Issues: (i) Whether a temporary trustee could validly gift temple inam land to the Government and whether registration of that gift was legally effective; (ii) Whether the Government could continue as lessee of the temple land and the appropriate fair lease rent.

Issue (i): Whether a temporary trustee could validly gift temple inam land to the Government and whether registration of that gift was legally effective.

Analysis: The subject land was an inam granted for the deity's support and maintenance. Section 34(5) excluded such inams from Section 34, making Section 41 applicable. Section 41(1) declares a gift of such inam land null and void and permits governmental sanction for specified transactions other than a gift; therefore, a gift could not be validated by sanction. Section 22-A(1)(ii) of the Registration Act, 1908 also precluded registration of a transfer of religious-institution property without the requisite statutory sanction. Sections 23, 27 and 28 impose statutory custodianship upon the State and a fiduciary duty upon trustees, requiring administration under the prudent person standard for the institution's benefit. A gratuitous transfer of temple property is inconsistent with those obligations, and registration cannot validate a transaction declared void by the governing enactment.

Conclusion: The gift deed was void ab initio, its registration had no legal effect, and the subject land remained vested in the Temple.

Issue (ii): Whether the Government could continue as lessee of the temple land and the appropriate fair lease rent.

Analysis: Although the Government had constructed and was operating a Taluk Office on the land, its occupation could continue only as a lease from the Temple. Section 34-A requires fair rent determination with reference to prevailing market rental value. Applying the prescribed committee formula, including 225% of the guideline or market value under the applicable Government Order and the depreciated value of the building, produced a monthly rent of Rs. 31,000. Lease renewal and all future terms remain subject to a fresh determination in the best interests of the trust.

Conclusion: The Government may continue only as lessee, with monthly rent fixed at Rs. 31,000 from 08.03.2019, subject to triennial refixation and lease terms determined by the Temple for its benefit.

Final Conclusion: The Temple's ownership and control over its inam property were preserved; the State's occupation was confined to a compensatory leasehold arrangement, with arrears payable to the Temple and mandatory compliance with the statutory safeguards governing religious endowment property.

Ratio Decidendi: A gift of inam property dedicated to a religious institution is void where the governing statute expressly prohibits gifts and permits no sanction for them; registration cannot cure the statutory invalidity, and the State as statutory custodian cannot acquire such property gratuitously.

Issues: (i) Whether a bail order obtained without disclosure of parallel proceedings and refusals of release may remain final; (ii) Whether a direction to list a petition "two weeks hence" requires vacation to be excluded where the two-week period expires during court vacation.

Issue (i): Whether a bail order obtained without disclosure of parallel proceedings and refusals of release may remain final.

Analysis: While the prosecuting authority was not wholly unrepresented at the bail hearing, its standing counsel could not appear and material facts were not placed before the High Court. The accused pursued successive and parallel remedies for bail or release before the Sessions Court, the High Court and the writ court, without disclosing the rejection of bail and refusal of ad-interim release when seeking urgent listing of the pending bail petition. This conduct amounted to forum shopping, suppression of material facts and abuse of process, defeating the uberrima fides required for discretionary bail.

Conclusion: The final disposal of the bail petition was set aside and the petition was revived for fresh consideration on merits; the accused shall remain on interim bail on the earlier terms pending further orders.

Issue (ii): Whether a direction to list a petition "two weeks hence" requires vacation to be excluded where the two-week period expires during court vacation.

Analysis: A general direction for listing after two weeks does not ordinarily require vacation listing where the expiry falls during a court vacation, unless the matter is made returnable on a specific vacation date or listing before the Vacation Bench is directed.

Conclusion: The two-week period should ordinarily be computed excluding the vacation period, subject to the applicable High Court rules.

Final Conclusion: The bail application requires a fresh and fully informed determination after completion of pleadings, while the stated approach to vacation listing is to be applied ordinarily.

Ratio Decidendi: A litigant seeking discretionary bail must disclose all parallel proceedings and material orders; suppression of such facts constitutes abuse of process warranting reconsideration of the bail determination.

