existing order was found unsustainable and further consideration by the authority, after production of the invoices and hearing the petitioner, was warranted.
Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the petitioner was directed to produce the invoices and raise the relevant issues before the second respondent, who was required to afford an opportunity of hearing and pass a fresh order.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, with the assessment proceedings sent back for reconsideration after the petitioner's supporting documents are produced and heard.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the liability depends on invoice-wise verification and the assessee is afforded an opportunity to substantiate the claim, an order made without such consideration may be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh decision after hearing.
E-way bill exemption for consignments below prescribed value - production of invoices for verification - setting aside of impugned order and remand for fresh consideration - opportunity of hearing and reasoned order
E-way bill exemption for consignments below prescribed value - production of invoices for verification - opportunity of hearing and reasoned order - Impugned order set aside and matter remanded for production and verification of invoices to determine applicability of e-way bill exemption - HELD THAT: - The petitioner contended that the consolidated amount in the show cause notice comprised multiple invoice bills, each below Rs. 1,00,000, which would attract exemption from e-way bill requirements if examined invoice-wise. The respondents stated that no invoices had been produced to substantiate this. The High Court set aside the impugned order and directed the petitioner to produce the invoices and to raise any issues regarding the inward invoices before the second respondent by the specified date. On receipt of the invoices, the second respondent is to afford the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and pass reasoned orders within two weeks thereafter. The Court did not decide the substantive question whether the invoices are indeed below the threshold or whether the exemption applies; instead, it remanded the matter for verification and fresh adjudication on the material to be produced by the petitioner. [Paras 3]
Impugned order dated 09.07.2024 set aside; petitioner directed to produce invoices and raise issues before the second respondent by 24.01.2025, who shall hear the petitioner and pass orders within two weeks of receipt.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed by setting aside the impugned order and remanding the matter to the second respondent for verification of invoices, hearing, and fresh decision within the prescribed timelines; no order as to costs.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Violation of Principles of Natural Justice
Issue 2: Adequate Notification and Fair Opportunity
Issue 3: Appropriate Remedies
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Violation of principles of natural justice - petitioner was adequately notified of the proceedings and given a fair opportunity to respond or not - petitioner is ready and willing to pay 10% of the disputed tax and that he may be granted one final opportunity before the adjudicating authority to put forth their objections to the proposal, to which the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent does not have any serious objection.
HELD THAT:- The petitioner shall deposit 10% of the disputed taxes as admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order - The impugned order dated 28.08.2024 is set aside - petition disposed off.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Methodology of NAA and DGAP
Relevant legal framework and precedents:
The relevant legal framework involves the assessment of profiteering under the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime. The precedent considered is the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of "Reckitt Benckiser India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India" and related matters, which addressed the methodology used by NAA and DGAP.
Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The court agreed with the Delhi High Court's finding that the methodology used by NAA and DGAP was flawed. The methodology was based on comparing the ratio of Input Tax Credit (ITC) to turnover before and after the implementation of GST. The court noted that this approach did not account for the non-uniform nature of expenses and ITC accrual in real estate projects.
Key evidence and findings:
The court relied on the findings of the Delhi High Court, which highlighted the lack of a direct correlation between turnover and ITC in the real estate sector. The court found that the methodology did not consider the varying nature of construction activities and their impact on ITC accrual.
Application of law to facts:
The court applied the legal principles established by the Delhi High Court to the facts of the current cases, concluding that the methodology used by NAA and DGAP was inappropriate for determining profiteering in the real estate industry.
Treatment of competing arguments:
The court acknowledged the arguments of the petitioners, who contended that the methodology failed to accurately reflect the benefits of GST to flat buyers. The court agreed with the petitioners' suggestion that a project-specific calculation of savings and benefits should be used instead.
Conclusions:
The court concluded that the methodology adopted by NAA and DGAP was flawed and that the matters should be remanded to the Competition Commission of India for reconsideration in line with the Delhi High Court's decision.
Issue 2: Remanding the Cases
Relevant legal framework and precedents:
The legal framework involves the powers of the court to quash orders and remand cases for reconsideration. The precedent is the Delhi High Court's decision, which remanded similar matters to the Competition Commission of India.
Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The court found that the Delhi High Court's decision was directly applicable to the present cases. The court reasoned that remanding the cases would allow for a reconsideration of the methodology in line with the correct legal principles.
Key evidence and findings:
The key finding was the Delhi High Court's determination that the NAA's methodology was flawed and required reconsideration.
Application of law to facts:
The court applied the legal principles from the Delhi High Court's decision to the facts of the current cases, finding that remanding the cases was necessary for a fair determination.
Treatment of competing arguments:
The court considered the joint submission by the parties to remand the cases, indicating agreement on this course of action.
Conclusions:
The court concluded that the cases should be remanded to the Competition Commission of India for adjudication in accordance with the Delhi High Court's decision.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning:
The court quoted the Delhi High Court's reasoning: "This Court is in agreement with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners representing the real estate companies that the methodology adopted by NAA is flawed as in the real estate sector, there is no direct correlation between the turnover and the Input Tax Credit availed for a particular period."
Core principles established:
Final determinations on each issue:
Methodology adopted by the National Anti-Profiteering Authority (NAA) and the Director General of Anti Profiteering (DGAP) to determine profiteering in the real estate industry - HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Reckitt Benckiser India Pvt. Ltd. [2024 (1) TMI 1248 - DELHI HIGH COURT] has held 'As it is an admitted position that neither the advances received nor the construction activity is uniform throughout the life cycle of the project, the accrual of Input Tax Credit is not related to the amount collected from the buyers. This Court is in agreement with learned counsel of the petitioners that one needs to calculate the total savings on account of introduction of Goods and Services and Tax for each project and then divide the same by total area to arrive at the per square feet benefit to be passed on to each flat buyer. This would ensure that flat-buyers with equal square feet area received equal benefit.'
The impugned orders passed by the National Anti-profiteering Authority are quashed and set aside, so as to enable the Competition Commission of India to pass appropriate order in accordance with law.
Petitions are accordingly disposed off.
Issues: Whether the assessment order deserved to be set aside for want of proper service and opportunity, and whether the matter should be remanded on payment of part of the disputed tax.
Analysis: The petitioner complained that the show cause notice and the assessment order were uploaded on the GST portal and were not otherwise served, resulting in non-participation in the adjudication. The respondent did not seriously oppose a further opportunity. The Court accepted the grievance of denial of opportunity and considered it appropriate to restore the matter for fresh adjudication, while directing deposit of 10% of the disputed tax as a condition for reopening the proceedings.
Conclusion: The assessment order was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration upon compliance with the stipulated deposit and filing of objections; failing such compliance, the assessment order would stand restored.
Violation of principles of natural justice - service of show cause notice and order by uploading on portal insufficient for adjudicatory notice - remand for fresh adjudication subject to protective deposit - treating assessment order as show cause notice for filing objections - restoration of assessment order on non-compliance with conditional directions
Violation of principles of natural justice - service of show cause notice and order by uploading on portal insufficient for adjudicatory notice - Impugned assessment order was vitiated for want of effective service and denial of opportunity to be heard. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that although statutory intimations and hearing dates were uploaded on the GST portal, neither the show cause notices nor the impugned order of assessment were served on the petitioner by tender or RPAD, and the petitioner remained unaware of the proceedings and could not participate in adjudication. On this basis the impugned order, which confirmed the proposal in absence of the petitioner, was set aside as made in violation of the principles of natural justice. The matter was remitted to the adjudicating authority to afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. [Paras 6]
Impugned order set aside and matter remitted for fresh consideration after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
Remand for fresh adjudication subject to protective deposit - treating assessment order as show cause notice for filing objections - restoration of assessment order on non-compliance with conditional directions - Procedure and conditions for remand: deposit, mode of treating order, timelines for filing objections and consequence of non-compliance. - HELD THAT: - The Court directed that the petitioner shall deposit 10% of the disputed tax within four weeks of receipt of the order; upon compliance the impugned assessment order shall be treated as a show cause notice and the petitioner given four weeks to submit objections with supporting material. The respondent is to consider any objections filed and pass orders in accordance with law after affording a reasonable hearing. The Court further directed that if the deposit is not made or objections are not filed within the stipulated periods, the impugned assessment order shall stand restored. [Paras 6]
Remand subject to deposit of 10% within four weeks; order to be treated as show cause notice for filing objections within four weeks; assessment restored on failure to comply.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed by setting aside the impugned assessment order for non-service and denial of hearing; matter remitted for fresh adjudication subject to the petitioner depositing 10% of disputed tax and following the stipulated procedure and timelines, failing which the assessment order is to be restored.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Legality and Jurisdiction of the Respondent's Order
Issue 2: Entitlement to Input Tax Credit
Issue 3: Remand for Reconsideration
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Input tax credit - order is ex-facie illegal and without jurisdiction under the provisions of the CGST Act - violation of Section 16 (4) of CGST Act - HELD THAT:- Considering the amendment in CGST Act by insertion of Section 16 (5) of the Act, the alleged default committed by the petitioners of not complying with Section 16 (4) of the Act would now no longer exists subject to verification of the facts by the Adjudicating Authority.
In view of such subsequent development which has taken place after passing the impugned order by the respondent authority, the matter is required to be remanded back to the Adjudicating Authority to pass a fresh denovo order considering the provisions of Section 16 (5) which has come into operation w.e.f. 01.07.2017.
Petition allowed by way of remand.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Liability to Pay Interest
Issue 2: Imposition of Penalty
Issue 3: Nature of Transitional Cenvat Credit
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Interest under Section 50(3) of the CGST Act for wrongly availing and utilizing Cenvat Credit - imposition of penalty under Section 122(2)(b) read with Section 74(1) of the CGST Act - transitional Cenvat Credit qualifies as "input tax credit" under the CGST Act or not.
Levy of interest under Section 50(3) of the CGST Act for wrongly availing and utilizing Cenvat Credit - HELD THAT:- On perusal of the impugned orders passed by the respondent authorities, it appears that the petitioner has made a claim to carry forward excess Cenvat Credit in Form GST TRAN-I under a bona fide belief.
The interest can be levied under section 50 (3) of the CGST Act which has been substituted by the Finance Act, 2022 with effect from 01.07.2017 where the input tax credit has been wrongly availed and utilized. The definition of “input tax credit” as per section 2 (63) means the credit of input tax whereas “input tax” has been defined in section 2 (62) of the Act in relation to a registered person means the Central tax, State tax, integrated tax or Union territory tax charged on any supply of goods or services or both made to him and includes the tax payable under the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 9 of the CGST Act and SGST Act and sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 7 of the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act. Thus, on a first blush, it appears it is not an input tax and therefore, not an input tax credit. However, the provisions of section 140 of the CGST Act, stipulates transitional arrangement for input tax credit - the credit available as per the existing law in form of Cenvat credit or any other input tax credit, would fall within the scope of “input tax credit” under the CGST Act also. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the petitioner was liable to pay interest as computed under the provisions of section 50 (3) for wrongly availing Cenvat credit and the petitioner has rightly deposited such amount after the impugned order was passed.
Imposition of penalty under Section 122(2)(b) read with Section 74(1) of the CGST Act - absence of fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression of facts - HELD THAT:- The petitioner was under bona fide belief that amount of Cenvat credit to the extent of Rs. 99,46,810/- was available to be carried forward. Out of the said amount when verification was made by the respondent authority, the petitioner accepted that Cenvat credit to the extent of Rs. 27,78,825/- could not have been carried forwarded and therefore, the provisions of section 122 (1) (b) read with section 74 (1) could not have been invoked by the adjudicating authority, more particularly, when the petitioner has not challenged the confirmation of demand of the excess ITC claimed in Form TRAN-I.
Reliance placed by the appellate authority on the decision in case of Union of India v. Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills [2009 (5) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT] discussing the imposition of penalty under section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which is stated to be pari-materia provision for levy of imposition of penalty under the GST Act is not applicable in the facts of the case as there was no conscious or deliberate wrong doing on part of the petitioner and as such, the order passed by the adjudicating authority confirming the disallowance of claim of the petitioner of transitional Cenvat Credit of Rs. 27,78,825/- out of transitional Cenvat credit of Rs. 99,46,810/- cannot be said to be claim made for a reason on account of fraud or any suppression of fact to evade tax.
The findings arrived at by both the authorities that the petitioner deliberately misstated the facts in TRAN-I so as to utilise Cenvat credit in its payment of output GST liability which was found during the verification of TRAN-I cannot be the basis for imposition of penalty as it cannot be said that there was any intention on part of the petitioner which is a Government company to evade tax.
Conclusion - Transitional Cenvat Credit, once carried forward, is treated as input tax credit under the CGST Act, attracting interest if wrongly availed and utilized, but penalties require evidence of fraudulent intent. The levy of interest upheld but the penalty imposed on the petitioner is quashed, recognizing the absence of fraudulent intent.
Petition allowed in part.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment from the Allahabad High Court primarily addresses the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Denial of Fair Opportunity Due to Non-Receipt of Show Cause Notice
Issue 2: Rejection of Appeal Due to Lack of Knowledge of the Order
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of adhering to procedural mandates to ensure fairness and justice in tax liability cases under the GST framework. The court's directions aim to rectify procedural oversights and provide the petitioner a fair opportunity to contest the tax liability.
Violation of principles of natural justice - petitioner was denied opportunity to put up its defence - absence of service of notice/ the show cause notice - Remedy of appeal having been denied on the ground of delay that was for want of knowledge - HELD THAT:- The court is of the considered view that statutes provide procedure either in their substantive provisions, or under the rules framed thereunder, to ensure that orders are not passed by the authorities whimsically, more especially where the authorities exercise power which is quasi judicial in nature or akin to that. The legal position is well settled on the point that when a thing is required to be done in a particular manner then the same shall have to be done in that manner alone. In the case of SHARIF-UD-DIN VERSUS ABDUL GANI LONE [1979 (11) TMI 225 - SUPREME COURT], it was held that "whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow."
