Issues: (i) Whether the refund adjusted against the disputed demand before any stay was sought was required to be restored; (ii) Whether the subsequent adjustment of refund against the remaining disputed demand was lawful when more than 80% of the demand had already been recovered and the stay proceedings were pending.

Issue (i): Whether the refund adjusted against the disputed demand before any stay was sought was required to be restored.

Analysis: No stay application had been made before the Assessing Officer or the appellate authority before the earlier adjustment and recovery exceeding 80% of the demand. The assessee approached the Court after that recovery. The CBDT memoranda limiting recovery during pendency of appeal were therefore inapplicable. Though the adjustment without an opportunity of hearing was arbitrary, the lapse of more than three years weighed against ordering restitution.

Conclusion: Restoration of the earlier adjusted refund was declined, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the subsequent adjustment of refund against the remaining disputed demand was lawful when more than 80% of the demand had already been recovered and the stay proceedings were pending.

Analysis: The further adjustment was made while the writ petition and the stay application were pending, notwithstanding the assessee's representation that more than 80% of the demand had already been recovered. CBDT recovery instructions bind the Assessing Officer, and declaration of the assessee as in default does not deprive it of their benefit. No prior intimation under Section 245 was shown before the subsequent adjustment.

Conclusion: The subsequent recovery was a colourable and unlawful exercise of power; the adjusted amount was required to be refunded with applicable interest, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The later adjustment of refund was required to be restituted, while the earlier adjustment remained undisturbed; the pending statutory appeal was to be decided expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Where CBDT recovery instructions apply, tax authorities remain bound by them notwithstanding default status and cannot make a further refund adjustment without the requisite Section 245 intimation while a stay is pending after substantial recovery of the disputed demand.

Issues: (i) Whether inherent jurisdiction should be exercised to interfere with the trial Court's directions concerning supply of relied-upon documents under Sections 207 and 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (ii) Whether adverse remarks about the petitioner and the investigating officer warranted expunction; and (iii) Whether the standing requirement that the investigating officer attend every hearing should continue.

Issue (i): Whether inherent jurisdiction should be exercised to interfere with the trial Court's directions concerning supply of relied-upon documents under Sections 207 and 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is confined to cases of patent illegality or want of jurisdiction. The questions whether the best available copies had been supplied and whether particular documents remained unavailable were factual matters pending determination on the trial Court's record. The directions for supply of documents accord with the fair-trial safeguards underlying Sections 207 and 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, whose principles apply to complaints under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 after cognizance.

Conclusion: Interference with the substantive directions concerning supply of relied-upon documents was declined, and the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether adverse remarks about the petitioner and the investigating officer warranted expunction.

Analysis: The trial Court's record of what transpired at the hearing is conclusive, and any alleged misrecording must be brought before that Court. The impugned observations arose from repeated unmet assurances regarding document supply and were directed toward securing procedural compliance; they did not amount to findings on the bona fides or integrity of the officers concerned.

Conclusion: Expunction was declined, but the observations were clarified not to influence the document-supply determination or be used against the petitioner or its officers in other proceedings.

Issue (iii): Whether the standing requirement that the investigating officer attend every hearing should continue.

Analysis: The trial Court may require the investigating officer's attendance when necessary for case progress, including for clarifications concerning documents or digital devices. An unconditional requirement of attendance on every date, irrespective of necessity, was not required.

Conclusion: The standing attendance direction was modified; the investigating officer is required to appear physically or through permitted video-conferencing only where an order specifically requires attendance and states its purpose.

Final Conclusion: The trial Court's expedited process for completing document disclosure remains operative, while the investigating officer's attendance is confined to dates on which it is specifically required.

Ratio Decidendi: Inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked to pre-empt the trial Court's factual determination of compliance with document-disclosure requirements absent patent illegality or want of jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether absence of accusation in the scheduled offence bars prosecution for money-laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) Whether an auditor may prima facie be proceeded against as an "other officer" under Section 70 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; and (iii) Whether the prosecution complaint disclosed a prima facie case warranting refusal of quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether absence of accusation in the scheduled offence bars prosecution for money-laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Section 3 covers a person who directly or indirectly assists, participates in, or is involved with proceeds of crime, including their concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection as untainted property. The statutory explanation treats such activity as a continuing offence. A person who enters the transaction after commission of the scheduled offence may therefore be proceeded against where the scheduled offence subsists and the material indicates assistance in handling its proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: Absence of accusation in the scheduled offence does not bar prosecution under Section 3 where the person is prima facie connected with laundering the proceeds of a subsisting scheduled offence.

