Issues: (i) Whether the departmental appeal was maintainable despite the monetary limit in the applicable circular; (ii) whether penalty could be imposed for non-completion of Part B of the e-way bill without an established intention to evade tax.

Issue (i): Whether the departmental appeal was maintainable despite the monetary limit in the applicable circular.

Analysis: The circular excepted cases which, in the Commissioner's opinion, required contest in the interest of justice or revenue. Where an appeal is based on that opinion, the Commissioner need not state its grounds or reasons, and the opinion cannot be challenged.

Conclusion: The monetary-limit objection was rejected, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty could be imposed for non-completion of Part B of the e-way bill without an established intention to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 129 of the GST enactments was applied in light of the principle that mens rea is necessary for a penalty where the violation is technical. The transaction was supported by genuine commercial documents, and the e-invoice was generated on the portal before movement. Neither the penalty order nor the departmental grounds identified an intention to evade tax.

Conclusion: The penalty could not be sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee remains relieved of the penalty despite rejection of the monetary-limit objection.

Ratio Decidendi: A technical e-way bill violation alone cannot sustain a penalty under section 129 without an intention to evade tax.

Issues: Whether the penalty and appellate orders could be sustained without adequate verification of the transactions and an effective opportunity for the taxpayer to be heard.

Analysis: The appellate authority had not adequately examined whether the taxpayer discharged the burden of substantiating the transactions, while the original proceedings were ex parte. Closure of the premises after the claimed discontinuance of business, subsequent cancellation of a supplier's registration, or the absence of a particular document was not conclusive by itself. The available evidence required collective evaluation, and an effective hearing was necessary to permit the taxpayer to respond and produce supporting records.

Conclusion: Neither order could be sustained. The genuineness of the transactions and ultimate penalty liability remain undecided.

Ratio Decidendi: A finding of fictitious transactions requires evaluation of the available evidence as a whole; where material facts remain unresolved following ex parte proceedings, an effective hearing is necessary before an adverse finding.

Issues: Whether non-consecutive tax invoice numbering warrants detention or a penalty under section 129, or a general penalty under section 125.

Analysis: Rule 46 requires consecutive invoice numbering. The interstate movement was supported by valid documents, and the quantity and description of the goods matched. No other discrepancy, unaccounted transaction or tax evasion was alleged. The numbering lapse was treated as a technical irregularity in a revenue-neutral transaction. Section 125 was identified as the appropriate provision for a technical infraction, with deliberate noncompliance required for its imposition.

Conclusion: The numbering lapse did not justify detention or a penalty under section 129; a general penalty under section 125 was not established on the facts. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A technical invoice-numbering lapse, without a substantive contravention or tax evasion, does not justify detention and penalty for goods in transit.

Issues: (i) Whether a fraud-based penalty could be imposed when the notice proposed a non-fraud penalty; (ii) Whether undisputed transitional credit could be denied for late filing of a return caused by a departmental portal failure; (iii) Whether invocation of the fraud-based demand provision was justified.

Issue (i): Whether a fraud-based penalty could be imposed when the notice proposed a non-fraud penalty.

Analysis: The notice proposed a penalty under section 122(2)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, while the authorities applied section 122(2)(b) read with section 74. Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of a demand on grounds not specified in the notice. The notice also combined a fraud-based demand provision with a non-fraud penalty provision.

Conclusion: The fraud-based penalty was impermissible.

Issue (ii): Whether undisputed transitional credit could be denied for late filing of a return caused by a departmental portal failure.

Analysis: Section 140 requires the relevant returns for the six months preceding the appointed date, while Rule 117 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 provides for the transitional declaration. The credit balance and timely declaration were undisputed. A departmental portal failure prevented filing of one return despite diligent efforts, and the return was filed at the first available opportunity. The principle that law does not compel the impossible and the concept of substantial compliance informed the interpretation of the filing requirement.

Conclusion: The transitional credit was admissible.

Issue (iii): Whether invocation of the fraud-based demand provision was justified.

Analysis: Section 74 requires fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax, supported by foundational facts in the notice. The filing difficulty had been disclosed to the department, and the notice identified no supporting facts or undisclosed information. Mere perceived wilfulness did not establish the requisite intent. A subsequent GST instruction requiring supporting evidence in the notice was treated as consistent with that interpretation.

Conclusion: Invocation of section 74 was unjustified.

