Issues: Whether penalty for failure to furnish the audit report within the prescribed time was sustainable where the delay was explained by illness.

Analysis: Section 273B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 precludes imposition of penalty under Section 271B where the assessee establishes reasonable cause for the failure. The assessee explained the three-month delay in furnishing the audit report as arising from viral fever. The Revenue did not produce material to refute that explanation. In the light of the statutory protection and the authorities relied upon, the explanation constituted reasonable cause.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 271B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not imposable because reasonable cause for the delay was established.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner was eligible for the first-proviso relaxation under Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) Whether bail was permissible under the twin conditions in Section 45(1)(ii) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner was eligible for the first-proviso relaxation under Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The first proviso applies where a person is accused, alone or jointly with co-accused, of laundering less than one crore rupees. The relevant measure is the amount alleged to have been laundered jointly where the accusation is of a concerted operation, and not merely the credits or assets individually received by the accused. The accusation alleged joint siphoning by the petitioner, family members and associates exceeding one crore rupees.

Conclusion: The first-proviso relaxation was unavailable to the petitioner. This issue was against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether bail was permissible under the twin conditions in Section 45(1)(ii) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The twin conditions require reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. At the bail stage, the inquiry proceeds on probabilities and requires prima facie foundational facts showing the scheduled offence, derivation of the property from it, and the accused's knowing involvement in a process connected with the proceeds of crime. The material did not prima facie establish that the properties or funds attributed to the petitioner were derived from the scheduled offence or that he knowingly dealt with such proceeds. The documentary material had already been gathered, the petitioner had cooperated before arrest, and no prior misuse of liberty or instance of interference was shown.

Conclusion: There were reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner was not guilty of money-laundering and was not likely to commit an offence while on bail. This issue was in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: Although the first-proviso threshold was not met, the statutory twin conditions did not prevent the petitioner's release on bail.

Ratio Decidendi: Where joint laundering is alleged, the first-proviso threshold under Section 45(1) is assessed by the jointly alleged amount; however, bail under Section 45(1)(ii) is warranted where the prosecution fails to prima facie establish the foundational facts linking the accused to proceeds of crime and the record shows no likelihood of further offending.

Issues: Whether uploading an adjudication order only on the common GST portal, without using other available modes of service, constituted communication sufficient to commence the limitation period for filing an appeal.

Analysis: Section 169(1) permits alternative modes of service, but the statutory choice must be exercised fairly and reasonably according to the circumstances. Where the assessee had not undertaken production or manufacturing for a considerable period, the departmental authorities were required to use an additional mode, such as email or registered/speed post, rather than rely exclusively on uploading the order to the portal. Mere portal upload did not create constructive notice when the order was not otherwise communicated. The limitation for appeal therefore commenced from the assessee's actual knowledge of the order in the first week of February 2024; the appeal filed on 12.03.2024 was consequently within time.

Conclusion: Uploading the order solely on the common portal did not constitute effective communication or constructive notice to the assessee. The delay was supported by sufficient cause, stood condoned, and the appeal was required to be treated as timely filed.

Issues: Whether the assessee established that the cost of acquisition of the shares sold equalled the sale consideration, so that no taxable long-term capital gain arose.

Analysis: Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires the cost of acquisition to be established for computing capital gains. Receipt of the sale consideration was undisputed, but the claimed corresponding cost was unsupported by share transfer forms, share certificates, acquisition records, sale agreements, valuation particulars, or a properly supported scrip-wise reconciliation. Ledger extracts and accounting reconciliation alone did not establish the cost attributable to the particular shares sold. The observations concerning purchasers' identity or creditworthiness were not determinative because the addition was not made under section 68; the material deficiency was failure to substantiate the cost of acquisition despite specific opportunities.

Conclusion: The assessee failed to prove that the sale consideration merely represented recovery of acquisition cost; the addition of Rs. 37,00,000 as long-term capital gain was sustained against the assessee.

Issues: Whether proceedings under Section 74 could validly be initiated where the notice neither alleged fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression nor disclosed foundational facts supporting such an inference.

Analysis: Invocation of Section 74 requires the assessing authority's satisfaction not merely of tax short-payment or mismatch, but also that it resulted from fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression. The notice must itself disclose the foundational facts supporting that satisfaction; mechanical recitation of such expressions, and a fortiori their complete absence, cannot sustain recourse to the extended recovery mechanism.

Conclusion: The notice issued under Section 74 was legally invalid, and the proceedings founded upon it lacked jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings could be initiated without affording an opportunity to furnish confirmations and further details concerning bank credits claimed to be advances.

