Issues: (i) Whether the tax demand of Rs.4,58,289/- could be sustained after its payment before the order-in-original; (ii) Whether interest under Section 50(1) is payable until credit of tax to the Government's account or until subsequent debit from the Electronic Cash Ledger on return filing; (iii) Whether the interest liability for FY 2017-18 and the balance payable required alteration or a further credit; (iv) Whether the penalty of Rs.45,829/- was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the tax demand of Rs.4,58,289/- could be sustained after its payment before the order-in-original.

Analysis: Section 73(1) authorises determination and recovery of tax that remains unpaid. The tax shortfall and interest thereon had been deposited through DRC-03 before the order-in-original was made, but the payment was not considered. Section 73(1) does not permit double recovery of an amount already received by the Government.

Conclusion: The tax demand of Rs.4,58,289/- was rightly set aside. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest under Section 50(1) is payable until credit of tax to the Government's account or until subsequent debit from the Electronic Cash Ledger on return filing.

Analysis: Section 50(1) imposes interest only for the period during which tax remains unpaid. Under Section 49, a payment made through Form GST PMT-06 is credited to the Government's account and reflected in the Electronic Cash Ledger upon realisation of the challan. The later debit from that ledger while filing the return is an accounting appropriation and does not prolong the period for which tax remains unpaid.

Conclusion: Interest under Section 50(1) runs only up to the date of credit of the tax amount to the Government's account, not up to the later Electronic Cash Ledger debit date. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the interest liability for FY 2017-18 and the balance payable required alteration or a further credit.

Analysis: For September 2017, interest was correctly computed only up to the respective challan-payment dates, resulting in interest of Rs.5,22,204/-. For the remaining months, the record did not establish any earlier credit of cash to the Government's account than the return-filing dates. The due date for December 2017 was correctly taken as 22.01.2018 under Notification No. 02/2018-Central Tax dated 20.01.2018. The interest of Rs.4,58,289/- paid with the tax shortfall discharged interest attributable to that separate shortfall and could not also be adjusted against interest on delayed monthly tax payments.

Conclusion: The total interest liability of Rs.40,47,151/- and the balance of Rs.25,47,151/- after credit of Rs.15,00,000/- were confirmed; no further credit was allowable. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee and partly against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the penalty of Rs.45,829/- was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 73(8) grants penalty immunity only where tax and applicable interest are paid within thirty days of the show-cause notice. Since payment was made after that period, the immunity was unavailable. Sections 73(9) and 122(2)(a) prescribe the applicable statutory penalty upon confirmation of the demand, without requiring proof of fraud, deliberate default, or contumacious conduct.

Conclusion: The penalty of Rs.45,829/- was sustainable. This issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The discharged tax shortfall cannot be recovered afresh; the recomputed interest liability and residual balance remain payable without further set-off, and the statutory penalty remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of Section 50(1), tax deposited through a PMT-06 challan ceases to remain unpaid when it is credited to the Government's account, and interest cannot be levied for the subsequent period merely because the Electronic Cash Ledger is debited later upon filing of the return.

Issues: Whether penalty for alleged facilitation of undervalued imports through use of another person's importer-exporter code was sustainable where the appellant's role was confined to introducing a freight forwarder and providing a contact for arranging an importer-exporter code.

Analysis: Penalty under the Customs Act, 1962 requires material establishing blameworthy conduct, knowledge of illegality, or participation in the alleged unlawful arrangement. Merely informing an importer about a freight forwarder or a person who could allegedly arrange an importer-exporter code does not itself contravene the Customs Act. The record contained no evidence that the appellant procured the importer-exporter code, participated in an illegal act, or knew of the alleged undervaluation or other illegal activity. The allegations therefore did not establish criminal conspiracy or culpable involvement.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 112(a) and Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 was not sustainable against the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court could interfere under Section 62 with concurrent findings of debt and default; (ii) Whether the assignee was entitled to maintain the Section 7 applications as a financial creditor; (iii) What evidentiary threshold governs proof of default for Section 7 admission and whether accounting disputes or profitability preclude admission; (iv) What legal weight an authenticated Information Utility record and other documentary material carry in establishing default.

Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court could interfere under Section 62 with concurrent findings of debt and default.

