Issues: Whether detention, tax demand and penalty under Section 129 for an un-updated Part-B of an e-way bill, where the vehicle had reached the consignee's premises and the omission was immediately cured, were legally sustainable.

Analysis: Section 129 applies to goods while in transit. The vehicle had completed its journey and was stationary at the consignee's registered premises when it was intercepted; hence, the jurisdictional condition of goods being in transit was absent. Valid tax invoices and Part-A of the e-way bill accompanied the goods, and the Part-B omission was promptly rectified, establishing substantive compliance and a curable procedural defect without revenue loss or mens rea. Section 126, the applicable circular, and the doctrine of proportionality required moderation rather than punitive action for such a bona fide technical lapse. The adjudication was also vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice, since the personal hearing was conducted after the date borne by the adjudication order, offending audi alteram partem.

Conclusion: The detention, tax demand and penalty under Section 129 were illegal and unsustainable; the amounts recovered under protest were directed to be refunded with applicable statutory interest.

Issues: (i) Whether the re-investigation was void ab initio for want of jurisdiction; (ii) Whether the investigative authority was functus officio and a fresh Standing Committee reference was required before re-investigation; (iii) Whether the re-investigation was barred by limitation under Rule 129(6), including the validity of the extension; (iv) Whether the revised methodology and re-investigation denied the respondent natural justice; (v) Whether failure to pass on the additional input tax credit benefit contravened Section 171(1), and the consequential relief.

Issue (i): Whether the re-investigation was void ab initio for want of jurisdiction.

Analysis: A binding jurisdictional precedent found the earlier real-estate profiteering methodology legally unsustainable because input tax credit and buyer collections do not correlate uniformly during a project's life cycle. The applicable methodology requires project-wide GST savings to be apportioned across the total saleable area on a per-square-foot basis. Remitting pending matters to correct that legal infirmity ensured conformity with binding precedent and did not amount to an impermissible review of a concluded adjudication. No fundamental statutory prohibition or jurisdictional defect was established.

Conclusion: The re-investigation was valid and was not void ab initio, against the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the investigative authority was functus officio and a fresh Standing Committee reference was required before re-investigation.

Analysis: The doctrine of functus officio did not apply because the original report, founded on a flawed methodology, had not culminated in a final adjudicatory order. Rule 133(4) permitted remand for re-investigation, while the original reference under Rule 128 remained operative. The fresh exercise was undertaken pursuant to remand within the same proceedings rather than through a suo motu reopening.

Conclusion: The investigative authority was not functus officio, and no fresh Standing Committee reference was required, against the respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether the re-investigation was barred by limitation under Rule 129(6), including the validity of the extension.

Analysis: Rule 129(6) does not prescribe a consequence of abatement upon expiry of the reporting period. Its time limit is directory, not mandatory, particularly having regard to the beneficial and consumer-welfare character of the anti-profiteering framework. Complete documents were furnished only in August 2025, and the respondent could not rely on delay attributable to its own non-production of records.

Conclusion: The re-investigation was not barred by limitation, and the extension was valid, against the respondent.

Issue (iv): Whether the revised methodology and re-investigation denied the respondent natural justice.

Analysis: The revised methodology followed binding law and was not an arbitrary alteration of standards. Notice of re-investigation, an opportunity to supply documents, service of the report, and repeated opportunities to file objections were provided. The respondent elected to confine its defence to preliminary objections and did not contest the computation on merits.

Conclusion: There was no violation of the principles of natural justice, against the respondent.

Issue (v): Whether failure to pass on the additional input tax credit benefit contravened Section 171(1), and the consequential relief.

Analysis: Section 171(1) requires actual transmission of input tax credit benefit through commensurate reduction in price and is a beneficial provision requiring purposive construction. Once records establish an accrued benefit, the evidential burden lies on the supplier to show that it was passed on. The uncontroverted computation showed an increase in credit ratio from 2.37% to 8.42%, producing a per-square-foot benefit of Rs. 40.33 and an aggregate unpassed benefit of Rs. 31,20,542 for 66 eligible homebuyers. No evidence of price reduction, adjustment, credit note, refund, or other transmission of the benefit was produced. The contravention period ended before Section 171(3A) came into force.

Conclusion: The respondent contravened Section 171(1) by failing to pass on Rs. 31,20,542 to 66 eligible homebuyers; the amount is payable with interest at 18% per annum, and no penalty is imposable.

Final Conclusion: The remand and corrected project-wide methodology were sustained, and the additional input tax credit saving was required to be restored to the eligible homebuyers with interest; the pre-effective-date period excluded penal liability.