Analysis: The reassessment action under Sections 147, 148 and 148A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 proceeded on bank credits and the apparent difference with the return. The explanation that such credits included advances was supported by details of the concerned entities, with an offer to provide further material. No further confirmation or clarification was sought before the order was made. Fitness for reassessment required consideration of the explanation after permitting the requisite confirmations and further particulars to be furnished.

Conclusion: Reassessment initiation cannot be sustained without allowing the assessee an opportunity to furnish confirmations and further details relevant to the fitness of the case for reassessment; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether deletion of the addition under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the asserted source of cash sales, including the Rule 46A objection, was sustainable; and (ii) Whether the notice under Section 148A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was invalid for allowing less than seven days for a reply.

Issue (i): Whether deletion of the addition under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the asserted source of cash sales, including the Rule 46A objection, was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 69A required the claimed cash-sale source to be adequately linked to the bank deposits. The matching aggregate turnover in the return and VAT records, and the nature of the retail business, did not establish a date-wise or account-wise nexus between cash sales and deposits made in the multiple bank accounts. No cash book, sales register, stock register, or reconciliation demonstrating the availability of cash-in-hand at the relevant times was identified. The Rule 46A objection was not made out; nevertheless, the necessary factual verification of the claimed source had not been undertaken.

Conclusion: No breach of Rule 46A was established, but the source of the deposits was not conclusively proved; deletion of the addition required verification by the Assessing Officer, overall in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice under Section 148A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was invalid for allowing less than seven days for a reply.

Analysis: Section 148A(b) requires an opportunity of not less than seven days to respond. Although the stated response deadline in the notice was shorter, the order under Section 148A(d) was passed twelve days after the notice. No attempt to respond during that period, or any impediment preventing a response, was shown. The available time therefore constituted a real opportunity to reply.

Conclusion: The notice was not vitiated and the challenge to the reassessment failed, in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The asserted cash-sale explanation remains subject to factual verification, while the challenge to the reassessment notice does not invalidate the reassessment.

Ratio Decidendi: Matching overall sales turnover with VAT records does not, by itself, establish the source of cash deposits under Section 69A; a demonstrable reconciliation between cash sales, cash availability, and individual deposits is required.

Issues: Whether the orders initiating reassessment under Section 148A(3) and the notices under Section 148, issued after the assessee's explanation of alleged unreported turnover, could be sustained without allowing further clarification and loan confirmations.

Analysis: The assessee had supplied ledger details and bank statements to show that the impugned amounts were unsecured loans rather than turnover, and explained the error in the stated financial year. The adverse action relied on alleged incorrect bank statements, mismatches, and absence of lender confirmations. Assessment of the case's fitness for reassessment under Section 147 required an opportunity to provide the confirmations and any further details sought.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the preliminary reassessment action, including the Section 148A(3) orders, prior approval, and Section 148 notices, could not stand; a fresh determination of reassessment fitness must follow an opportunity to furnish clarifications.

Issues: Whether two assessment orders concerning the same mismatch between GST returns and annual return for the same assessment period could be sustained, and the manner in which the surviving assessment should be dealt with.

Analysis: Both assessment orders dealt with the same return mismatch, while one of them also contained a minor error. Parallel determinations of the same tax discrepancy could not coexist. Reconsideration of the other assessment required verification of recovery of the SGST demand and the grant of a reasonable opportunity to the assessee, consistent with the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The erroneous duplicate assessment was quashed, and the other assessment was set aside for fresh consideration after verification and opportunity to the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether GST liability, including return requirements and liability for interest and penalty, arising from works contracts transitioning from the VAT regime can be altered through directions to tax authorities; (ii) Whether works contractors are entitled to seek adjustment or reimbursement of incremental GST burden from employers.

Issue (i): Whether GST liability, including return requirements and liability for interest and penalty, arising from works contracts transitioning from the VAT regime can be altered through directions to tax authorities.

Analysis: Levy, assessment, recovery and enforcement of GST under the Central, State and Integrated GST enactments are governed by the applicable statutory scheme. The contractual terms between a contractor and its employer cannot alter those statutory obligations. Directions permitting revised returns contrary to statute, or waiving statutory interest, penalty or limitation, are unsustainable.

Conclusion: GST liability and related statutory compliance cannot be modified by directions to the tax authorities. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether works contractors are entitled to seek adjustment or reimbursement of incremental GST burden from employers.

Analysis: The additional tax burden resulting from the transition from VAT to GST concerns the contractual relationship between the contractor and the employer. The incorporated directions require computation of the relevant pre-GST and post-GST works and enable contractors to submit comprehensive representations for consideration by the concerned employers in accordance with the retained guidelines.