Analysis: Section 62(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 confines an appeal to questions of law. Concurrent factual findings of the specialised insolvency fora cannot be reopened through a reassessment of accounts or documentary evidence unless they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, ignore material evidence, or apply an erroneous legal standard.

Conclusion: No basis existed to disturb the concurrent findings of financial debt and default.

Issue (ii): Whether the assignee was entitled to maintain the Section 7 applications as a financial creditor.

Analysis: Section 5(7) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 includes a person to whom a financial debt has been legally assigned or transferred. The validity of the assignment had been finally determined, and the identity of issue, finality of that determination, and identity of parties or privies attracted issue estoppel. The Adjudicating Authority's Section 7 jurisdiction does not extend to a collateral re-examination of a concluded assignment dispute.

Conclusion: The assignee was a financial creditor competent to initiate proceedings under Section 7, and the assignment challenge was barred by issue estoppel.

Issue (iii): What evidentiary threshold governs proof of default for Section 7 admission and whether accounting disputes or profitability preclude admission.

Analysis: Sections 3(12), 4 and 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 require proof that a financial debt, in whole or in part, became due and remained unpaid above the statutory threshold. Default is a historical event, whereas the outstanding quantum remains variable due to interest, charges, adjustments and repayments. The admission-stage enquiry is summary and is determined on a preponderance of probabilities from documentary material; it does not require a forensic reconciliation of accounts or a final calculation of every component of the claim. Detailed verification and quantification are addressed during the CIRP claims process under Section 18(b). Positive EBITDA or profitability does not establish debt-serviceability and is not a legal bar to admission once default is shown.

Conclusion: A documented default exceeding the statutory threshold was sufficient for admission; disputes on quantification, appropriation, and profitability did not negate or cure the default.

Issue (iv): What legal weight an authenticated Information Utility record and other documentary material carry in establishing default.

Analysis: Sections 7(3)(a) and 7(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 establish a hierarchy of proof. An authenticated Record of Default issued by an Information Utility is independently sufficient at the first tier and carries a strong evidentiary presumption, rebuttable only by clear, cogent, credible and compelling material rather than bare denial or bookkeeping disagreement. At the second tier, loan agreements, statements of account, acknowledgements, settlement communications and the materials identified in Part V of Form 1 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 may collectively establish default on the summary standard. A debtor's failure to dispute the Information Utility record during authentication may operate as an admission and estoppel.

Conclusion: The authenticated Information Utility records, read with the collective documentary record, sufficiently established default for Section 7 purposes.

Final Conclusion: The statutory requirements for commencing the corporate insolvency resolution process were satisfied, and the resolution process in respect of both corporate debtors may continue in accordance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Ratio Decidendi: In a Section 7 proceeding under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, admission depends on prima facie documentary proof of an unpaid due financial debt above the statutory threshold, not on final quantification of the claim or the corporate debtor's commercial solvency; an authenticated Information Utility Record of Default is sufficient unless displaced by compelling contrary material.

Issues: (i) Whether the construction demands relating to the landowners' and developer's shares were taxable and correctly classified and valued; (ii) Whether reverse-charge liability for GTA, security, legal and manpower services was established; and (iii) Whether extended limitation and consequential penalties could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the construction demands relating to the landowners' and developer's shares were taxable and correctly classified and valued.

Analysis: The legal character of a joint development arrangement depends on its contractual terms, the parties' rights and obligations, and the consideration flowing between them; its nomenclature is not determinative. Transfer of land or development rights in return for constructed flats is capable of being non-monetary consideration under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, but taxability must first be established for the relevant period. The pre-01.07.2010 position requires examination under the applicable Board circulars and the relevant statutory exclusion; subsequent periods require independent application of the governing provisions.

Analysis: Valuation of a taxable landowners' share under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 and Rule 3(a) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 arises only after taxability is established. Comparable flats must be genuinely similar in material particulars and at the relevant time, and the record must be verified to avoid duplication of value already subjected to service tax. Whether the developer's construction was a service simpliciter or a composite works contract depends upon the actual agreements, transfer of property in goods, and contemporaneous records. The works-contract provisions and the correct taxable classification remain material after 01.07.2012; an incorrect statutory citation in a notice alone does not invalidate an otherwise sustainable demand.