Issues: Whether the Revenue appeals warranted consideration despite the low tax effect and the claimed exception to the monetary-limit policy for proceedings under section 263.

Analysis: The claimed exception for revision proceedings does not require the tax effect to be disregarded in every case. The tax difference was approximately Rs. 7 lakhs, substantially below the Union policy threshold of Rs. 2 crores for Revenue litigation before the High Court, and the transactions did not indicate recurring or multiple disputes.

Outcome: The appeals were dismissed as below the monetary limit; the questions of law were left open.

Issues: (i) Whether an Assessing Officer may issue a notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in reassessment proceedings before disposing of the assessee's objections to reopening; (ii) Whether an Assessing Officer may issue a notice under Section 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 within four weeks after rejecting the assessee's objections to reopening.

Issue (i): Whether an Assessing Officer may issue a notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in reassessment proceedings before disposing of the assessee's objections to reopening.

Analysis: Under the pre-1 April 2021 reassessment framework, a return filed pursuant to a notice under Section 148 is processed as a return under Section 139. Scrutiny of that return commences with a notice under Section 143(2). Recorded reasons must be furnished on request, and objections to reopening must be determined by a speaking order before the assessment is proceeded with. Since such objections may establish that jurisdictional requirements for reopening are absent, initiating scrutiny before their disposal reverses the mandatory sequence. The notice under Section 143(2) was issued even before the recorded reasons were furnished.

Conclusion: A notice under Section 143(2) cannot be issued before the assessee's objections to reopening are disposed of by a speaking order. The impugned notice was invalid and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an Assessing Officer may issue a notice under Section 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 within four weeks after rejecting the assessee's objections to reopening.

Analysis: Where objections to reopening are rejected, the reassessment procedure requires a four-week interval from service of the order rejecting those objections before further assessment steps may be taken. The notice under Section 142(1) was issued before expiry of that mandatory interval and therefore breached the prescribed procedural safeguard.

Conclusion: A notice under Section 142(1) cannot be issued within the mandatory four-week interval following rejection of objections to reopening. The impugned notice and consequential action were invalid and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Reassessment scrutiny cannot validly commence until reopening objections have been decided by a speaking order and the mandatory interval for challenging that decision has expired.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the pre-2021 reassessment scheme, notices initiating scrutiny or calling for assessment details constitute proceeding with the assessment and may be issued only after a speaking disposal of reopening objections and completion of the required four-week interval.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition challenging conditions of provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy; and (ii) Whether the bank-guarantee condition of Rs. 6 crore for provisional release of the seized barge was unreasonable and excessive.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition challenging conditions of provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: Section 110A confers discretion to prescribe security and conditions for provisional release, while Section 128 provides an appellate remedy. However, writ jurisdiction could be exercised where the conditions imposed were ex facie excessive and unreasonable on the facts.

Conclusion: The alternate statutory remedy did not bar exercise of writ jurisdiction in the circumstances, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the bank-guarantee condition of Rs. 6 crore for provisional release of the seized barge was unreasonable and excessive.

Analysis: The discretion under Section 110A must be exercised reasonably on relevant material while safeguarding revenue. The substantially lower bank guarantee required for release of the vessel to which the seized fuel had been transferred, the disputed valuation material regarding the barge, and the voluntary payment already made were relevant to assessment of an appropriate security. The impugned security was therefore disproportionate to the circumstances.

Conclusion: The bank-guarantee requirement was reduced from Rs. 6 crore to Rs. 50 lakh, while the remaining provisional-release conditions were retained, in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The security for provisional release was recalibrated to ensure reasonable, case-specific protection of revenue while preserving the other applicable conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Discretion to impose security for provisional release under Section 110A must be exercised reasonably on relevant case-specific material and cannot sustain an excessive condition.

Issues: (i) Whether the seizure of gold under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was founded on the requisite reasonable belief that the gold was liable to confiscation; and (ii) Whether the gold was liable to confiscation and the appellants to penalty despite the owner's purchase documents.

Issue (i): Whether the seizure of gold under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was founded on the requisite reasonable belief that the gold was liable to confiscation.

Analysis: Section 110(1) requires the proper officer to form an independent reasonable belief, based on objective material, that goods are liable to confiscation. The gold was initially seized by the railway police and handed to Customs. The seizure records disclosed no foreign markings, and the sole marking "W" did not establish foreign origin. Customs did not independently verify the alleged foreign origin or form a subjective satisfaction on credible material; mere suspicion that the gold was smuggled was insufficient.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: the seizure lacked the reasonable belief required under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (ii): Whether the gold was liable to confiscation and the appellants to penalty despite the owner's purchase documents.

