Issues: Whether an adjudicating authority may confirm GST tax and penalty exceeding the amounts proposed in the show-cause notice, contrary to Section 75(7).

Analysis: Section 75(7) was treated as mandatory and as restricting the adjudicating authority from confirming a demand greater than that proposed in the show-cause notice. The notice proposed tax and penalty of Rs. 16,20,000 each, whereas the adjudication order confirmed tax and penalty of Rs. 25,28,400 each.

Conclusion: No; confirmation of tax and penalty exceeding the amounts proposed in the show-cause notice was without jurisdiction and invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an ex parte GST adjudication order could stand when the taxpayer's request for relied-upon documents and for cross-examination had not been addressed.

Analysis: The Revenue could not dispute the asserted procedural error. The ex parte order was therefore set aside, and the adjudicating authority was directed to furnish the available relied-upon documents, exclude from reliance any documents not furnished, consider any cross-examination request through a reasoned order, and thereafter undertake fresh adjudication.

Conclusion: The ex parte adjudication was set aside for fresh proceedings after disclosure of relied-upon documents and determination of the cross-examination request, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the amended pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6) applies to a statutory appeal against a penalty-only order where the show-cause notice was issued before 1 October 2025.

Analysis: Section 107(6) governs the pre-deposit required for maintaining a statutory appeal. The liability imposed was solely penalty, and the show-cause notice initiating the proceedings preceded the amendment effective from 1 October 2025. These facts attracted the applicable principles governing pre-deposit in penalty-only proceedings initiated before that amendment.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to the benefit of the applicable pre-deposit principles for the penalty-only proceedings, and the requirement under Section 107(6) shall be determined accordingly.

Issues: Whether deduction under the first proviso to section 36(1)(viia)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is an alternative to deduction under the main clause and is unavailable once the main-clause deduction has been allowed.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(viia)(a) permits deduction for provisions for bad and doubtful debts within the prescribed ceiling, while the first proviso addresses provisions for assets classified under RBI guidelines as doubtful or loss assets. The expression "at its option" vests the choice of claiming the special statutory benefit in the assessee and cannot be treated as surplusage. Reading the proviso as an alternative mechanism controlled by the Assessing Officer would deprive that expression of operative effect. The proviso, enacted to address banking-sector provisioning for specified assets, must receive effect within its express factual requirements and statutory limits.

Conclusion: The first-proviso deduction is not automatically exhausted or barred merely because deduction under section 36(1)(viia)(a) has been allowed. The issue is answered in favour of the assessee, subject to satisfaction of the prescribed conditions, RBI classification requirement and statutory ceiling.

Issues: (i) Whether the bond and bank-guarantee requirements for provisional release of the seized consignment required modification; (ii) Whether demurrage and other charges on the detained consignment were liable to be waived.

Issue (i): Whether the bond and bank-guarantee requirements for provisional release of the seized consignment required modification.

Analysis: The tariff value justified securing the assessable value through a bond. However, fine and penalty would become recoverable only if the investigation established the Revenue's case and after the consequential litigation; their quantification at the provisional-release stage was premature. The previous final clearance of a consignment from the same exporter on the basis of a certificate of origin also supported recalibration of the security conditions.

Conclusion: The issue was determined partly in favour of the assessee. Provisional release was made subject to a bond of Rs.9,05,73,295 and a bank guarantee of Rs.1,00,00,000.

Issue (ii): Whether demurrage and other charges on the detained consignment were liable to be waived.

Analysis: Regulation 6(1)(l) prohibits a Customs Cargo Service Provider from charging rent or demurrage on goods that are seized, detained or confiscated, subject to any other applicable law.

Conclusion: The issue was determined in favour of the assessee. Complete waiver of demurrage and other charges for the detained consignment was directed.

Final Conclusion: The provisional-release safeguards were recalibrated to protect revenue without requiring security for unascertained penal liabilities, and the detained consignment was entitled to waiver of demurrage and related charges.

