Issues: Whether refund claims could be rejected by applying Rule 96(10) after its omission without a saving clause.

Analysis: Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 was omitted with prospective effect by Notification No. 20/2024-Central Tax dated 08.10.2024. The binding interpretation of the omission establishes that, in the absence of a saving or sunset clause, pending proceedings founded on the omitted restriction cannot be continued. The settled precedent therefore rendered the rejection of the refund claim unsustainable.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to have its refund claim processed; the rejection founded on the omitted Rule 96(10) cannot stand.

Issues: Whether reassessment initiation under Section 148A(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid where the material concerning alleged manipulation by a mutual fund did not link the assessee to a knowing sham transaction or to income escaping assessment.

Analysis: Allegations that the mutual fund manipulated its accounting methodology and that investors received dividends or booked short-term capital losses did not, without assessee-specific material, establish knowing participation by the assessee in a sham transaction or escapement of income. Reassessment requires a rational and direct nexus, or live link, between the information available and the belief that taxable income has escaped assessment. The precedent concerning synchronised trades under securities regulations did not establish such nexus for the impugned reassessment.

Conclusion: The reassessment initiation lacked the jurisdictional basis required for reopening and was invalid.

Issues: Whether interim physical possession of the secured property should be delivered to the petitioner pending adjudication of the writ petition.

Analysis: The petitioner had deposited the entire sale consideration pursuant to an earlier direction and held a registered sale certificate. The Bankruptcy Trustee took possession immediately after the appellate interim protection in the bankruptcy proceedings was vacated. Retention of possession by the Trustee was not considered appropriate at the interim stage, while the unresolved questions concerning the bankruptcy process and the auction-payment timeline were reserved for final hearing.

Outcome: The Bankruptcy Trustee was directed to hand over physical possession to the petitioner, subject to restrictions against creation of third-party rights and major alterations, and subject to further orders and the final result of the writ petition.

Issues: Whether funds in foreign bank accounts already subjected to provisional attachment and confirmation could be transferred to another foreign bank pending adjudication of the challenge to those orders.

Analysis: The accounts were covered by the provisional attachment order and its confirmation. The material did not disclose the nature and details of the overseas business operations requiring use of the funds. Permitting the requested transfer before determination of the challenge would dilute the effect of the existing attachment; the validity of the attachment and confirmation remains unadjudicated in the writ proceedings.

Outcome: The requested overseas transfer was declined. A request may be made to the enforcement authorities for transfer in the manner proposed by them, with the funds remaining subject to attachment.

Issues: Whether a declaration treating a return of income as invalid under Section 139(9) is an order revisable under Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: A declaration under Section 139(9) that invalidates a return has the character of a mandate or authoritative direction. It therefore constitutes an order for the purposes of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 264. The contrary view that such a CPC intimation is not revisable was legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: A declaration under Section 139(9) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is revisable under Section 264 of that Act.

Issues: Whether Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies where land is acquired through purchase of leasehold rights.

Analysis: Section 56(2)(x) taxes receipt of immovable property for consideration below its stamp-duty value. Conflicting judicial views existed on whether transfer of leasehold rights in land attracts the analogous deeming provision in Section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee-favourable interpretation, previously applied to Section 56(2)(x), was followed in the absence of any contrary jurisdictional High Court or Supreme Court decision. The undisputed transaction was a transfer of 99-year leasehold rights, with permission granted by the lessor authority for that transfer.

Conclusion: Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not apply to land acquired through purchase of leasehold rights; the addition based on the stamp-duty-value difference was deleted.

Issues: Whether the Revenue's application under Section 254(2) disclosed a patent mistake apparent from the record in the order invalidating an unsigned notice under Section 143(2), and whether Section 292BC altered the requirement under Section 282A(1).

Analysis: Rectification jurisdiction is confined to an obvious, patent and self-evident error apparent from the record; it cannot be used to reopen a concluded decision through arguments requiring review or a fresh examination of the merits. The application sought reconsideration of the finding that an unsigned and blank notice under Section 143(2) was invalid for non-compliance with Section 282A(1). Section 292BC was confined to electronically granted approvals by income-tax authorities and did not dispense with authentication requirements for notices or other communications issued to an assessee.

