Issues: Whether the addition based on the reported payment to the founder trustee and the consequential denial of exemption could be sustained solely on the original Form No. 10B without verification of the revised report and underlying records.

Analysis: Sections 13(1)(c), 13(2)(c) and 13(3) require a distinction between identifying a specified person, establishing that remuneration was actually paid or credited to that person, and determining whether any payment exceeded reasonable remuneration for services rendered. The status of a founder or trustee does not by itself establish a violation, and section 13(3) does not prescribe a general salary ceiling of Rs. 50,000. The original Form No. 10B remains relevant evidence, but the subsequently revised report cannot be rejected merely because it was filed after scrutiny commenced. Both reports must be tested against the salary and general ledgers, financial statements, bank records, payment vouchers, payroll and TDS records, and the auditor's explanation. If payment is established, its nature, services rendered and reasonableness must be examined before determining the effect on exemption under sections 11 and 12.

Conclusion: The addition and denial of exemption cannot rest solely on the original Form No. 10B; the issue requires an evidence-based fresh determination after verification of the relevant records.

Issues: Whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain a challenge to seizure and non-release of imported goods detained at ICD, Dadri, Uttar Pradesh.

Analysis: The seizure, detention and proceedings concerning provisional release arose at ICD, Dadri, under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs, Noida. The asserted links with authorities headquartered in Delhi, including challenges concerning classification, reliance on the Chartered Engineer's certificate and CBIC policy, did not give rise to any part of the cause of action within Delhi. The doctrine of forum conveniens did not apply because the case involved absence of territorial jurisdiction rather than a choice between competent forums.

Conclusion: The High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the challenge; the issues concerning classification, reliance on the Chartered Engineer's certificate and release of goods fall for consideration before the appropriate forum.

Issues: Whether writ petitions concerning foreign-exchange adjudication proceedings fall within Group IV governing revenue and tax matters, rather than Group IX governing residuary matters, for roster allocation.

Analysis: Rules 8A and 8B require Article 226 petitions to be assigned a group under the prescribed classification. Group IV includes adjudication proceedings and miscellaneous matters concerning revenue and tax laws. The foreign-exchange regulatory framework, its subject matter, and the cause-list classification treating foreign exchange as a revenue subject supported allocation to Group IV.

Conclusion: Foreign-exchange matters fall under Group IV and not Group IX; the classification issue is decided against the petitioners.

Issues: Whether a refund claim under Section 102 of the Finance Act, 2016, filed after the prescribed six-month period, is barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 102 prescribed six months from the presidential assent to the Finance Bill, 2016, for filing the refund claim. As assent was received on 14.05.2016, the prescribed deadline was 14.11.2016, whereas the claim was filed on 14.02.2017. The binding position affirming rejection of such delayed claims was applied; the contrary High Court decision was not followed because it had not considered the Supreme Court decision on the same issue.

Conclusion: The refund claim filed after 14.11.2016 was time-barred and was liable to be rejected.

Issues: Whether an adjudicating authority may confirm tax, interest and penalty beyond the demand proposed in the show-cause notice under Section 75(7).

Analysis: The show-cause notice proposed tax alone and specified no interest or penalty, whereas the adjudication order additionally confirmed substantial interest and penalty. Section 75(7) imposes a mandatory limitation that the confirmed demand cannot exceed the demand proposed in the notice. Confirmation of amounts beyond that scope constitutes a jurisdictional error.

Conclusion: An adjudicating authority cannot confirm interest or penalty not proposed in the show-cause notice; an order confirming demand beyond the notice is without jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether proceedings for demand under Section 74 could validly be initiated and concluded in the name of a deceased sole proprietor despite the revenue authority having knowledge of the death and of the legal heir.

Analysis: Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was invoked against a sole proprietor who had died before the impugned intimation, show-cause notice and demand order. The death and the legal heir's status had been disclosed to the revenue authority in earlier registration-cancellation proceedings and in prior demand proceedings. Initiating fresh proceedings in the deceased person's name, despite that knowledge, constituted a jurisdictional defect. No opinion was expressed on the merits of the alleged input-tax-credit liability.