As and when mandatory requirement of law is not taken care of in the matter of compliance of procedure before taking decision by assessing authority or any competent authority for that matter, then it becomes inherent defect in the decision making process which cannot be cured at a later stage. If in a decision making procedure adopted by the authority is de hors the provisions of the act or rules framed thereunder, it is liable to be rendered as flawed one. A division bench in the case of M/S SKYLINE AUTOMATION INDUSTRIES VERSUS STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER [2023 (1) TMI 379 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] has dealt with this principle of law to hold that "any subsequent reminder will not cure inherent defect in proceedings initiated against the petitioner."
The procedural requirements are mandatory, and failure to comply invalidates subsequent actions. It also established that a fair opportunity must be provided to all parties, and appeal timelines should consider actual knowledge of orders.
The order passed by the assessing officer dated 11.12.2023 shall be taken to be notice within the meaning of Section 73 of the GST Act, 2017 to enable the petitioner to file his objections and place his documents before assessing officer/competent authority for its consideration.
Petition disposed off.
Issues: Whether the impugned order reversing input tax credit could stand when the same supplies were stated to have been covered by an earlier proceeding for the same period in which the proposal had been dropped.
Analysis: The petitioner asserted that two assessment proceedings for the same tax period overlapped and that the amount reversed in the impugned order related to the very same supplies covered by the earlier dropped proceedings. The respondent did not dispute the possibility of overlap, but sought verification whether the supplies in both proceedings were in fact identical. In view of the apparent overlap and the need for such verification before further action, the impugned order was set aside with liberty to the authority to issue a fresh notice and proceed only after examining whether the supplies were one and the same.
Conclusion: The impugned order could not be sustained in its present form and was set aside in favour of the petitioner, with liberty reserved to the authority to proceed afresh in accordance with law.
Double assessment - input tax credit reversal - overlap of assessment proceedings - remand for verification - liberty to issue fresh notice and proceed in accordance with law
Double assessment - input tax credit reversal - overlap of assessment proceedings - remand for verification - Impugned order dated 18.07.2024 set aside and matter remanded for verification whether the supplies on which Input Tax Credit was rejected are identical to those in the earlier proceeding where the proposal for reversal was dropped. - HELD THAT: - Petitioner contended that two assessment proceedings for the period 2019-20 ran concurrently and that the amount confirmed for reversal of Input Tax Credit in the impugned order related to the same supplies in respect of which the earlier proceeding had dropped the reversal proposal. The respondent acknowledged a possible overlap and the need to verify whether the supplies covered by the two orders are one and the same. In view of this unresolved factual overlap, the court set aside the impugned order dated 18.07.2024 and granted the respondent authority liberty to issue a fresh notice to examine whether the supplies in the order dated 21.08.2024 and those in the impugned order dated 18.07.2024 are identical, and thereafter to proceed, if warranted, in accordance with law.
Impugned order dated 18.07.2024 is set aside; matter remanded to respondent to verify identity of supplies and, after issuing fresh notice if necessary, proceed in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed of by setting aside the impugned order dated 18.07.2024 and remanding the matter for verification of overlapping assessment proceedings, with liberty to the tax authority to issue a fresh notice and proceed in accordance with law; no costs.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Violation of Principles of Natural Justice
Relevant legal framework and precedents:
The relevant legal framework is Section 144B(6)(vii) and (viii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which provides that if a request for a personal hearing is made, the income tax authority must allow such a hearing through video conferencing. The Petitioner also relied on a precedent from the Co-ordinate Bench of the Bombay High Court in a similar matter.
Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The court interpreted Section 144B(6)(vii) and (viii) to mean that once a request for a personal hearing is received, it is mandatory for the income tax authority to grant such a hearing. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the principles of natural justice, which include the right to be heard.
Key evidence and findings:
The Petitioner provided evidence of having requested a personal hearing through digital communication and reiterated this request in subsequent written communications. The Respondents' affidavit did not firmly deny the receipt of such requests but suggested a possible technical issue in executing the request.
Application of law to facts:
The court applied the provisions of Section 144B(6)(vii) and (viii) to the facts, finding that the Petitioner had indeed requested a personal hearing, which was not granted. This constituted a breach of the statutory provisions and a violation of the principles of natural justice.
Treatment of competing arguments:
The Respondents argued that no request for a personal hearing was received, citing a technical issue. However, the court found this argument vague and unsupported by concrete evidence, particularly when contrasted with the documentary evidence provided by the Petitioner.
Conclusions:
The court concluded that the assessment order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice due to the denial of a personal hearing, which was requested by the Petitioner. Consequently, the assessment order and any consequential notices were set aside.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning:
"Since, in this case, we are satisfied that the Petitioner requested a personal hearing and admittedly, no such personal hearing was granted to the Petitioner, we set aside the impugned assessment order on the grounds of violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play on the ground of breach of Section 144B(6) (vii) and (viii) of the Act, which provisions incorporate the principles of natural justice and fair play."
Core principles established:
Final determinations on each issue:
Validity of assessment order - non granting a personal hearing, even though such a hearing was specifically requested - HELD THAT:- It is clear that where a request for personal hearing has been received, the income tax authority of the relevant unit shall allow such a hearing through the National Faceless Assessment Centre, which shall be conducted exclusively through video conferencing or video telephony, including use of any telecommunication application software which supports video conferencing or video telephony, to the extent technologically feasible, in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Board.
Since, in this case, we are satisfied that the Petitioner requested a personal hearing and admittedly, no such personal hearing was granted to the Petitioner, we set aside the impugned assessment order on the grounds of violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play on the ground of breach of Section 144B(6) (vii) and (viii) of the Act, which provisions incorporate the principles of natural justice and fair play. The consequential demand notice/penalty notice issued based on the impugned assessment order will also not survive and are set aside.
We remand the matter for fresh consideration and disposal of the show cause notice issued to the Petitioner after granting the Petitioner an opportunity for a personal hearing in terms of the above-referenced statutory provisions.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions presented and considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification of Tribunal's decision to set aside NFAC's order
Issue 2: Tribunal's direction to Assessing Officer regarding Form 10IC
Issue 3: Allowing tax computation under Section 115BAA without Form 10IC
Issue 4: Reliance on High Court decisions in other cases
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Filing of Form 10IC - condonation of delay in filing - mandatory vs directory nature of statutory filing - opting for taxation under Section 115BAA - inadvertent procedural error - restoration for fresh consideration
Filing of Form 10IC - mandatory vs directory nature of statutory filing - opting for taxation under Section 115BAA - inadvertent procedural error - Assessee to be permitted to file Form 10IC and claim benefit under Section 115BAA in the peculiar facts of the case where the form was not filed within the extended period. - HELD THAT: - The court examined whether filing Form 10IC was a mandatory statutory prerequisite or a directory/formality in the facts before it. It noted as admitted that the return was filed within the due date and that the assessee had indicated its option for taxation under Section 115BAA in the ITR-6, demonstrating intent to avail the concessional regime. The court observed the CBDT Circular No. 6 of 2022 condoning delay subject to specified conditions but found the Circular silent on whether conditions must be cumulatively satisfied. Having regard to the peculiar facts, including difficulties arising from the pandemic and portal-related uploading issues, the court treated the omission as an inadvertent procedural error and, declining to interfere with the Tribunal's factual appraisal, upheld the Tribunal's grant of leave to file the Form 10IC. The court did not pronounce a universal rule beyond the case's facts and expressly left substantial questions of law open. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 11]
Tribunal's order permitting filing of Form 10IC is upheld; omission treated as inadvertent procedural error and, on the facts, not a ground for denial of benefit.
Condonation of delay in filing - restoration for fresh consideration - Matter restored to the Assessing Officer to permit filing of Form 10IC and to consider entitlement to relief subject to legal conditions. - HELD THAT: - The court directed restoration of the file to the Assessing Officer, leaving it to the Assessing Officer to consider the Form 10IC and determine what relief, if any, the assessee would be entitled to, subject to fulfillment of all other legal conditions. The Tribunal's order to remit for fresh consideration was therefore sustained; the court refrained from adjudicating the ultimate entitlement on merits and confined itself to authorising the procedural opportunity to file and seek consideration. [Paras 9, 10]
File restored to Assessing Officer for consideration of Form 10IC and for determination of relief if statutory conditions are fulfilled; substantive questions left open.
Final Conclusion: Appeal dismissed; Tribunal's order permitting the assessee to file Form 10IC is upheld and the matter is remitted to the Assessing Officer to consider the form and grant relief, if any, subject to applicable legal conditions; substantial questions of law left open.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment addresses the following core legal questions:
1. Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was justified in estimating the addition for bogus purchases at 6% instead of the 100% disallowance made by the Assessing Officer (AO), given that the purchases were deemed sham transactions involving accommodation entriesRs.
2. Whether the ITAT's decision to estimate the addition at 6% of disputed purchases was appropriate, considering the precedent set in the case of Mayank Diamonds Private Ltd, where the High Court directed an addition of 5% of the total turnoverRs.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification of 6% Addition for Bogus Purchases
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:
The case revolves around Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which deals with appeals to the High Court. The AO initially disallowed 100% of the purchases, considering them bogus based on information from the Investigation Wing about the Rajendra Jain Group's involvement in providing accommodation entries. The ITAT reduced this disallowance to 6% based on precedents and its assessment of the facts.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The court considered the ITAT's reliance on the decision in the case of Pankaj K. Choudhary, where it was held that a 6% addition for bogus purchases was fair and reasonable. The ITAT found that the AO had credible new information and had applied his mind to conclude that the purchases were non-genuine, thus justifying the reopening of the assessment under sections 147 and 148 of the Act.
Key Evidence and Findings:
The AO's conclusion was based on information from the Investigation Wing, which indicated that the Rajendra Jain Group was involved in issuing non-genuine purchase bills. The ITAT considered the evidence and found that the AO had failed to consider the evidence furnished by the assessee adequately.
Application of Law to Facts:
The ITAT applied the principle that tax authorities should not tax the entire transaction but only the income component to prevent revenue leakage. The decision to restrict the disallowance to 6% was based on the overall facts and circumstances, including the gross profit rates and the nature of the transactions.
Treatment of Competing Arguments:
The ITAT balanced the AO's assertion of 100% disallowance with the assessee's evidence and arguments, ultimately finding a middle ground by applying a 6% disallowance to avoid potential revenue leakage.
Conclusions:
The court upheld the ITAT's decision, finding no substantial question of law arising from the appeal. The decision to apply a 6% disallowance was deemed reasonable and justified based on the evidence and precedents.
Issue 2: Consistency with Mayank Diamonds Precedent
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:
The decision in Mayank Diamonds Private Ltd was a key precedent, where the court directed an addition of 5% of the total turnover for similar bogus purchase cases. The ITAT considered this precedent in its decision-making process.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The court noted that the ITAT had considered the Mayank Diamonds case but found that the facts and circumstances of the present case justified a 6% addition. The ITAT's decision was based on a detailed analysis of the assessee's gross profit rates and the nature of the transactions.
Key Evidence and Findings:
The ITAT considered the gross profit rates and the nature of the transactions, concluding that a 6% disallowance was appropriate given the specific facts of the case, including the lower gross profit rate compared to Mayank Diamonds.
Application of Law to Facts:
The ITAT applied the principle of preventing revenue leakage by taxing only the income component of disputed transactions. The decision to apply a 6% disallowance was based on the specific facts, including the gross profit rate and the nature of the transactions.
Treatment of Competing Arguments:
The ITAT considered the precedent set by Mayank Diamonds but found that the specific facts of the case warranted a different approach. The decision was based on a detailed analysis of the evidence and arguments presented.
Conclusions:
The court upheld the ITAT's decision, finding that the application of a 6% disallowance was reasonable and justified based on the specific facts of the case, despite the precedent set in Mayank Diamonds.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning:
The court noted, "The requirements of section 147 r.w.s. 148 have clearly been met; and the reopening is held justified and legal. Therefore, we dismiss the ground raised by the assessee challenging the validity of reassessment."
Core Principles Established:
The judgment reinforces the principle that tax authorities should focus on the income component of transactions to prevent revenue leakage and that the application of disallowances should be based on a detailed analysis of the specific facts and circumstances of each case.
Final Determinations on Each Issue:
The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the ITAT's decision to apply a 6% disallowance for bogus purchases. It found no substantial question of law arising from the appeal and concluded that the ITAT's decision was reasonable and justified based on the evidence and precedents.
Estimation of income - bogus purchases - Tribunal justification estimating the addition in respect of bogus purchases @ 6% - HELD THAT:- When the Tribunal has thought it fit to reduce the disallowance at 6% from 12.5%, the Tribunal had before it the facts which were duly analysed by it. No interference is called for in the said conclusion and findings of the Tribunal in the present appeal by this court. See Pankaj K. Choudhary case [2023 (3) TMI 1402 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] No substantial questions of law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment presented involves several core legal questions concerning the applicability of Section 80P of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The issues considered by the Gujarat High Court in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Justification of ITAT's Decision to Quash PCIT's Order
Issue (ii): Ignoring Supreme Court's Decision in Totgars Cooperative Sale Society Ltd.
Issue (iii): Quashing of Revision Proceedings under Section 263
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the Gujarat High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, affirming that the AO's order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The court found that the interest income earned from a cooperative bank qualifies for deduction under Section 80P (2) (d), consistent with established precedents. The judgment reinforces the interpretation that cooperative banks are considered cooperative societies for the purpose of Section 80P deductions.