Conclusion: The construction demands were not sustainable on the existing record and can be determined only after examination of the agreements, period-wise taxability, correct classification, valuation, and possible duplication of taxable value.

Issue (ii): Whether reverse-charge liability for GTA, security, legal and manpower services was established.

Analysis: GTA liability requires proof that the transporter satisfied the statutory definition, including issuance of a consignment note or a document meeting that requirement. Ledger entries and freight expenditure alone cannot replace that jurisdictional fact. For security services, the identity and status of the provider, applicability of Notification No. 30/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, and any prior discharge of tax on the same service require verification.

Analysis: Direct engagement, payment, supervision and control of workers by the recipient do not, without proof of supply by an independent provider, constitute manpower-supply service. Similarly, an entry described as legal fees does not by itself establish that the provider was an advocate or that the service was a legal service covered by reverse charge. Revenue retains the initial burden to establish these foundational facts, subject to the assessee disclosing material within its special knowledge.

Conclusion: Reverse-charge liability can arise only upon proof of the statutory prerequisites for each alleged service and after reconciliation of the relevant records and payments.

Issue (iii): Whether extended limitation and consequential penalties could be sustained.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 requires a positive act of fraud, wilful misstatement, or deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax; mere non-payment, non-registration, or an omission does not suffice. For the first notice, collection of service tax from purchasers, coupled with non-deposit and non-disclosure in statutory returns, was treated as material to the allegation of suppression. Availability of information in private books or subsequent departmental access during investigation does not by itself negate suppression. An incomplete voluntary disclosure and unsupported financial hardship do not establish reasonable cause for retaining tax collected from purchasers.

Analysis: A subsequent notice is not barred merely because an earlier notice concerned the same assessee or service category. The decisive inquiry is whether the notices rest on the same material facts and transactions. For a subsequent invocation of the extended period, Revenue must independently establish the statutory ingredients from evidence relating to the distinct project and transactions. Penalties under Sections 77, 78 and 78A of the Finance Act, 1994 depend upon the liability and limitation findings ultimately reached.

Conclusion: Limitation for both notices and the consequential penalties require fresh determination by applying the stated statutory tests to the relevant evidence.

Final Conclusion: Service-tax liability remains dependent on a fresh, evidence-based determination of the contractual arrangements, taxable character of the construction and alleged reverse-charge services, valuation, limitation, and consequential interest and penalties.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order could be sustained where the assessee expressly sought a personal hearing in its reply to the show-cause notice but had inadvertently selected "No" in the hearing option in Form GST DRC-06.

Analysis: Section 75(4) requires an opportunity of hearing where a written request is made by the person chargeable with tax or penalty. The express request for a personal hearing in the reply to the show-cause notice had to be read holistically. An inadvertent selection of "No" in the form could not be treated as an express waiver of the right to be heard, and a mechanical reliance on that selection was impermissible.

Conclusion: Denial of a personal hearing despite the written request breached the principles of natural justice; the assessee is entitled to fresh adjudication after being heard.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order could stand where, despite an express request in the reply to the show-cause notice, the taxpayer was not afforded or notified of a personal hearing.

Analysis: The written reply and subsequent communication expressly requested a personal hearing to explain factual matters and supporting documents. No material showed that a hearing date was intimated after the reply was filed. The order nevertheless proceeded on the basis that no representative had attended to explain the transactions. Section 75(4) of the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires a fair opportunity of personal hearing where it is sought.

Conclusion: Denial of the requested personal hearing vitiated the adjudication; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty for concealment under Section 271(1)(c) is leviable where additional income was disclosed in the return filed under Section 153A pursuant to notice under Section 153C, and that return was accepted without any further addition.

Analysis: Sections 153A and 153C prescribe assessment of the other person pursuant to search-related proceedings and override the ordinary return provisions; pending earlier returns or assessment proceedings cease to govern the assessment. The return filed in response to the Section 153C notice disclosed the additional income and was accepted as returned. Under Section 271(1)(c), read with Section 271(1)(iii) and Explanation 4(c), penalty depends on tax sought to be evaded, being the difference between tax on assessed income and tax chargeable after excluding the concealed income. Since there was no difference between the accepted returned income and assessed income, no tax was sought to be evaded. Explanation 5 was inapplicable because it concerns a searched person found with specified assets and did not determine the penalty issue.