Issue (ii): Whether an auditor may prima facie be proceeded against as an "other officer" under Section 70 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Section 70 extends vicarious liability to directors, managers, secretaries, and other officers where the company's contravention is attributable to their consent, connivance, or neglect. The duties of an auditor under Section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 include scrutiny of accounts, transactions, loans, and advances. The material indicated that the auditor of family-controlled companies was allegedly connected with fictitious entries, diversion and layering of funds through shell entities. The auditor's appointment was also prima facie inconsistent with the disqualification prescribed by Section 141(3) of the Companies Act, 2013. Whether the alleged transactions occurred without knowledge remains a matter for trial.

Conclusion: An auditor may prima facie fall within the expression "other officer" under Section 70 and be proceeded against where material indicates involvement in, or connivance with, the company's laundering activity.

Issue (iii): Whether the prosecution complaint disclosed a prima facie case warranting refusal of quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings is exercisable sparingly and does not permit an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations. The complaint and investigation material prima facie indicated accommodation entries, diversion and layering of loan funds, and a commission allegedly earned for facilitating the transactions. These allegations disclosed an offence under the PMLA and required adjudication on evidence at trial.

Conclusion: The complaint disclosed a prima facie case, and no ground existed for quashing the proceedings at the preliminary stage.

Final Conclusion: The allegations concerning laundering of proceeds of crime and the accused's asserted role in the corporate transactions must be tested through trial.

Issues: (i) Whether the disallowance of input tax credit as time-barred under Section 16(4) was sustainable; (ii) Whether the assessment on the remaining issues, made without a personal hearing after portal-only notice, required remand.

Issue (i): Whether the disallowance of input tax credit as time-barred under Section 16(4) was sustainable.

Analysis: The limitation issue stood covered by an earlier common order that had quashed a departmental order on the same point.

Conclusion: The limitation-based disallowance of input tax credit was unsustainable; the assessment was quashed to that extent, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment on the remaining issues, made without a personal hearing after portal-only notice, required remand.

Analysis: Uploading a notice on the GST portal is a valid mode of service. However, where repeated portal communications receive no response, the officer must explore other prescribed modes under Section 169(1), preferably registered post, to secure effective service. Passing an ex parte assessment without such effort and without personal hearing amounts to empty formality and offends the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The assessment on the remaining issues was set aside for fresh consideration through an effective notice-and-hearing process, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The input-tax-credit limitation demand cannot stand, while the remaining assessment questions require redetermination after compliance with the directions for payment, reply, and personal hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Where portal-uploaded notices elicit no response, an ex parte assessment without personal hearing requires the officer to use other prescribed modes of service to secure effective notice.

Issues: Whether input tax credit claimed for the relevant financial years could be denied solely on limitation under Section 16(4) where it fell within the extended period retrospectively provided by Section 16(5).

Analysis: Section 16(5), inserted with retrospective effect from 01.07.2017, permits registered persons to avail input tax credit relating to financial years 2017-18 to 2020-21 through returns filed up to 30.11.2021, notwithstanding Section 16(4). The limitation-based reversal was therefore inconsistent with the subsequently applicable statutory entitlement.

Conclusion: The limitation-based reversal of input tax credit falling within the period under Section 16(5) does not survive; the petitioner is entitled to consequential release of recovery measures and adjustment or refund of amounts recovered on that basis.

Issues: Whether payments for live-feed broadcast rights constituted royalty taxable under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The issue stood governed by the earlier ruling involving the same assessee. A payment for rights confined to live telecast of specified matches does not yield an enduring benefit. Royalty may arise where the licensee obtains rights to record, preserve, re-telecast, or otherwise commercially exploit the feed beyond the stipulated event or period; such rights were absent.

Conclusion: Payments for the live-feed rights were not taxable as royalty under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the question was answered against the Revenue.

Issues: Whether penalty for accepting a cash advance towards sale of immovable property in contravention of the prescribed mode of receipt was sustainable despite the assessee's claim of reasonable cause.

Analysis: Section 269SS covers a specified sum received as an advance or otherwise in relation to transfer of immovable property; therefore, receipt of the cash advance constituted a technical contravention. However, Section 273B precludes penalty under Section 271D where the assessee proves reasonable cause. The sale agreement, subsequent completion of sale, confirmation of the transaction, substantial outstanding housing loan, modest annual income, and the necessity to realise funds to discharge the secured liability established that the transaction was genuine and arose from bona fide financial exigency. No material showed that the transaction was fictitious, intended to introduce undisclosed money, or designed to evade tax.