Final Conclusion: The transitional credit remains available, with consequential relief from the associated interest and penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: Otherwise admissible transitional credit cannot be denied for delayed filing of a required return where a diligent taxpayer is prevented from timely filing by a departmental portal failure and files at the first available opportunity.

Issues: (i) Whether the return mismatch and non-production of certificates justified denial of input tax credit for the relevant period. (ii) Whether integrated-tax credit on an inter-State supply was wrongly availed when recorded under central and state tax heads.

Issue (i): Whether the return mismatch and non-production of certificates justified denial of input tax credit for the relevant period.

Analysis: Section 16 required possession of an invoice, receipt of services, actual payment of the tax to the Government and furnishing of a return; Section 155 placed the burden of proving eligibility on the claimant. The later invoice-reflection requirement did not apply to the relevant period. The record included the invoices' integrated-tax entries in GSTR-2A, reconciliation and bank records, with no material showing non-payment by the supplier. The circular prescribed certificates as a means of verification, not an additional eligibility condition. Its certificate mechanism addressed specified supplier-reporting discrepancies and was not engaged where the integrated tax on the invoices was reflected in GSTR-2A. The prescribed preliminary inquiry into the invoices and statutory conditions was not shown to have been undertaken.

Conclusion: No. The mismatch and non-production of certificates did not justify denial of the credit. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether integrated-tax credit on an inter-State supply was wrongly availed when recorded under central and state tax heads.

Analysis: Supplies by a special economic zone unit are treated as inter-State supplies, while Section 73 addresses wrongly availed credit. The integrated tax on the invoices corresponded to credit entered under the central and state tax heads. A reasoned higher-court construction of Section 73 was followed, and the statutory text was independently applied. The provisions concerning tax paid under the wrong head address tax paid on a transaction, not credit claimed by its recipient. The alleged state revenue loss was unquantified, and revenue neutrality was not established.

Conclusion: No. The credit was not wrongly availed merely because it was recorded under the central and state tax heads. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The credit remains available, the related interest and penalty cannot survive, and consequential pre-deposit relief, including statutory interest, follows.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory conditions for input tax credit are satisfied, inadvertent reporting of eligible integrated-tax credit under central and state tax heads does not constitute wrongful availment; a verification certificate under an administrative circular is not an independent condition of eligibility.

Outcome: The special leave petitions were dismissed on the grounds of delay and merits.

Issues: Whether penalties for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars are sustainable on estimated additions for alleged bogus purchases.

Analysis: The penalties were imposed under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on additions for alleged bogus purchases that were successively assessed at 100%, reduced to 5% and ultimately sustained at 6%. Judicial discipline and consistency required adherence to coordinate-bench decisions on identical estimated additions, in the absence of distinguishing features or a subsequent contrary ruling.

Conclusion: The penalties on the estimated additions are unsustainable and must be deleted.

Issues: Whether the belated suspension of a customs broker's licence pending inquiry was justified.

Analysis: Regulation 16 of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 provides for immediate suspension pending inquiry; Regulation 17 governs disciplinary proceedings. Preventive suspension requires a demonstrated need for urgent action. The licensing authority received an offence report containing allegations against the broker three to four months before suspension. The suspension order identified no additional information in the later documents establishing a need for urgency. Separate action for revocation remains subject to the applicable procedure and timelines.

Conclusion: The suspension was unjustified and is set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Immediate suspension of a customs broker's licence pending inquiry cannot be sustained where the authority delays acting on an offence report without demonstrating a subsequent need for urgent action.

Issues: (i) Whether confiscation of the tea and imposition of a redemption fine were justified; (ii) whether penalties on the owner and transporter were justified.

Issue (i): Whether confiscation of the tea and imposition of a redemption fine were justified.

Analysis: Section 119 of the Customs Act, 1962 concerns confiscation of goods used to conceal confiscable goods. The tea was in the vehicle's rear, while the contraband was recovered from the driver's cabin. The evidence did not establish that the tea was dispatched as a guise for moving the contraband.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessees: the confiscation and redemption fine are set aside. The recovered fine is to be refunded with interest.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties on the owner and transporter were justified.

Analysis: Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 governs penalties relating to goods liable to confiscation. The driver's immediate statement and the call records did not implicate either appellant. The driver had been engaged by the vehicle owner, and defects in transport documents did not provide cohesive evidence of the appellants' involvement. Revenue was required to provide cogent evidence linking them to the alleged perpetrators.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessees: the penalties on both appellants are set aside.