Conclusion: No penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was leviable on the additional income disclosed in the Section 153A return filed pursuant to the Section 153C notice.

Issues: Whether revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 could be exercised over a reassessment order for an assessment year already settled by the Settlement Commission.

Analysis: Once an application is allowed to proceed under section 245D(1), the Settlement Commission obtains exclusive jurisdiction over the assessment case. Its jurisdiction extends to matters covered by the application and other matters relating to the case referred to in the Commissioner's report. A final settlement order under section 245D(4) attains statutory finality under section 245-I, leaving no scope for parallel assessment proceedings. The assessment year in question formed part of the final settlement order and a consequential order had been passed; the subsequent reassessment could not furnish a valid basis for revision.

Conclusion: The exercise of revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 was invalid and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Enforcement Directorate could continue retaining seized documents and digital devices and freezing the locker after expiry of the statutory 180-day period without permission of the Adjudicating Authority.

Analysis: Section 17 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 authorises search, seizure and freezing, subject to an application for retention or continuation of freezing before the Adjudicating Authority. Under Section 20(1) and Section 20(3), seized or frozen property may be retained or kept frozen for 180 days, after which it must be returned unless the Adjudicating Authority permits its continued retention or freezing. The 180-day period had expired, and no order permitting retention of the seized articles or continuation of the locker freeze had been obtained.

Conclusion: The Enforcement Directorate lost statutory authority to retain the seized articles or continue freezing the locker; the documents and digital devices must be returned and the locker released to the petitioner.

Issues: Whether a show-cause notice invoking Section 74 was valid when it did not disclose the factual basis for allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 74, which carries a five-year limitation as against the three-year limitation under Section 73, can be invoked only where the notice itself discloses specific allegations and supporting material showing fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts to evade tax. Mere use of those expressions, without particulars demonstrating the basis for their application, cannot justify recourse to the extended limitation period. The notice contained no such factual disclosure or material.

Conclusion: The notice did not validly invoke Section 74 and was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, inserted retrospectively by the Finance Act, 2026, is constitutionally valid, and whether reassessment notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer without faceless automated allocation are sustainable.

Outcome: Notice was issued to the opposite parties. No separate interim order was made in view of the subsisting Supreme Court stay on further assessment and reassessment proceedings, and the matter remains pending for hearing.

Issues: Whether revision under Section 263 in respect of issues outside the scope of reassessment is barred by limitation reckoned from the original assessment order.

Analysis: Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits reassessment of escaped income, including other escaped income that comes to the Assessing Officer's notice during reassessment proceedings under Explanation 3. However, where reassessment is confined to specified grounds, the original assessment continues to operate for matters not forming the subject of reassessment. For revision under Section 263 concerning such unrelated matters, the limitation under Section 263(2) runs from the original assessment order and not the reassessment order.

Conclusion: Revision under Section 263 on issues not forming part of the reassessment was time-barred; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the amendment to Section 17(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, concerning taxation of interest-free or concessional loans as perquisites, is unconstitutional.

Analysis: Earlier binding decisions had upheld Section 17(2)(viii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 3(7)(i) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, holding the delegated mechanism for valuing concessional-loan benefits valid and non-arbitrary. The present constitutional challenge was squarely governed by those decisions.

Conclusion: The amendment to Section 17(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is constitutionally valid.

Issues: Whether separate cash capital contributions, each below Rs. 2,00,000 and received from the same partner on different dates, could be aggregated to attract Section 269ST of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and penalty under Section 271DA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 269ST applies where cash of Rs. 2,00,000 or more is received from a person in a single day, in respect of a single transaction, or in respect of transactions relating to one event or occasion. The cash contributions of Rs. 1,99,000 and Rs. 9,000 were received fifteen days apart, and neither receipt independently reached the statutory threshold. The record did not establish that the two receipts formed a single transaction or related to one event or occasion; their contribution towards the partner's capital account alone was insufficient to justify aggregation.

Conclusion: The cash contributions could not be aggregated under Section 269ST; consequently, penalty under Section 271DA was not sustainable.