Conclusion: No rectifiable mistake apparent from the record was established. Section 292BC does not dilute compliance with Section 282A(1) for an unsigned notice under Section 143(2).

Ratio Decidendi: Rectification power cannot be exercised to review a concluded merits determination, and a provision validating defects in electronic approvals does not validate unauthenticated statutory notices.

Issues: Whether the price stated in a sale certificate issued after an e-auction conducted by a liquidator under the supervision of the National Company Law Tribunal constitutes the true market value for stamp-duty purposes, or whether the Collector may reassess the property on Annual Statement of Rates.

Analysis: Section 3 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 read with Articles 16 and 25 of Schedule I imposes duty on the market value of property conveyed through a sale certificate. Rule 4(6) of the Maharashtra Stamp (Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules, 1995 ordinarily requires assessment with reference to the Annual Statement of Rates where the stated value is lower. That mechanism is directed against undervaluation and cannot displace a value established through an open, competitive and properly supervised sale process.

Analysis: The liquidation was ordered by the National Company Law Tribunal under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Registered valuers were appointed in accordance with the applicable liquidation regulations, the reserve price was fixed from the prescribed valuation process, public notice was issued, and the e-auction received competitive participation and fetched a price above the reserve price. The National Company Law Tribunal, acting as the adjudicating authority, remained informed of the liquidation process. Its status as a tribunal, rather than a conventional civil court, does not justify treating the liquidator's transparent, tribunal-supervised auction differently from a court-supervised public auction. In the absence of material indicating intentional suppression or undervaluation, reassessment solely on the basis of Annual Statement of Rates was unwarranted, particularly as a liquidation sale may yield a lower price than a conventional market sale.

Conclusion: The auction price stated in the liquidator's sale certificate was the true market value of the land and building. Stamp duty was payable on Rs. 8,03,60,000, and the Collector could not demand duty on a higher Annual Statement of Rates valuation.

Issues: Whether the rate and commencement of interest on excise-duty refunds are governed by the statutory refund and interest regime, including the distinction between voluntary and involuntary deposits.

Analysis: Conflicting Tribunal decisions on the applicability of the statutory rate of interest and the date from which interest becomes payable were noted. The order also identified wider questions concerning the applicability of the statutory refund provisions to payments claimed to have been made under mistake, involuntarily, or pursuant to investigation.

Outcome: The questions were referred to the President for constitution of a still larger Bench; no final adjudication was made on the entitlement, rate, or commencement of interest.

Issues: Whether the Department has accepted or proposes to challenge prior decisions stated to prima facie cover the controversy.

Analysis: The applicability of the prior decisions and the Department's considered position were treated as requiring clarification before further consideration of the writ petition.

Outcome: Matter listed for the Department to apprise the Court of its considered position.

Issues: Whether a corporate debtor in liquidation may be exempted from the mandatory pre-deposit for a GST appeal where payment from the liquidation estate is asserted to conflict with the statutory distribution mechanism.

Analysis: The order records a substantial question regarding the interaction between the statutory pre-deposit requirement and the obligations governing distribution of liquidation proceeds. Assistance of the Additional Solicitor General was sought to examine the issue.

Outcome: Matter listed for further hearing.

Issues: Whether the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to seizure and denial of provisional release of imported goods detained at ICD, Dadri, Uttar Pradesh.

Analysis: Territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India depends upon the existence of a material part of the cause of action within the Court's territorial limits. The seizure, classification dispute, requirement of BIS certification, and decision on provisional release arose at ICD, Dadri, under the Commissioner of Customs, Noida. The alleged inconsistency with CBIC policy, the location of central authorities in Delhi, and clearance of similar goods elsewhere did not constitute any part of the cause of action in Delhi. The doctrine of forum conveniens was inapplicable because this was a case of absence of territorial jurisdiction, rather than a case where concurrent jurisdiction existed.