Issues: (i) Whether transitional credit of CVD and additional duty on capital goods received after 1 July 2017 was admissible under Section 140(2); (ii) Whether central excise duty paid on goods cleared before GST but exported after 1 July 2017 was eligible for transitional credit; (iii) Whether interest was payable on inadmissible transitional credit; and (iv) Whether penalty for wrongful availment of the inadmissible credit was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether transitional credit of CVD and additional duty on capital goods received after 1 July 2017 was admissible under Section 140(2).

Analysis: Section 140(2) permits transition of unavailed CENVAT credit on capital goods that was not carried forward under the existing law, provided the credit was admissible under both the existing and GST regimes. Neither the provision nor Rule 117(2)(a) requires that credit must have been partly availed before the appointed day or restricts transition to fifty per cent of the eligible credit. The prescribed TRAN-1 particulars were furnished and the capital-goods credit fulfilled the statutory conditions.

Conclusion: The transitional credit of Rs. 2,90,845 is admissible under Section 140(2), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether central excise duty paid on goods cleared before GST but exported after 1 July 2017 was eligible for transitional credit.

Analysis: Table 7(a) concerns credit relating to inputs under specified categories of Section 140 and does not provide a residual route for transitioning central excise duty paid on goods cleared for export before GST. No provision of Section 140 authorises such duty to be converted into GST input tax credit. Section 174(2)(c) does not preserve a right to transitional credit where no such right had accrued under the existing law or the GST transitional framework.

Conclusion: The transitional credit of Rs. 6,99,004 is not admissible, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest was payable on inadmissible transitional credit.

Analysis: Interest follows the recoverability of wrongly availed input tax credit. Since the export-related transitional credit was inadmissible, interest is consequentially chargeable on that amount.

Conclusion: Interest is payable only on the inadmissible transitional credit, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty for wrongful availment of the inadmissible credit was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 73 applies to wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax credit in cases other than fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression. Upon determination of the inadmissible credit, Section 73(9) requires penalty at ten per cent of the tax determined; disclosure in TRAN-1 does not displace that consequence.

Conclusion: Penalty is sustainable at Rs. 69,900, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional framework preserves eligible unavailed capital-goods credit, but does not authorise conversion of central excise duty paid on pre-GST export clearances into GST credit.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 140(2) permits transition of eligible unavailed capital-goods credit not carried forward under the existing law, but transitional credit cannot be claimed where the statute provides no enabling category for the duty concerned.

Issues: (i) Validity of the appellate order for want of a reasoned determination of the appellant's submissions; (ii) Whether a notice under section 73 can be sustained where ineligible input tax credit is fully offset by excess output tax paid; (iii) Whether refund of excess output tax paid is subject to unjust enrichment; (iv) Sustainability of the sales-return demand where the adjudicating authority relied on a ground not stated in the show cause notice and credit/debit notes were not uploaded on the GST portal; (v) Sustainability of interest demand for delayed returns where the show cause notice lacked particulars and the quantified demand was unexplained.

Issue (i): Validity of the appellate order for want of a reasoned determination of the appellant's submissions.

Analysis: The appellate order rejected extensive submissions concerning tax set-off, credit/debit notes and delayed-return interest through a bare one-line observation. It did not address the material contentions or disclose any reasoned basis for confirming the demand. This failed the speaking-order requirement and breached the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The appellate order was invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a notice under section 73 can be sustained where ineligible input tax credit is fully offset by excess output tax paid.

Analysis: The excess output tax payment was undisputed and exceeded the disputed ineligible input tax credit. Section 73 is attracted only where tax remains unpaid or short paid, or credit is wrongly availed or utilised. Requiring payment of the disputed amount followed by a separate refund claim, despite an admitted excess payment, would defeat the permissible set-off of tax liability and produce no revenue loss.

Conclusion: No notice under section 73 lay where the admitted excess output tax payment fully offset the ineligible input tax credit; the related tax, interest and penalty demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether refund of excess output tax paid is subject to unjust enrichment.