Revision u/s 263 - deduction claimed by the assessee u/s 80P (2) (d) which was earned by the assessee in the form of interest from the Surat District Cooperative bank Ltd and hence was not allowable as the activities were not associated with the members of the society - HELD THAT:- Issue involved in this appeal is already decided by this Court in favourof the assesee in case of Ashwinkumar Arban Cooperative Society Limited. [2024 (11) TMI 971 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] held that the provisions of section 80P (2) (d) would be applicable in the facts of the case and the PCIT was not justified in invoking revisional powers under section 263 of the Act which is rightly reversed by the Tribunal holding that the cooperative bank is a cooperative society registered under the Gujarat State Cooperative Societies Act and in view of the various decisions of the Court, the Tribunal after following the same has come to the conclusion that the assessment was not erroneous allowing deduction of section 80P (2) (d) of the Act which is in consonance with the various decisions of the Court as a twin condition invoking section 263 as to the assessment being erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue are not being fulfilled. - Decided in favour of assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment revolves around the following core legal issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification for Reopening the Assessment
Issue 2: Procedural Compliance for Reopening
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Validity of reopening of assessment - "reason to believe” that any "income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment" - Independent application of mind or borrowed satisfaction - profits under the head of “future and options” to be treated as “derivatives” - reopening has been resorted to on the basis of information received under “Project Falcon” from DGIT(Investigation), Mumbai in March, 2021 through Insight Portal regarding coordinated and premeditated trading by brokers on behalf of their clients on the Bombay Stock Exchange by engaging in reversal trades in illiquid stock options resulting in non-genuine business loss/gains to the beneficiary
HELD THAT:- It cannot be held that the department was justified in reopening the assessment for Assessment Year 2015-16, which, we may add, has been done mechanically without application of mind, in the absence of any tangible material.
As appears from the reasons recorded that no verification of the material on record is made by the respondent and there is no independent opinion that any income has escaped assessment due to any failure on the part of the assessee in not disclosing fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment.
From the reasons recorded it appears that the initiation of reopening proceedings are on borrowed satisfaction as no independent opinion is formed and on bare perusal of the reasons recorded, it emerges that the AO considering the information received from the insight portal, has issued the impugned notice forming his reason to believe that the income has escaped the assessment on the presumption that the petitioner has been involved in creating the non-genuine profit which is already reflected in the return of income which is accepted in the regular course of assessment by passing the order u/s 143 (3) of the Act.
There is no basis to form reasonable belief for escapement of income except the information made available on the insight portal. AO has not considered the material on record to come to the conclusion that there is failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose truly and fully all material facts to have reason to believe for escapement of income.
Therefore, on the basis of the information received from another agency on insight portal or from the SEBI report, there cannot be any reassessment proceedings unless the respondent, after considering such information/material received from other sources, consider the same with the material on record in the case of the petitioner assessee and thereafter, is required to form independent opinion, that income has escaped assessment.
Without forming such opinion, solely and mechanically relying upon the information received from the other sources, AO could not have assumed the jurisdiction to reopen the assessment based on such information. See Harikishan Sunderlal Virmani [2016 (12) TMI 1558 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT]
Thus AO could not have assumed the jurisdiction merely and solely relying upon the information made available on the insight portal without forming any independent opinion on the basis of the material on record vis-a-vis the petitioner is concerned.
petitioner had disclosed in its return for the Assessment Year 2015-16 the particulars of the profits under the head of “future and options” which was subsequently accepted by the Department. Therefore, the notice for re-opening the assessment under the head of “derivatives” is based on change of opinion. The assessee cannot be said to have failed to have fully and truly disclosed all materials facts which would warrant the re-opening after a period of four years, anyways - Decided in favour of assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions presented and considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity and Jurisdiction of the Notice under Section 148
Issue 2: Legality of Re-assessment on the Same Set of Facts
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the court allowed the petition, quashing the Notice dated 30.03.2021 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, as it was based on the same facts as a previous notice without any new material, thus lacking jurisdiction. The ruling reinforces the principle that reassessment must be grounded in new information or material facts. No order as to costs was made.
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - reasons to believe - HELD THAT:- As the impugned Notice u/s. 148 of the Act has been issued on the same set of facts, which was the basis of the Notice for re-opening issued in the year 2018, the impugned Notice is without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed and set aside. Decided in favour of assessee.
Issues: Whether penalty for non-compliance with notices under section 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was leviable under section 271(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 when the assessee showed reasonable cause for the default.
Analysis: The assessee had participated in the original assessment, the reassessment proceedings arose after revision under section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the notices under section 142(1) were issued during the Covid period. The Tribunal accepted that the assessee was posted in a far-off place with inadequate telephone and internet connectivity and that these circumstances constituted reasonable cause. It also relied on section 273B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which bars penalty where reasonable cause is proved. On that basis, the Tribunal found the levy of penalty unsustainable.
Conclusion: Penalty under section 271(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not justified and was directed to be cancelled.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee proves reasonable cause for non-compliance, section 273B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 protects against penalty under section 271(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Penalty levied u/sec. 271(1)(b) - assessee could not respond to the statutory notice issued by the CIT(A) - Whether there was a "reasonable cause" for the assessee's non-compliance with the statutory notices, thereby warranting relief under Section 273B? - AO in the order passed u/sec.144 r.w.s.264 determined the income
HELD THAT:- As admitted fact that the two statutory notices u/sec.142(1) were issued by the AO which were during the Covid period, for which, the assessee has a ‘reasonable cause’ for not appearing before the AO.
We find due to non submission to the statutory notice issued by the CIT(A), he passed an ex-parte order sustaining the addition made by the AO. It is the submission of Assessee that adequate opportunity of hearing was not granted by the CIT(A) and since the e- portal was not functioning, therefore, the assessee could not respond to the statutory notice issued by the CIT(A).
It is also the submission of Assessee that the assessee, who worked as a Major General in Indian Army, is no more and is being represented by his wife Mrs. Balbir Kaur Birdie and the penalty so levied by the AO and confirmed by the Ld. CIT(A) should be deleted.
We find some force in the above arguments of the Learned Counsel for the Assessee. It is an admitted fact that Mr. Sandeep Singh Birdie was a Major General in the Indian Army serving for 34 years.
As admitted fact that the assessee has participated in the original assessment proceedings and the AO has passed the order u/sec.143(3). It is also an admitted fact the order u/sec.144 r.w.s.264 of the Act was passed assessing the same income which was determined by the Assessing Officer in the order passed u/sec.143(3) of the Act. Since the two statutory notices u/sec.142(1) were issued during the Covid period and since the assessee was posted in a far-off place and such area was not having proper telephone and internet facility, therefore, under these circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that there was a ‘reasonable cause’ on the part of the assessee for such non-compliance to the statutory notices issued by the AO. Levy of penalty u/sec.271(1)(b) of the Act is not justified. Appeal of the Assessee is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment addresses several core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Penalty Proceedings under Section 270A
Issue 2: Sustainability of Penalty Order due to Procedural Lapses
Issue 3: Entitlement to Immunity under Section 270AA
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Penalty u/s 270A - misreporting of income - assessee evidently did not file Form No. 68 but had requested for immunity from imposition of penalty on plain paper -HELD THAT:- Since the required Form No. 68 was not filed before the Ld. AO, the Ld. CIT(A) confirmed the penalty imposed by the Ld. AO - CIT(A) has not appreciated the fact that the assessee had substantively complied with the conditions specified u/s 270AA, not contested the assessment order further and had paid the tax.
CIT(A) has not considered the fact whether for mere non-filing of Form No. 68 but otherwise making the application on a plain paper for waiver of penalty and fulfilling the substantive conditions, the immunity provided u/s 270AA could be denied to the assessee or not when filing of a Form is only a procedural requirement.
higher amount of penalty for mis-reporting of income is specified as per the provisions of sub-section (9) of section 270A and the Ld. AO has not specified under which clause from (a) to (f) the assessee’s case fell so as to impose the penalty for misreporting of income. At the most, the case was a case of under reporting of income in the first place. Sub-section (6) of section 270A also excludes cases of under-reported income where the assessee’s explanation is found to be bona fide. Since the Ld. CIT(A) has gone by the procedural requirement while the assessee had duly complied with the substantive requirement, and neither in the order of the Ld. AO nor in the order of the Ld. CIT(A) a case of mis-reporting of income has been made out and higher amount of penalty has been imposed, hence, in the interest of justice if the order of the Ld. CIT(A) is set aside and the issue is remitted back to the file of Ld. CIT(A) to decide whether filing of Form 68 could be dispensed with and immunity could be granted when the assessee had paid the taxes, not further contested the order of the Ld. AO and had applied for immunity from imposing of penalty on plain paper.
Order to pass a speaking order as to whether it is a case of mis-reporting of income and which of the clauses of section 270A(9) of the Act, if any is attracted for arriving at his decision. The assessee shall file all necessary evidence before the Ld. CIT(A) for the relief claimed and shall not seek unnecessary adjournments. Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to TDS and Advance Tax Credit
Issue 2: Infructuous Appeal Against Assessment Order
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Non granting the TDS credit and Advance Tax pertaining to the amalgamating company as per the order passed by the Faceless Assessment Centre u/s 143(3) r/w Section 143(3A) and 143(3B) - maintainability of appeal against the assessment order u/s 143(3) - HELD THAT:- Since the income of the amalgamating company had been included in the income of the amalgamated company as per the provisions of Section 199(1) r.w.s.198 the credit for the TDS made in respect of the income of the amalgamating company which was shown in the hands of the amalgamated company ought to have been allowed to the amalgamated company.
Since the amalgamating company is no longer in existence and all the assets and liabilities by virtue of the order of the NCLT were taken over by the amalgamated company, even the credit for TDS and advance tax had to be allowed to the amalgamated company. The assessee was claiming only a credit for the tax paid and neither in the intimation u/s 143(1) of the Act nor in the assessment order u/s 143(3) of the Act any addition was made and only the credit for TDS and advance tax was being made, therefore, the same ought to have been allowed in the hands of the person in whose case the income of the earlier entity was finally assessed.
Hence, the grounds of appeal in respect of credit for TDS and Advance Tax are allowed pertaining to the amalgamating company while assessing/computing the income u/s 143(3) read with Section 143(3A) and 143(3B) of the Act in the case of the amalgamated company. Hence, Ground nos. 1, 7, 8 & 9 are allowed.
Validity of order u/s 143(3) being infructuous as the cause of action had arisen in the intimation u/s 143(1) - As a finding has been given that the credit of taxes paid has to be allowed in the case of the amalgamated company, hence these grounds of appeal are also allowed and since no variation to the income computation was made in the order u/s 143(3) and the demand arisen on account of intimation u/s 143(1) had been subsumed in the demand raised vide order u/s 143(3), the Ld. CIT(A) ought to have decided the appeal relating to the claim of credit for taxes paid. Hence, all these grounds of appeal are also allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment addresses several core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of CIT(A) Order and Unlawful Search
Issue 2: Violation of Statutory Conditions under Section 153A
Issue 3: Additions Without Incriminating Material
Issue 4: Violation of Section 153D
Issue 5: Justification of Gross Profit Additions
Issue 6: Double Taxation of Income
Issue 7: Reliance on Third-Party Statements
Issue 8: Assessment Based on Conjectures
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Addition based on estimated gross profit applied to total turnover despite no specific defect being pointed out in books - double taxation by making gross profit addition already reflected in declared profits - rejection of books of account under section 145(3) without pointing out specific defects - reliance on coordinate-bench precedent - reliance on third-party statements without opportunity for cross-examination
Addition based on estimated gross profit applied to total turnover despite no specific defect being pointed out in books - rejection of books of account under section 145(3) without pointing out specific defects - Validity of the additions made by the Assessing Officer by applying a gross profit rate to total turnover where no specific defect in books of account was pointed out - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the AO's approach of rejecting the assessee's books under section 145(3) and then making an addition by applying the gross profit rate disclosed in the books to the total turnover. The Tribunal observed that the AO did not point out any specific defect in the books of account before proceeding to make the impugned addition and that the AO's reasoning was internally inconsistent where he treated the underlying sales/purchases as bogus but still applied the declared gross profit rate to arrive at an addition. The Tribunal relied on Coordinate Bench decisions dealing with identical facts in which similar additions were quashed because the AO had not justified either the rejection of books or the basis for estimating additional gross profit. Applying those precedents to the present appeals and finding no change in facts or circumstances, the Tribunal held that the additions failed to meet legal scrutiny and were liable to be set aside. [Paras 3, 5, 6]
The additions made by applying the gross profit rate to total turnover, in the absence of specific defects pointed out in the books, are quashed and set aside.
Double taxation by making gross profit addition already reflected in declared profits - reliance on third-party statements without opportunity for cross-examination - reliance on coordinate-bench precedent - Whether the impugned additions amounted to double taxation and whether reliance on third party statements without affording the assessee opportunity of cross-examination could sustain the additions - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted the assessee's contention that the gross profit on the sale transactions had already been declared and that making an additional gross profit addition would result in double taxation. It also noted the grievance that the AO relied on third-party statements without affording the assessee the opportunity to cross-examine the declarants. The Revenue did not dispute that the issue was covered by Coordinate Bench orders. Having considered the identical Coordinate Bench decisions which accepted the assessee's contentions (including on the absence of cross-examination and the risk of double taxation), and in the absence of any differing material facts in the present matters, the Tribunal found these contentions persuasive and followed the Coordinate Bench precedents to set aside the additions. [Paras 3, 5, 6]
The appeals are allowed insofar as the additions that would result in double taxation and which relied upon undisputed third party statements without cross-examination are quashed, following Coordinate Bench precedent.