Conclusion: The assessee established reasonable cause under Section 273B; consequently, the penalty under Section 271D was unsustainable and was liable to be deleted.

Issues: Whether a delay of 735 days in filing the appeal against the revision order was supported by sufficient cause.

Analysis: The explanation based on reliance on professional assistance, delay in monitoring communications, and change of auditor did not satisfactorily account for the prolonged inaction. Participation through professional representation in the consequential assessment proceedings indicated that the revision order had not been timely challenged; filing the appeal only after the consequential assessment was treated as an afterthought.

Conclusion: The delay was not condoned.

Issues: Whether interest income earned by a co-operative society from investments with a co-operative bank qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The settled position applied was that a co-operative bank is also a co-operative society for the purpose of deduction of interest income derived from investments with another co-operative society. The exclusion in Section 80P(4), applicable to a co-operative bank's own claim for deduction, does not disqualify a co-operative society from claiming deduction on interest earned from investments made with such bank. The amendment concerning tax deduction at source under Section 194A(3)(v) does not exclude co-operative banks from the class of co-operative societies for this purpose.

Conclusion: Interest earned from investments with a co-operative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d); the questions were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issues: Whether the addition for unsecured loans could be sustained under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the assessee furnished lender particulars, confirmations and banking records.

Analysis: The assessee established the identity of the creditors and genuineness of the loan transactions through PAN details, confirmations and bank statements; the loans were also repaid through banking channels. This discharged the initial onus of proof, shifting the burden to the Revenue. The absence of income-tax returns of certain lenders was insufficient to sustain the addition when the Assessing Officer did not independently verify the lenders despite having their particulars, and the appellate authority also failed to undertake or cause necessary enquiries into their creditworthiness.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 2,06,70,000 for unsecured loans was unsustainable and was deleted.

Issues: Whether revision of the assessment under Section 263 on the ground that related-party payments required examination under Section 40A(2)(b) was valid.

Analysis: Revision under Section 263 requires the assessment order to be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Where the Assessing Officer has made inquiry, obtained particulars of payments to specified persons, considered the explanation regarding their nature and reasonableness, and adopted a plausible view, the matter is not one of lack of inquiry merely because the assessment order contains no detailed discussion. Section 40A(2)(a) does not permit disallowance solely because a payment is made to a specified person; excessiveness or unreasonableness must be established with reference to the statutory criteria or comparable market material. No such material, identification of excessive payment, or quantification of prejudice was provided. Explanation 2 to Section 263(1) does not authorise revision merely because further inquiry is considered desirable.

Conclusion: The assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; the revision under Section 263 was invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether gross cash movements recorded in seized notebook and digital material of an angadia operator could be assessed as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether commission income on the unaccounted turnover was properly estimated at 2% and taxable under Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether gross cash movements recorded in seized notebook and digital material of an angadia operator could be assessed as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 69A applies to money beneficially owned by the assessee whose nature and source remain unexplained. The accepted angadia business model involved receiving and routing third-party cash through a network for a service fee. The seized entries reflected gross transit funds and did not establish that their principal amount belonged to the assessee. The absence of client particulars did not by itself convert third-party transit funds into the assessee's income. Treating identified transactions as commission-bearing while treating unidentified transactions as the assessee's own money was impermissibly inconsistent and attracted the doctrine of approbation and reprobation. Applying the real income doctrine and embedded profit theory, gross receipts could not be equated with taxable income.

Conclusion: The gross principal cash movements were not assessable as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961; only the embedded commission income was taxable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether commission income on the unaccounted turnover was properly estimated at 2% and taxable under Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The 2% estimate lacked a reasonable nexus with the low-margin nature and large volume of the cash-transfer business. A reasonable estimation of income required a realistic commission rate consistent with the operating model and comparable angadia business margins. Since the amount represented business commission income rather than unexplained money, it was not liable to tax under Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: Commission income shall be estimated at 0.30% of the total unaccounted turnover, taxed at normal rates, and recomputed after adjustment for commission income already assessed, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Taxability is confined to the reasonably estimated embedded commission income and not to the gross cash turnover handled in the angadia business.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an intermediary merely handles and transfers third-party cash without beneficial ownership, only the embedded commission or profit may be taxed on a reasonable estimate, not the gross funds routed through it.

Issues: (i) Whether sufficient cause was established for condonation of the 803-day delay in filing the appeal; and (ii) Whether the penalty order under Section 271D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was barred by limitation under Section 275(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether sufficient cause was established for condonation of the 803-day delay in filing the appeal.

