Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued under the second PAN warranted interference in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 govern reassessment of income alleged to have escaped assessment. Judicial review under Article 226 is limited and does not extend to judging the sufficiency of the reasons for the assessing officer's belief. The second PAN remained active and had been used for bank accounts, while no return was filed under it. The financial statements did not identify those accounts. A preliminary verification report described the information as explained against the first PAN, whereas the final verification report flagged possible escaped income under the e-verification scheme. Verification of whether the deposits formed part of declared sales required a factual exercise.

Conclusion: The challenge to the reassessment notice failed.

Issues: (i) Whether provisional attachment of two movable properties under Section 24(4)(a)(i), without preceding notice and attachment under Sections 24(1) and 24(3), was valid; (ii) Whether failure to identify, or incorrect identification of, the applicable clause of Section 2(9) invalidated the provisional attachment; (iii) Whether reliance on statements and evidence obtained in income-tax proceedings without independently collected evidence vitiated the attachment; and (iv) Whether the material established a benami transaction concerning the property under Section 2(9)(A).

Issue (i): Whether provisional attachment of two movable properties under Section 24(4)(a)(i), without preceding notice and attachment under Sections 24(1) and 24(3), was valid.

Analysis: Section 24(4)(a)(i) permits attachment only in respect of property already provisionally attached under Section 24(3). No notice or attachment under Sections 24(1) and 24(3) had been issued for the two movable properties. Attachment of other property required recourse to Section 24(4)(b)(i).

Conclusion: The attachment of the two movable properties under Section 24(4)(a)(i) was invalid, in favour of the respondents.

Issue (ii): Whether failure to identify, or incorrect identification of, the applicable clause of Section 2(9) invalidated the provisional attachment.

Analysis: Absence of a statutory reference, or reference to an incorrect clause, does not by itself invalidate action where the stated facts disclose a benami transaction under an applicable provision.

Conclusion: Non-reference or incorrect reference to the applicable clause of Section 2(9) was not fatal, in favour of the appellant Department.

Issue (iii): Whether reliance on statements and evidence obtained in income-tax proceedings without independently collected evidence vitiated the attachment.

Analysis: Evidence gathered during income-tax proceedings was capable of being relied upon, and the record also disclosed collection of evidence by the appellant Department.

Conclusion: Reliance on the income-tax material did not vitiate the attachment for want of independent evidence, in favour of the appellant Department.

Issue (iv): Whether the material established a benami transaction concerning the property under Section 2(9)(A).

Analysis: Section 2(9)(A) required proof that the consideration was paid by the alleged beneficial owner and that the property was held for that person's benefit. The alleged share-premium source arose eight to nine years before the purchase, and no evidence established a nexus between that premium and the purchase consideration. The premium had been received from several entities over different years, while financial records supported the stated source through liquidation of investments and mutual funds. The property also remained with the alleged benamidar, without proof of future benefit to an alleged beneficial owner.

Conclusion: The alleged benami transaction was not established, in favour of the respondents.

Final Conclusion: The refusal to confirm the attachment remained sustainable because the alleged benami transaction was not proved, notwithstanding the rejection of certain objections to the initiation procedure.

Ratio Decidendi: An allegation under Section 2(9)(A) requires proof that the purchase consideration was provided by the alleged beneficial owner and that the property was held for that person's benefit; temporal suspicion about earlier funding without a demonstrable nexus does not discharge that burden.

Issues: Whether the reassessment order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148, issued after expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year upon approval of the Principal Commissioner, were jurisdictionally valid.

Analysis: Section 151(ii) requires approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General, or in their absence the Chief Commissioner or Director General, where more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. The order under section 148A(d) and consequential notice under section 148 were issued on 17.04.2023, after the three-year period for assessment year 2019-20 had expired, but approval was obtained only from the Principal Commissioner. Prior approval of the specified authority is mandatory for assumption of reassessment jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The approval did not comply with section 151(ii); consequently, the order under section 148A(d), the notice under section 148, and all proceedings and orders emanating from them were quashed.

Issues: Whether credits in a jointly held bank account could be assessed as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without establishing that the assessee owned the credited amounts.