Ratio Decidendi: Security for provisional release must adequately protect revenue, but cannot be fixed by prematurely quantifying fine and penalty before investigation establishes the underlying liability.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice was invalid because it was issued by an Assistant Commissioner and later corrected by corrigendum, and for want of pre-notice consultation; (ii) Whether differential customs duty could be demanded under Section 28 without first challenging self-assessment; (iii) Whether the imported CKD e-bike components were classifiable as complete electrically operated motorcycles under CTH 87116020; (iv) Whether the goods qualified for concessional duty under Serial No. 531A(1), or alternatively Serial No. 531A(2), of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017; (v) Whether confiscation and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice was invalid because it was issued by an Assistant Commissioner and later corrected by corrigendum, and for want of pre-notice consultation.

Analysis: An officer designated as an officer of customs under Section 2(34) of the Customs Act, 1962 is a proper officer for the assigned function. A corrigendum issued before adjudication that merely corrected the clause making the notice answerable to the Principal Commissioner caused no prejudice and related back to the notice. The record also showed receipt of the pre-consultative letter.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and adjudication proceedings were valid, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether differential customs duty could be demanded under Section 28 without first challenging self-assessment.

Analysis: Recovery proceedings for duty not levied or not paid under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 are distinct from refund proceedings. The existence of self-assessment did not bar issuance of a notice for recovery of differential duty.

Conclusion: Differential duty could be demanded under Section 28 without prior challenge to self-assessment, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the imported CKD e-bike components were classifiable as complete electrically operated motorcycles under CTH 87116020.

Analysis: Rule 2(a) of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 requires classification by the identity and essential character of goods as presented for assessment. An incomplete vehicle may retain the essential character of a complete vehicle despite absence of items such as a battery or charger. The imported goods were declared as e-bikes in CKD condition with pre-assembled essential parts and components.

Conclusion: The goods possessed the essential character of complete electrically operated motorcycles and were correctly classified under CTH 87116020, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the goods qualified for concessional duty under Serial No. 531A(1), or alternatively Serial No. 531A(2), of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017.

Analysis: The exemption under Serial No. 531A(1) required a knocked-down kit containing all necessary components for assembly of the complete vehicle. Battery packs, chargers and electric compressors were admittedly not imported. The alternative exemption had not been claimed in the Bills of Entry and could not be claimed subsequently.

Conclusion: The claimed concessional and alternative exemption benefits were unavailable, against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether confiscation and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: Confiscation under Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962 and imposition of redemption fine are legally distinct. The absence of redemption fine did not invalidate confiscation or the penalty under Section 112(a)(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The confiscation and penalty were sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The denial of the claimed exemption and the consequential customs liability were maintained.

Issues: Whether the impugned orders, being consequential implementation of prior binding appellate directions, warranted appellate interference.

Analysis: The order under challenge merely reiterated earlier appellate directions, already affirmed by the Supreme Court, and supplied no independent factual or legal finding affecting the merits of the company petition. The connected directions were consequential compliance measures. Entertaining the challenge would indirectly reopen the affirmed appellate directions.

Conclusion: The consequential orders did not warrant appellate interference and remain governed by the finality of the prior affirmed directions.

Issues: Whether cancellation, refund and no-show charges recovered by an airline from passengers constitute consideration for a distinct declared service of agreeing to tolerate an act.

Analysis: Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994 applies where an agreement is intended to tolerate an act for consideration. The passenger-airline contract is intended for carriage of the passenger in return for fare; cancellation charges operate only upon the passenger's failure to perform that contract. Such charges are liquidated damages compensating the airline for breach and do not arise from a separate agreement to tolerate cancellation or default. The absence of a service charge makes the question of abatement immaterial.

Conclusion: Cancellation, refund and no-show charges are compensation for breach of contract and are not taxable as consideration for tolerating an act under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Issues: Whether tender fee collected for supplying tender documents is consideration for a taxable service liable to service tax.

Analysis: Service tax under Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires an identifiable service provided for consideration. The prescribed tender fee was the cost of supplying tender documents and constituted sale or supply of documents, rather than a service rendered to bidders. A tender is merely an invitation to offer and does not create a contractual service arrangement between the tendering authority and every purchaser of tender documents.

Conclusion: Tender fee collected towards supply of tender documents is not consideration for a taxable service and is not liable to service tax; decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax from a subcontractor where conflicting decisions had created uncertainty about the subcontractor's tax liability after payment of tax by the main contractor.