Conclusion: The Delhi High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction; remedies concerning the seizure and provisional release must be pursued before the appropriate forum.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to anticipatory bail for the alleged misappropriation of funds entrusted for GST payments and use of fabricated GST payment documents.

Analysis: The allegations showed that substantial amounts received for GST payments were not deposited on the GST portal and that fabricated GST forms were allegedly furnished to falsely represent that the payments had been made. Given the seriousness of the alleged conduct, pre-arrest protection was not warranted.

Conclusion: The applicant was not entitled to anticipatory bail.

Issues: Whether the delay of 3,062 days in filing Form 10B for Assessment Year 2017-18 should be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The application concerned discretionary condonation of delay in electronic filing of the audit report. The Form had been physically signed within the prescribed period, but its electronic upload had not been completed by the former accountant without the assessee's knowledge. The delay was sufficiently explained by the assessee's bona fide belief that the compliance had been completed, subsequent disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the death of the successor accountant, and prompt remedial action after the lapse was discovered during a records review.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned upon payment of costs within the stipulated period; upon such payment, the rejection order would stand set aside and the return would be processed by treating Form 10B as having been filed within time. Failure to pay the costs would result in dismissal of the writ petition.

Issues: (i) Whether clause 7 of the dissolution deed assigned user rights rather than transferred ownership of the intangible assets, and whether the receipt of Rs. 50 crore was taxable as income from other sources; (ii) Whether the receipt of Rs. 50 crore was chargeable to long-term capital gains despite the unascertainable cost of acquisition of the intangible assets; (iii) Whether the arbitral award determining ownership and entitlement to sale consideration could be disregarded by the Revenue; (iv) Whether penalty for concealment survived after deletion of the quantum addition.

Issue (i): Whether clause 7 of the dissolution deed assigned user rights rather than transferred ownership of the intangible assets, and whether the receipt of Rs. 50 crore was taxable as income from other sources.

Analysis: The payment under clause 7 was linked to 2.5% of net profits or a minimum amount, was payable for an indefinite duration including to the assessee's heirs, was not linked to a stipulated lump-sum sale price, and did not provide for the fate of the assets if the user ceased business. Applying the tests for distinguishing a sale from an assignment of user rights, the arrangement was an assignment of user rights and not a transfer of ownership. The variable profit-linked payment was not an annuity; the Rs. 50 crore represented consideration for the subsequent sale of the assessee's ownership rights in the trademarks and trade brands.

Conclusion: Clause 7 assigned only user rights, and the Rs. 50 crore was not a commutation of royalty, annuity, or perpetual fee taxable as income from other sources. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the receipt of Rs. 50 crore was chargeable to long-term capital gains despite the unascertainable cost of acquisition of the intangible assets.

Analysis: The receipt was capital consideration for sale of trademarks and trade brands and could fall only under the head of long-term capital gains. The assets were self-generated, and their cost of acquisition and improvement remained unascertainable in the hands of the assessee and the previous owners. The amendments deeming the cost of specified self-generated assets to be nil were neither clarificatory nor retrospective for the assessment year concerned; moreover, the transaction did not involve sale of goodwill. Accordingly, the capital-gains computation provisions could not be applied.

Conclusion: Although the receipt was capital in nature and fell under the head of long-term capital gains, it was not chargeable to tax because its cost of acquisition was unascertainable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the arbitral award determining ownership and entitlement to sale consideration could be disregarded by the Revenue.

Analysis: The arbitral award was binding upon the parties to the arbitration. In the absence of inquiry, verification, or evidence establishing a colourable arrangement or lack of genuineness, the Revenue could not merely attribute motives to disregard the award or the ownership and sale entitlement determined under it.

Conclusion: The arbitral award was valid and binding between its parties, and the Revenue's challenge to its genuineness was unsustainable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty for concealment survived after deletion of the quantum addition.

Analysis: The penalty rested on the addition of Rs. 50 crore, which did not survive after the receipt was held not chargeable to tax.

Conclusion: The penalty was not leviable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned additions and the consequential penalty lack a sustainable basis under the applicable tax provisions.