Analysis: Section 69A requires the assessee to be found to be the owner of the money sought to be treated as unexplained. The account was jointly operated by the assessee and her spouse, and the record showed that it was used for transactions of both. The sale proceeds credited in the account arose from a property accepted by the Revenue as belonging exclusively to the spouse. Transaction-wise explanations were also furnished for the disputed clearing entries. Mere credit in a joint account did not establish that every amount belonged to the assessee.

Conclusion: The ownership condition under Section 69A was not established; the addition of Rs. 14,04,069 was deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether an assessment could validly be framed against a company that had been struck off and dissolved without restoration of its name; (ii) Whether an outward bank remittance towards import purchases could be assessed as unexplained money.

Issue (i): Whether an assessment could validly be framed against a company that had been struck off and dissolved without restoration of its name.

Analysis: The company had ceased to exist before the assessment was made, and the assessing authority was aware of its dissolution from the material on record. A struck-off company must be restored through the prescribed corporate-law process before assessment proceedings can validly be initiated or continued against it. Participation in proceedings cannot cure the jurisdictional defect arising from assessment of a non-existent entity.

Conclusion: The assessment against the dissolved and non-restored company was a jurisdictional nullity, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an outward bank remittance towards import purchases could be assessed as unexplained money.

Analysis: The provision concerning unexplained money requires a finding that the assessee was the owner of money or another specified valuable article not recorded in its books. The amount represented an outward remittance through banking channels for import purchases, being an application of funds rather than money found to be owned by the assessee. Failure to establish the source of expenditure cannot substitute the statutory requirement of ownership of unrecorded money.

Conclusion: The outward remittance was not assessable as unexplained money, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment and the consequential addition lacked legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment made against an entity that has ceased to exist in law is void for want of jurisdiction unless its legal existence is first restored.

Issues: Whether the appellants' statutory customs appeal should be restored where their claim had not been adjudicated on merits and restoration was refused on account of the absence of reciprocal liberty from the High Court and the CESTAT.

Analysis: The writ petition was dismissed because the original adjudication order was treated as final after withdrawal of the earlier civil appeals, while the CESTAT declined restoration because the High Court had not granted liberty to seek recall. This left the appellants without an opportunity to present their case on merits before any appellate forum. The right of appeal is a valuable remedy, and an aggrieved party should have at least one appellate forum to address its grievance. The procedural difficulties arose from efforts to restore the appeal and could be resolved by permitting pursuit of the statutory remedy.

Conclusion: The appellants are entitled to pursue their statutory appeal before the CESTAT, which must decide it on merits within the stipulated period.

Issues: Whether an order determining that it is a fit case to issue a reassessment notice can stand where the assessee, despite seeking it, was not afforded a personal hearing under Section 148A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 148A requires that the assessee be afforded an opportunity of being heard before the determining order is made. Service of a show-cause notice and consideration of a written reply do not, by themselves, satisfy the requirement of a personal hearing where such hearing has been sought. The absence of that opportunity breached the statutory mandate and the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The impugned order determining the case fit for issuance of reassessment notice was invalid and was set aside; fresh proceedings may be undertaken only after affording the assessee a personal hearing.

Issues: Whether brought-forward loss originally arising from weighted scientific-research deduction under section 35(2AB) could be set off after the assessee opted for the concessional regime under section 115BAA, to the extent of the actual underlying expenditure independently allowable under other provisions.

Analysis: Section 115BAA(2) excludes set-off of losses attributable to specified incentive deductions, including weighted deduction under section 35(2AB). The eligibility and true character of a carried-forward loss are nevertheless determinable in the assessment year in which its set-off is claimed; the earlier treatment of the expenditure does not preclude examination of its independent allowability. The forfeiture of the additional weighted component does not bar deduction of actual scientific-research expenditure otherwise allowable under sections 35(1)(i), 35(1)(iv) or 37(1), absent an express statutory prohibition. The concessional regime restricts specified incentives and exemptions, not actual expenditure independently deductible under the Act.

Conclusion: The underlying actual expenditure is eligible in principle to be considered for deduction under sections 35(1)(i), 35(1)(iv) and/or 37(1), and the corresponding brought-forward loss may be set off after verification of the statutory conditions, without allowing the additional weighted deduction under section 35(2AB).

Issues: Whether the assessee's eligibility for benefits under the India-Mauritius Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement must be freshly adjudicated before determining the taxability in India of capital gains arising from redemption of equity-oriented mutual fund units.