Analysis: The requirement of sufficient cause calls for a justice-oriented but reasonable assessment of the explanation for delay, including the party's conduct and diligence throughout the relevant period. The cessation of business and departure of two partners did not explain the delay where seven other partners remained, related tax proceedings continued to be pursued, and no credible account was given for non-compliance in the set-aside proceedings or for failure to monitor communications. The prolonged unexplained inaction evidenced gross negligence rather than a bona fide impediment.

Conclusion: Sufficient cause for condonation of the 803-day delay was not established; the issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty order under Section 271D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was barred by limitation under Section 275(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Penalty proceedings were initiated by notice in May 2003 and the penalty order was made in November 2003. The order was therefore made within six months from the end of the month in which the penalty proceedings were initiated, as required by Section 275(1)(c).

Conclusion: The penalty order was not barred by limitation; the issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The unexplained prolonged inaction precluded consideration of the delayed penalty challenge, and the independent limitation objection also failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Sufficient cause for condonation requires a credible explanation for the entire period of delay, and prolonged unexplained inaction despite the ability to pursue tax affairs constitutes gross negligence warranting refusal of condonation.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the penalty appeals for assessment years 2013-14 and 2019-20 should be condoned and the appeals reconsidered after decision of the pending quantum appeals; and (ii) whether penalty for non-compliance with notices could exceed Rs. 10,000 per assessment year when subsequent notices followed the original default and compliance was later furnished.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the penalty appeals for assessment years 2013-14 and 2019-20 should be condoned and the appeals reconsidered after decision of the pending quantum appeals.

Analysis: The assessment and penalty proceedings had been completed ex parte. The non-availability of the accountant, coupled with the director's inability to effectively operate the income-tax portal, constituted sufficient cause for the delay. Principles governing condonation of delay require a liberal approach in such circumstances. As the penalties under Section 271(1)(c) and Section 270A rested on assessments under challenge in pending quantum appeals, their adjudication was required to await determination of the corresponding quantum matters.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the penalty appeals were restored for decision on merits after disposal of the quantum appeals, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty for non-compliance with notices could exceed Rs. 10,000 per assessment year when subsequent notices followed the original default and compliance was later furnished.

Analysis: Although the assessee initially remained ex parte, an adjournment request was made and necessary compliance was subsequently furnished. Following the best judgment assessment, the later notices were treated as continuations of the first notice on which default had occurred. Penalty under Section 271(1)(b) could therefore be imposed only for the initial default, not separately for each subsequent notice.

Conclusion: The penalty was restricted to Rs. 10,000 for each assessment year and the balance penalty was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Penalties dependent on unresolved quantum assessments require reconsideration after quantum adjudication, while default penalties for repeated notices in continuation of the same original default remain confined to the initial default.

Issues: Whether the show-cause notice and Order-in-Original under Section 122 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were void for want of a valid assignment of the competent proper officer.

Analysis: Sections 2(91) and 122 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 govern the assignment and exercise of functions by a proper officer. Although CBIC Circular No. 254/11/2025-GST dated 27.10.2025 was issued after the impugned proceedings, it designated the Joint Commissioner as the proper officer for matters involving an amount exceeding Rs.2 crore. The Order-in-Original was passed by the Joint Commissioner in a matter exceeding that monetary threshold. Section 160 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prevents invalidation of proceedings merely for a mistake, defect, or omission where they substantially conform to the Act.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional challenge failed; the show-cause notice and Order-in-Original were not void for want of jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice validly invoked Section 74(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017? (ii) Whether the writ challenge to the appealable order-in-original should be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy?

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice validly invoked Section 74(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017?

Analysis: Section 65(7) permits action under Section 73 or Section 74 where audit detects unpaid or short-paid tax. Invocation of Section 74(1) requires the notice itself to disclose foundational facts supporting fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts to evade tax; a mechanical recital is insufficient. The notice specified audit-detected non-payment and short payment of tax, delayed statutory filings, unpaid late fees, reverse-charge liabilities, communications of the audit findings, and non-compliance with the final audit report. These particulars supplied the factual basis for the proper officer's prima facie satisfaction of deliberate non-compliance. The notice also proposed the demands, interest, and penalties and afforded an opportunity to respond, satisfying natural justice.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice does not suffer from non-application of mind or jurisdictional error in invoking Section 74(1) (against the assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether the writ challenge to the appealable order-in-original should be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy?