Conclusion: Any adjustment or reimbursement of incremental GST may be pursued only against the concerned employer as a contractual matter, and not against the tax authorities. This issue is decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transition-related tax burden must be addressed through the contractual mechanism between the contractor and the employer, while GST administration remains exclusively subject to the governing statutory framework.

Ratio Decidendi: A contractor's contractual claim for reimbursement of incremental GST cannot alter statutory GST obligations or justify directions to tax authorities contrary to the tax enactments.

Issues: Whether the appeal involves a question of law under Section 109(8) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, requiring hearing by a Division Bench.

Analysis: The controversy concerning entitlement to input tax credit not reflected in FORM GSTR-2A requires interpretation of Section 16(2)(c), Rule 36(4), and the relevant departmental circulars, including their scope and interrelation. These questions cannot be resolved merely through verification of returns or documents and directly affect the merits of the appeal.

Conclusion: The appeal involves a question of law within Section 109(8) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and is required to be heard by a Division Bench comprising one Judicial Member and one Technical Member.

Issues: Whether an amount already deposited at the first appellate stage, exceeding the aggregate pre-deposit required on the surviving tax dispute, can be adjusted towards the pre-deposit under Section 112(8)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 without requiring a fresh additional payment.

Analysis: Section 112(8)(b) requires payment of 10% of the remaining tax in dispute in addition to the amount paid under Section 107(6)(b). The relevant measure is the tax arising from the impugned appellate order and remaining in dispute before the Tribunal, excluding the separately remanded demand. The expression "in addition to" fixes a cumulative pre-deposit requirement of 20% of that surviving disputed tax; it does not mandate that the further 10% must be paid through a fresh challan after the first appellate order.

Analysis: Pre-deposit is an adjustable part of the disputed tax and is not an independent levy. Adjustment of an earlier deposit is consistent with Circular No. 224/18/2024-GST dated 11.07.2024, which permits amounts paid through FORM GST DRC-03 to be adjusted towards pre-deposit under Sections 107 and 112. Requiring refund of an excess deposit followed by a fresh deposit of the same amount would produce an anomalous and purposeless result, contrary to the procedural object of securing access to the appellate remedy.

Conclusion: The amount already deposited satisfied the combined pre-deposit requirement under Sections 107(6)(b) and 112(8)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; no further pre-deposit was required.

Issues: (i) Whether interest, insurance charges and depreciation relating to motor cars registered in the director's name were fully deductible where the vehicles had a personal-use element; (ii) Whether interest on borrowings was disallowable under section 36(1)(iii) because the assessee had made interest-free advances to its director; (iii) Whether rent paid for premises used as residential accommodation for a director was deductible as a business expenditure; (iv) Whether penal interest paid for delayed instalments of a bank loan was an allowable business expenditure.

Issue (i): Whether interest, insurance charges and depreciation relating to motor cars registered in the director's name were fully deductible where the vehicles had a personal-use element.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(iii) allows interest on capital borrowed for business purposes, and section 32 permits depreciation on business assets. Although the company had funded the margin money, recorded the loans and vehicles in its accounts, and booked the related expenditure, no log book or comparable record was maintained to exclude the director's personal use. The claims could therefore not be regarded as wholly and exclusively incurred for the company's business. The absence of a similar disallowance in an earlier assessment did not preclude a disallowance for the relevant year, since res judicata does not apply to income-tax proceedings.

Conclusion: Only 25% of the interest, insurance charges and depreciation is disallowable, and the balance is deleted. The issue is partly in favour of the assessee and partly in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on borrowings was disallowable under section 36(1)(iii) because the assessee had made interest-free advances to its director.

Analysis: The interest-bearing bank loans were shown to have been utilised for construction, acquisition-related purposes and repayment of earlier business borrowings, and were repaid during the relevant year. The interest-free advance to the director was supported by interest-free funds and deposits received from a related concern. No nexus was established between the interest-bearing borrowings and the interest-free advance.

Conclusion: The deletion of the interest disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) is sustained. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether rent paid for premises used as residential accommodation for a director was deductible as a business expenditure.

Analysis: The lease agreement was entered into by the company, rent was paid by it after deduction of tax at source, and the accommodation was provided to a key managerial person. Provision of such accommodation may be commercially expedient, and residential use does not by itself make the expenditure non-business. Any rent-free accommodation benefit is assessable as a perquisite in the director's personal assessment.

Conclusion: The rental expenditure is allowable as a business deduction. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether penal interest paid for delayed instalments of a bank loan was an allowable business expenditure.