Analysis: The owner produced purchase invoices for auctioned gold ornaments, bank records and income-tax returns, and explained their conversion into gold pieces. As these documents were not discredited, they were admissible evidence and discharged the burden under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962. The burden consequently lay on Revenue to establish that the gold was smuggled, but no cogent evidence of foreign origin or smuggling was produced.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: the gold was not liable to confiscation and no penalties were imposable.

Final Conclusion: Absence of an independently formed reasonable belief and failure to prove foreign origin or smuggling precluded confiscation of the gold and penal consequences.

Ratio Decidendi: A customs seizure must rest on the proper officer's independent reasonable belief founded on objective material indicating foreign origin or smuggling; where the claimant discharges the statutory burden and Revenue produces no such proof, confiscation and penalty cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether imported non-sterile latex examination gloves that were sterilised, repacked and relabelled before retail sale qualified for Special Additional Duty refund under Notification No. 102/2007-Customs dated 14.09.2007.

Analysis: The exemption notification repeatedly refers to the sale of the "said goods", invoices for sale of the "imported goods", and payment of VAT on sale of "such imported goods"; these requirements mandate sale of the imported goods themselves. Sterilisation, repacking and relabelling constituted deemed manufacture under Section 2(f) and the Third Schedule to the Central Excise Act, 1944, as also evidenced by payment of concessional central excise duty on the processed goods. The goods sold were consequently manufactured goods and not the imported goods sold as such. Strict construction of exemption conditions precluded the claimed refund.

Conclusion: Refund of Special Additional Duty under Notification No. 102/2007-Customs dated 14.09.2007 was unavailable; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether waiver under the proviso to Section 244(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013 was validly granted for maintaining proceedings under Sections 241 and 242 where the waiver application was filed after the company petition and the adequacy and genuineness of the members' consent were disputed.

Analysis: Section 244(1)(b) permits members of a company without share capital to seek relief under Section 241 where not less than one-fifth of the total members support the proceeding, subject to the Tribunal's discretionary power to waive the eligibility requirements. The company petition had from its inception pleaded the basis of maintainability and relied on consent from 209 members. The accepted electoral list showed 977 eligible voting members, making the consent sufficient to meet the statutory threshold. The subsequent waiver application, filed as a precaution amid disagreement over the membership strength, did not render the petition incompetent. The assertion that consents were forged or uninformed was unsupported; the burden to establish those facts lay on the party alleging them, and no evidence, expert verification, or testimony of any member disputing consent was produced. The waiver jurisdiction does not extend to deciding the merits of oppression and mismanagement allegations. Section 244(1)(b) requires a purposive and regulatory construction to prevent frivolous litigation without obstructing access to judicial remedies.

Conclusion: The waiver order was valid, and the proceedings under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 were maintainable.

Issues: Whether an interim order granting substantive relief could be made without affording an effective opportunity to answer the interlocutory application and without recording reasons.

Analysis: Interim relief materially affecting parties' rights requires a reasoned prima facie assessment. Non-filing of a reply in the main proceedings or in the interlocutory application, without proof of an effective opportunity to respond, cannot by itself justify such relief. Section 424 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the principles of natural justice require an effective hearing and recorded reasons.

Conclusion: An ex parte interim order granting substantive relief without an effective opportunity of hearing and recorded reasons is vitiated.

Ratio Decidendi: A tribunal cannot grant materially rights-affecting interim relief solely because a party has not filed a reply; it must afford an effective opportunity of hearing and give reasons for the relief.

Issues: (i) Whether the Adjudicating Authority has the power and jurisdiction to recall CIRP by dismissing an admitted Section 9 petition founded on fraud and collusion?; (ii) Whether CIRP can continue after its original Section 9 application is found to have been fraudulently and collusively initiated?

Issue (i): Whether the Adjudicating Authority has the power and jurisdiction to recall CIRP by dismissing an admitted Section 9 petition founded on fraud and collusion?

Analysis: The existence of a debt and default is a jurisdictional fact for assumption of insolvency jurisdiction. A jurisdictional fact procured through fraud or collusion cannot sustain the exercise of statutory power. In public-law proceedings, deception of the adjudicatory process or a collusive presentation of facts undermines the integrity of the process and permits correction despite the ordinary finality of an admission order. The purported operational debt was conclusively found to be illusory and presented through collusion to procure CIRP and a moratorium.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority has the power and jurisdiction to recall admission of CIRP by dismissing a Section 9 application founded on fraudulent and collusive jurisdictional facts.