Analysis: A Tax Residency Certificate is an eligibility condition for treaty relief but is not conclusive where treaty abuse or lack of commercial substance is alleged. The Revenue bears the burden of identifying and establishing an abusive arrangement before invoking a substance-over-form inquiry. The suspension of the licence of the assessee's management shareholder, regulatory action involving its sister concern, and uncertainty regarding the authority responsible for investment and redemption decisions warranted factual verification on treaty entitlement. The human-probabilities approach permits scrutiny beyond the apparent form of transactions. Principles of natural justice require an effective opportunity to address the material, allegations, and applicability of the anti-abuse framework.

Conclusion: The assessee's entitlement to India-Mauritius DTAA benefits and the consequential taxability of the gains were remitted for fresh adjudication after providing adequate opportunity.

Issues: Whether prolonged incarceration caused by unexplained failure to file chargesheets in the scheduled offences, and the resulting absence of a realistic prospect of completing the money-laundering trial within a reasonable time, justified constitutional relief notwithstanding the twin conditions for bail.

Analysis: The offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 depends upon the existence of proceeds of crime derived from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Although proceedings under that Act may continue independently, their final determination requires establishment of the scheduled offence. The prolonged non-filing of chargesheets in the scheduled offences, without explanation, made commencement and completion of those trials in the foreseeable future unrealistic. The resulting delay also precluded completion of the money-laundering trial within a reasonable time. Continued detention for an extended period, without delay attributable to the accused, would defeat the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India; the statutory conditions in Section 45 cannot operate as a means for unreasonably prolonged incarceration.

Conclusion: The constitutional protection under Article 21 warranted relief notwithstanding the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002, as there was no reasonable prospect of completion of the scheduled-offence and money-laundering trials within a reasonable time.

Issues: Whether reassessment under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be initiated solely on material found in a search under Section 132, without a satisfaction note and without independent material, instead of proceeding under Section 153C.

Analysis: The reopening was founded exclusively on incriminating material obtained during searches conducted on other entities. The special search-assessment mechanism under Section 153C governs assessment or reassessment of an other person on such material. Recording of a satisfaction note on the search material is a jurisdictional precondition, and recourse to Sections 147 and 148 is available only where independent material, apart from the search material, supports escapement of income. No satisfaction note or independent material existed in the present case.

Conclusion: Reassessment under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, based exclusively on search material without the statutory satisfaction note and independent material, was impermissible and without jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether equity-oriented mutual fund units are shares for Article 13(3A) of the India-Mauritius treaty; (ii) whether a tax residence certificate conclusively establishes entitlement to treaty benefits; (iii) whether fresh treaty-substance contentions may be entertained on appeal and require an opportunity to respond.

Issue (i): Whether equity-oriented mutual fund units are shares for Article 13(3A) of the India-Mauritius treaty.

Analysis: The Tribunal followed its decision for the preceding assessment year, which distinguished mutual fund units from shares as separate legal instruments for treaty interpretation.

Conclusion: Redemption of equity-oriented mutual fund units is not an alienation of shares under Article 13(3A). The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a tax residence certificate conclusively establishes entitlement to treaty benefits.

Analysis: Section 90 requires a tax residence certificate as an eligibility condition, but permits examination of treaty abuse and substance where the statutory anti-abuse framework applies. The burden of establishing abuse lies on Revenue; limited physical presence alone does not establish it.

Conclusion: A tax residence certificate is not conclusive by itself. The issue is decided against the assessee on conclusiveness.

Issue (iii): Whether fresh treaty-substance contentions may be entertained on appeal and require an opportunity to respond.

Analysis: The scope of appellate jurisdiction permits a respondent's fresh plea within the subject matter of the appeal, without enhancement of the assessment. Treaty eligibility and management had already arisen below, while additional material concerning substance required scrutiny. Natural justice required an effective opportunity to address that material and the alleged avoidance arrangement.

Conclusion: The fresh substance-related contentions may be considered, against the assessee on the scope of appellate examination. Treaty eligibility is remitted for fresh adjudication after an opportunity to respond.

Final Conclusion: The distinction between mutual fund units and shares is settled for Article 13(3A), but the assessee's entitlement to treaty benefits remains open for fresh examination.