Final Conclusion: The tea and the appellants are relieved of the challenged confiscation, fine and penalties, with refund of the recovered fine and interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Co-transportation of legitimate goods with contraband, without cogent evidence of a connection, is insufficient to establish their use as concealment or justify penalties against their owner or transporter.

Issues: (i) Whether the personal-guarantor insolvency application was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether resignation and subsequent changes to credit arrangements discharged the earlier guarantee by novation; (iii) Whether disputed signatures on later documents warranted rejecting or staying the insolvency application; (iv) Whether non-enforcement of collateral discharged the guarantor.

Issue (i): Whether the personal-guarantor insolvency application was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 18 of the Limitation Act provides for a fresh limitation period following a written acknowledgment of subsisting liability made before expiry of the existing period. The borrower's settlement proposals in 2018 and 2021 were made within the respective running periods; rejection of a proposal does not itself negate an acknowledgment. The guarantee made acknowledgments by the borrower or its authorised agent binding on the guarantor. A surety's liability is co-extensive with the principal debtor's unless the contract otherwise provides.

Conclusion: The application was not barred by limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether resignation and subsequent changes to credit arrangements discharged the earlier guarantee by novation.

Analysis: Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act addresses substitution of a contract, while Section 133 addresses discharge of a surety following variation without consent. The admitted continuing guarantee expressly preserved the guarantor's obligations despite variations to the loan or security documents. Resignation from directorship and revised credit facilities did not establish an agreement substituting the earlier guarantee or a release from it.

Conclusion: The earlier guarantee was not discharged by novation.

Issue (iii): Whether disputed signatures on later documents warranted rejecting or staying the insolvency application.

Analysis: The guarantor bore the burden of proving forgery. Absence from the bank's attendance records was not conclusive, and the private forensic report was not accepted as proof. Insolvency proceedings are summary in nature; the admitted earlier guarantees provided an independent basis for establishing debt and default.

Conclusion: The disputed signatures did not warrant rejection or stay of the insolvency application. Their authenticity remains for appropriate proceedings.

Issue (iv): Whether non-enforcement of collateral discharged the guarantor.

Analysis: Sections 134 and 139 of the Indian Contract Act require the relevant conditions for discharge, including release of the principal debtor or impairment of the surety's remedies, to be established. The material did not show that the securities were lost, surrendered or impaired, or that the principal debtor was released.

Conclusion: Non-enforcement of the collateral did not discharge the guarantor.

Final Conclusion: The admitted earlier guarantee remained enforceable, and the challenges did not displace the basis for personal-guarantor insolvency proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A written acknowledgment of a subsisting debt made within limitation by a borrower extends time against a guarantor where the guarantee makes the borrower's acknowledgment binding on the guarantor.

Issues: Whether a forensic audit of the creditor's records could be directed to ascertain when the corporate debtor's security deposit was appropriated.

Analysis: The creditor gave conflicting dates for appropriation, one before commencement of the insolvency resolution process and the other during the moratorium. The dispute required verification of relevant accounting records and electronic data. The audit was confined to determining the actual date of appropriation.

Conclusion: The limited forensic audit was permissible.

Ratio Decidendi: A limited forensic audit may be directed to verify the date of appropriation of a corporate debtor's security deposit where the creditor gives conflicting dates material to the insolvency process.

Issues: (i) Whether the corporate applicant fraudulently or maliciously initiated insolvency proceedings, warranting recall and a penalty; (ii) whether the initiation of insolvency proceedings was validly authorised; (iii) whether non-joinder of the resolution applicant or approval of its plan by the committee of creditors prevented recall of the insolvency admission order.

Issue (i): Whether the corporate applicant fraudulently or maliciously initiated insolvency proceedings, warranting recall and a penalty.

Analysis: Sections 10 and 65 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 require a truthful disclosure of liabilities and address proceedings initiated fraudulently or maliciously for a purpose other than bona fide insolvency resolution. A recent decree was omitted from the application, and its proximity to the authorising resolution and filing supported an inference of deliberate concealment. A further decree was also omitted. The absence of disclosed recovery steps for a substantial write-off, disputed statutory amounts and doubtful corporate authorisation added to the evidence of improper purpose. A delayed creditor claim could not cure concealment at initiation.

Conclusion: The proceedings were fraudulently and maliciously initiated. Recall of the admission order, termination of the process and the Rs. 5 lakh penalty were upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the initiation of insolvency proceedings was validly authorised.