Analysis: Section 107 provides an efficacious statutory appeal against the order-in-original. Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is ordinarily unwarranted where such remedy exists unless a jurisdictional defect or another recognised exception is established. Since no jurisdictional error was found in the notice, the merits of the order-in-original are to be addressed in appeal. The statutory appellate authority may consider an appeal filed within one month on its merits.

Conclusion: The writ challenge to the order-in-original cannot be entertained in view of the efficacious statutory appeal (against the assessee).

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional challenge to the Section 74 notice fails, while the merits of the tax, interest, penalty, and all remaining questions are left open for determination by the appellate forum.

Ratio Decidendi: An Article 226 challenge to an appealable GST order is not maintainable where the Section 74(1) notice itself discloses foundational facts supporting the proper officer's prima facie satisfaction of wilful suppression and no jurisdictional error is established.

Issues: Whether the purchase of pre-bonus shares of listed companies through a recognised stock exchange and sale of an equivalent quantity after bonus allotment, resulting in short-term capital loss set off against long-term capital gains on a slump sale, constituted an arrangement and an impermissible avoidance arrangement under the General Anti-Avoidance Rule provisions.

Analysis: Chapter X-A requires the Revenue to establish an arrangement under Section 102(1), that its main purpose was obtaining a tax benefit, and that it additionally fell within one of the conditions in Section 96(1). Open-market dealings in listed shares through a regulated stock exchange, at arm's length and at market-determined prices with unidentifiable counterparties, lacked the concert, pre-ordained design, or control over outcome necessary to constitute an operation or scheme. The investment decisions were supported by a commercial deployment of surplus funds, diversification across asset classes, and the prospect of market returns; the continuing retention of substantial shares was inconsistent with manufacture of a loss.

Analysis: A short-term capital loss genuinely sustained through ordinary securities transactions may be set off against long-term capital gains under Section 70(2). The resulting tax efficiency from applying the statutory computation mechanism does not itself establish a tax benefit or a dominant tax-avoidance purpose. Use of a recognised stock exchange, payment of applicable transaction taxes, statutory computation of bonus-share cost, and application of the prescribed first-in-first-out method did not amount to misuse or abuse of the Act, nor were they means not ordinarily employed for bona fide purposes under Section 96(1)(b) or (d).

Conclusion: The transactions did not constitute an arrangement or an impermissible avoidance arrangement. The short-term capital loss was validly available for set-off against the long-term capital gains from the slump sale.

Issues: Whether Section 430 of the Companies Act, 2013 bars civil suits seeking a declaration that a registered sale deed is void and not binding on a company.

Analysis: Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 confer jurisdiction on the National Company Law Tribunal in matters concerning oppression, mismanagement, company affairs and shareholders' rights. Section 430 excludes civil-court jurisdiction only in respect of matters that the Tribunal is empowered to determine. As a statutory tribunal has no inherent jurisdiction, its powers cannot be extended to grant a declaration invalidating a registered sale deed as against the company. Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, civil jurisdiction continues unless expressly or necessarily impliedly excluded, and such exclusion cannot rest on assumptions.

Conclusion: Section 430 of the Companies Act, 2013 does not bar the suits; the Commercial Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the declaratory relief concerning the registered sale deed.

Issues: (i) Whether a one-day delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), within the statutorily condonable period, could be rejected merely because no separate condonation application was filed; (ii) Whether the service-tax demand for FY 2015-16, raised by invoking the extended period of limitation, was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether a one-day delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), within the statutorily condonable period, could be rejected merely because no separate condonation application was filed.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 permits presentation of an appeal within a further one-month period on sufficient cause. Its exercise is not expressly conditional upon a separate condonation application. Since the delay was only one day and the appellant had been heard, an explanation could have been sought instead of rejecting the appeal on a technical lapse.

Conclusion: The one-day delay was condoned; rejection of the appeal on limitation for want of a separate condonation application was erroneous and in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the service-tax demand for FY 2015-16, raised by invoking the extended period of limitation, was sustainable.

Analysis: The entire demand was beyond the normal limitation period and could survive only upon proof of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994. The notice was based on income-tax-return data already available to the Government. Mere non-payment of tax, non-registration, or non-filing of returns did not establish deliberate concealment or intent to evade. The Revenue produced no corroborative material establishing wilful suppression. Further, the demand for April to September 2015 was issued after expiry of the maximum five-year period.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable, and the entire demand was barred by limitation; the consequential interest and penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax liability, interest, and penalties arising from the time-barred demand do not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Invocation of the extended limitation period requires proof of deliberate suppression or other statutory ingredients with intent to evade tax; a mere failure to pay tax, register, or file returns, particularly where relevant information was available to the Revenue, is insufficient.