Issue (ii): Whether CIRP can continue after its original Section 9 application is found to have been fraudulently and collusively initiated?

Analysis: Before admission, insolvency proceedings are in personam between the initiating creditor and the corporate debtor. Upon admission, CIRP becomes an in rem and collective process: the moratorium operates, management vests in the insolvency professional, claims of all creditors are collated, and the Committee of Creditors participates in resolution. The initiating creditor consequently ceases to control the process, and withdrawal is not unilateral. The original collusive applicant must be excluded and action under the Code may follow, but the continuation of CIRP depends on a reasoned assessment of the resolution professional's submissions, the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors, the interests of stakeholders, and the capacity to conduct the process with integrity and transparency.

Conclusion: CIRP need not automatically terminate because the original Section 9 application was fraudulent and collusive. The Adjudicating Authority may continue it after hearing the resolution professional, the Committee of Creditors and affected stakeholders, while disallowing the original applicant from participation.

Final Conclusion: Fraudulent initiation permits recall of insolvency admission, but does not by itself extinguish a mature collective insolvency process; continuance depends on a transparent and stakeholder-informed determination directed to the statutory objects of insolvency resolution.

Ratio Decidendi: Fraud or collusion in jurisdictional facts permits recall of CIRP admission, but an admitted CIRP may continue where the Adjudicating Authority determines that collective stakeholder interests and the statutory purpose of insolvency resolution so require.

Issues: Whether personal guarantors could invoke liberty to revive appeals dismissed upon an OTS settlement when the settlement failed due to non-performance by the principal borrower and guarantors.

Analysis: The appeals had been treated as infructuous on the basis of the OTS, subject to liberty of revival if the settlement failed. The OTS required payment of the stipulated balance amounts and cooperation by the guarantors; apart from the upfront amount, no further payment was made. The liability of the principal borrower and guarantors was co-extensive. The revival liberty applied where the settlement failed because of default by the Bank, and could not be used by guarantors to benefit from their own failure to comply with the OTS.

Conclusion: The personal guarantors were not entitled to revival of the appeals.

Issues: Whether liquidation could be deferred after expiry of the CIRP period where no resolution plan was received or valid extension approved, despite failure of the liquidation proposal to secure the requisite voting majority and subsequent expressions of interest.

Analysis: Section 33(1)(a) mandates liquidation where no resolution plan under Section 30(6) is received before expiry of the CIRP period or a validly extended period under Section 12. This statutory consequence is distinct from liquidation initiated upon a Committee of Creditors resolution under Section 33(2). Failure of the separate liquidation proposal to secure the prescribed majority did not create a legal deadlock or affect liquidation under Section 33(1)(a). Post-expiry Committee of Creditors proceedings, fresh expressions of interest, and MSME eligibility under Section 240A could not revive an expired CIRP. Commercial wisdom operates within, and cannot override, the statutory timelines and voting requirements.

Conclusion: Upon expiry of the CIRP period without a resolution plan or valid extension, liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) was mandatory; approval of a separate liquidation resolution by the Committee of Creditors was not a condition precedent.

Issues: Whether the Enforcement Directorate may undertake further investigation and issue summons under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 after filing its complaint but before charges are framed, without prior leave of the Special Court.

Analysis: Explanation (ii) to Section 44(1) recognises further investigation and the bringing of additional oral or documentary evidence in respect of an offence of money laundering after a complaint has been filed. The requirement of permission under the proviso to Section 193 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 applies to further investigation during trial. Trial commences upon framing of charges; as charges had not been framed, the matter had not entered the trial stage. Further investigation is a continuation of the original investigation, distinct from impermissible reinvestigation, and is supported by the statutory power under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Conclusion: The Enforcement Directorate could conduct further investigation and issue the impugned summons without obtaining prior leave of the Special Court before commencement of trial.

Issues: (i) Whether the services performed under the work orders were classifiable as goods transport agency service rather than mining of mineral, oil or gas service; (ii) Whether the appellant was entitled to small-service-provider exemption for management, maintenance and repair service and supply of tangible goods service, and the consequent tax, interest and penalties; (iii) Whether the separate service-tax demand for April 2013 to March 2014 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the services performed under the work orders were classifiable as goods transport agency service rather than mining of mineral, oil or gas service.