Conclusion: The proceedings initiated and concluded against the deceased proprietor were without jurisdiction. Fresh proceedings may be initiated against the legal heir if permissible in law.

Issues: (i) Whether the State may withhold the income-tax and VAT components of the auction deposit after the auction transaction failed; and (ii) Whether interest is payable on the refundable deposit and, if so, at what rate and for what periods.

Issue (i): Whether the State may withhold the income-tax and VAT components of the auction deposit after the auction transaction failed.

Analysis: The auction purchaser neither received the iron ore nor obtained permission to lift it, and the entitlement to refund the entire deposit was accepted. Amounts paid towards income tax and VAT formed part of the demand arising from the auction and their remittance to tax departments could not prejudice the payer. As no taxable event occurred and the auction consideration was never supplied, continued retention of those amounts lacked justification and attracted the principles of restitution and unjust enrichment.

Conclusion: The withholding of Rs.15,41,436 towards income tax and VAT is invalid. The balance amount must be refunded, with the State left free to obtain reimbursement or adjustment from the concerned tax departments in accordance with law.

Issue (ii): Whether interest is payable on the refundable deposit and, if so, at what rate and for what periods.

Analysis: Interest is compensatory, being the normal accretion on money whose use has been wrongfully withheld. The absence of a contractual or express statutory interest provision does not defeat compensation where the State retains money that ought to have been refunded after the transaction failed.

Conclusion: Interest is payable at 8% per annum on Rs.2,89,05,436 from 31.07.2023 to 31.03.2025, with credit only for amounts actually paid on 31.03.2025. From 01.04.2025, interest at 8% per annum is payable on Rs.8,00,000 and Rs.15,41,436 until actual payment.

Final Conclusion: The failed auction requires complete restitution of the amounts demanded and paid, together with compensatory interest for their undue retention.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an auction transaction fails and the purchaser receives no consideration, the State must make complete restitution of all amounts paid pursuant to its demand; inter-departmental remittance cannot defeat that obligation, and compensatory interest follows undue retention.

Issues: (i) Whether a criminal appeal against conviction could be adjudicated ex parte without direct notice to the unrepresented appellant or provision of legal assistance; (ii) Whether the conviction was vitiated because recalled documentary evidence was not subjected to verifiable cross-examination; (iii) Whether the complainant established a legally enforceable debt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, without primary accounts and authenticated vouchers; (iv) Whether the petitioner rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, on a preponderance of probabilities; (v) Whether duplicate proceedings asserting the same liability against another person affected the credibility of the complaint; and (vi) What relief followed from those determinations.

Issue (i): Whether a criminal appeal against conviction could be adjudicated ex parte without direct notice to the unrepresented appellant or provision of legal assistance.

Analysis: Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with the fair-hearing guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, requires that an appeal against conviction not be determined without securing effective representation where the appellant and counsel are absent. The appellate forum was required either to give direct administrative notice to the appellant or arrange legal assistance through legal aid or an amicus curiae before deciding the appeal on merits.

Conclusion: The ex parte appellate adjudication was procedurally illegal and denied the petitioner a fair hearing.

Issue (ii): Whether the conviction was vitiated because recalled documentary evidence was not subjected to verifiable cross-examination.

Analysis: Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 treats cross-examination as an essential safeguard for testing adverse evidence. The complainant introduced the trade licence and bill vouchers after recall, but the record did not reliably establish that she was made available for cross-examination on those documents; the order-sheet entry recording its closure was illegible. Treating the recalled material as unchallenged in those circumstances was impermissible.

Conclusion: The conviction was vitiated by material irregularity arising from the unreadable order-sheet entry and incomplete cross-examination of the recalled evidence.

Issue (iii): Whether the complainant established a legally enforceable debt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, without primary accounts and authenticated vouchers.