Ratio Decidendi: Equity-oriented mutual fund units are legally distinct from shares and their redemption is not an alienation of shares under Article 13(3A) of the India-Mauritius treaty.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice was legally sustainable when it classified the activity as business auxiliary service in the post-negative-list regime and invoked the extended period without evidence of intent to evade tax; (ii) Whether conversion of plastic granules supplied by the principal manufacturer into PET bottles and jars under job work amounted to manufacture and was consequently outside service-tax liability.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice was legally sustainable when it classified the activity as business auxiliary service in the post-negative-list regime and invoked the extended period without evidence of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 66D of the Finance Act, 1994 introduced the negative-list regime from 1 July 2012, while Section 65B(44) defined taxable service. Classification of the activity as business auxiliary service for the relevant post-negative-list period was therefore found unsustainable. Further, no evidence established any intent to evade tax so as to justify the extended period of limitation.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice was void ab initio, and the extended period of limitation was unavailable. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether conversion of plastic granules supplied by the principal manufacturer into PET bottles and jars under job work amounted to manufacture and was consequently outside service-tax liability.

Analysis: Under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, manufacture includes processes resulting in a distinct marketable product. Processing plastic granules into PET bottles and jars produced goods distinct from the input and amounted to manufacture. Such job work fell within the manufacture-related exclusion under Section 66D(f) of the Finance Act, 1994. Notification No. 25/2012-ST, applicable to taxable services, could not be applied to this manufacturing activity; the area-based excise exemption under Notification No. 50/2003-C.E. remained applicable.

Conclusion: The job work constituted manufacture and was not taxable as a service. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned service-tax demand could not be sustained because the activity was manufacturing job work covered by the negative-list exclusion and the notice was also issued by wrongly invoking extended limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: A job-work process that converts supplied raw materials into distinct marketable goods amounts to manufacture and cannot be subjected to service tax under the negative-list regime.

Issues: Whether the extended period for recovery of customs duty under Section 28(4) could be invoked in the absence of evidence of suppression or wilful misstatement by the importer.

Analysis: The importer had furnished the certificate of origin and other import documents, which were accepted at the time of import. Recovery proceedings were initiated nearly five years later, but the show-cause notice and the grounds of appeal contained no documentary evidence establishing collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts. The findings that the extended limitation provision was inapplicable remained unrebutted.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether additions under Sections 68 and 69A in respect of unsecured loans and their repayment could be sustained on the allegation that the lenders were accommodation-entry providers; (ii) Whether additions under Section 69C for alleged interest and commission expenditure relating to the loans could be sustained without evidence that such expenditure was incurred.

Issue (i): Whether additions under Sections 68 and 69A in respect of unsecured loans and their repayment could be sustained on the allegation that the lenders were accommodation-entry providers.

Analysis: The assessee furnished confirmations, bank statements, ledger accounts, income-tax returns, audited financial statements and corporate master data of the lenders. The loans were received through banking channels, and the records evidenced payment of interest and subsequent repayment through banking channels. The lenders' financial statements reflected sufficient funds to advance the loans. These materials established the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the transactions and discharged the assessee's onus of proof. No statement or seized material connected the assessee or the impugned transactions with the alleged accommodation-entry arrangement, and the documentary evidence was not rebutted by cogent material. A general investigation report or the allegation that the lenders were controlled by entry operators could not, by itself, render the documented transactions non-genuine.

Conclusion: The additions under Sections 68 and 69A were unsustainable, and their deletion was upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether additions under Section 69C for alleged interest and commission expenditure relating to the loans could be sustained without evidence that such expenditure was incurred.

Analysis: Section 69C applies only where the fact of incurring expenditure is established and its source remains unexplained. The alleged interest and commission additions were made on presumption or estimation, without any statement, seized material, confirmation, payment trail, or other independent evidence demonstrating that the expenditure had actually been incurred. Since the underlying loan transactions were substantiated by documentary evidence, a consequential allegation of interest or commission payment could not rest on conjectures and surmises.

Conclusion: The additions under Section 69C for alleged interest and commission expenditure were unsustainable, and their deletion was upheld in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deletions of all loan-related and alleged expenditure additions were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Documentary evidence corroborated by banking-channel transactions and repayment discharges the assessee's onus regarding loan credits, and an addition for unexplained expenditure cannot be made unless actual incurrence of that expenditure is established by evidence.