Analysis: The substantive tax liability of a subcontractor stood settled by the Larger Bench decision. However, prior conflicting Tribunal decisions had generated genuine uncertainty on whether a subcontractor was independently liable where the main contractor had paid service tax. This acknowledged confusion supported the appellant's bona fide belief and precluded invocation of the extended limitation period under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994. The normal limitation period remained unaffected.

Conclusion: The extended-period demand and the penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994, were set aside; the demand for the normal period and the penalty under Section 72 of the Finance Act, 1994, were sustained. The issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the relevant date for limitation of refund of accumulated CENVAT credit attributable to export of services is the date of the export invoice or the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received; and (ii) Whether refund of CENVAT credit can be denied solely because the invoices relate to unregistered premises.

Issue (i): Whether the relevant date for limitation of refund of accumulated CENVAT credit attributable to export of services is the date of the export invoice or the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received.

Analysis: Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, read with Notification No. 27/2012-C.E. (N.T.) dated 18.06.2012, governed the refund. Although Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 applied to such refund claims, it did not prescribe a specific relevant date for export of services. The applicable principle fixed the relevant date as the last day of the quarter in which the export proceeds were received in foreign exchange. The date of the export invoice could not invariably be adopted, and the prospective character of the subsequent notification did not displace that principle.

Conclusion: The one-year limitation is to be reckoned from the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received, and not from the date of the export invoice. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund of CENVAT credit can be denied solely because the invoices relate to unregistered premises.

Analysis: Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, did not make registration of the premises a prerequisite for refund of unutilised CENVAT credit attributable to exported services. The requirement concerning the jurisdictional authority for filing the refund application could not operate as a prohibition on refund merely because the premises from which services were exported were unregistered. The jurisdictional High Court ruling on this point was binding.

Conclusion: Refund cannot be denied merely because the invoices pertain to unregistered premises. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The limitation objection based on the export-invoice date and the objection based solely on non-registration of premises cannot defeat the refund claim.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax on construction of the residential complex was sustainable under Construction of Residential Complex Service; (ii) Whether receipts accounted for as sub-contract and petty job receipts were liable to service tax under the same category; and (iii) Whether the demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether service tax on construction of the residential complex was sustainable under Construction of Residential Complex Service.

Analysis: The statutory definition of a residential complex required proof that the prescribed conditions, including the number of dwelling units, were satisfied. The material did not establish that the additional units were constructed by, or attributable to, the appellant. Further, the Explanation inserted in Section 65(105)(zzzh) with effect from 01.07.2010 could not be retrospectively applied to construction undertaken before that date. The contracts were composite contracts involving goods and services; such contracts could not be taxed under the construction-service categories, which applied to services simpliciter.

Conclusion: The construction-service demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts accounted for as sub-contract and petty job receipts were liable to service tax under the same category.

Analysis: The receipts were treated as consideration for construction services without establishing their precise nature or that they represented independently taxable services simpliciter. The absence of documents from the appellant did not displace the Department's obligation to prove the taxable service and its legal basis. The reasoning applicable to composite works contracts also precluded their taxation under the construction-service category.

Conclusion: The demand on sub-contract and petty job receipts was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was sustainable.

Analysis: Commercial letting alone did not establish the amount of tax payable. The eligibility for small service provider exemption, year-wise rental receipts, and the asserted tax payment on later receipts required verification. The allegations were not supported by sufficient evidence or cogent rebuttal of these matters; consequently, the evidentiary benefit enured to the appellant.

Conclusion: The demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The construction-related and rental demands lacked a sustainable legal and evidentiary basis, and the associated penalties could not survive.

Issues: (i) Whether sewage and drainage pumps were eligible for the concessional duty rate under Entry No. 235 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012; (ii) Whether the earlier audit objection or the principle of res judicata precluded Revenue from denying the concessional rate; (iii) Whether the penalty imposed for availing the concessional rate was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether sewage and drainage pumps were eligible for the concessional duty rate under Entry No. 235 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012.