Analysis: The explanation to Section 138 requires the cheque to have been issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability. The vouchers did not contain a receiving signature, seal, or acknowledgement by the petitioner, and their provenance was uncertain. Primary commercial records, including cash books, ledgers, stock registers, financial statements, and debtor records, were not produced to substantiate the alleged credit transaction.

Conclusion: The complainant failed to establish the legally enforceable debt alleged in the complaint.

Issue (iv): Whether the petitioner rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, on a preponderance of probabilities.

Analysis: The presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, may be rebutted on a preponderance of probabilities through a plausible defence and the inherent deficiencies in the complainant's evidence. The asserted absence of a garments business, the cheque bearing the stamp of a travel concern, the explanation that the blank signed cheque was supplied to a loan intermediary, and the absence of acknowledged commercial records together raised a probable defence. The principle concerning voluntarily delivered blank cheques did not apply where the alleged delivery was to an intermediary rather than the claimant in discharge of a debt.

Conclusion: The petitioner successfully rebutted the statutory presumption on a preponderance of probabilities.

Issue (v): Whether duplicate proceedings asserting the same liability against another person affected the credibility of the complaint.

Analysis: Parallel complaints sought recovery of the identical aggregate liability from another person through cheques bearing the same date, without any pleaded joint arrangement or guarantee. Such overlapping and mutually destructive claims undermined the asserted underlying transaction and corroborated the defence of misuse of blank cheques. Failure to address this material ground was an error.

Conclusion: The duplicate proceedings discredited the complaint and constituted an abuse of process of court.

Issue (vi): What relief followed from those determinations.

Analysis: The denial of legal representation in the appellate proceedings, coupled with the identified evidentiary and procedural defects requiring appellate consideration, made the ex parte appellate decision unsustainable. A merits determination was required after due notice and effective representation for the appellant.

Conclusion: The ex parte appellate decision was set aside, and the criminal appeal was required to be reheard and decided afresh in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The conviction appeal must receive a fresh merits adjudication after the appellant is afforded due notice and effective legal representation, with the identified evidentiary issues and duplicate claims addressed.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate court deciding an appeal against conviction must ensure that an unrepresented appellant receives direct notice or legal representation before a merits decision is rendered.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand adjudication dated 14 January 2026 was valid when a filed DRC-06 reply was treated as absent; and (ii) Whether the Electronic Credit Ledger could be negatively blocked for alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit.

Issue (i): Whether the demand adjudication dated 14 January 2026 was valid when a filed DRC-06 reply was treated as absent.

Analysis: The record established that the reply dated 16 February 2025 had been uploaded in Form GST DRC-06, but the adjudication proceeded ex parte on the erroneous premise that no reply had been filed. Confirmation of demand without considering the uploaded response and without an effective hearing was inconsistent with fair adjudication and the requirement of a reasoned decision.

Conclusion: The demand order was quashed, and the matter requires fresh adjudication after consideration of the reply and an opportunity of personal hearing. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Electronic Credit Ledger could be negatively blocked for alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit.

Analysis: Negative blocking under Rule 86A(1) cannot operate as a recovery mechanism for allegedly fraudulent or ineligible input tax credit. The issues concerning non-filing of returns, cancellation of registration, and ledger operability require determination in accordance with the applicable statutory formalities.

Conclusion: Negative blocking of the Electronic Credit Ledger for alleged wrongful input tax credit was held impermissible. This is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demand requires fresh adjudication on the filed reply, while the registration and Electronic Credit Ledger consequences must be addressed within the stated legal limits.

Issues: Whether a faceless best-judgment assessment could be sustained where the assessee's reply, though filed after the stipulated deadline, had been viewed before the assessment was made but was not considered, and no video-conference hearing was afforded.