Final Conclusion: Following the Coordinate Bench decisions on identical facts, the Tribunal set aside and quashed the gross profit additions confirmed by the CIT(A) for assessment years 2008-09 to 2012-13 and allowed the assessee's appeals.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Application of Higher Tax Rate
Issue 2: Choice of Remedy - Rectification vs. Appeal
Issue 3: Inclusion of Excise Duty, VAT/Sales Tax, and Other Income
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Rectification u/s 154 denied - applying a higher tax rate of 30% instead of 25% on the assessee's income, considering the turnover or gross receipts did not exceed Rs. 50 crores in the relevant previous year - HELD THAT:- We are of considered view that there appears to have been an error on the part of assessee to go for rectification proceedings instead of filing a regular first appeal before CIT(A) against the initiation processed u/s. 143(1) of the Act.
The technicalities of the law can never become a handicap of assessee and the Revenue is entitle to only raise a demand in regard to income legally assessable under the provisions of Act. The submissions raised before us on merits quiet substantially make out a case of assessee, however, as the assessee has reached us at appellate stage through proceedings initiated by way of erroneous remedy of filing a rectification application and not a regular appeal before the CIT(A), it will be not appropriate to enter in to the merits and give a relief to the assessee, and perpetuate the illegality further.
As in Shivganga Drillers Private Ltd. [2022 (5) TMI 1427 - ITAT INDORE] has taken into consideration decision in Akbar Mohammad, Nagaur [2022 (2) TMI 479 - ITAT JODHPUR] it is a case in point that the assessee did not file any appeal against the intimations passed us 143(1) of the Act and the Ld. Sr. DR is right to the extent that the assessee cannot be given relief for that reason. However, it is also a settled law that the assessee cannot be taxed on an amount on which tax is not legally imposable. Although, the assessee might have chosen a wrong channel for redressal of his grievance, all the same, it is incumbent upon the Tax.
Appeal of assessee allowed for statistical purpose only and setting aside the assessment we are restoring the issue on merits for examination and verification of the claim of assessee by the ld. AO
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment involves several core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Business Connection and Permanent Establishment (PE)
Attribution of Income
Applicability of India-UK DTAA
Allowability of Expenses
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of judicial consistency and adherence to established legal principles in tax matters, particularly concerning international transactions and treaty applications.
Income deemed to accrue or arise in India - Appellant has a business connection or a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India u/s 9(1) - whether the assessee a conduit entity? - Appellant is a company incorporated in the United Kingdom - HELD THAT:- We observe that the issue raised by the assessee in this appeal are exactly similar to the facts in the AY 2018-19 and AY 2019-20 [2023 (1) TMI 1464 - ITAT DELHI] decided grounds against the assessee by holding that the assessee has business connection and PE in India and 15% of the booking fees should be attributed to the PE in India.
Conduit entity determination - As decided in own case [2023 (10) TMI 1482 - ITAT DELHI] the status of the assessee as a conduit entity was ever an issue. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the observations of the AO regarding the status of the assessee as a conduit company are not based on any cogent material brought on record, and rather unnecessary and irrelevant for deciding the issue, as to whether, assessee’s income is taxable in India or not.
Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Reassessment Proceedings
Issue 2: Justification of Additions Made in Reassessment
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of procedural integrity in reassessment processes under the Income Tax Act, emphasizing that any discrepancies or procedural lapses can render such proceedings invalid.
Validity of Reassessment proceedings initiated u/s 148 - Difference between the reasons communicated in the notice u/s 148A(b) and the subsequent order u/s 148A(d) - HELD THAT:- We find that undisputedly the notice u/s 148A(b) of the Act has been issued by the AO on the ground that transactions worth ₹ 50,00,000/- with M/s Savitri Ispat India Pvt. Ltd. were made which were alleged to be bogus, therefore, order u/s 148A(d) paased but addition was made of ₹ 9,68,45,467/- in respect of purchases made from non-filing of IT return.
The very initiation of proceedings u/s 148A of the Act are itself flawed and full of infirmities and the issue for which the notice was issued were not carried into the order passed u/s 148A(d) of the Act on 31st.03.2022.
We note that in order issued u/s 148A(d) AO noted that the assessee has taken accommodation entry for bogus billing and accordingly, the income has escaped assessment. In our opinion, the casualness in issuance of notice u/s 148A(b) of the Act and then passing the order u/s 148A(d) of the Act is apparent from the above. Therefore, re-assessment proceeding is flawed and cannot be stayed. The case of the assessee find force from the decision of Banyan Real Estate Fund Mauritius [2024 (8) TMI 371 - DELHI HIGH COURT] wherein similar issue has been decided in favour of the assessee.
Thus, we quash the notices issued re-assessment proceedings as well as the consequent order passed. The appeal of the assessee is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment addresses the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Delay in Payment of Employee's Contribution towards EPF & ESIC
Issue 2: Disallowance of Business Expenses
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment emphasizes the need for precise evaluation of facts and adherence to legal precedents, ensuring that tax assessments are both fair and legally sound.
Disallowance of expenditure towards employees contribution to ESIC/PF u/s 36(1)(va) -Timing of Salary Disbursement and Due Date Determination - HELD THAT:- The issue towards taxability of belated employees’ contribution to PF/ESIC is no longer res integra in the light of the judgment in the case of Checkmate Services [2022 (10) TMI 617 - SUPREME COURT] thus no merit in the case of the assessee for impermissibility of such adjustment u/s 143(1) of the Act.
Determination of due date - Month during which the disbursement of salary is actually made would be relevant for the purposes of determination of due date of deposit under the respective statute. The accrual of liability towards payment of salary without actual disbursement would not fasten obligation for deposits of employees contribution in the labour Acts per se. as observed by the co-ordinate bench in Kanoi Paper and Industries Ltd. [2001 (5) TMI 139 - ITAT CALCUTTA-E] This aspect has not been found to be examined by the AO or CIT(A). Hence without expressing any opinion on merits on this aspect, we deem it expedient to restore the matter to the file of designated AO. It shall be open to the assessee to place factual matrix before the AO and take such plea for evaluation of the AO. AO shall examine this aspect and fresh order in accordance with law after giving proper opportunity.
AO shall thus recompute the amount of disallowance u/s 36(i)(va) if any, on the above basis, in accordance with law. Assessee shall be entitled to appropriate relevant u/s 36(i)(va) where it is found that deposits have been made towards PF/ESIC within the due date from the close of month of actual disbursement of salary/wages - Appeal of the assessee is allowed ex-parte for statistical purposes.
Disallowing the business expenses - Assessee was awarded a contract by Whirlpool of India Limited and on the basis of back to back contracts, it has given the sub-contracts to Meliora Services. Assessee has completed the contract with the assistance of Meliora and paid the relevant job work charges after deducting relevant TDS. Assessee also claimed the relevant explanation only in its Profit & Loss Account.
AO has wrongly noticed that the assessee has given contract to Meliora Services to the extent - AO with the wrong information observed that the assessee has not deducted TDS on the difference amount accordingly proceeded to disallow the same. After considering the facts on record, we observed that the total amount of the contract was which was already declared by the assessee in their books of account as income and offered to tax. Therefore, the addition proposed by the AO is uncalled for.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Deletion of Addition under Section 68
Issue 2: Validity of Reopening under Section 147
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Addition u/s 68 - share capital raised during the year unexplained - information recovered during search and post search operation that the assessee has been beneficiary of bogus share capital from three subscribers - HELD THAT:- In the case of Data ware Private Limited [2011 (9) TMI 175 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] as held that where the assessee has given PAN No. and other information along with names of creditors, AO should enquire the creditworthiness, genuineness of the transactions and whether such transaction has been accepted by the AO of the Creditor but instead of adopting such course, the AO himself could not enter into the return of the creditor and brand the same as unworthy of credence.
Similarly, in Naina Distributors Pvt. Ltd. [2023 (6) TMI 1362 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] decided the issue in favour of the assessee by holding that mere non-production of director cannot be the ground for making any addition in the hands of assessee u/s 68.
Also see Orissa Corporation Pvt. Ltd. [1986 (3) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT] and Orchid Industries Ltd. [2017 (7) TMI 613 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]
Validity of re-assessment proceedings - We find that the ld. AO in the reasons recorded referred to the material found during the course of search and based on the search enquiries that the assessee is a beneficiary of bogus share capital. We note that that the ld. AO has not made any enquiry independently and just made the conclusion as to reopening the assessment based on the search enquiries. Therefore, this is the case of borrowed satisfaction by the AO. The case of the find support from the decision of Meenakshi Overseas (P.) Ltd. [2017 (5) TMI 1428 - DELHI HIGH COURT] Accordingly, the re-assessment proceedings as well as assessment order is hereby quashed.
Assessee appeal allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether the directions issued in the connected writ petitions were to apply to the present petition on a mutatis mutandis basis. (ii) Whether the Director General of Foreign Trade was to decide the petitioner's pending application for amendment of the TRQ licence within a fixed time.
Issue (i): Whether the directions issued in the connected writ petitions were to apply to the present petition on a mutatis mutandis basis.
Analysis: The present petition arose from a similar factual matrix and involved identical grounds of challenge as the connected matters in which directions had already been passed.
Conclusion: The earlier directions were directed to apply mutatis mutandis to the present petition.
Issue (ii): Whether the Director General of Foreign Trade was to decide the petitioner's pending application for amendment of the TRQ licence within a fixed time.
Analysis: The petitioner's amendment request had been pending since 23 October 2024 and had not been decided despite a reminder, warranting a further direction for consideration.
Conclusion: The Director General of Foreign Trade was directed to decide the amendment application within four weeks.
Final Conclusion: The petition was disposed of by extending the benefit of the earlier order and by issuing a time-bound direction for decision on the petitioner's amendment request.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a petition raises identical grounds to connected matters already decided, the same directions may be extended mutatis mutandis, and a pending administrative application may be directed to be decided within a fixed timeframe.
Challenge to revision of a Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) under the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between India and UAE - HELD THAT:- This Court, after careful consideration of the contentions, has issued directions vide order dated 05th December, 2024. Accordingly, it is directed that the order dated 05th December, 2024 passed in W.P.(C) 16809/2024 and other connected matters [2024 (12) TMI 544 - DELHI HIGH COURT], shall apply mutatis mutandis in the present case as well.
The petition is disposed off.
Issues: Whether the order directing recovery of drawback was liable to be set aside for service at the old address and for non-consideration of the petitioner's claim regarding realization of export proceeds.
Analysis: The impugned order and the notices of personal hearing had been sent to the old address despite the asserted change of address having been intimated and reflected in the export documentation and IEC portal. The petitioner also claimed that export proceeds had in fact been realized and sought an opportunity to place the supporting bank realization statement and other documents before the authority.
Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the petitioner was permitted to file a representation with relevant documents for fresh consideration after a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Recovery of drawback which has been availed by the petitioner was ordered on the premise that the petitioner had failed to furnish the proof of realization of export proceeds - HELD THAT:- The petitioner is directed to submit their representation along with relevant documents in support of the petitioner's entitlement to the benefit of duty drawbacks within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If such a representation is filed, the same would be considered and orders would be passed in accordance with law after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The impugned order is set aside - Petition disposed off.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to Refund of SAD
Issue 2: Interpretation of "Imported Goods"
Issue 3: Reliance on CBEC Circulars
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Refund of the Special Additional Duty (SAD) paid on imported raw cashew nuts, which were processed into cashew kernels before being sold - denial of refund on the ground that description of the imported goods and sold goods were not tallying - HELD THAT:- On perusal of N/N. 102/2007-Cus, it is observed that there are certain conditions which are required to be satisfied for getting refund. On perusal of these conditions it would indicate that time and again reference has been made to “said goods”, which in this context would indicate ‘imported goods’. The documents required also, interalia, requires them to produce documents evidencing payment of appropriate sales tax or VAT as the case may be by the importer “on sale of such imported goods” (emphasis supplied). Therefore, notification is exempting all the goods when they are imported for subsequent sale and subject to following various conditions including payment of VAT in respect of said goods. Therefore, if the wordings used in notification are read conjointly, it would be obvious that the notification is applicable only when the imported goods itself is sold and at the time of said sale appropriate sales tax are also paid. Admittedly, the word “as such” has not been mentioned in the notification, but strict interpretation of this notification having regard to the wordings used would indicate that the exemption is available only when the goods are sold as such and not after certain processing.
In AGARWALLA TIMBERS (P) LTD., MITTAL TIMBERS PRODUCTS (P) LTD., VARIETY LUMBERS (P) LTD. AND ASHIRWAD IMPEX (P) LTD. VERSUS CC [2013 (11) TMI 1013 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], in a given factual matrix, it was held that cutting of log/timber into smaller pieces does not bring into account any new product nor identity of original timber has underwent any fundamental change. They also took into account that as per the Statutory conditions, the importer/transporter cannot carry the logs of length more than 40 feet and therefore having regards to these submissions, a view was taken. These facts are clearly distinguished in the present appeal.
A notification has to be interpreted strictly as held in catena of judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and in fact in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (IMPORT) , MUMBAI VERSUS M/S. DILIP KUMAR AND COMPANY & ORS. [2018 (7) TMI 1826 - SUPREME COURT (LB)], it was, interalia, observed that in case there is any ambiguity in the notification, the benefit should go to the Revenue. In this case, though the word “as such” has not been used in Notification No. 102/2007, the reading of the detail notification would collectively indicate that it was only intended for goods sold as such and not after manufacture/process.