Analysis: Excess output tax paid over the tax actually due was found to fall within the exception in section 54(8)(c). Accordingly, the statutory basis asserted for applying the test of unjust enrichment was unavailable.

Conclusion: Refund of excess output tax paid was not subject to the test of unjust enrichment, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Sustainability of the sales-return demand where the adjudicating authority relied on a ground not stated in the show cause notice and credit/debit notes were not uploaded on the GST portal.

Analysis: The show cause notice alleged absence of supporting documents, whereas the adjudication order confirmed the demand because the counterparty had not declared a debit note in its returns. The adjudication thereby travelled beyond the scope of the show cause notice. Further, for the disputed 2017-18 period, GSTR-2A was a reconciliation facility and portal declaration of the credit/debit notes was not mandatory; documents otherwise in order could not be invalidated merely for non-uploading.

Conclusion: The sales-return demand and consequential tax, interest and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Sustainability of interest demand for delayed returns where the show cause notice lacked particulars and the quantified demand was unexplained.

Analysis: The show cause notice did not identify the defaulting months, tax amounts, or period for which interest was claimed. Its stated interest amount also materially differed from the amount in the adjudication order without any disclosed basis. The demand lacked the specificity required by the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The interest demand for delayed filing of returns was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The asserted liabilities for tax, interest and penalty lacked legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 73 cannot be invoked where an admitted excess output tax payment fully offsets the disputed ineligible input tax credit and no net short payment of tax remains.

Issues: (i) Whether alleged excess input tax credit was sustainable when the updated GSTR-2A reconciliation, including import IGST credit, disclosed a surplus aggregate credit and IGST could offset CGST/SGST shortfalls; (ii) Whether the adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by denial of a personal hearing and failure to address the taxpayer's contentions.

Issue (i): Whether alleged excess input tax credit was sustainable when the updated GSTR-2A reconciliation, including import IGST credit, disclosed a surplus aggregate credit and IGST could offset CGST/SGST shortfalls.

Analysis: The reconciliation based on the latest GSTR-2A figures and IGST paid on imports was unrebutted and showed aggregate eligible credit exceeding the credit claimed. Section 49(5)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Kerala State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits surplus IGST credit, after payment of IGST liability, to be utilised towards CGST and SGST liabilities. The Fungibility of Input Tax Credit principle treats the electronic credit ledger as a unified resource for this purpose. Under Judicial Discipline, the applicable jurisdictional ruling on adjustment of IGST surplus against CGST/SGST shortfalls was required to be followed.

Conclusion: The alleged excess input tax credit was not sustainable; surplus IGST credit validly offset the CGST and SGST shortfalls, leaving no short payment of tax warranting proceedings under Section 73.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by denial of a personal hearing and failure to address the taxpayer's contentions.

Analysis: The original adjudication was passed without affording a Right to Personal Hearing and without considering the taxpayer's contentions. The appellate order mechanically affirmed the demand without analysing the contentions and evidence. Such adjudication breached the Principles of Natural Justice and the requirement of a Speaking Order.

Conclusion: The adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by breach of the Principles of Natural Justice and were null and void.

Final Conclusion: The alleged ITC mismatch had no factual or legal basis after complete reconciliation and permissible cross-utilisation of IGST credit, while the underlying proceedings were independently invalid for procedural unfairness.

Issues: (i) Whether a consolidated show cause notice and order covering multiple financial years is valid under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the disputed input tax credit demands are sustainable; (iii) Whether invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the consequential penalty are sustainable; (iv) Whether interest is payable under Section 50 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on tax determined as payable.

Issue (i): Whether a consolidated show cause notice and order covering multiple financial years is valid under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Sections 74(1), 74(2) and 74(10) prescribe the conditions and limitation for issuance of a demand notice and order, but do not require separate notices for each financial year. A consolidated notice covering more than one tax period is permissible where each period is within the prescribed limitation and the noticee suffers no prejudice to its right of defence or appeal.

Conclusion: A consolidated show cause notice and order for multiple financial years are valid. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the disputed input tax credit demands are sustainable.