Analysis: Explanation 1 to section 37(1) excludes expenditure incurred for an offence or for a purpose prohibited by law. Penal interest charged by a bank for delayed payment of loan instalments is compensatory for breach of a contractual payment obligation and is not a payment for an offence or a prohibited purpose.

Conclusion: The penal interest is an allowable business expenditure. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Vehicle-related claims are allowable only after a 25% disallowance for personal use, while the interest claim on business borrowings, rental expenditure, and penal interest remain allowable.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition could be entertained notwithstanding the statutory appellate remedy; (ii) Whether an assessment based solely on PAN-linked Form 26AS and risk-management data, without disclosure of adverse material or an independent inquiry after denial of the transactions, was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition could be entertained notwithstanding the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The statutory appeal was not an efficacious remedy for an assessee of limited means facing an exceptional demand, as interim protection would ordinarily require a substantial deposit or security and interest would continue to accrue. The failure to disclose the material relied upon and to meaningfully address the response alleging misuse of PAN also implicated the requirements of a fair hearing and protection against arbitrariness under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The alternate remedy was held to be illusory and did not bar exercise of writ jurisdiction, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an assessment based solely on PAN-linked Form 26AS and risk-management data, without disclosure of adverse material or an independent inquiry after denial of the transactions, was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessment rested solely on portal-based information, without any independent verification from the alleged vendor or other cogent incriminating material connecting the assessee to the transactions. The assessee's denial, supporting employment and bank material, and complaints concerning PAN misuse required objective inquiry. The adverse material was not supplied, and the cash-payment figure and the corresponding net Form 26AS figure were aggregated, resulting in duplication of the alleged turnover. Once the transactions were specifically denied, the evidentiary burden lay on the Revenue to establish the assessee's connection with them.

Conclusion: The assessment was invalid for breach of natural justice, arbitrariness, absence of independent inquiry, and lack of evidence linking the assessee to the alleged transactions, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned assessment and consequential demand could not rest on undisclosed portal data alone; any fresh action requires cogent material establishing the assessee's connection with the transactions and must comply with the applicable limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee specifically denies PAN-linked transactions and presents a plausible case of identity misuse, an assessment cannot rest solely on portal information; the Revenue must disclose the adverse material, independently inquire, and establish the assessee's linkage with the transactions.

Issues: (i) Whether an appeal under Section 31(2) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 from rejection of registration is to be heard by a Division Bench; (ii) Whether rejection of FCRA registration was valid where the applicant described itself as non-religious despite its Zen Buddhist religious activities, and what is the scope of entitlement to registration under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act.

Issue (i): Whether an appeal under Section 31(2) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 from rejection of registration is to be heard by a Division Bench.

Analysis: Section 31(3) deems such an appeal to be an appeal from an original decree and applies Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Appeals under the special statute that are incapable of monetary valuation fall within the overall appellate scheme requiring consideration by a Division Bench.

Conclusion: An appeal under Section 31(2) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 against rejection of registration is to be heard by a Division Bench.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of FCRA registration was valid where the applicant described itself as non-religious despite its Zen Buddhist religious activities, and what is the scope of entitlement to registration under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act.

Analysis: Rule 9 and Form FC-3A of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules, 2011 require full and frank disclosure of the organisation's nature. Zen Buddhism was treated as falling within the broader Buddhist religious category, and a Buddhist school may constitute a religious denomination. Describing an organisation engaged in such religious programmes as non-religious amounted to material misrepresentation.

Analysis: Sections 11 and 12 do not confer a vested or absolute right to receive foreign contribution or obtain registration. The authority has broad administrative discretion to grant or refuse registration, subject to judicial review for perversity, disregard of relevant material, or non-application of mind. Organisations genuinely engaged in structured teaching, research, preservation, or dissemination of Indian Knowledge Systems may be classified as educational or cultural; organisations engaged in worship or rituals must be classified as religious. Registration may be denied where activities involve conversion from one religious faith to another.

Conclusion: The rejection of registration was validly sustained. FCRA registration is not an enforceable entitlement.

Final Conclusion: The FCRA registration framework requires truthful classification of an applicant's activities and preserves broad regulatory discretion, while permitting judicial intervention only for legally defective exercise of that discretion.

Ratio Decidendi: An applicant for FCRA registration must make full and correct disclosure of its organisational character, and registration is a regulatory privilege subject to the authority's discretion, reviewable only for perversity, non-consideration of relevant material, or non-application of mind.

Issues: (i) Whether the attached immovable property was proceeds of crime liable to attachment despite its acquisition in 2020; (ii) Whether the statements recorded under Section 50(2) and Section 50(3) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 could be relied upon despite allegations of coercion.