Analysis: An assessment under Sections 144 and 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 must conform to the principles of natural justice. Although the assessee did not seek adjournment within the stipulated time and the Assessing Officer could not be faulted merely for proceeding after expiry of that time, the right to file a reply had not been formally closed. Only a short period had been given for responding to an extensive questionnaire, and the reply was available and viewed before completion of the assessment. As a quasi-judicial authority, the Assessing Officer was required to objectively consider material available on record and provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The assessment could not be sustained; it must be redetermined after considering the reply and providing a video-conference hearing, without any opinion on the merits of the assessee's claims.

Issues: Whether the proposed substantial questions concerning deduction for product development expenditure arose from the ITAT order challenged in the present appeal.

Analysis: Under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the appeal challenged the ITAT order in one Revenue appeal. The proposed questions, however, concerned the deduction claimed in a separate assessee appeal, against which the Revenue had independently filed another appeal.

Conclusion: The proposed substantial questions did not arise from the impugned ITAT order and could not form the basis of the present appeal.

Issues: Whether refunds due for other assessment years could be adjusted in full against a disputed penalty demand while the first appeal and stay applications were pending.

Analysis: The applicable CBDT instructions governing stay and recovery of disputed demands before the first appellate authority permit recovery only to the prescribed extent, ordinarily 20% of the demand, with the balance remaining stayed pending appeal. Those instructions apply equally to demands arising from penalty orders; they contain no distinction between assessment and penalty appeals. Full adjustment of refunds without disposal of the pending stay applications was therefore contrary to the binding instructions.

Conclusion: Full adjustment was impermissible and the assessee was entitled to reversal and refund of the amount adjusted beyond 20% of the disputed penalty demand, with applicable interest; the corresponding balance demand remained stayed until disposal of the first appeal.

Issues: Whether revision in respect of an issue not forming part of reassessment proceedings was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The reassessment was initiated only for specified financial transactions and did not concern the debenture redemption reserve. The reserve issue had been addressed in the original assessment and did not become part of the reassessment. Section 147, including Explanation 3, permits assessment of another escaped-income issue that comes to notice during reassessment proceedings, but there was no material that this issue had so come to notice. For matters outside the subject of reassessment, the original assessment continues to operate and limitation for revision under Section 263(2) runs from the original assessment order rather than the reassessment order.

Conclusion: The revision concerning the debenture redemption reserve was barred by limitation; no substantial question of law arose on that issue.

Issues: Whether a person summoned under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 may be permitted to tender a statement through video conferencing owing to bona fide medical inability to undertake long-distance travel.

Analysis: The statutory power to summon for a customs enquiry must be exercised reasonably, proportionately and without arbitrariness; it cannot be used to cause undue hardship. Secure video conferencing fulfils the object of examination under Section 108 while protecting the citizen's rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The applicant's recorded knee injuries, willingness to cooperate, and safeguards against coaching, tampering and identity concerns justified virtual examination. The safeguards included secure access, verification of identity, visible but non-audible presence of counsel, videography, and a reasoned prior notice if physical attendance is subsequently found imperative.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to tender the statement through secure video conferencing under Section 108, subject to the prescribed safeguards and continued cooperation with the investigation.

Issues: Whether revocation of the customs broker's licence and forfeiture of security were warranted for breach of licensing obligations arising from an employee's conduct.

Analysis: The established lapse consisted of failure to verify the exporter's authorisation and address. The factual findings recorded no active role of the customs broker in the attempted prohibited export, noted prompt termination of the employee and initiation of criminal action, and found no deliberate or mala fide conduct. Although the licensing obligations were breached and a monetary penalty remained justified, revocation and security forfeiture were found disproportionate. Authorities concerning repeated or continuing violations did not apply to an isolated violation on these facts. The proportionality finding disclosed no factual or legal error or perversity and raised no substantial question of law.

Conclusion: Revocation of the licence and forfeiture of security were not warranted; the monetary penalty was sufficient for the established breach.

Issues: (i) Whether the remand order barred fresh reappreciation of the material concerning the alleged quality dispute; (ii) Whether a plausible pre-existing dispute as to the quality of goods existed before the demand notice, precluding admission under Section 9.