Issues: Whether the cancellation of GST registration should be reconsidered upon the petitioner filing a reply and explaining the factual position regarding exempt supplies.

Analysis: The assertion that the petitioner was supplying exempt goods and regularly filing returns raised a factual matter requiring consideration upon a reply to the show-cause notice and an opportunity of hearing.

Outcome: The cancellation order was quashed and the matter was remitted for a fresh order on merits.

Issues: Whether the petitioner could be permitted to submit an application for revocation of cancellation of GST registration where the online portal did not accept the application.

Analysis: The registration had been cancelled for non-filing of returns, the statutory appeal against cancellation had been rejected as time-barred, and the portal did not permit filing of an application for revocation beyond the prescribed period. No final adjudication on the merits of revocation was made.

Outcome: The petitioner was granted liberty to submit the revocation application online within two weeks or physically if prevented by technical reasons; the competent authority was directed to entertain and decide it in accordance with law within three weeks thereafter.

Issues: Whether absence of express irrevocability and dissolution clauses in a charitable trust deed justifies rejection of registration under Section 12AB and consequential approval under Section 80G.

Analysis: A public charitable trust is deemed irrevocable unless its trust instrument expressly confers a power of revocation. The absence of an express irrevocability clause is therefore not a statutory ground to reject registration under Section 12AB. Further, absence of a dissolution clause or specification of the destination of net assets upon dissolution cannot independently justify denial of registration, since concerns regarding transfer of such assets are addressed under Section 115TD. The trust's charitable activities and unchanged objects supported grant of registration.

Conclusion: Absence of irrevocability and dissolution clauses does not justify rejection of registration under Section 12AB or consequential denial of approval under Section 80G; registration and approval are to be granted.

Issues: Whether cognizance of an offence on an Enforcement Directorate complaint filed after commencement of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 could be taken without first giving the accused an opportunity of being heard.

Analysis: A complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, filed after 1 July 2024, is governed by the complaint procedure under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The proviso to Section 223(1) creates a mandatory audi alteram partem safeguard by barring cognizance unless the accused is afforded an opportunity of hearing. The earlier registration of the ECIR does not displace this requirement for a subsequently filed complaint.

Conclusion: Cognizance taken without first hearing the accused on such a post-commencement complaint is illegal and impermissible.

Issues: (i) Whether the holding period of the allotted flat must be reckoned from the allotment letter rather than the registered conveyance deed, making the resultant gain long-term capital gain and allowing indexation and deduction under section 54; (ii) Whether the allotment letter constituted an agreement for applying the first and second provisos to section 56(2)(vii)(b), thereby requiring use of the stamp-duty value on the allotment date.

Issue (i): Whether the holding period of the allotted flat must be reckoned from the allotment letter rather than the registered conveyance deed, making the resultant gain long-term capital gain and allowing indexation and deduction under section 54.

Analysis: Sections 2(29A) and 2(42A) classify an asset by the period for which it is held, rather than by the date on which formal conveyance is registered. The allotment of an identified flat conferred enforceable rights in the property, and payments were made under the allotment arrangement. Subsequent registration of the conveyance deed did not determine the commencement of the holding period.

Conclusion: The holding period commenced from the date of allotment. The property was a long-term capital asset when sold, and the assessee is entitled to indexation and deduction under section 54 in accordance with law. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the allotment letter constituted an agreement for applying the first and second provisos to section 56(2)(vii)(b), thereby requiring use of the stamp-duty value on the allotment date.

Analysis: The first proviso permits adoption of stamp-duty value as on the date of an agreement where that date differs from registration, and the second proviso requires whole or part consideration to have been paid by a non-cash mode on or before the agreement date. The allotment letter, containing the material terms of acquisition, was an agreement for this purpose; part consideration had also been paid through banking channels before its issue.

Conclusion: The stamp-duty value as on the allotment date must be adopted for section 56(2)(vii)(b), not the value as on registration. The valuation-based addition requires recomputation by the Assessing Officer. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The sale must receive long-term capital-gain treatment, and the valuation-based income determination must be recomputed by reference to the stamp-duty value prevailing on the date of the agreement/allotment.

Ratio Decidendi: For immovable property acquired under an allotment arrangement, the relevant property rights are held from the date of allotment; where consideration is paid by non-cash modes before that agreement, the statutory stamp-duty comparison is made with the value on the agreement date rather than the registration date.