Analysis: The prior-year input tax credit reflected in the subsequent year's return was not rejected on legal ineligibility, but for want of proof that the benefit had not already been granted. Verification of that factual position is required. The claims concerning payment under an incorrect tax head and credit availed under incorrect heads also require verification of revenue impact and compliance with Section 49 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 88A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017. A fair opportunity to furnish supporting evidence is required.

Conclusion: The three disputed input tax credit components require fresh factual verification and determination in accordance with law; no final tax liability is fixed on these components.

Issue (iii): Whether invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the consequential penalty are sustainable.

Analysis: Section 74 applies only where non-payment, short-payment, erroneous refund, or wrongful availment of input tax credit is attributable to fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. The show cause notice must disclose foundational facts supporting such allegations; mechanical recitation of those expressions is insufficient. The burden of proving mala fides lies on the Department. The relevant input tax credit particulars were disclosed in statutory returns, and the notice did not establish fraud, deliberate suppression, or mens rea to evade tax.

Conclusion: The confirmation of demand and penalty under Section 74 is set aside in favour of the assessee. Tax, interest and penalty, if any, shall be determined under Section 75(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 as if the notice had been issued under Section 73(1).

Issue (iv): Whether interest is payable under Section 50 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on tax determined as payable.

Analysis: Interest under Section 50 is a statutory consequence of tax validly determined as payable.

Conclusion: Interest is payable on the tax ultimately determined as payable. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Consolidation of tax periods does not invalidate the demand proceedings, but liability must be determined after factual verification under the ordinary demand framework, with statutory interest following the lawful determination of tax.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 74 can be invoked only where the show cause notice discloses foundational facts establishing fraud, wilful misstatement, or deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax; a bare allegation founded on disclosed return particulars is insufficient.

Issues: Whether the Appellate Authority could direct the adjudicating authority to verify reconciliation workings and delete input tax credit demand, interest and penalty to the extent of eligible credit.

Analysis: Section 107(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 empowers the Appellate Authority to make further inquiry and to confirm, modify or annul the appealed order, while expressly prohibiting it from referring the case back to the adjudicating authority. The conditional direction for verification and consequential deletion of demand required the adjudicating authority to perform the inquiry that the Appellate Authority itself was required to undertake. There was no dispute regarding the need to verify the taxpayer's reconciliation workings.

Conclusion: The referral to the adjudicating authority was impermissible under Section 107(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and the issue was decided in favour of Revenue.

Issues: Whether input tax credit proposed to be disallowed under Section 16(2)(aa) in the show-cause notice could be denied under Section 16(2)(c) on the ground of non-payment of tax by suppliers, merely because the latter provision was reproduced in the notice.

Analysis: The scope of the show-cause notice was confined to alleged non-compliance with Section 16(2)(aa), which was inapplicable to the relevant period. It contained no allegation or factual basis that tax on the disputed supplies had not actually been paid to the Government, as required for invoking Section 16(2)(c). The adjudication order nevertheless disallowed input tax credit on that distinct ground. Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of a demand on grounds other than those specified in the notice. A bare recital of a statutory provision, without identifying its contravention, does not give effective notice of a charge. Such substitution of the basis of demand also violates principles of natural justice. Section 160(1) does not cure a proceeding that is substantively inconsistent with the statutory requirements.

Conclusion: Confirmation of the demand under Section 16(2)(c) was outside the show-cause notice and invalid; mere reproduction of that provision did not constitute a charge or put the taxpayer on notice. The proceedings and demand were set aside.

Issues: Whether an airline is entitled to refund of GST paid on cancelled air tickets where the fare, including GST, was refunded to passengers and the corresponding credit notes could not be adjusted against output tax liability.