Analysis: Entry No. 235 grants the concessional rate only to power-driven pumps primarily designed for handling water. As the expression "water" is undefined, it was construed in its common and commercial sense as clean water, and not as sewage or drainage water. A claimant for a concessional notification must establish clear compliance with its conditions. The material showed that sewage and drainage pumps had a different design and manufacturing process from pumps for handling water; the engineer's certificate only stated that the pumps could also handle clean water and did not establish design similarity.

Conclusion: Sewage and drainage pumps were not eligible for the concessional rate under Entry No. 235; the differential duty and applicable interest were rightly sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier audit objection or the principle of res judicata precluded Revenue from denying the concessional rate.

Analysis: The audit objection was neither implemented through adjudication nor accepted by the assessee, which continued to pay duty at the full rate until March 2016. It therefore did not constitute a concluded determination capable of binding Revenue. Further, res judicata does not apply to distinct tax periods in the manner asserted, and a different position may be adopted where the prior view is not a binding final decision.

Conclusion: The earlier audit objection did not bar Revenue from denying the concessional rate, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the penalty imposed for availing the concessional rate was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee had initially paid duty at the full rate and began claiming the concession after the audit objection. Revenue subsequently reversed its position and demanded differential duty. These circumstances did not disclose evidence warranting the penalty retained by the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The differential duty together with interest remains enforceable, while no penalty is exigible.

Ratio Decidendi: A claimant for a concessional excise notification must establish strict satisfaction of its conditions, and an undefined product expression is to be understood in its common-parlance meaning.

Issues: (i) Whether the claimed transitional input tax credit attributable to input services, exceeding the closing balance reflected in the ER-1 and ST-3 returns, required verification. (ii) Whether the notice under section 74(1) could be sustained on the alleged wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed transitional input tax credit attributable to input services, exceeding the closing balance reflected in the ER-1 and ST-3 returns, required verification.

Analysis: Section 140(1) permits carry-forward of eligible credit under the existing law. The difference between the credit declared in TRAN-1 and the balance reported in the pre-GST returns required verification against the relevant records before entitlement could be determined.

Conclusion: The transitional credit claim is to be verified by the Proper Officer/Adjudicating Authority through a reasoned order.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice under section 74(1) could be sustained on the alleged wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Analysis: Invocation of section 74(1) requires material establishing fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with a deliberate intent to evade tax. Mere incorrect information or an ordinary non-declaration does not by itself establish those elements. No investigation or evidence establishing such deliberate intent was on record.

Conclusion: The notice issued under section 74(1) was not sustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional-credit claim remains subject to factual verification, but the fraud-based notice cannot be maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: An incorrect declaration, without material evidence of a deliberate intent to evade tax, does not establish wilful misstatement or suppression of facts for invoking section 74(1).

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked on an allegation of suppression of facts.

Analysis: The differential demand arose from an audit-based verification of the assessee's books of account and invoices, with a prior departmental communication quantifying the liability. The record disclosed no material establishing deliberate suppression of facts or an intent to evade tax. Mere delayed payment and detection upon scrutiny of accounts were insufficient to invoke the extended period of limitation. A show-cause notice issued beyond the normal limitation period raises a jurisdictional challenge and cannot sustain the demand.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; the show-cause notice and consequential demand were time-barred, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the withholding of used multifunction print and copying machines on the basis of the model-wise import restriction was sustainable despite the absence of a centralised all-India monitoring mechanism and the furnishing of security for the entire consignment.

Analysis: The relevant policy framework treated the 100-unit criterion as applicable collectively to a particular model imported through all ports and by all importers. No centralised mechanism had been evolved to monitor that criterion, resulting in inconsistent port-wise practices. A prior decision on identical facts, directing provisional release against a provisional duty bond and bank guarantee, had attained finality following dismissal of the departmental challenge and implementation by the Department. Since security covered the whole consignment, there was no valid basis to retain any part of it.

Conclusion: The direction for provisional release of the withheld machines upon the stipulated security was valid.