Conclusion - The appellant is not entitled to a refund of SAD under Notification No. 102/2007-Cus, as the goods sold were not the same as those imported.
Appeal dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification of Gold Seizure
Issue 2: Compliance with Legal Requirements
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment thus sets a precedent for the requirement of concrete evidence in cases of seizure under the Customs Act, emphasizing the importance of reasonable belief based on objective criteria.
Town seizure - Absolute confiscation of gold seized from the possession of the appellant - levy of penalty - gold of foreign origin and smuggled or not - HELD THAT:- It is found that it is a case of town seizure wherein the purity of gold was found 99.30% to 99.39 % and having no foreign marking thereon and are of irregular shape, size and weight. In that circumstances, can there be a reasonable believe to confiscate that the gold in question or not.
The said issue has been dealt by this Tribunal in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (PREVENTIVE) , KOLKATA VERSUS SHRI BAJRANG INGOLE AND COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (PREVENTIVE) , KOLKATA VERSUS SHRI SACHIN GUPTA (DIRECTOR OF M/S. AKRITI GUPTA JEWELLERS PVT. LTD. [2023 (11) TMI 423 - CESTAT KOLKATA] wherein this Tribunal has observed 'It is apparent from the records itself that it is a case of town seizure. The purity of gold is 99.5% and having no embossing of foreign mark, in that circumstances, Revenue has failed to prove reasonable belief that being the gold in question is smuggled one. In the absence of that the impugned gold cannot be seized under section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 and therefore the gold in question is not liable for confiscation and no penalty is imposable on the appellant.'
Admittedly the facts of the case are similar to the case of and Bajrang Ingole.
Conclusion - As it is a case of town seizure having no foreign marking on the gold and gold is of different shape, size and weight and purity of 99.30% to 99.39%, in that circumstances, the gold in question cannot be absolutely confiscated. Therefore, the conditions of Section 110 for seizure of gold are not complied with as there is no reasonable believe that the gold in question is of foreign origin.
The impugned gold is not liable for confiscation and is to be released to the appellant and no penalty is imposable on the appellant - Appeal allowed.
Issues: Whether Aluminium Formwork Materials are classifiable under CTH 76109090 as aluminium structures or under CTH 84806000 as moulds for mineral materials, and whether the benefit of S.No. 610 of Notification No. 152/2009-CUS dated 31.12.2009 is available.
Analysis: The imported goods were found to be predesigned aluminium formwork panels used as temporary shuttering to hold concrete in place until it sets, after which the panels are removed and reused. The distinguishing feature of a mould is that it produces blanks or finished articles by retaining material in a predetermined shape, whereas formwork functions as in situ support for construction and does not itself produce a separate article. The HSN notes to heading 7610 cover aluminium structures and exclude only those items that are truly moulds falling under Chapter 84. On the facts, the goods were held not to be coffering panels or moulds for mineral materials, but aluminium structural components used in construction. Since the goods remained classifiable under CTH 7610, the exemption notification for imports from Korea was also applicable, and the denial of that benefit without specific reasons was unsustainable. The rule of strict interpretation of taxing statutes and the benefit of doubt in cases of genuine classification ambiguity also supported acceptance of the assessee's classification.
Conclusion: The imported goods are classifiable under CTH 76109090 and not under CTH 84806000, and the assessee is entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 152/2009-CUS dated 31.12.2009.
Final Conclusion: The demand, reclassification, and denial of exemption were set aside on merits, and the appeal succeeded with consequential relief.
Ratio Decidendi: Temporary aluminium formwork used as shuttering in construction, which is removed after concrete sets and does not itself create separate blanks or finished articles, is classifiable as an aluminium structure rather than as a mould under Chapter 84; where classification remains under Chapter 76, the linked customs exemption cannot be denied without specific justification.
Classification of imported product ‘Aluminium Formwork Materials’ - to be classified under CTH 84806000 or under CTH 76109010? - denial of benefit under S.No.610 of Notification No. 152/2009-CUS dt. 31.12.2009.
Classification of imported product ‘Aluminium Formwork Materials’ (AFM) - HELD THAT:- An AFM which essentially is a shuttering to facilitate efficient and faster casting and therefore cannot ipso facto become mould. At this juncture, it is important to understand the difference between formwork and mould. Basically, a formwork is nothing but a shutter plate/shuttering material, which is temporary structure used to shape and support freshly poured concrete until it hardens and gains sufficient strength to support itself and the formwork can be used in different areas, including building foundations, where it is used to create the shape of foundation walls, footings and piers, walls and partitions, beams and columns, where it is used to shape columns, slabs, where it is used to create flat surface such as floors, roofs and bridge decks - The reliance placed by the Adjudicating Authority that it is customized and cannot be used or moved to other location is also misplaced. It is nobody’s case that these formworks remain even after concretes were set in and that they were not removed and kept elsewhere for a similar use at a later date, if required.
CTH 7610 covers, inter alia, aluminium structures and by way of example, it includes, inter alia, roofing frameworks. The roofing framework is therefore covered within CTH 7610 and therefore, it is necessary to understand what roofing framework is and how it is different from formwork. Roofing framework refers to structural element that supports a roof and, inter alia, provides structural support and also serves as a base for roofing material. In other words, it would be permanent structure as distinct from aluminium formwork - A complete immovable building structure cannot be called a blank or an article. The illustration also made it clear that mould would create blanks, articles, etc., including cement slabs but not the entire building or structure.
In view of the HSN explanatory note, which clearly excludes structures and part of structures, which do not stay in place after construction and specific exclusion (b) which excludes coffering panels intended for pouring concrete having the character of mould from the purview of Chapter 76, came to the conclusion that the product imported by the appellant is rightly classifiable under CTH 8480. Admittedly, apart from this evidence, there is no other evidence like expert opinion or comparable imports, etc., to support the claim of the department that the goods are more in the nature of mould and not otherwise.
On the other hand, CTH 7610 covers, inter alia, all kinds of aluminium structure except for the exclusion provided, i.e., mould falling under Chapter 84. Therefore, even if there is a mould made out of 100% aluminium also, it would be not classifiable under CTH 7610 and it will be falling under Chapter 84. However, when the product itself is not a mould then the exclusion will not be applicable. The same heading also includes aluminium plates, rods, profiles, tubes and the like, prepared for use in structures.
Therefore, if there is any ambiguity in a taxation provision, it is to be interpreted in favour of the subject/ assessee. However, when a tax exemption has to be interpreted, the benefit of doubt should go in favour of the Revenue. Thus, as the issue is not that of exemption and more of classification leading to demand of duty, this judgment would not help the cause of the department. In fact, going by the ratio, we find that since in this case, there could be grey area regarding coverage under Chapter 76, vis-à-vis Chapter 84 due to various interpretations not emanating from the heading itself, the benefit of doubt should be given to the appellant and not to the Revenue.
Denial of benefit of Notification - HELD THAT:- This is a notification provided for concessional duty in respect of imports made from Republic of Korea. In the SCN or in the OIO, there is no specific discussion as to why this notification has been denied, whether it was on account of import not being considered as import from Korea or it was on account of the fact that it was not covered under S.No.610 of the notification. Therefore, in the absence of these details, the appellants were not given adequate opportunity to defend the eligibility for said notification and therefore, this denial is also not tenable.
Conclusion - The product AFM imported by the appellant is rightly classifiable under CTH 76109090 and not under CTH 84806000, as confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. Moreover, since there is no dispute as regards origin of the goods, therefore, once the goods are falling under CTH 7610, the same would be entitled for exemption notification 152/2009 dt. 31.12.2009 at S.No.610.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether imposition of penalty under Regulation 5 of the Customs (Provisional Duty Assessment) Regulations, 2011 is attracted for non-submission of original/bank-signed documents within the one-month period stipulated by Regulation 3(3) where provisional assessment was allowed under Section 18 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. If penalty is attracted, what is the permissible exercise of discretion as to quantum where Regulation 5 provides that penalty "may extend to Rs.50,000/-".
3. Whether enhancement of a nominal penalty by the Commissioner (Appeals) to the maximum permissible amount per Bill of Entry is justified where (a) many Bills had been finalized, (b) further delay was attributable in part to parallel litigation, and (c) there was no revenue implication established by the department.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Attractiveness of penalty for failure to submit documents within the one-month period (Regulation 3(3) and Regulation 5)
Legal framework: Regulation 3(3) requires the bond executed for provisional assessment to contain an undertaking to produce documents/information "within one month or within such extended period as the proper officer may allow" and to pay any deficiency between provisional and final duty. Regulation 5 prescribes penalty for contravention of these Regulations, providing that the penalty "may extend to Rs.50,000/-". Provisional assessment was permitted under Section 18 of the Customs Act pending production of documents.
Precedent treatment: The Tribunal has previously considered delay in furnishing documents and looked to the presence or absence of revenue implication and mala fide conduct when imposing penalties (referenced decisions adopting lenient approach where delay was procedural and without revenue impact).
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court interprets Regulation 3(3) and Regulation 5 conjunctively to mean that failure to submit documents within one month can attract penalty; however, Regulation 5 confers discretion as to quantum since it states penalty "may extend to" a maximum. The existence of provisional assessment under Section 18 does not, by itself, convert every delay into a deliberate contravention warranting maximum penalty-contextual factors (revenue implication, bona fides, reasons for delay) are relevant to exercise of discretion.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Penalty liability can arise for non-submission within prescribed time, but quantum is discretionary and must account for attendant circumstances, including revenue impact and bona fide reasons. Obiter - Observations on general policy of deterrence are contextual, not absolute.
Conclusions: Penalty is legally permissible for non-submission within one month, but imposition of the maximum amount is not mandatory; the proper officer must exercise discretion considering surrounding facts.
Issue 2 - Proper exercise of discretion as to quantum of penalty under Regulation 5
Legal framework: Regulation 5 confers a penal range up to Rs.50,000 per contravention. The decision to impose a particular quantum lies with the adjudicating authority and is subject to review for reasonableness.
Precedent treatment: The Tribunal relied on prior authorities where nominal penalties were confirmed or penalties waived where delay caused no revenue loss and there was no mala fide intention. Those authorities treated modest penalties as adequate for procedural lapses.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court reasons that discretion must be exercised proportionately. Relevant factors include: whether delay caused revenue loss, whether there was deliberate or mala fide conduct, the number of Bills already finalised, reasons for delay (including pending litigation), and comparable tribunal decisions. A penal sum intended merely as deterrence cannot be mechanically maximised where mitigating circumstances exist.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Quantum must be proportionate and determined after evaluation of facts; identical maximum penalties need not be imposed across similar defaults absent aggravating factors. Obiter - Reference to "deterrence" as a policy aim is explanatory but not a justification for disproportionate enhancement without reasons.
Conclusions: The adjudicating authority's imposition of a modest penalty (Rs.15,000 total, or the amount imposed by the original authority) was a lawful and reasonable exercise of discretion in the circumstances; enhancement to the maximum per pending Bill required reasoned justification which was absent.
Issue 3 - Validity of enhancement by appellate authority where delay arose from pending litigation and no revenue implication was shown
Legal framework: An appellate authority may modify penalty but must give adequate reasons demonstrating why a higher penalty is warranted. The authority's exercise of power is reviewable for absence of adequate reasoning or failure to apply legal standards.
Precedent treatment: Tribunal decisions cited show that where delays were due to procedural difficulties or pending litigation and there was no revenue implication, modest or no penalty has been treated as appropriate; higher penalties have been disapproved in such contexts.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found that many Bills had been finalized and remaining delays were attributable in part to pending appeals before tribunals and high courts on the same issue; the department failed to demonstrate revenue loss or deliberate mala fide conduct. The appellate authority enhanced penalty to aggregate Rs.10,00,000 (by applying maximum to multiple Bills) without adequate reasoning explaining why deterrence required such increase despite mitigating factors. The Court views such enhancement as disproportionate and unsupported.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Enhancement of penalty on appeal requires cogent, case-specific reasons; unexplained enhancement in presence of mitigating circumstances is unsustainable. Obiter - Observations on what constitutes adequate reasons are illustrative rather than exhaustive.
Conclusions: Enhancement by the appellate authority was set aside for lack of adequate reasoning and for being disproportionate given absence of revenue implication and presence of bona fide/justifiable delay; the original modest penalty was restored.
Cross-references and Overall Conclusion
Cross-reference: Issues 1-3 are interrelated - the legal availability of penalty (Issue 1) must be read with judicially guided discretionary application of quantum (Issue 2) and the requirement that appellate enhancement be reasoned and proportionate (Issue 3).
Overall conclusion: The Court held that while Regulation 3(3) and Regulation 5 permit penalty for non-submission within one month, the adjudicating authority's modest penalty was appropriate in the factual matrix (no demonstrated revenue loss; delay partly due to pending litigation) and the appellate enhancement to the maximum aggregate amount was set aside for lack of adequate justification. The original penalty was restored.
Enhancement of penalty - failure to submit the required documents within the stipulated time period - contravention of the Customs (Provisional Duty Assessment) Regulations, 2011 - HELD THAT:- The appellant could not submit some of the documents required for finalisation of the provisional assessment because of the various appeals pending before the Tribunals and High Courts on the same issue. Thus, the appellant cannot be faulted for the delay in submission of the documents. The ld. adjudicating authority has considered the issue and imposed a penalty of Rs.15,000/- for the violations, if any, committed by the appellant. It is observed that this penalty is sufficient for the procedural violations committed by the appellant.
Similar view has been taken by this tribunal and a lesser penalty has been confirmed on such procedural violations - In the case of M/S ESSAR OIL LIMITED VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS [2015 (5) TMI 942 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD], it was held by the Tribunal that when there is some delay in furnishing the documents and there is no revenue implication, penalty is not called for.