Issue (i): Whether the remand order barred fresh reappreciation of the material concerning the alleged quality dispute.

Analysis: The remand required a fresh, reasoned decision after the missing material was placed on record and did not determine the quality dispute for either side. Fresh assessment of the enlarged record was therefore permissible, but any departure from matters previously noted as relevant required reasons founded on the material subsequently produced.

Conclusion: The remand did not preclude fresh reappreciation of the material.

Issue (ii): Whether a plausible pre-existing dispute as to the quality of goods existed before the demand notice, precluding admission under Section 9.

Analysis: Under Sections 5(6), 8 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, a Section 9 proceeding cannot be used for recovery of a genuinely contested operational debt. The inquiry is confined to whether a plausible contention requiring investigation existed before the demand notice, rather than whether the debtor can conclusively prove the defence at a trial. Only a spurious, hypothetical or illusory defence may be disregarded.

Analysis: The admitted return of goods shortly after supply, contemporaneous chats from November and December 2022 containing complaints, photographs, videos and the laboratory report, and the timely reply raising quality objections collectively showed that the dispute was not an afterthought. The bill-to-ship arrangement plausibly connected complaints from end-users to the supplied goods. Deficiencies alleged in the laboratory report, the disputed authority of the recipient of chats, and the absence of contractual quality stipulations concerned evidentiary weight and liability, which require adjudication in appropriate proceedings. The implied condition of merchantable quality under Section 16(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 did not require a written quality clause. Customer debit notes were not relied upon.

Conclusion: A genuine and plausible pre-existing dispute regarding the quality of the goods existed before the demand notice; admission under Section 9 was therefore impermissible.

Final Conclusion: The insolvency process could not be invoked for the disputed operational claim, while the parties' substantive claims concerning product quality, loss and outstanding amounts remain open for determination in appropriate proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: At the Section 9 stage, contemporaneous material showing a plausible pre-existing dispute requires rejection of insolvency admission; the adjudicatory inquiry cannot demand conclusive proof or resolve contested evidentiary and contractual questions reserved for trial.

Issues: (i) Whether contemporaneous e-mail communications with the Resolution Professional satisfied the requirement to record proceedings and prepare minutes of consultations with creditors in a class; (ii) Whether concurrence to extensions for submission of revised resolution plans without prior instructions from the creditor class contravened the statutory duty of an authorised representative; (iii) Whether cancellation of registration and consequential disqualification from other assignments was proportionate to the established contraventions.

Issue (i): Whether contemporaneous e-mail communications with the Resolution Professional satisfied the requirement to record proceedings and prepare minutes of consultations with creditors in a class.

Analysis: Regulation 16A(10)(i) imposed distinct and mandatory obligations to record proceedings and prepare minutes of consultations. By virtue of Regulation 16A(11), the standard governing minutes under Regulation 24 applied mutatis mutandis. Although no prescribed format, register, or signature requirement existed, the record was required to identify the consultation, its date, participating creditors or their representative extent, and the substance of their views. The e-mails substantially reflected the dates and concerns raised but did not consistently record the extent of participation by class members. Cooperation in furnishing available records and the absence of concealment affected the gravity of the lapse, not its existence.

Conclusion: The e-mails did not fulfil the complete record-keeping requirement, and the contravention was established against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether concurrence to extensions for submission of revised resolution plans without prior instructions from the creditor class contravened the statutory duty of an authorised representative.

Analysis: Section 25A(3) requires an authorised representative always to act in accordance with prior instructions and contains no exception permitting the representative to unilaterally treat a matter as merely procedural. The fact that the extensions were administrative, time-bound, Resolution Professional-driven, and connected with an intervening statutory claim mitigated the gravity of the lapse. Those circumstances did not displace the requirement to obtain prior instructions, particularly where the representative controlled a decisive voting share and no prior consultation was shown for the extensions in question.

Conclusion: The concurrence without prior instructions contravened Section 25A(3), and the issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether cancellation of registration and consequential disqualification from other assignments was proportionate to the established contraventions.