Issues: (i) Whether a suspended director who is also a personal guarantor and unsuccessful resolution applicant may maintain an appeal against plan approval under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether the challenge-process, e-bidding, treatment of secured statutory dues, Section 29A verification, and consideration of the successful plan were vitiated by material irregularity or unequal treatment; (iii) Whether the CIRP valuation of the corporate debtor's land and building warranted interference; (iv) Whether the continuation of the resolution professional during suspension of authorisation for assignment invalidated the CIRP; (v) Whether the approved consortium plan breached the special-purpose-company and shareholding requirements of the request for resolution plan; and (vi) Whether refusal of the suspended director's one-time-settlement proposal warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether a suspended director who is also a personal guarantor and unsuccessful resolution applicant may maintain an appeal against plan approval under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: A suspended director who is also a personal guarantor and an unsuccessful resolution applicant is an aggrieved person with standing to challenge approval of a resolution plan under the statutory appellate framework.

Conclusion: In favour of the appellants: their status as suspended directors, personal guarantors, and unsuccessful resolution applicants did not bar the appeals.

Issue (ii): Whether the challenge-process, e-bidding, treatment of secured statutory dues, Section 29A verification, and consideration of the successful plan were vitiated by material irregularity or unequal treatment.

Analysis: The e-bidding terms, accepted by all participating resolution applicants, required incorporation of the bid placed in the price-discovery process and prohibited unilateral deviation from that bid. The request for resolution plan allowed the Committee of Creditors to seek clarifications, negotiate terms, and require modifications necessary to ensure feasibility, viability, and statutory compliance. The higher second proposal submitted after closure of e-bidding was unsolicited and could not compel a reopening of the concluded process.

Analysis: Clarifications on equal treatment of the secured operational creditor were sought from all applicants. The successful applicant's subsequent addendum, made in response to a written query and allocating an additional amount to comply with the applicable treatment of secured statutory dues, was a permitted compliance-related modification rather than a discriminatory reopening of financial bidding. Eligibility verification under Section 29A had no bearing on the appellants' failure to enhance their bids during e-bidding. The amended Regulation 39(2), applicable when the plans were considered, required all plans, including non-compliant plans, to be placed before the Committee of Creditors with relevant particulars; the successful plan was compliant when voted upon.

Conclusion: Against the appellants: no material irregularity or unequal treatment was established in rejection of the unilateral revised bid or approval of the successful resolution plan.

Issue (iii): Whether the CIRP valuation of the corporate debtor's land and building warranted interference.

Analysis: Valuation under Regulations 27 and 35 was performed by two registered valuers. The reports accounted for the land's agricultural planning zone, industrial use, surrounding properties, access, prevailing market rates, and relevant adjustments. The objections based on different circle rates, prior valuations, and a private valuation did not establish a glaring illegality in the CIRP valuation. Valuation accepted by the Committee of Creditors after compliance with the prescribed process falls within its commercial domain.

Conclusion: Against the appellants: the valuation process did not justify fresh valuation or interference with plan approval.

Issue (iv): Whether the continuation of the resolution professional during suspension of authorisation for assignment invalidated the CIRP.

Analysis: The suspension order permitted the Committee of Creditors to decide whether the resolution professional should continue. Given the advanced stage of CIRP, the Committee of Creditors consciously retained the same resolution professional. No statutory breach or material irregularity affecting plan approval was shown.

Conclusion: Against the appellants: the resolution professional's continuation did not invalidate the CIRP or the approved plan.

Issue (v): Whether the approved consortium plan breached the special-purpose-company and shareholding requirements of the request for resolution plan.

Analysis: The request for resolution plan used the expression "may" regarding incorporation of a special-purpose company, making such incorporation optional rather than mandatory. The proposed shareholding demonstrated that the consortium collectively retained more than 50% shareholding in the corporate debtor. The consortium remains responsible for implementation of the resolution plan.

Conclusion: Against the appellants: no breach of the special-purpose-company requirement was established; the consortium must retain more than 50% shareholding in the corporate debtor until full implementation of the plan.

Issue (vi): Whether refusal of the suspended director's one-time-settlement proposal warranted interference.

Analysis: The financial creditor had already declined the one-time-settlement proposal. The limited appellate jurisdiction under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not permit a direction requiring acceptance of such a proposal after approval of the resolution plan. Any separate dispute regarding retention of pre-CIRP amounts must be pursued before the competent forum.