Analysis: The dispute concerned whether the persons who convened the meeting continued to hold office, not merely a failure to file an appointment form. The record did not establish regularisation of the directors relied upon; one was recorded as having ceased before the meeting. Section 176 of the Companies Act, 2013 did not protect acts performed after the company knew that an appointment had terminated.

Conclusion: The meeting and special resolution authorising initiation were invalid.

Issue (iii): Whether non-joinder of the resolution applicant or approval of its plan by the committee of creditors prevented recall of the insolvency admission order.

Analysis: Under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, a resolution plan becomes binding upon approval by the adjudicating authority. The plan had received committee approval but not adjudicating authority approval. The resolution applicant was fully heard on appeal, leaving no prejudice from its earlier non-joinder. Fraud at initiation affected the authority to continue the process; the proposed revision and party consent arose subsequently.

Conclusion: Neither non-joinder nor committee approval prevented recall. Subsequent consent could not sustain the process or the plan.

Final Conclusion: The corporate debtor remains restored to its pre-insolvency position, and creditors may pursue their claims in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: An insolvency process initiated through fraudulent concealment cannot be sustained by subsequent committee approval of a resolution plan or consent of the parties.

Issues: (i) Whether approval of a resolution plan and partial supply of records discharged the suspended management's duty to cooperate; (ii) Whether costs for non-cooperation could be sustained in proceedings initiated under Section 19(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (i): Whether approval of a resolution plan and partial supply of records discharged the suspended management's duty to cooperate.

Analysis: Section 19 imposes a continuing duty to assist and cooperate with the resolution professional. Approval by the committee of creditors is a commercial decision, and resolution may proceed using information obtained from other sources. The assessment of compliance drew on the list of outstanding documents and the finding that the appellant's statements were incorrect.

Conclusion: No. Plan approval and partial disclosure did not discharge the duty to cooperate; non-cooperation was established.

Issue (ii): Whether costs for non-cooperation could be sustained in proceedings initiated under Section 19(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Section 19(2) enables the resolution professional to seek directions but does not itself provide for costs. Section 60(5) of the Code and Rule 11 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 provide the source of the adjudicating authority's power to impose costs for conduct in proceedings. Section 70 provides for punishment for misconduct during insolvency resolution without displacing that power. An incorrect reference to an enabling provision does not invalidate an order if the power exists under another source of law.

Conclusion: Yes. The costs imposed on the appellant for non-cooperation were sustained.

Final Conclusion: The continuing cooperation obligation remains enforceable through directions and the adjudicating authority's independently sourced power to impose costs.

Ratio Decidendi: A wrong citation of an enabling provision does not invalidate a costs order if the power exercised is otherwise available in law.

Outcome: Delay was condoned and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. Pending applications were disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether the clearances of separately constituted units could be clubbed for SSI exemption? (ii) Whether clandestine manufacture and removal were established by electronic records and other evidence? (iii) Whether the personal penalties under Rule 26 were sustainable?

Issue (i): Whether the clearances of separately constituted units could be clubbed for SSI exemption?

Analysis: Notification No. 8/2003-CE governs the exemption based on clearance value. Clubbing requires an assessment of the evidence as a whole to determine whether the units operated as a single manufacturer. Family relationships and shared facilities, marketing or transport are not independently conclusive; financial flow-back is relevant but not indispensable in every case. The alleged inter-unit financial arrangements were not adequately verified, and the production, electricity and brand evidence did not demonstrate that the units lacked independent operations.

Conclusion: The units' clearances could not be clubbed for SSI exemption.

Issue (ii): Whether clandestine manufacture and removal were established by electronic records and other evidence?

Analysis: Section 36B of the Central Excise Act governs the admissibility of electronic printouts. Compliance with its certification requirements and the source, extraction and chain of custody of the data were not established; a signature on the printouts did not cure those deficiencies. The adjudication also did not adequately address the safeguards under Section 9D for reliance on statements. The alleged parallel accounts lacked sufficient independent corroboration of actual manufacture, removal and sale.

Conclusion: Clandestine manufacture and removal were not established, and the associated duty demand and appropriation were unsustainable.

Issue (iii): Whether the personal penalties under Rule 26 were sustainable?

Analysis: Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules requires conduct satisfying the applicable provision. The notice and adjudication did not adequately identify such conduct by either individual; association with the concerns and an unspecified allegation of assistance were insufficient.