The penalty of Rs.15,000/- imposed by the Ld. Assistant Commissioner would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. The Ld. Commissioner (Appeals) has not given adequate reason for enhancing the penalty from Rs.15,000/- to Rs.10,00,000/- in respect of each of the 20 Bills of Entry, for the delay in submission of the documents.
Conclusion - Procedural lapses without revenue loss or mala fide intent should not attract severe penalties. The enhanced penalty of Rs. 10,00,000/- imposed by the Commissioner (Appeals) set aside and the original penalty of Rs. 15,000/- restored concluding that it was adequate for the procedural violation.
The enhanced penalty set aside - appeal allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether the typographical errors regarding the shipper and beneficial owner in the earlier final order could be rectified; (ii) Whether recomputation of anti-dumping duty could be undertaken in rectification proceedings.
Issue (i): Whether the typographical errors regarding the shipper and beneficial owner in the earlier final order could be rectified.
Analysis: The record showed no dispute that M/s. Xinjiang Zhongtai Chemical Co. Ltd. was the shipper and M/s. Vesak Singapore PTE Ltd. was the beneficial owner. The earlier narration in the final order was therefore corrected in the corresponding paragraph. The rectification was confined to correcting the factual description already borne out by the documents.
Conclusion: The typographical errors were rectified in favour of the department.
Issue (ii): Whether recomputation of anti-dumping duty could be undertaken in rectification proceedings.
Analysis: The scope of rectification was held to be limited to mistakes apparent from the record. A debatable question, or one requiring a process of reasoning and possible competing views, does not amount to such an error. On that footing, the request to recalculate the anti-dumping duty was treated as beyond rectification jurisdiction.
Conclusion: Recomputation of anti-dumping duty was refused.
Final Conclusion: The application was allowed only to the extent of correcting the factual description in the earlier order, while the prayer for recomputation of anti-dumping duty was declined.
Ratio Decidendi: Rectification is confined to obvious mistakes apparent from the record and cannot be used to decide a debatable issue or to undertake substantive recomputation.
Seeking rectification of mistake - typographical error - Error apparent on the face of record - identity of the shipper and beneficial owner - recomputation of Anti Dumping Duty (ADD) liability - HELD THAT:- The rectification of typographical errors in the final order correcting the identities of the shipper and beneficial owner is ordered. The request for recomputation of ADD was denied as it was beyond the scope of rectification.
Application allowed in part.
Issues: Whether populated printed circuit boards imported for manufacture of GPON ONTs/OLTs were classifiable under tariff item 8517 79 10 as parts, and whether they qualified for the reduced basic customs duty under Serial No. 22 of Notification No. 57/2017-Customs dated 30-6-2017.
Analysis: The imported goods were found to be parts used in the manufacture of telecommunication equipment and not complete GPON apparatus capable of independent function. The specific tariff entry for populated, loaded or stuffed printed circuit boards under 8517 79 10 was held to be the correct classification, and the residuary entry was rejected because a specific entry prevailed. The notification, as clarified by Circular No. 8/2023 dated 13-3-2023, covered PCBA of packet optical transport product or switch, including OLT and ONT for FTTX networks. The ruling also relied on the principle that residuary classification is available only when no specific entry applies.
Conclusion: The goods were held eligible for classification under 8517 79 10 and for the concessional duty benefit under Serial No. 22 of Notification No. 57/2017-Customs.
Final Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to the reduced customs duty on the imported populated printed circuit boards for use in manufacturing GPON ONTs/OLTs.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a specific tariff entry squarely covers the goods, that entry must be applied in preference to a residuary entry, and notification benefits applicable to the specified goods cannot be denied when the imported goods are identifiable parts used in the notified telecommunication equipment.
Eligibility to claim the benefit of reduced duty of 10% vide Sl. No. 22 of N/N. 57/2017-Customs, dated 30-6-2017 in respect of populated printed circuit boards (PCBs) imported for the manufacture of telecommunication equipment, specifically GPON ONTs/OLTs - HELD THAT:- The product intended to be imported by the Applicants is not a finished product but a part of the finished product GPON ONT/OLT device. From the assembling process illustrated in the pictures provided in Annexure-2 of the reply letter dated 4-4-2024 it can be seen that this process includes putting the accessories to the PCBA (configuring/Connecting and checking all the cables) adding CMOS battery, adding PON modules and testing thereof and adding the software before it is finally packed. The configuration, testing and addition of software apparently play a crucial role in giving character GPON ONT/OLT device. Hence it appears that the department contention that the subject import goods is not parts but is a complete goods does not appears sound and tenable. It is clear from above that under CTI 85176290 the products sought to be covered are to be finished products and not parts.
In the instant case the applicant proposes to import the Populated Printed Circuit Board for the manufacturing of Telecommunication equipment and more specifically for the purpose of manufacturing of GPON ONTs/OLTs which is aptly covered under ‘Combination of one or more of Packet Optical Transport Product or Switch (POTP or POTS)’.
The decision of the Tribunal in the case of Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai (Air Cargo Import) v. Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd. [2022 (6) TMI 1051 - CESTAT MUMBAI], deals with classification of ‘cards i.e., Populated Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs)’ incorporated in photonic service switch. Thus, the imported goods in the present case “interface cards” being functionally similar, the decision of the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal, which has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 000586-000598/2023 arising out of Diary No. 31965/2022 [2023 (1) TMI 1297 - SC ORDER], by holding that they do not think it is appropriate to interfere in the impugned order, is relevant to the present case.
Thus, the subject goods for the manufacturing of Telecommunication equipment and more specifically for the purpose of manufacturing of GPON ONTs/OLTs are covered under Sr. No. 22 of Notification No. 57/2017-Cus., dated 30-6-2017 as amended.
Conclusion - The applicant is eligible to claim the benefit of reduced duty of 10% vide Sl. No. 22 of Notification No. 57/2017-Customs, dated 30-6-2017 in respect of Populated Printed Circuit Boards, for the manufacture of telecommunication equipment and more specifically for the purpose of manufacturing of GPON ONTs/OLTs.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment primarily revolves around the following legal issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Maintainability of Counterclaim in CIRP Proceedings
Issue 2: Applicability of Section 60(5) of the I&B Code
Issue 3: Implications of the Approved Resolution Plan
Issue 4: Jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Maintainability of the counter claim in the proceedings of the CIRP - where the controversy pertains to raising of a counter claim by the Appellant, against the Corporate Debtor, whether the relief would at all be tenable to be pressed in before the Tribunal and that too, by invoking the provisions contained under Section 60(5) of the I & B Code, 2016, which being a residuary clause, is to be used for the aspects and fields not covered by I & B Code, 2016? - HELD THAT:- Within the time bound process, all such proceedings lying outside the purview of Resolution Plan, may not be permitted to be agitated by invoking Sub Section (5) of Section 60 of the I & B Code, 2016, so as to delay the proceedings, and to widen the scope of Section 60(5) to its disproportionate implication and application, so as to distort the application and object of I & B Code, 2016.
The learned Adjudicating Authority, while considering the claim as it was raised by the Appellant, in the Application preferred being IA No. 545 / 2024, has also considered the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of Adani Power Limited V. Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. [2023 (3) TMI 1555 - SC ORDER] wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that in the statute or the precedence of the Hon’ble Apex Court or the NCLAT, there is no ambiguity as such, which reflects that once the plan is approved it is binding and it cannot be made a subject matter to be considered, analysed or interpreted before the Arbitration or for that matter before any proceedings and thus, it has opined that the claim even if allowed in favour of Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd., will have no bearing on the right and obligations of the Appellant, as against the Corporate Debtor, who would be bound by its own terms of contract with the Corporate Debtor, owing to the fact that the Appellant cannot be saddled with a new liability except which is mentioned in the Resolution Plan.
In the absence of there being any challenge given with regards to the effect of non-admission of the claim of the present Appellant by the Resolution Professional, the reliefs was sought for in IA No. 545 / 2024 in the shape of seeking a necessary directions to clarify that the Appellant’s claim not be extinguished upon the approval of Resolution Plan, would be barred by the Judgment of Adani Power Limited [2023 (3) TMI 1555 - SC ORDER] as relied by the learned Adjudicating Authority, because the same cannot be permitted to be widen the scope of the claim by consideration of the counter claim particularly, when the denial of acceptance of the claim on 11.03.2024, has attained finality, having not been questioned, before any Appropriate Forum.
The Application thus preferred does not meet out the objective of the I & B Code, 2016, where finalization of the claims against the Corporate Debtor are required to be done in a Time-bound manner in order to take steps, for restructuring of the Corporate Debtor. Since, the same was being infringed by the nature of the relief sought for, the same would not be sustainable and the restrictions which was imposed by the Judgment of Adani Power Ltd. V. Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors, would be attracted, to make the Interlocutory Application preferred by the Appellant as to be not maintainable.
Conclusion - i) Claims not included in the Resolution Plan are extinguished. ii) The counterclaim is not maintainable within CIRP. iii) Section 60(5) cannot be used to challenge the extinguishment of claims post-approval of the Resolution Plan.
Appeal dismissed.
Issues: (i) whether the appellants had contravened section 8(1) and section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 in relation to the seized foreign currency; and (ii) whether the penalty of Rs. 80 lakhs on each appellant was excessive and required reduction.
Issue (i): whether the appellants had contravened section 8(1) and section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 in relation to the seized foreign currency.
Analysis: The statements of the appellants and the seized documents were treated as sufficient material to show possession and dealing in foreign currency without the prior or special permission of the Reserve Bank of India. The later attempt to shift responsibility was not accepted, as the record showed admission of recovery of foreign exchange and involvement in its sale and purchase.
Conclusion: The finding of contravention under section 8(1) and section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 was upheld against the appellants.
Issue (ii): whether the penalty of Rs. 80 lakhs on each appellant was excessive and required reduction.
Analysis: Although the contravention was sustained, the Tribunal found the quantum of penalty to be excessive in the circumstances, particularly having regard to the value of the foreign currency involved and the material on record. The penalty was therefore rationalised to bring it in line with the facts proved.
Conclusion: The penalty of Rs. 80 lakhs on each appellant was reduced to Rs. 8 lakhs on each appellant.
Final Conclusion: The adjudication on contravention was maintained, but the punitive amount was substantially scaled down, resulting in a partial success for the appellants.
Ratio Decidendi: Where contravention of foreign exchange law is established on admitted possession and supporting documents, the finding may be sustained, but the penalty must remain proportionate to the proved misconduct and may be reduced if found excessive.
Offence u/s 8(1) and 8(2) of FERA - dealing in foreign exchange without the necessary permissions from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) - recovery of the currency - appellant's penalized by imposing heavy penalty of Rs. 80 lakhs though the worth of the foreign currency as on the date of the recovery was not more than 8 lakhs - as argued foreign currency said to have been recovered from their sister's house
HELD THAT:- We find no such argument by the appellant before the Special Director, Enforcement rather in the statements made by the appellants, they literally admitted possession of the foreign currency. It was later on qualified to be at the instance of Sudhakar Verma.
The careful reading of their statement would however reveal that the foreign currency was recovered from the house in the name of Mrs. Madhu who is none else but the wife of appellant Ashok Kumar. The appellant Manoj Kumar in his statement admitted that seized foreign currency was purchased by them 6 to 7 days prior to the seizure from a person who deals in it. The other appellant Ashok Kumar also admitted that the foreign currency was seized from his own premises, but refused to make further statement.
Special Director found violation of section 8(1)and 8 (2) by the appellants and accordingly imposed penalty of Rs. 80 lakhs on each appellant under section 50 of the FERA, 1973.
If we go further deep into the matter, the documents seized from the appellants shows their involvement in the sale and purchase of the foreign currency without special or general permission of the RBI.
No error in the impugned order for recording contravention of section 8 (1) and 8 (2) of the Act of 1973 at the instance of the appellants.
Whether penalty imposed on each appellant said to be excessive? - As we find penalty of Rs. 80 lakhs to be excessive. It is even after taking into consideration the documents recovered from the appellant showing their involvement in dealing with the foreign currency without prior or special permission of the Reserve Bank of India.
We are inclined to reduce the amount of penalty from 80 lacs to 8 lakhs on each appellant to rationalize the quantum of penalty.
Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - Legality of petitioner's arrest - illegal mining - It was held by High Court that 'The petitioner has not been found involved in any illegal activity, in any manner whatsoever, attracting the offence of money laundering under PMLA. There is no option, except to allow the petition.
HELD THAT:- It is not required to interfere with the finding of the High Court that the arrest of the respondent was illegal. The findings which are rendered by the High Court are only for the purposes of deciding the issue whether the arrest of the respondent was illegal.
These findings will not effect the merits of the pending complaint under Section 44 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002.
SLP dismissed.
Issues: Handing over of control of provisionally attached properties of the corporate debtor to the successful resolution applicant, and the effect of the order on the pending legal questions under the insolvency and money-laundering statutes.
Outcome: By consensus, the appellant was directed to hand over, and the successful resolution applicant was directed to take over, control of the provisionally attached properties under Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 read with Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money Laundering (Restoration of Property) Rules, 2016. The Court expressly stated that it was not expressing any opinion on the interpretation of Section 32A(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 or on the Enforcement Directorate's power to attach the corporate debtor's property, and all appeals were disposed of accordingly.
Jurisdiction to attach properties of a Corporate Debtor undergoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Section 32A of the IBC - HELD THAT:- The Appellant-E.D. is directed to handover and the Respondent successful Resolution Applicant JSW is directed to take over the control of the properties of Corporate Debtor-Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd., provisionally attached vide the order dated 10.10.2019 passed by the E.D., immediately in view of Section 8(8) of the PMLA read with Rule 3A of the said Rules.