Issue (i): Whether the attached immovable property was proceeds of crime liable to attachment despite its acquisition in 2020.

Analysis: Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 covers property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The established crime period was from 2010-11 to 2022-23, and the property was purchased in 2020, within that period. The appellant failed to produce documentary support for the asserted lawful businesses or to explain the source of funds, while the account material disclosed substantial unexplained credits and cash deposits. The claim regarding gold seized by the police did not concern the immovable property under attachment.

Conclusion: The immovable property was direct proceeds of crime and was validly attached, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the statements recorded under Section 50(2) and Section 50(3) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 could be relied upon despite allegations of coercion.

Analysis: The constitutional validity and evidentiary use of statements under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 stood affirmed by the applicable legal position. The statements were recorded pursuant to summons, were in the makers' handwriting, and were corroborated by the investigation material and unexplained financial transactions. The allegation of duress did not furnish a basis to discard them.

Conclusion: The Section 50 statements were reliable and could be relied upon, against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The confirmation of provisional attachment of the immovable property remains legally sustainable.

Issues: Whether works contracts awarded through letters of acceptance before 01.03.2015 qualified for exemption under Sl. No. 12A(a) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 despite subsequent execution of formal agreements and requirements to furnish EMD, ISD or performance security.

Analysis: Sl. No. 12A(a) applies where the relevant contract was entered into before 01.03.2015. The letters awarding the identified works and accepting the offers evidenced that the contracts had been entered into before that date. Directions to furnish EMD, ISD or performance security for execution of the works did not alter the date on which the contracts were concluded.

Conclusion: The works were covered by the exemption under Sl. No. 12A(a) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, and no service tax was payable on them.

Issues: Whether rejection of the rectification request was sustainable where the summary rectification order requiring payment conflicted with the detailed rectification order recognising eligible input tax credit.

Analysis: The detailed rectification order had recognised eligible input tax credit on inward supplies as reflected in GSTR-2A and dropped the proposal. The accompanying summary order nevertheless required payment, creating an inconsistency. The subsequent rectification request was rejected summarily by stating that no error apparent on the face of the record existed, without addressing that inconsistency.

Conclusion: The rejection of rectification was unsustainable; the matter requires fresh consideration after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity.

Issues: Whether interest income earned by a credit co-operative society on investments with co-operative banks qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 80P(2)(d) allows deduction of interest or dividend income derived by a co-operative society from investments with another co-operative society. The exclusion in Section 80P(4) prevents a co-operative bank from claiming deduction under Section 80P in its own right, but does not alter its status as a co-operative society for determining the depositor society's entitlement under Section 80P(2)(d). Consistent co-ordinate decisions treating interest from investments with co-operative banks as eligible income were followed, with no contrary material warranting a different view.

Conclusion: Interest income of Rs. 43,70,081 earned from investments with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction to direct the authorised authority to invoke the committal mechanism under Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) Whether the authorised authority was required, in the circumstances, to apply for committal of the scheduled-offence case to the Special Court trying the money-laundering complaint.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction to direct the authorised authority to invoke the committal mechanism under Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, territorial jurisdiction arises where a part of the cause of action has a sufficient territorial nexus with the Court. The relief sought was not a transfer of the scheduled-offence proceeding pending outside the State, but a direction to an authority amenable to writ jurisdiction to take the statutory step of filing a committal application. The attachment of property and bank account within the State, the petitioner's residence, and custody within the State established the requisite territorial nexus.

Conclusion: The territorial-jurisdiction objection fails; the issue is decided in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the authorised authority was required, in the circumstances, to apply for committal of the scheduled-offence case to the Special Court trying the money-laundering complaint.

Analysis: Sections 43 and 44 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 confer primacy on the Special Court trying the money-laundering offence. Where cognizance of the scheduled offence and money-laundering complaint has been taken by different courts, Section 44(1)(c) provides for statutory committal upon an application by the authorised authority; the proceedings remain separate trials and not a joint trial. Although the authority has discretion regarding invocation of the provision, its discretion must be exercised consistently with the statutory scheme and cannot be exercised arbitrarily to defeat it. Having previously invoked the provision and identified the scheduled offence as connected with the money-laundering case, the authority disclosed no cogent change in facts or law to justify abandoning the committal mechanism.

Conclusion: The authorised authority must file the appropriate application for committal under Section 44(1)(c); the issue is decided in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The statutory committal process is required to be initiated, while the competent court independently determines the committal application in accordance with law and the merits of the underlying prosecutions remain undecided.

Ratio Decidendi: The authorised authority's discretion under Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 must be exercised consistently with the statutory committal mechanism and cannot be used arbitrarily to render that mechanism ineffective.