Conclusion: The personal penalties were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: Both duty demands, the related appropriation, interest and penalties were set aside, with consequential relief in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Clubbing the clearances of separately constituted units requires a cumulative evidentiary showing that they operated as a single manufacturer; family ties and shared facilities alone are insufficient.

Issues: (i) Whether credit-linked demands could be sustained despite reversal of proportionate CENVAT credit and failure to verify the amount as directed on remand; (ii) whether the extended limitation period applies to the demand on goods cleared at concessional duty rates; (iii) whether penalties on the manufacturer and its director are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether credit-linked demands could be sustained despite reversal of proportionate CENVAT credit and failure to verify the amount as directed on remand.

Analysis: Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 gives an option to the assessee, and reversal of proportionate credit is treated as non-availment. The adjudicating authority reapplied Rule 6 without verifying the quantum of reversal as directed, contrary to judicial discipline.

Conclusion: The credit-linked demands cannot be sustained on the basis adopted in the impugned order. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period applies to the demand on goods cleared at concessional duty rates.

Analysis: The assessee regularly filed declarations and returns and was audited. The reasoning excluding the extended period for the classification demand applied equally to the concessional-rate demand.

Conclusion: The extended period does not apply, and the demand is confined to the normal period. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties on the manufacturer and its director are sustainable.

Analysis: There was no allegation or evidence of mens rea, and the same reasoning applied to the director.

Conclusion: All penalties on the assessee and its director are set aside.

Final Conclusion: Credit reversal is recognised, surviving demands are confined to the normal period with cum-duty benefit, and no penalties remain.

Ratio Decidendi: Reversal of proportionate CENVAT credit is treated as non-availment of that credit.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner should be granted anticipatory bail; (ii) whether the tax-department reporting directions were appropriate in the bail proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner should be granted anticipatory bail.

Analysis: The allegations arose from an advance for a property purchase and dishonoured cheques. On a prima facie assessment, the transaction appeared commercial and the criminal proceedings appeared to be a strong-arm tactic. No proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act or civil recovery proceedings had been brought to the Court's notice.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was granted in favour of the petitioner, subject to conditions.

Issue (ii): Whether the tax-department reporting directions were appropriate in the bail proceedings.

Analysis: Bail proceedings concern the accused's culpability. Tax authorities have mechanisms to address evasion, and a court deciding bail should not assume an adversarial role against the accused absent apparent and compelling circumstances.

Conclusion: The tax-department reporting directions were inappropriate in the bail proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner received protection from arrest on conditions; the underlying criminal allegations remain to be determined.

Issues: (i) Whether denial of a personal hearing before an adverse tax demand breached Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and was cured in first appeal; (ii) Whether the alleged excess input tax credit could be sustained on the existing record without verification of returns, books of account, and reconciliation.

Issue (i): Whether denial of a personal hearing before an adverse tax demand breached Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and was cured in first appeal.

Analysis: Section 75(4) mandates an opportunity of personal hearing where an adverse decision is contemplated. Receipt of notices and submission of a written reply do not substitute this separate statutory right. The first appellate order adopted the departmental figures without independently addressing the GSTR-9C, books of account, or return reconciliation; it therefore did not cure the breach of principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: Denial of a personal hearing breached Section 75(4) and was not cured in first appeal. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged excess input tax credit could be sustained on the existing record without verification of returns, books of account, and reconciliation.

Analysis: The finding of excess credit proceeded on an unverified assumption that reverse-charge credit of Rs. 5,24,259 was included in Table 4(A)(5) of GSTR-3B. The relevant monthly returns had not been verified, the comparison with GSTR-9 disclosed a different mismatch, the alleged admission of excess credit was unsupported by the record, and the books and reconciliation explaining a possible error in GSTR-9 were not examined. Section 155 places the burden of proving input tax credit on the claimant, requiring production and verification of books, invoices, returns, and relevant reverse-charge records. Section 44 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 80 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules do not provide for online alteration of a filed annual return; a bona fide error in the return consequently required factual verification rather than outright rejection. Section 113(1) authorises fresh adjudication after additional evidence is considered.