Appeal disposed off.
Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the ECIR proceedings on the ground of acquittal in the predicate cases, despite one connected case ending in conviction and the appeals against the acquittal and conviction judgments remaining pending.
Analysis: The order notes that the ECIR arose from three FIRs and that the respondent had been acquitted in two connected cases, while being convicted in the third. It records that appeals against the acquittal and conviction judgments were pending before the High Court. On that basis, the Court found that the High Court erred in quashing the ECIR proceedings by treating the acquittals as while ignoring the subsisting conviction in one predicate case. Leave was granted and interim protection was issued by staying the operation and effect of the impugned order during the pendency of the appeal.
Outcome: The impugned order was stayed, leave was granted, and the appellants were permitted to proceed in accordance with law pending the appeal.
Money Laundering - respondent-accused is already convicted by the concerned Court and an appeal against the same is pending before the High Court - HELD THAT:- The High Court has committed an error in quashing the ECIR proceedings initiated by the petitioner(s) under the PMLA Act, on the ground that the respondentaccused was acquitted in the predicate cases ignoring the fact that the respondent-accused was already convicted by the concerned Court in Special C.C. No. 188 of 2013 vide the order dated 29.07.2019.
The matter deserves consideration. Hence, leave granted.
Issues: Whether, after filing of the complaint, the accused can be called for interrogation for recording statements under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Analysis: The explanation (ii) to Section 44(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 specifically permits such a course to be adopted by the investigating agency. The contrary view taken in the impugned judgment did not account for this express provision.
Conclusion: The accused can be called for interrogation after filing of the complaint for recording statements under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Money Laundering - interrogation process - whether after the filing of the complaint, the accused can be called for interrogation or not for the purpose of recording their statement under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002? - HELD THAT:- The High Court, in the impugned judgment, did not take into consideration the explanation (ii) to Section 44 (1) of the PMLA, wherein it is specifically provided that such a course is well open to the investigating agency.
In such view of the clear provision contained in Section 44, as afore-stated, the impugned judgment is set aside.
Appeal disposed off.
Issues: Whether the Special Court can be directed to conduct simultaneous trial of the PMLA case and the predicate offence, and whether pendency of the predicate offence bars continuation of the PMLA trial.
Analysis: Section 44 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was treated as the controlling provision governing trial of money-laundering offences and connected scheduled offences. The explanation to Section 44 was applied to hold that the Special Court's jurisdiction to deal with the PMLA offence is not dependent on orders passed in the scheduled offence, and that trial of both sets of offences by the same court is not to be construed as a joint trial. The Court relied on the settled position that money-laundering is an independent and stand-alone offence, and that the pendency of the predicate offence does not disable the Special Court from proceeding with the PMLA case. On that footing, there was no legal basis to compel a simultaneous trial at the instance of the accused.
Conclusion: The request for a direction to conduct simultaneous trial was rejected, and the PMLA trial was held to be maintainable independently of the pending predicate offence.
Ratio Decidendi: Prosecution under the PMLA is independent of the predicate offence, and Section 44 does not require simultaneous trial or make the Special Court's jurisdiction dependent on the progress or outcome of the scheduled offence.
Simultaneous trial for offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) and the predicate offence - right to fair trial - contention of the petitioner is that the right to fair trial to an accused is a basic right, which needs to be protected - HELD THAT:- Since, the nature of money laundering offence is distinguishable and unconnected with the nature of offences under the IPC (presently BNS), one is not dependant on the other and that being the position, there is no impediment for the Special Court to continue the trial under PMLA even during the pendency of the trial under predicate offence.
The present petition has been instituted under Section 482 of Cr.PC for a direction to the Special Court to conduct simultaneous trial. When the procedures contemplated under the PMLA for trial are distinct and different, question of conducting simultaneous or joint trial would not arise at all. That apart, the accused in a PMLA offence cannot be allowed to make any attempt to stall the trial on economic offences, since the procedures contemplated are independent. Thus it is not inclined to consider the present petition.
Conclusion - The PMLA is a standalone process, and its trial is independent of the predicate offence. Simultaneous trials are not mandatory and are at the discretion of the prosecuting authority.
The criminal original petition is dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to VCES Benefits
Issue 2: Appealability of VCES Rejection
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning:
"The cut-off date under the scheme which is sacrosanct and cannot be ignored by the department."
"If the intention of the legislature was to exclude any tax deposited before framing of the scheme, the same could have been provided in plain language."
Core Principles Established:
Final Determinations on Each Issue:
The judgment concludes by allowing the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's and adjudicating authority's orders, and directing the designated authority to reconsider the application under the scheme.
Entitlement for benefit of the Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme (VCES) - payment of the principal tax dues after the cut-off date of 1st March, 2013 done - Rejection of assessee’s declaration filed under the scheme on 23rd July, 2013, by a communication dated 25th July, 2014 on the ground that certain sums of money were deposited by the assessee prior to coming into force of the scheme - HELD THAT:- The communication dated 25th July, 2014 cannot be construed to be an order in the strict sense for an appeal to be preferred. That apart, the CBEC by Circular dated 8th August 2013 issued certain clarifications with regard to the implementation of the scheme and it has been clarified that the scheme does not have a statutory provision for filing of an appeal against the order for rejection of declaration under Section 106 (2) by the designated authority.
The cut-off date under the scheme which is sacrosanct and cannot be ignored by the department - the cut-off date fixed under the scheme is the very crucial factor and this aspect was noted in the case of Sadguru Construction [2014 (5) TMI 219 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] and it was held that if the intention of the legislature was to exclude any tax deposited before framing of the scheme, the same could have been provided in plain language. On the contrary, the legislature excluded from the purview of declaration only those taxes which were already paid by 1st March, 2013 and, therefore, the period between the 1st March, 2013 and 10th May, 2013 would, by necessary implication of the provision of the scheme, be covered for declaration under the scheme itself.
Conclusion - Payments made after the cut-off date but before the scheme's introduction are eligible under VCES. The assessee is entitled to the benefit under scheme and the declaration of the assessee should be accordingly processed. The rejection of the VCES declaration is not an appealable order.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Exemption of Services to PGCIL and MCD
Issue 2: Taxability of Hire Charges
Issue 3: Construction Services for MCD
Issue 4: Raising New Grounds of Appeal
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Leviability of service tax - Exemption for services for transmission of electricity - Supply of tangible goods / Deemed sale - Sub-contractor liability and double taxation - Governmental authority versus commercial activity - Negative list (post 01.07.2012) and works contract services
Leviability of service tax - Exemption for services for transmission of electricity - Negative list (post 01.07.2012) and works contract services - Dropping of demand in respect of services provided to M/s Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. (PGCIL). - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the show cause notices did not allege that the respondent rendered site preparation services to PGCIL and that the department cannot raise a new case at the appellate stage. Applying Circular No. 80/10/2004 which ties leviability to whether the building/service is for commerce or industry, and having regard to Notification No. 11/2010-ST exempting services for transmission of electricity, the Tribunal observed there is no evidence contradicting that the services related to electricity transmission infrastructure. On these bases, the adjudicating authority's dropping of demand in respect of PGCIL projects was upheld. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 20]
Upheld the dropping of demand relating to projects executed for M/s PGCIL.
Supply of tangible goods / Deemed sale - Leviability of service tax - Dropping of demand in respect of hire charges/income for supply/letting out of equipment (DG sets, excavators, etc.). - HELD THAT: - The adjudicating authority found that contract terms transferred possession and effective control of equipment to the client, bringing the transactions within 'supply of tangible goods' or 'deemed sale' and outside the ambit of service tax. The department produced no evidence that possession and effective control were retained by the respondent. In absence of such evidence, the Tribunal found no infirmity in dropping the demand for service tax on hire charges. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 20]
Upheld the dropping of demand in respect of hire charges/income.
Governmental authority versus commercial activity - Sub-contractor liability and double taxation - Leviability of service tax - Validity of dropping demand for construction of paid parking for Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD). - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal disagreed with the original adjudicating authority's reliance on exemption entry which protects construction for use other than commercial/industrial purposes. Applying precedent that sub-contractors are independently taxable for activities they undertake, the Tribunal held that the respondent provided services to the main contractor (a private entity) and that the parking constructed was a revenuegenerating/commercial facility of MCD. Thus the exemption for government works was inapplicable. On this basis the Tribunal set aside the part of the original order that had dropped demand for the MCD parking work. [Paras 17, 18, 19, 20]
Set aside the dropping of demand for the MCD parking construction; departmental challenge allowed to this extent.
Final Conclusion: The departmental appeal is partly allowed: the impugned order is upheld insofar as demands relating to PGCIL projects and hireincome were correctly dropped; it is set aside insofar as the demand for construction of paid parking for MCD was wrongly dropped and must be restored.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal question in this judgment is whether the activity of distributing and selling SIM Cards and Air Time Scratch Cards by the appellant constitutes the provision of 'Business Auxiliary Services' under the Finance Act, 1994, thereby making it liable for service tax.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
The primary legal framework revolves around the Finance Act, 1994, specifically the provisions concerning 'Business Auxiliary Services' under Section 65(19) and the applicability of service tax under Section 73(1). The precedents cited include various judgments where similar issues were adjudicated, such as the cases of Commissioner of CGST Vs. Rama Sales, Dyal Medicos, and Daya Shankar Kailash Chand.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The court interpreted the activity of the appellant as not constituting 'Business Auxiliary Services' because the telecom companies, such as BSNL, had already discharged the service tax liability on the full value of the SIM cards. The court reasoned that imposing service tax again on the appellant would result in double taxation, which is not permissible.
Key Evidence and Findings
The court relied on the factual matrix that the telecom companies had already paid the service tax on the gross amount of the SIM cards. This was a crucial piece of evidence that supported the appellant's claim that their activity was merely a sale transaction and not a service provision.
Application of Law to Facts
Applying the law to the facts, the court concluded that the appellant's activities did not fall under the definition of 'Business Auxiliary Services' as defined in the Finance Act, 1994. The court applied the principle that when the primary service provider (telecom companies) has discharged the service tax, the intermediary (appellant) should not be taxed again for the same transaction.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The court considered the arguments from both sides. The appellant argued that their activity was a sale and not a service, supported by various precedents. The Revenue, on the other hand, maintained that the appellant provided auxiliary services. The court found the appellant's argument more persuasive, given the existing legal precedents and the principle against double taxation.
Conclusions
The court concluded that the appellant was not liable to pay service tax under the category of 'Business Auxiliary Services' for the sale of SIM cards, as the tax liability had already been discharged by the telecom companies.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning
"...purchase and sale of SIM Cards by franchisee/distributors appointed by telecom companies not leviable to Service Tax under category of Business Auxiliary Service especially when such companies already discharged service tax on gross amount of Such SIM cards and charging any further service tax on same amount would lead to double taxation."
Core Principles Established
The judgment establishes that double taxation is not permissible, and when a primary service provider has discharged the service tax liability on a transaction, intermediaries involved in the sale of such goods are not liable to pay service tax again under 'Business Auxiliary Services.'
Final Determinations on Each Issue
The final determination was that the appellant's appeal was allowed, and they were not liable for service tax for the sale of SIM cards. The court granted consequential relief as per law, effectively overturning the previous orders that had imposed tax liability on the appellant.
Levy of service tax - Business Auxiliary Services - activity of distributing and selling SIM Cards and Air Time Scratch Cards by the appellant - HELD THAT:- The issue is no more res integra and has been decided in favour of the assessees in a number of judgments. This Bench in the case of Jalandhar Sales vs. Commissioner of CE & ST, Ludhiana [2024 (5) TMI 561 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] has held that 'the tribunal has held that the activity of purchase and sale of SIM card belonging to BSNL where BSNL discharged the service tax on the full value of the SIM cards, does not amount to providing business auxiliary services and confirmation of demand on the distributor for the second time is not called as per Section 65(19) and 65(105) (zzb) of Finance Act, 1994.'
Conclusion - Appellant are not liable for service tax for the sale of SIM cards.
Appeal allowed.
Issues: Whether, on partial debonding of a 100% Export Oriented Undertaking, the excise duty foregone on duty-free indigenous goods lying in stock could be paid from legally availed Cenvat credit instead of in cash.
Analysis: The petitioners had validly accumulated Cenvat credit and sought to use it for discharging the excise duty liability arising on debonding. The relevant notifications and the Cenvat scheme did not impose a requirement that such amount must necessarily be paid in cash. The distinction between customs duty on imported goods and excise duty on indigenous goods was recognised, and the Court also relied on the settled principle that validly availed credit is indefeasible and available for utilisation. The Court further noted that similarly situated assessees had been permitted to discharge such liability from Cenvat credit, and that forcing cash payment would serve no legal purpose.
Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to pay the excise duty foregone from legally availed Cenvat credit, and the departmental insistence on cash payment was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned demand requiring cash payment was quashed, and the petition succeeded to the extent of permitting utilisation of Cenvat credit for the debonding-related excise liability.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a validly availed Cenvat credit is available and the governing scheme does not expressly require cash payment, the credit may be used to discharge the excise duty liability arising on debonding of a 100% EOU.
Debonding from an Export Oriented Unit (EOU) scheme - insistence by the respondent authorities on payment of excise duty in cash, instead of utilizing Cenvat credit - whether the petitioners can be permitted to pay an amount equal to the excise duty leviable on the goods lying with the petitioners at the manufacturing plant proposed to be debonded, from the Cenvat credit account of the company? - HELD THAT:- Partial debonding of an unit from the existing EOU is permissible under EOU Scheme, inasmuch as, there is no bar to such debonding, that has been brought to the notice of this Court.