Analysis: The work orders established that transportation of coal, slurry and related material was the predominant activity, while the remaining activities were incidental or ancillary. Applying composite service classification and the essential character test, the service was to be classified according to its principal transportation element. Where consignment notes are issued, liability for goods transport agency service is attracted on the specified corporate service recipients under the reverse charge mechanism; transportation without consignment notes falls within the negative list.

Conclusion: The services were classifiable as goods transport agency service and not mining service. The mining-service tax demand, related interest and penalty under Section 78 were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant was entitled to small-service-provider exemption for management, maintenance and repair service and supply of tangible goods service, and the consequent tax, interest and penalties.

Analysis: The turnover from these two services remained within the exemption threshold in all relevant financial years except that it exceeded the threshold by Rs. 18,958 in 2010-11. Tax was consequently payable on the excess turnover for 2010-11 and on the taxable turnover of Rs. 8,66,678 for 2011-12, aggregating to Rs. 91,221, with interest. Suppression with intent to evade was not established. The amount already deposited was directed to be appropriated towards the confirmed tax and interest.

Conclusion: Service tax of Rs. 91,221 with interest was confirmed only for the specified taxable turnover for 2010-11 and 2011-12. No penalty under Section 76 was imposable, while the penalty under Section 77 for delayed filing of returns was upheld; the issue was partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the separate service-tax demand for April 2013 to March 2014 was sustainable.

Analysis: The adjudication order contained no finding supporting this demand. Further, if the demand concerned mining service, it failed for the same classification reason; otherwise, the turnover qualified for the small-service-provider exemption.

Conclusion: The demand for April 2013 to March 2014 was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The enforceable fiscal liability was confined to the limited non-exempt turnover under management, maintenance and repair service and supply of tangible goods service, together with interest and the return-filing penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite service must be classified by its essential character, and incidental activities accompanying the predominant transportation of goods do not convert it into mining service.

Issues: (i) Whether the deputation of an expatriate employee by the overseas company constituted taxable Manpower Recruitment and Supply Service?; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable?

Issue (i): Whether the deputation of an expatriate employee by the overseas company constituted taxable Manpower Recruitment and Supply Service?

Analysis: The memorandum described the expatriate as an employee of the overseas company assigned to the assessee for a fixed and short duration. The statutory definitions cover temporary supply of manpower, and the relevant enquiry is the nature of the service provided by the overseas entity. Salary payments, tax deduction at source and issuance of Form 16 by the assessee did not alter the character of the arrangement. The binding principle governing seconded employees was applied.

Conclusion: The deputation constituted taxable Manpower Recruitment and Supply Service. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable?

Analysis: The demand was issued after the normal period, and the Department relied on audit and investigation to allege suppression. The applied limitation principle requires deliberate withholding of material facts; discovery during audit, without a reasoned establishment of such deliberate suppression, cannot by itself justify the extended period.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable and the demand was time-barred. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Although the service was found taxable on merits, the demand could not be sustained because the notice was barred by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Invocation of the extended period of limitation requires deliberate withholding of material facts; audit-based detection without a reasoned finding of such suppression is insufficient.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit could be denied on alleged non-receipt of inputs where the Revenue relied on unadmitted third-party statements, uncertified third-party electronic records and limited transport discrepancies; (ii) Whether the Director's personal penalty under Rule 26 could survive without admissible proof of his knowing participation or of goods liable to confiscation; and (iii) Whether the Rs. 8,00,000 deposit made during investigation constituted an admission of liability

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit could be denied on alleged non-receipt of inputs where the Revenue relied on unadmitted third-party statements, uncertified third-party electronic records and limited transport discrepancies

Analysis: Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 requires the maker of an investigative statement to be examined and the statement admitted in evidence in the interests of justice, unless a specified statutory exception applies. The dealers' and transporter's statements were directly relied upon without compliance with this mandatory procedure and were therefore unavailable to prove their contents. The electronic data extracted from a hard disk seized from a third party was also inadmissible because the statutory safeguards and certificate required by Section 36B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were absent.

Analysis: No cogent financial trail established that payments made by the appellant-company had been returned in cash. Nor was there evidence of an alternative source of inputs, stock deficit, input-output mismatch, or transaction-specific non-transportation sufficient to displace the appellant-company's invoices, payment records, production records and duty-paid clearances. Sample vehicle-registration discrepancies and untested portal data could not establish non-receipt under every disputed invoice.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the denial of CENVAT credit, consequential interest and the corporate penalty were unsustainable and were set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the Director's personal penalty under Rule 26 could survive without admissible proof of his knowing participation or of goods liable to confiscation

Analysis: Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 requires transaction-specific proof of knowledge, active participation and conscious dealing with goods liable to confiscation. No admissible evidence established the Director's personal mens rea or overt involvement, and the foundation of the principal credit demand had failed.