Analysis: Section 34(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits adjustment through credit notes, while Circular No. 137/07/2020-GST dated 13.04.2020 permits a refund claim under the category of excess payment of tax where no output liability exists for such adjustment. The ticket number and passenger details consistently linked the air ticket, tax invoice, refund voucher and credit note, and the billing settlement records corroborated the refund mechanism. These records sufficiently established that the fare and GST were returned to the respective passengers and that no incidence of tax was retained or passed on. As the transactions were predominantly business-to-consumer supplies, input tax credit reversal did not arise; the later amendment concerning recipient credit reversal was inapplicable to the relevant period.

Conclusion: The airline is entitled to refund of the GST relating to cancelled tickets, the documentary evidence establishes absence of unjust enrichment, and the refund claim was validly made as excess payment of tax.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand for the period up to 30 September 2016 was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether works-contract supplies to Sintex Prefab and Infra Ltd. and Sintex Industries Ltd. attracted service tax for the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 June 2017; (iii) Whether commission earned on Vodafone distributorship was exempt from service tax; and (iv) Whether VAT-paid supplies of plastic dustbins, portolet toilets and similar goods to local bodies and State Governments attracted service tax.

Issue (i): Whether the demand for the period up to 30 September 2016 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The show-cause notice was issued on 22 October 2021. The demand pertaining to the period found to be beyond the five-year extended limitation period could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The demand up to 30 September 2016 is time-barred and is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether works-contract supplies to Sintex Prefab and Infra Ltd. and Sintex Industries Ltd. attracted service tax for the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 June 2017.

Analysis: The taxable works-contract component was confined to the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 June 2017 and quantified at 33% of the gross amount received.

Conclusion: Service tax at 33% of the gross amount received, with interest, is payable for the specified period; no penalty is imposable.

Issue (iii): Whether commission earned on Vodafone distributorship was exempt from service tax.

Analysis: The commission from Vodafone distributorship fell within Serial No. 29(f) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012.

Conclusion: The commission is exempt from service tax and the entire demand on that account is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether VAT-paid supplies of plastic dustbins, portolet toilets and similar goods to local bodies and State Governments attracted service tax.

Analysis: The invoices established sale and supply of goods on which VAT had been paid, rather than provision of a taxable service.

Conclusion: The VAT-paid supplies of goods are not liable to service tax and the demand on that account is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Only the non-time-barred works-contract receipts remain chargeable to service tax with interest; the demands relating to Vodafone commission and VAT-paid supplies of goods do not survive, and no penalty is payable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where invoices establish a VAT-paid sale of goods rather than provision of a service, the related receipts are not chargeable to service tax.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns could be sustained where the cancellation proceedings were materially similar to an earlier decided case.

Analysis: The cancellation arose from non-filing of returns required under Section 39 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The matter was found to be factually similar to the previously decided case relied upon, and the assessee was held entitled to corresponding relief. Directions were also issued for filing overdue returns, payment of statutory dues, and computation of the limitation period under Sections 73(10) and 74(10) from the date of the order, subject to the stated treatment of financial year 2026-27.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was quashed in favour of the assessee, with consequential compliance directions.

Issues: Whether orders treating the assessee as an assessee in default for failure to deduct tax at source on external development charges under Section 194I could be sustained.

Analysis: Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) permit consequences for a person in default in deducting tax at source. The issue of deduction under Section 194I on external development charges paid to the development authority had already been conclusively settled by an earlier decision in favour of the assessee. The impugned original order and the consequential rejection of rectification were contrary to that binding determination. Relegating the assessee to the appellate remedy in these circumstances would be redundant and inefficacious.

Conclusion: The orders treating the assessee as in default and refusing rectification were illegal and were quashed; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) could be refused at the inception stage on the apprehension that accommodation charges might make the activities commercial; (ii) Whether approval under Section 80G(5)(iii) could be directed without an independent inquiry by the competent authority.

Issue (i): Whether registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) could be refused at the inception stage on the apprehension that accommodation charges might make the activities commercial.

Analysis: For initial registration, the relevant inquiry is into the stated objects, project report, and purpose for which the institution is established. Non-commencement of operations does not permit a conclusive presumption that activities will be commercial. Recovery of partial, subsidised, or concessional charges for accommodation or services does not by itself negate charitable character. The undertaking that units would not be sold also removed the apprehension of an outright-sale activity.