Issues: Whether the addition based on the reported payment to the founder trustee and the consequential denial of exemption could be sustained solely on the original Form No. 10B without verification of the revised report and underlying records.

Analysis: Sections 13(1)(c), 13(2)(c) and 13(3) require a distinction between identifying a specified person, establishing that remuneration was actually paid or credited to that person, and determining whether any payment exceeded reasonable remuneration for services rendered. The status of a founder or trustee does not by itself establish a violation, and section 13(3) does not prescribe a general salary ceiling of Rs. 50,000. The original Form No. 10B remains relevant evidence, but the subsequently revised report cannot be rejected merely because it was filed after scrutiny commenced. Both reports must be tested against the salary and general ledgers, financial statements, bank records, payment vouchers, payroll and TDS records, and the auditor's explanation. If payment is established, its nature, services rendered and reasonableness must be examined before determining the effect on exemption under sections 11 and 12.

Conclusion: The addition and denial of exemption cannot rest solely on the original Form No. 10B; the issue requires an evidence-based fresh determination after verification of the relevant records.

Issues: Whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain a challenge to seizure and non-release of imported goods detained at ICD, Dadri, Uttar Pradesh.

Analysis: The seizure, detention and proceedings concerning provisional release arose at ICD, Dadri, under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs, Noida. The asserted links with authorities headquartered in Delhi, including challenges concerning classification, reliance on the Chartered Engineer's certificate and CBIC policy, did not give rise to any part of the cause of action within Delhi. The doctrine of forum conveniens did not apply because the case involved absence of territorial jurisdiction rather than a choice between competent forums.

Conclusion: The High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the challenge; the issues concerning classification, reliance on the Chartered Engineer's certificate and release of goods fall for consideration before the appropriate forum.

Issues: Whether writ petitions concerning foreign-exchange adjudication proceedings fall within Group IV governing revenue and tax matters, rather than Group IX governing residuary matters, for roster allocation.

Analysis: Rules 8A and 8B require Article 226 petitions to be assigned a group under the prescribed classification. Group IV includes adjudication proceedings and miscellaneous matters concerning revenue and tax laws. The foreign-exchange regulatory framework, its subject matter, and the cause-list classification treating foreign exchange as a revenue subject supported allocation to Group IV.

Conclusion: Foreign-exchange matters fall under Group IV and not Group IX; the classification issue is decided against the petitioners.

Issues: Whether a refund claim under Section 102 of the Finance Act, 2016, filed after the prescribed six-month period, is barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 102 prescribed six months from the presidential assent to the Finance Bill, 2016, for filing the refund claim. As assent was received on 14.05.2016, the prescribed deadline was 14.11.2016, whereas the claim was filed on 14.02.2017. The binding position affirming rejection of such delayed claims was applied; the contrary High Court decision was not followed because it had not considered the Supreme Court decision on the same issue.

Conclusion: The refund claim filed after 14.11.2016 was time-barred and was liable to be rejected.

Issues: Whether an adjudicating authority may confirm tax, interest and penalty beyond the demand proposed in the show-cause notice under Section 75(7).

Analysis: The show-cause notice proposed tax alone and specified no interest or penalty, whereas the adjudication order additionally confirmed substantial interest and penalty. Section 75(7) imposes a mandatory limitation that the confirmed demand cannot exceed the demand proposed in the notice. Confirmation of amounts beyond that scope constitutes a jurisdictional error.

Conclusion: An adjudicating authority cannot confirm interest or penalty not proposed in the show-cause notice; an order confirming demand beyond the notice is without jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether proceedings for demand under Section 74 could validly be initiated and concluded in the name of a deceased sole proprietor despite the revenue authority having knowledge of the death and of the legal heir.

Analysis: Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was invoked against a sole proprietor who had died before the impugned intimation, show-cause notice and demand order. The death and the legal heir's status had been disclosed to the revenue authority in earlier registration-cancellation proceedings and in prior demand proceedings. Initiating fresh proceedings in the deceased person's name, despite that knowledge, constituted a jurisdictional defect. No opinion was expressed on the merits of the alleged input-tax-credit liability.

Conclusion: The proceedings initiated and concluded against the deceased proprietor were without jurisdiction. Fresh proceedings may be initiated against the legal heir if permissible in law.