Conclusion: In favour of the Director, the personal penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 was unsustainable and was set aside.

Issue (iii): Whether the Rs. 8,00,000 deposit made during investigation constituted an admission of liability

Analysis: A payment made during investigation, including one asserted to have been made under coercion or apprehension of coercive action, does not by itself amount to an unconditional admission of tax liability or establish fraudulent availment of credit.

Conclusion: The investigative deposit did not constitute an admission of liability.

Final Conclusion: The inadmissible and uncorroborated evidentiary material did not establish non-receipt of inputs or collusive availment of credit, leaving no sustainable basis for the related fiscal or personal penal consequences.

Ratio Decidendi: Third-party statements not admitted under Section 9D and electronic records not authenticated under Section 36B cannot sustain denial of CENVAT credit where independent, transaction-specific evidence does not establish non-receipt of inputs or the assessee's participation in fraud.

Issues: (i) Whether a statutory demand notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is validly served when it is sent by registered post to the drawer's correct address and received by the drawer's mother; (ii) Whether the decision treating service upon a drawer's spouse as insufficient without examining the correctness of the address or shared residence is binding precedent.

Issue (i): Whether a statutory demand notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is validly served when it is sent by registered post to the drawer's correct address and received by the drawer's mother.

Analysis: Proviso (b) to Section 138 requires the payee to give written notice to the drawer. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 raise a rebuttable presumption of service where notice is properly addressed and dispatched by registered post. The statutory requirement concerns giving notice, not proof of its personal receipt by the drawer. Once dispatch to the correct address is established, the burden lies on the drawer to show that the address was incorrect, that the notice was not tendered, or that the drawer had no knowledge of its delivery at that address. Receipt by a family member at the shared residential address does not, by itself, rebut that presumption.

Conclusion: Dispatch of the notice by registered post to the drawer's correct address satisfied the statutory requirement of giving notice; the unrebutted presumption of valid service applied notwithstanding receipt by the drawer's mother.

Issue (ii): Whether the decision treating service upon a drawer's spouse as insufficient without examining the correctness of the address or shared residence is binding precedent.

Analysis: The earlier decision had disregarded binding larger-Bench authority establishing deemed service upon correct dispatch and had treated a spouse as equivalent to an unrelated third party without addressing whether the notice was sent to the correct address or whether the spouse resided with the drawer. Such an approach conflicts with the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the settled rule that the drawer must rebut it.

Conclusion: The earlier decision was per incuriam and cannot operate as binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.

Final Conclusion: A correctly addressed statutory notice sent by registered post attracts a rebuttable presumption of service, and the drawer cannot defeat that presumption merely because a co-residing family member received the notice.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, dispatch of a correctly addressed notice by registered post constitutes giving notice and raises a rebuttable presumption of service, which the drawer must displace by credible proof of non-service or lack of knowledge not attributable to the drawer.

Issues: Whether a merits order quashing the issuance of process warranted recall because the complainant was unrepresented when the matter was finally heard.

Analysis: The order sought to be recalled had adjudicated the complaint on merits after considering the pleadings and record and applying Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Although the complainant had remained absent when the matter was heard, the record reflected prior adjournments sought on its behalf and no cogent ground or infirmity was established to justify reopening the merits determination.

Conclusion: Recall of the merits order was unwarranted.

Issues: Whether refund of unutilised input tax credit under the inverted duty structure is available where bulk sulphur and packaged sulphur attract the same GST rate but packing materials attract a higher rate, notwithstanding the CBIC circulars concerning identical input and output supplies.

Analysis: Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits refund where input tax credit accumulates because the tax rate on inputs exceeds that on output supplies. Packing materials used to make bulk sulphur marketable in customised packets qualify as inputs under Section 2(59), and the higher tax paid on such materials resulted in accumulated credit. Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST concerned accumulation arising from a reduction in the rate on the same goods and did not govern the stated facts. Further, instructions issued under Section 168(1) may secure uniform implementation but cannot curtail a statutory refund entitlement.

Conclusion: The taxpayer is entitled to refund of accumulated input tax credit under the inverted duty structure; the restriction urged by Revenue on the basis that input and output supplies are the same is not applicable.