Conclusion: Registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) must be granted; decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether approval under Section 80G(5)(iii) could be directed without an independent inquiry by the competent authority.

Analysis: Registration under Section 12A entails a preliminary examination of objects, whereas Section 80G approval confers donor-related tax benefits and requires separate satisfaction of the statutory prerequisites under the third proviso to Section 80G(5). Acceptance of registration under Section 12A does not automatically require approval under Section 80G. The project proposal alone did not support an appellate direction granting Section 80G approval without the required inquiry by the competent authority.

Conclusion: The direction granting approval under Section 80G(5)(iii) is set aside, and the application requires fresh determination by the competent authority; decided in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: Initial charitable registration is to be granted, while approval enabling donor deductions remains subject to an independent statutory examination.

Ratio Decidendi: Approval under Section 80G cannot follow automatically from registration under Section 12A and requires an independent inquiry into the applicable statutory conditions.

Issues: (i) Allowability of expenditure on replacement of dies and moulds; (ii) Deduction under Section 35(1)(iv); (iii) Deduction under Section 35(2AB) for research and development expenditure; (iv) Deduction under Section 80-IA on notional profit from captive power generation; (v) Allowability of agency commissions paid to foreign agents; (vi) Depreciation rate for UPS and voltage stabilizers; (vii) Depreciation rate for temporary construction.

Issue (i): Allowability of expenditure on replacement of dies and moulds.

Analysis: Replacement dies and moulds attached to manufacturing machinery were treated as components necessary for restoring the machinery's specified output, rather than as independent plant and machinery. The expenditure consequently fell for consideration under Section 31 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: expenditure on replacement of dies and moulds is allowable.

Issue (ii): Deduction under Section 35(1)(iv).

Analysis: The issue was governed by the established treatment of the assessee's claim under Section 35(1)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which had sustained the corresponding finding of the Tribunal on materially similar facts.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the deduction under Section 35(1)(iv) is allowable.

Issue (iii): Deduction under Section 35(2AB) for research and development expenditure.

Analysis: The research and development claim, including the component relating to work-in-progress, was governed by the prior determination on identical facts under Section 35(2AB) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the deduction under Section 35(2AB) is allowable.

Issue (iv): Deduction under Section 80-IA on notional profit from captive power generation.

Analysis: The computation of profits from the captive power undertaking was governed by the applicable interpretation of Section 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the relevant departmental circular, as applied in the earlier decision on the same issue.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: deduction under Section 80-IA on notional profit from captive power generation is allowable.

Issue (v): Allowability of agency commissions paid to foreign agents.

Analysis: No variation in facts or legal position was shown from the earlier final determination concerning commissions paid to foreign agents, including the issue of their characterization under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the agency commissions are allowable.

Issue (vi): Depreciation rate for UPS and voltage stabilizers.

Analysis: UPS and voltage stabilizers used with computers were treated as integral computer-related equipment. The applicable rate was fixed consistently with the precedents governing depreciation on such equipment.

Conclusion: Partly in favour of the assessee: depreciation on UPS and voltage stabilizers is allowable at 60% instead of 15%.

Issue (vii): Depreciation rate for temporary construction.

Analysis: The temporary construction was a parking shed, for which the applicable depreciation rate under the prior determination was 10%, not 100%.

Conclusion: In favour of the Revenue: depreciation on the temporary construction is allowable only at 10%.

Final Conclusion: The deductions and allowances claimed by the assessee were sustained on the first five issues, depreciation on UPS and voltage stabilizers was confined to 60%, and depreciation on the temporary structure was restricted to 10%.

Issues: (i) Whether the applicants had locus standi for leave to appeal against a direction to register an FIR; (ii) Whether a person accused in a corruption case is entitled to a pre-registration hearing; (iii) Whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory before registration of an FIR in a corruption case where detailed material discloses a cognizable offence.

Issue (i): Whether the applicants had locus standi for leave to appeal against a direction to register an FIR.