In case of Eicher Motors Ltd. [1999 (1) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT], it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that 'a right accrued to the assessee on the date when they paid the tax on the raw materials or the inputs and that right would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed. Therefore, it becomes clear that Section 37 of the Act does not enable the authorities concerned to make a rule which is impugned herein and, therefore, we may have no hesitation to hold that the Rule cannot be applied to the goods manufactured prior to 16-3-1995 on which duty had been paid and credit facility thereto has been availed of for the purpose of manufacture of further goods.'
Rule 3(4) of the Cenvat Credit Rules was an enabling provision for utilization of Cenvat credit. This Court has held in CCE Vs. Shilpa Copper Wire Industries [2010 (2) TMI 711 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] that there is no difference between 100% export oriented unit and a normal DTA Unit as regards the Cenvat scheme.
In view of the provision of Section 142 (6) (a) of GST Act, also the petitioners will not be liable to pay the amount of excise duty in cash and would be entitled for refund of the outstanding credit in cash as per the aforesaid provisions.
It will be seen on plain reading of section that “any amount of credit found to be admissible to the claimant shall be refunded to him in cash”. Therefore, there can be no arguments to the contrary that the legitimately availed Cenvat credit could not be used for the payment of duties and therefore, the demand of the respondents to pay the excise duty on goods that would be manufactured in the concerned manufacturer plant of the petitioner -company after debonding has to be rejected outright.
Conclusion - The petitioners have made out a strong prima facie case, inasmuch as, when similarly situated assessees have been permitted to pay the excise duty foregone from the Cenvat credit account, there is no reason as to why the petitioners should be denied such benefit.
In view of the interim order dated 30.10.2015, since the “No Due Certificate” has been issued to the petitioners for debonding out of 100% EOU scheme upon the petitioners having been permitted to pay the excise duty forgone from the legally availed Cenvat credit account, this petition succeeds.
Issues: Whether the unutilized CENVAT credit could be treated as lapsed under Rule 11(3)(ii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 in the case of goods cleared under conditional exemption notifications, and whether the rebate claims on exported goods were therefore liable to be rejected.
Analysis: Rule 11(3)(ii) applies where the final product has been exempted absolutely under Section 5A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The exemption notifications involved were held to be conditional, not absolute, and the record showed that the petitioners had cleared goods by paying duty under one notification while availing credit on inputs, with the balance credit duly carried forward. The Court relied on the settled principle that validly earned credit is an indefeasible right and does not lapse merely because the assessee later operates under a conditional exemption scheme. On that construction, the departmental view that the credit had lapsed and could not be used for payment of duty on exported goods was unsustainable.
Conclusion: Rule 11(3)(ii) was held inapplicable, the carried-forward CENVAT credit was held not to have lapsed, and the rejection of the rebate claims was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded, and the rebate claims were directed to be sanctioned with interest.
Ratio Decidendi: Lapsing of CENVAT credit under Rule 11(3)(ii) is attracted only where the exemption is absolute; valid credit earned under a conditional exemption scheme remains available for utilisation and cannot be treated as lapsed in the absence of such absolute exemption.
Lapse of CENVAT credit - applicability of Rule 11(3)(ii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 - conditional exemption under Section 5A / Notification No.30/2004 - legally availed CENVAT credit is indefeasible and available for utilisation - sanction of rebate for exported goods
Applicability of Rule 11(3)(ii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 - conditional exemption under Section 5A / Notification No.30/2004 - lapse of CENVAT credit - Whether Rule 11(3)(ii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 applies to Notification No.30/2004 and causes lapse of CENVAT credit carried forward by the petitioners - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Rule 11(3)(ii), introduced by Notification No.10/2007, applies only where a final product has been "exempted absolutely" under Section 5A. Notification No.30/2004 is a conditional exemption which, by its proviso, does not apply where credit of duty on inputs or capital goods has been taken. A harmonious reading of the provisions shows that the words "exempted absolutely" in Rule 11(3)(ii) exclude application to Notification No.30/2004. Consequently the Revenue's reliance on Rule 11(3)(ii) to declare the petitioners' carried forward CENVAT credit lapsed was misplaced. The Court further relied on settled precedents that a credit validly availed under the earlier scheme cannot be taken away retrospectively so as to affect accrued rights. Having regard to these legal propositions, Rule 11(3)(ii) was held not attracted to the facts of the case and could not be used to nullify the petitioners' carried forward credit. [Paras 10, 11]
Rule 11(3)(ii) is not applicable to Notification No.30/2004 and therefore the carried forward CENVAT credit did not lapse.
Legally availed CENVAT credit is indefeasible and available for utilisation - sanction of rebate for exported goods - Whether the petitioners' accumulated CENVAT credit could be utilized to pay duty on goods exported and whether the rebate claims should be sanctioned - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the petitioners had lawfully availed CENVAT credit while clearing final product under Notification No.29/2004 and had reversed credit in respect of specified closing stocks as on 8.3.2006; the remaining balance was validly carried forward. Relying on authoritative decisions, the Court reiterated that credit validly taken under the earlier rules is as good as tax paid and does not lapse, and is available for adjustment against duties on excisable goods, including those exported. The Commissioner (Appeals) had rightly allowed the rebate claims; the Revisional Authority's setting aside of that order was unsustainable. In consequence, the Court directed sanction and payment of the rebate claims with interest from the date of filing until actual payment. [Paras 8, 11, 12]
The petitioners' accumulated CENVAT credit was available for payment of duty on exported goods; the rebate claims are to be sanctioned and paid with interest.
Final Conclusion: The revisional order dated 14.12.2020 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to sanction and pay the petitioners' rebate claims (as noted in the order) with interest at the rate ordered, and to disburse the amount within twelve weeks from receipt of the judgment.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Inclusion of Notional Cost in Assessable Value
Issue 2: Extended Period of Limitation
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment effectively clarifies the scope and application of valuation rules under the Central Excise Act, emphasizing the distinction between preliminary specifications and actual manufacturing inputs in determining assessable value.
Valuation of Central Excise Duty - inclusion of notional cost of drawings and designs supplied free of cost by Maruti to the vendors in the assessable value - HELD THAT:- It is pertinent to reproduce the findings of Division Bench of CESTAT Delhi in Denso India Private Limited [2024 (3) TMI 686 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] wherein, the Tribunal after considering the provisions relating to valuation of goods as provided under Section 4 of Central Excise Act and also the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2002 and few judgments of various courts on this issue has held that 'the notional cost of drawings and designs supplied free of cost by Maruti to the vendors cannot be included in the assessable value of the parts and components manufactured by vendors and cleared to Maruti for the purpose of payment of central excise duty.'
The impugned orders are not sustainable in law - Appeal allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether the remand order required the assessing authority to confine itself to a specific direction and barred fresh examination of the issue of reversal of input tax credit on lubricant stock; (ii) whether input tax credit on lubricant stock was rightly reversed after the lubricant was notified as non-VAT goods for traders; (iii) whether the revisional court could interfere with the impugned orders in the absence of a challenge to the circular.
Issue (i): Whether the remand order required the assessing authority to confine itself to a specific direction and barred fresh examination of the issue of reversal of input tax credit on lubricant stock
Analysis: The remand order dated 24.10.2019 was read as directing a fresh decision after detailed inquiry and in accordance with law. The order did not impose a closed or restrictive direction on the assessing authority. On that basis, the subsequent assessment after remand was treated as within jurisdiction, and the tribunal's affirmation of that view was held not to be erroneous.
Conclusion: The remand was an open remand and the assessing authority was not barred from re-examining the issue.
Issue (ii): Whether input tax credit on lubricant stock was rightly reversed after the lubricant was notified as non-VAT goods for traders
Analysis: Input tax credit under the VAT scheme was available only in respect of taxable goods and was subject to reversal where credit had been wrongly claimed or became inadmissible. The notification and the departmental circular treated lubricant as taxable in the hands of manufacturer or importer, but non-VAT goods in the hands of a trader. Since the revisionist was a trader, the statutory scheme and the circular supported reversal of the credit on the closing stock of lubricant.
Conclusion: The reversal of input tax credit was upheld as lawful.
Issue (iii): Whether the revisional court could interfere with the impugned orders in the absence of a challenge to the circular
Analysis: The validity of the circular had not been challenged before the competent forum, and its legality could not be tested in revisional jurisdiction. In the absence of any legal infirmity in the orders below, no interference was called for.
Conclusion: No interference was warranted in revision.
Final Conclusion: The revisional challenge failed, and the questions of law were answered against the revisionist and in favour of the Revenue.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a remand order directs a fresh decision in accordance with law after inquiry, it constitutes an open remand and does not prevent the authority from re-examining the issue on merits; input tax credit may be reversed when it becomes inadmissible under the statutory scheme applicable to the dealer's status.
Reversal of Input Tax Credit on lubricant - jurisdiction to travel beyond the specific order of remand by the appellate authority - Rule 21(11) of UP VAT Rules -HELD THAT:- On perusal of the order passed by the appellate authority in first round of litigation as well as the judgement of the Full Bench of this Court in M/s Ram Dayal Harbilas [1979 (2) TMI 176 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT], it is clear that the remand order for passing afresh order in accordance with law is an open remand order. The case in hand shows that the matter was not remanded by the first appellate authority with a specific direction as noted above and therefore, the order passed after remand by the assessing authority as well as the Tribunal cannot be said to be unjustified.
The record further shows that once the lubricant became taxable item at the hand of the manufacturer and importer and for the trader it become non VATable goods, and once the item is declared as non VAT goods in the hand of the trader as revisionist is also a trader, the judgements cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the revisionist in M/s Mercury Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. [1999 (12) TMI 829 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT LARGER BENCH], M/s Goodage Rubber Works [2003 (4) TMI 531 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] and Indra Industries [2000 (1) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT] that the circular will influence the same, will be of no help to the revisionist.
Further, the record shows that the revisionist, in its wisdom, has not challenged the validity of the circular dated 17.01.2014 before any competent court. Under the revisional jurisdiction, the validity of the circular cannot be tested.
Conclusion - The court established that an open remand order allows for a fresh determination of issues without specific restrictions, and the classification of goods impacts their VAT status and ITC claims.
Revision dismissed.
Issues: Whether the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be nullified in revision on the basis of a compromise entered into between the parties.
Analysis: The parties placed a joint compromise memo on record showing settlement of the cheque liability and payment of the agreed amount to the complainant. Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act gives overriding effect to compounding of offences under that Act, and the offence under Section 138 is compoundable at any stage. The Court held that the revisional court can, in an appropriate case, give effect to a genuine compromise to secure the ends of justice, and that the settlement in the present case justified compounding notwithstanding the earlier concurrent conviction.
Conclusion: Yes. The conviction and sentence were liable to be annulled on the basis of the compromise, and the petitioner was entitled to be treated as acquitted on compounding.
Final Conclusion: The compromise between the parties was accepted and the conviction and sentence for the cheque dishonour offence were set aside, resulting in the petitioner's acquittal.
Ratio Decidendi: An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act may be compounded at any stage, including in revision, and once a genuine settlement is recorded, the conviction can be annulled by giving effect to Section 147 notwithstanding the general scheme of compounding under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Dishonour of Cheque - challenge to conviction and sentence - compromise reached between the parties - invocation of inherent powers of the High Court to compound the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act at the revisional stage - HELD THAT:- It is well settled that inherent power of the Court can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigants and nor a specific remedy as provided by the statute. It is also well settled that if an effective, alternative remedy is available, the High Court will not exercise its inherent power, especially when the Revision Petitioner may not have availed of that remedy - This Court can always take note of any miscarriage of justice and prevent the same by exercising its power. These powers are neither limited, nor curtailed by any other provision of the Code or Act. However, such inherent powers are to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
In the instant case, it is true that the appeal was dismissed and the conviction and sentence was upheld by the appellate court, but it cannot be lost sight of the fact that this Court has power to intervene in exercise of its power only with a view to do the substantial justice or to avoid a miscarriage and the spirit of compromise arrived at between the parties. This is perfectly justified and legal too.
In the instant case, the Revision Petitioner is invoking the inherent power of this court after dismissal of the appeal confirming his conviction and sentence - In the case of Krishan Vs. Krishnaveni [1997 (1) TMI 529 - SUPREME COURT], Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that though the inherent power of the High Court is very wide, yet the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously particularly in a case where the applicant is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under section 397 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may in its discretion prevent the abuse of process or miscarriage of justice by exercising its power.
Section 147 of NI Act begins with a non obstante clause and such clause is being used in a provision to communicate that the provision shall prevail despite anything to the contrary in any other or different legal provisions. So, in light of the compass provided, a dispute in the nature of complaint under section 138 of N.I. Act, can be settled by way of compromise irrespective of any other legislation including Cr.P.C. In general and section 320 (1)(2) or (6) of the Cr.P.C. in particular - Merely because the litigation has reached to a revisional stage or that even beyond that stage, the nature and character of the offence would not change automatically and it would be wrong to hold that at revisional stage, the nature of offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act should be treated as if the same is falling under table-II of Section 320 IPC.
The court is inclined to hold accordingly only because there is no formal embargo in section 147 of the N.I. Act. This principle would not help any convict in any other law where other applicable independent provisions are existing as the offence punishable under section 138 of the N.I. Act is distinctly different from the normal offences made punishable under Chapter XVII of IPC (i.e. the offences qua property).
Conclusion - The conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be annulled based on the compromise reached between the parties. The inherent powers of the court were appropriately invoked to secure the ends of justice.
The conviction and sentence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in C.C.No.366 of 2013 stands annulled as this Court intends, otherwise to secure the ends of justice - the present Criminal Revision Case is disposed of.
TaxTMI