Ratio Decidendi: Consideration from the pre-amendment sale of self-generated trademark and brand assets is not chargeable to capital gains where their cost of acquisition is unascertainable and no retrospective deeming provision applies.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal was justified in refusing to condone the 694-day delay in filing the customs appeal.

Analysis: The law of limitation requires sufficient cause for condonation of delay. A stricter approach applies to an inordinate delay, and condonation cannot be granted mechanically where negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is evident. The factual record showed that the order had been received by counsel, the explanation for the prolonged delay was vague, and no adequate steps were taken to ascertain the outcome of the proceedings despite continued business activity. A litigant remains under a duty to be vigilant and cannot shift the entire blame for an inordinate delay to counsel.

Conclusion: The delay was not supported by sufficient cause and was rightly not condoned; no substantial question of law arose.

Issues: Whether penalty could be imposed where the seized betel nuts were neither prohibited nor notified goods and the Revenue failed to establish that they were smuggled.

Analysis: Under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962, the seized betel nuts did not attract the statutory burden applicable to notified goods. The Revenue consequently bore the burden of proving that the goods were smuggled. The prior decision arising from the same adjudication order, on materially identical facts, had found that this burden was not discharged; that reasoning applied equally to the appellant.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable because the Revenue did not prove that the seized goods were smuggled.

Issues: (i) Whether cognizance for the alleged failure to furnish a wealth-tax return under Section 35B, without a regular assessment or statutory notice, was liable to be quashed; (ii) Whether discharge from prosecution under Section 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was warranted on grounds of invalid sanction, absence of quantified tax evasion, and lack of prima facie proof of false statements

Issue (i): Whether cognizance for the alleged failure to furnish a wealth-tax return under Section 35B, without a regular assessment or statutory notice, was liable to be quashed

Analysis: Section 35B treats willful failure to furnish a wealth-tax return by the prescribed due date as an independently punishable default. The admitted non-filing of the return for the relevant assessment year supplied the prima facie basis for cognizance. Prior regular assessment, determination of tax liability, or notices under other assessment provisions were not prerequisites to prosecution for this distinct offence. A subsequent return did not cure the alleged default. The statutory presumption of culpable mental state applied, while the existence or absence of mens rea remained a matter for trial. Objections concerning limitation and sanction did not warrant interference at the cognizance stage.

Conclusion: Cognizance and summons for the Section 35B offence were legally sustainable, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether discharge from prosecution under Section 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was warranted on grounds of invalid sanction, absence of quantified tax evasion, and lack of prima facie proof of false statements

Analysis: Section 279 requires prior sanction for prosecution, and the sanction was treated as having been issued by a competent authority under the applicable notification. Section 277 penalises a statement known or believed to be false in a verification, account, or statement under the Income-tax Act. Material concerning undisclosed foreign-company associations and investments, juxtaposed with denials in statements recorded under Section 131, disclosed a prima facie case of knowingly false statements. For the accusation under Section 277(ii), prior assessment and quantification of tax allegedly evaded were not essential. At the discharge stage, the prosecution material was sufficient to require trial without evaluating the defence on merits.

Conclusion: Discharge was not warranted and the Section 277 prosecution could proceed, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The alleged delayed wealth-tax return and knowingly false income-tax statements disclosed independent statutory bases for criminal trial notwithstanding the absence of completed assessment or quantified tax evasion.

Ratio Decidendi: A fiscal prosecution may proceed without prior assessment or tax quantification where the charged provision independently criminalises delayed filing of a mandatory return or making a knowing false statement.

Issues: Whether the challenge to the show-cause notice under Section 74, as amended by a subsequent notice alleging suppression, warranted writ adjudication at that stage.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with directions to submit a reply to the amended show-cause notice, following which the authorities must grant a hearing and pass a reasoned order in accordance with law; questions of law, including jurisdiction, were kept open.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns should be revoked after the returns were filed.

Analysis: The filing of returns on 08.07.2026 was noted. No final adjudication was made on the validity of the cancellation or entitlement to revocation.

Outcome: The petitioner was permitted to apply for revocation within two weeks, and the concerned authority was directed to pass a reasoned order in accordance with law.