Analysis: Regulation 13(3) provides a graduated range of disciplinary measures, of which cancellation is the most severe. The doctrine of proportionality permits correction of a disciplinary sanction that is so excessive in relation to established misconduct as to shock the conscience. The record disclosed no fraud, dishonesty, personal gain, collusion, conflict of interest, concealment, demonstrated stakeholder prejudice, or prior disciplinary history. While the size of the represented class and the continuing documentation lapse were aggravating factors, the established breaches concerned incomplete documentation and action without instructions in a limited procedural setting.

Conclusion: Cancellation of registration was grossly disproportionate to the established misconduct, and the disciplinary authority must reassess the appropriate sanction after affording opportunity to the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The two compliance breaches remain established, but the maximum disciplinary sanction cannot be sustained; the disciplinary consequence must be freshly determined by applying proportionality.

Ratio Decidendi: A maximum disciplinary sanction under a graduated regulatory regime is unsustainable where it is grossly disproportionate to the established misconduct, and the appropriate sanction should ordinarily be freshly determined by the disciplinary authority.

Issues: Whether the consignee must be issued a show-cause notice and afforded an opportunity to produce documents before proceedings relating to detained goods are decided.

Analysis: The dispute concerning alleged undervaluation, underweight declaration, or tax evasion could be addressed by the consignee through relevant documents. As the earlier notice had been issued only to the transporter, the consignee required a fresh notice enabling it to respond and place its records before the competent authority.

Conclusion: A fresh show-cause notice must be issued to the consignee, which may submit its reply and supporting documents; the competent authority must thereafter decide the proceedings in accordance with the applicable GST enactments and rules.

Issues: (i) Whether income declared in a return filed for the first time pursuant to a notice under section 148, and accepted in assessment, constituted under-reported income and fell outside the exclusion under section 270A(6); (ii) Whether that under-reporting was in consequence of misreporting so as to attract a 200% penalty.

Issue (i): Whether income declared in a return filed for the first time pursuant to a notice under section 148, and accepted in assessment, constituted under-reported income and fell outside the exclusion under section 270A(6).

Analysis: Section 270A(2) treats income declared in a return furnished for the first time under section 148, where it exceeds the maximum amount not chargeable to tax, as under-reported income. Acceptance of the returned income without additions does not displace that statutory consequence. The exclusion under section 270A(6) was unavailable because no explanation was furnished for failure to file the return despite taxable income, and the return was filed only after initiation of reassessment proceedings.

Conclusion: The income constituted under-reported income, and the exclusion under section 270A(6) did not apply. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether that under-reporting was in consequence of misreporting so as to attract a 200% penalty.

Analysis: A 200% penalty is sustainable only where under-reporting results from a category of misreporting specified in section 270A(9). The cash deposits were explained as business sale proceeds and the returned income was accepted without any addition. Mere non-filing of the original return did not establish any statutory category of misreporting.

Conclusion: The under-reporting was not in consequence of misreporting; the 200% penalty was unsustainable and penalty was to be recomputed at 50% of the tax payable on the under-reported income. In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Penalty remained leviable for under-reporting, but only at the rate applicable to under-reporting and not at the enhanced rate prescribed for misreporting.

Ratio Decidendi: A first return filed under section 148 may result in under-reporting notwithstanding acceptance of the returned income, but enhanced penalty for misreporting requires proof that the case falls within a statutory category of misreporting; non-filing of the original return alone is insufficient.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging GST notices and a summary order was maintainable despite available statutory remedies.

Analysis: The impugned notices were not shown to be ex facie without jurisdiction. Statutory remedies require the petitioner to respond to the show-cause notice, raise all defences before the competent authority, and pursue the appellate remedy if aggrieved. Extraordinary writ jurisdiction is not to be used to bypass such remedies in revenue matters absent exceptional circumstances.

Conclusion: The petitioner must pursue the available statutory remedies; all merits-based contentions remain open.