Conclusion: The existing finding of excess input tax credit and the consequential demand were unsustainable; whether any excess credit was actually availed was left undecided for fresh adjudication. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The orders sustaining the disputed tax, interest, and penalty were annulled, and the original authority must determine the matter afresh within the confines of the show-cause notice after granting a meaningful hearing and verifying the relevant records.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an adverse GST demand rests on a contested mismatch between returns, the taxpayer must receive a mandatory personal hearing and a meaningful opportunity to establish input tax credit through underlying records; a return mismatch alone cannot sustain the demand.

Issues: (i) Whether a penalty under section 129(1) can be sustained where the show-cause notice does not specify the provisions of the Act or Rules alleged to have been contravened; (ii) Whether penalty under section 129(1) is leviable on goods sent for job work when the job-work e-way bill was generated after interception.

Issue (i): Whether a penalty under section 129(1) can be sustained where the show-cause notice does not specify the provisions of the Act or Rules alleged to have been contravened.

Analysis: Section 129(1) applies only where goods are transported or stored in transit in contravention of identified provisions of the Act or Rules. The show-cause notice merely alleged failure to produce documents for unloading at a different location, without identifying any statutory provision or rule contravened. The original order subsequently relied upon provisions relating to job work, tax invoices and transport documents that were absent from the notice. A notice must define the scope of adjudication and afford a meaningful opportunity to answer the precise allegations; an unstated statutory breach cannot subsequently be used to sustain the demand.

Conclusion: Penalty under section 129(1) could not be imposed without specifying the contravened statutory provisions or rules in the show-cause notice, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under section 129(1) is leviable on goods sent for job work when the job-work e-way bill was generated after interception.

Analysis: The contemporaneous documents and the findings in the original order established that the goods were sent for job work, and their authenticity was not disputed. Section 143(1) permits a principal to send inputs or capital goods to a job worker without payment of tax. A delay in generating the job-work e-way bill could not alter the accepted nature of the transaction into a taxable supply. Since no tax was payable on goods sent for job work, the tax-linked penalty under section 129(1) was not leviable.

Conclusion: No penalty under section 129(1) was leviable on the goods sent for job work, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax and penalty proceedings lacked valid statutory notice and were independently unsustainable because the goods were moved without tax for job work.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under section 129(1) requires a properly particularised statutory contravention and tax payable on the goods; it cannot rest on an unspecified breach where the goods are established to have been moved without payment of tax for job work.

Issues: (i) Whether the claim of Rs. 84,500 as carried-forward input tax credit in TRAN-1 was admissible where the June 2017 Kerala VAT return disclosed NIL closing credit; (ii) Whether VAT paid on a truck chassis and engine purchased in June 2017, which became commercially usable after 1 July 2017, could be claimed as transitional credit through TRAN-1 despite non-filing of Form 25/Form 25B and non-reflection of the credit in Part E of the VAT return.

Issue (i): Whether the claim of Rs. 84,500 as carried-forward input tax credit in TRAN-1 was admissible where the June 2017 Kerala VAT return disclosed NIL closing credit.

Analysis: Section 140 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits transition of eligible credit available under the existing law. The June 2017 VAT return recorded NIL balance VAT credit, and no basis was furnished to establish the claimed balance of Rs. 84,500.

Conclusion: The claim of Rs. 84,500 was not admissible and its rejection was sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether VAT paid on a truck chassis and engine purchased in June 2017, which became commercially usable after 1 July 2017, could be claimed as transitional credit through TRAN-1 despite non-filing of Form 25/Form 25B and non-reflection of the credit in Part E of the VAT return.

Analysis: Section 11(2) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act and Rule 13(1B) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Rules governed credit on capital goods. The vehicle was not commercially usable during the VAT regime because body-building work remained incomplete. The prescribed period for the Form 25 application ran from commercial use rather than purchase. By the time the vehicle was ready for use, GST had commenced and TRAN-1 was the prescribed mechanism for transition. The invoice and purchase disclosures established substantive eligibility under both the erstwhile VAT regime and the GST regime; failure to obtain Form 25B before 30 June 2017 was a procedural impediment that did not extinguish that entitlement.

Conclusion: The question was answered in the affirmative: transitional credit of Rs. 1,75,916.79 on the truck chassis and engine was admissible, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Transitional credit remains available for eligible capital goods whose commercial use arose after the GST transition, while a claimed carry-forward balance unsupported by the final VAT return is unavailable.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural Form 25/Form 25B requirement cannot defeat otherwise admissible transitional input tax credit on capital goods where commercial use arose after transition to GST and substantive eligibility is established.