Conclusion: Against the appellants: refusal of the one-time-settlement proposal did not warrant interference.

Final Conclusion: The objections disclosed no statutory non-compliance or material irregularity capable of displacing the Committee of Creditors' commercial decision approving the resolution plan, which remains binding and enforceable subject to the consortium's shareholding obligation during implementation.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors is not open to appellate interference absent statutory non-compliance or material irregularity; commercial decisions concerning permitted negotiations, plan viability, and compliant valuation remain within the Committee's domain.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to nil or concessional interest for belated payment of tax on outward supplies under Circular No. 136/06/2020-GST.

Analysis: The circular prescribed nil or reduced interest only where GSTR-3B returns were filed and tax was paid within the dates stipulated in the relevant notifications. The record established that the petitioner had not complied with those stipulated timelines. The interest demand was therefore consistent with the circular and disclosed no infirmity warranting judicial-review interference.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to nil or concessional interest under the circular; the interest imposed for delayed payment of tax was valid, against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating jurisdiction of Jurisdictional Assessing Officers, was constitutional; (ii) Whether proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had to be initiated through the faceless and automated mechanism under Section 151A and the Scheme of 2022; (iii) Whether Section 147A could validly be inserted into the repealed Income-tax Act, 1961 after its repeal took effect.

Issue (i): Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating jurisdiction of Jurisdictional Assessing Officers, was constitutional.

Analysis: Section 147A purported to deem the Assessing Officer for Sections 148 and 148A to be an officer other than the National Faceless Assessment Centre or an assessment unit, notwithstanding Section 151A and schemes framed under it. Retrospective validation is permissible only where a competent legislature removes the statutory defect or foundational basis of the prior judicial determination. The governing Scheme of 2022 continued to include issuance of notice under Section 148 through automated allocation and faceless assessment, and its statutory basis remained unamended. The amendment therefore sought to displace prior jurisdictional rulings without removing their foundation, contrary to the separation of powers and the rule of law.

Conclusion: Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is unconstitutional and void. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had to be initiated through the faceless and automated mechanism under Section 151A and the Scheme of 2022.

Analysis: Section 151A authorised a scheme for reassessment, issuance of notice under Section 148, and pre-notice action under Section 148A. Clause 3 of the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 required reassessment under Section 147 and issuance of notice under Section 148 to be undertaken through automated allocation and in a faceless manner to the extent provided by Section 144B. The mandatory language of the Scheme, the continued inclusion of Section 148, and the absence of automated allocation for case identification precluded initiation by Jurisdictional Assessing Officers. The pre-notice procedure under Section 148A is inseparable from issuance of a Section 148 notice and could not be retained with the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer merely because Section 148A was not separately specified in clause 3. Concurrent-jurisdiction notifications could not override the statutory faceless scheme, and transfer of a case to the National Faceless Assessment Centre without compliance with Section 127 did not cure the jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: Jurisdictional Assessing Officers lacked jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 outside the faceless mechanism. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 147A could validly be inserted into the repealed Income-tax Act, 1961 after its repeal took effect.

Analysis: Although the Finance Act, 2026 received Presidential assent before repeal, its express commencement date under Section 2(a) was 1 April 2026. The Income-tax Act, 1961 stood repealed at the end of 31 March 2026, while the Income-tax Act, 2025 came into force from 1 April 2026. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act did not advance the commencement date where the enactment expressly fixed one. The repeal-and-savings provisions preserved pending proceedings and the existing faceless scheme under the repealed enactment, but did not sustain insertion of Section 147A into that repealed Act after repeal.

Conclusion: Section 147A could not validly be inserted into the repealed Income-tax Act, 1961 and has no legal sanctity. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The operative statutory scheme required reassessment initiation through automated allocation and faceless procedure, and the unamended scheme could not be displaced by a retrospective provision that failed to remove the basis of the jurisdictional defect.

Ratio Decidendi: A retrospective validating provision is valid only where a competent legislature removes the statutory foundation of the earlier decision; it cannot merely override judicial determinations while the unamended governing scheme mandates a faceless and automated process.