Analysis: The direction was to register an FIR on information disclosing cognizable offences and did not adjudicate any individual legal right of the applicants. Registration of the FIR did not foreclose their remedies to seek its quashing under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before cognizance, or under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 thereafter. No prima facie legal injury establishing locus standi for appellate leave was shown.

Conclusion: The applicants were not entitled to leave to challenge the direction to register the FIR.

Issue (ii): Whether a person accused in a corruption case is entitled to a pre-registration hearing.

Analysis: The audi alteram partem rule does not confer on an accused public servant a right to be heard before registration of an FIR. A direction for registration based on material disclosing a cognizable offence is not an adjudication of guilt or of the accused person's legal rights.

Conclusion: An accused in a corruption case has no legal right to be heard before registration of an FIR.

Issue (iii): Whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory before registration of an FIR in a corruption case where detailed material discloses a cognizable offence.

Analysis: A preliminary inquiry may be desirable in corruption cases but is not mandatory where detailed and reasoned information, including material furnished under Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. In such circumstances, registration of an FIR may proceed without a preliminary inquiry.

Conclusion: The accused cannot demand a preliminary inquiry before registration of an FIR where the available material discloses cognizable corruption offences.

Final Conclusion: The direction to register and investigate the FIR on the material furnished remained legally unobstructed, without prejudice to the accused persons' independent remedies against the FIR or subsequent proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where credible material prima facie discloses a cognizable corruption offence, neither a preliminary inquiry nor a prior hearing to the suspected accused is a condition precedent to registration of an FIR.

Outcome: Delay condoned; review petitions dismissed; applications for oral hearing rejected; pending interlocutory applications disposed of.

Issues: Whether the assessee could be permitted to operate the locker and receive the jewellery kept therein when no tax demand or attachment subsisted.

Analysis: The block assessment had been completed, and the Revenue confirmed that no demand remained outstanding and that no attachment over the locker was in force. The Revenue also raised no objection to the assessee operating the locker in accordance with the bank's procedure and undertook to hand over the jewellery.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to operate the locker, and the jewellery was directed to be handed over to him.

Issues: Whether GST registration could be cancelled retrospectively from 2 July 2017 when the show-cause notice issued under Rule 21(a) did not propose retrospective cancellation.

Analysis: The show-cause notice alleged that no business was conducted from the declared place of business, but contained no indication that cancellation was proposed with retrospective effect. Cancellation from 2 July 2017 therefore exceeded the scope of the notice. The earlier cancellation for the same period had been revoked, and the subsequent penalty adjudication recorded that the input tax credit availed was genuine under Section 16 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: Retrospective cancellation without prior notice was unsustainable; the cancellation order was set aside, the registration was revived, and the show-cause notice was directed to be adjudicated afresh after the petitioner responds.

Issues: Whether the transfer applications relating to 450 appeals involving an identical question of law were required to be placed before the Principal Bench.

Analysis: The appeals raised a common question concerning GST on royalty payments under mining leases and consequential refund claims. Under the third proviso to Section 109(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with the notification dated 17.09.2026, the Principal Bench had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the common question.

Conclusion: The Principal Bench has exclusive jurisdiction over the 450 appeals, which shall be listed and heard before the appropriate Bench of the Principal Bench.

Issues: Whether an appeal remaining defective despite notice and repeated opportunities, coupled with the appellant's continued non-appearance, may be rejected under the Tribunal's inherent and procedural powers.

Analysis: Rule 24 of the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2025 permits the Bench to reject an appeal where notified defects remain unrectified after the prescribed scrutiny process. Rule 10 preserves the Tribunal's inherent powers to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process. Persistent failure to cure defects, absence on successive listings, and lack of any explanation demonstrated abandonment of the appellate proceedings. Retaining such defective proceedings would unjustifiably burden the Tribunal's docket.

Conclusion: The Tribunal may exercise its powers under Rules 10 and 24 to reject a defective appeal where the appellant fails to remove defects and abandons its prosecution; no opinion is expressed on the underlying merits.