Issues: Whether assessment orders could stand where show-cause notices were uploaded only on the GST portal, the taxpayer did not respond, and no personal hearing was afforded.

Analysis: Section 169(1) of the GST Act recognises portal uploading as a valid mode of service. However, where repeated portal notices elicit no response, the officer must explore other prescribed modes, preferably registered post, to ensure effective service rather than merely complete a procedural formality. Confirmation of the show-cause proposals without a personal hearing in those circumstances denied an effective opportunity to respond.

Conclusion: The ex parte assessment orders were invalid for want of effective service and an opportunity of personal hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether writ jurisdiction could be exercised despite the alternative remedy before the GST Appellate Tribunal when ineffective communication and breach of natural justice were alleged; (ii) Whether rejection of the statutory appeal as time-barred was sustainable where the adjudication order was uploaded under the "Additional Notices and Orders" tab and the delay explanation was not addressed.

Issue (i): Whether writ jurisdiction could be exercised despite the alternative remedy before the GST Appellate Tribunal when ineffective communication and breach of natural justice were alleged.

Analysis: Article 226 of the Constitution of India permits exercise of writ jurisdiction notwithstanding an alternative remedy where breach of natural justice is alleged. The challenge concerned the effective communication of the adjudication order and the appellate rejection of the appeal on limitation, warranting consideration under writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The existence of a further appellate remedy did not bar writ jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of the statutory appeal as time-barred was sustainable where the adjudication order was uploaded under the "Additional Notices and Orders" tab and the delay explanation was not addressed.

Analysis: Section 107(1) of the CGST and MGST Acts makes limitation run from communication of the decision. Communication requires sufficient knowledge of the decision to enable an effective statutory remedy. Uploading the order under a tab not designated for notices and orders did not establish such communication; routine filing of returns through the portal could not establish knowledge of an order placed there. The appellate order also failed to disclose reasons for rejecting the explanation for delay.

Conclusion: The limitation dismissal could not stand; the delay was condoned and the statutory appeal was restored for a merits decision after personal hearing.

Final Conclusion: The statutory appeal must receive adjudication on merits upon application of the communication requirement under section 107(1), without any pronouncement on the underlying tax demand or the alleged denial of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: For limitation under section 107(1), an order uploaded on a non-designated portal tab is not effectively communicated unless it imparts sufficient knowledge to enable effective pursuit of the statutory remedy; routine portal use for filing returns cannot substitute for such communication.

Issues: Whether sufficient cause was shown for condoning the 20-day delay in filing the appeal.

Analysis: Section 260A(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits admission of an appeal filed beyond the prescribed period where sufficient cause is established. A justice-oriented and pragmatic approach applies to short delays, while considering the conduct of the applicant and the need to advance substantial justice. The delay was short, arose in the governmental approval process, and the appeal was filed promptly after approval; the circumstances did not disclose lethargy or dilatory conduct.

Conclusion: Sufficient cause was established, and the 20-day delay in filing the appeal was condoned.

Issues: Whether a deduction for a provision made towards an approved gratuity fund was allowable under Section 40A(7)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether revision under Section 263 could be invoked by applying the actual-payment requirement under Section 43B(b).

Analysis: Section 40A(1) contains a non obstante clause, and Section 40A(7)(a) disallows provisions for gratuity except where the provision falls within Section 40A(7)(b), which specifically covers contributions towards an approved gratuity fund. Section 43B(b) applies generally to gratuity-related deductions on an actual-payment basis. Since Section 40A(7)(b) specifically addresses approved gratuity funds whereas Section 43B refers generally to gratuity funds, the provisions are reconcilable and the specific provision prevails over the general provision. The contrary disallowance view therefore involved a debatable issue and could not sustain revisionary jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The provision towards contribution to an approved gratuity fund was deductible under Section 40A(7)(b), and revision under Section 263 on the basis of Section 43B(b) was not sustainable. The issue was resolved in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether receipts from structured online executive and professional courses provided by an educational institution to Indian students and corporate employees were excluded from Fees for Included Services as consideration for teaching in or by an educational institution.

Analysis: Article 12(4) defines Fees for Included Services by reference to technical or consultancy services that, among other conditions, make available technical knowledge, skill, know-how or processes. Article 12(5)(c), introduced by a notwithstanding clause, specifically excludes amounts paid for teaching in or by educational institutions and therefore operates even where a course may impart technical knowledge or skills. The exclusion is not limited to degree-granting, credit-bearing, campus-based or long-duration programmes. The Technical Explanation confirms that technical and professional education imparted to employees of a commercial enterprise remains teaching, and that customised courses or teaching at locations other than the institution's campus do not alter that character. Structured courses in recognised academic and professional disciplines, including cohort-based programmes for corporate employees, retained their educational character; their description as training, their customisation, and the non-credit nature of the programmes did not convert them into technical consultancy services. Payment of Equalisation Levy under another fiscal regime did not determine the character of the receipts under the treaty. Consequently, the make available test was not determinative.

Conclusion: The course receipts fell within the educational exclusion under Article 12(5)(c) and were not taxable in India as Fees for Included Services.

Issues: (i) Whether cash deposits and credit entries in a bank account could be assessed as unexplained money in the hands of a partnership firm that had been dissolved before the relevant previous year; (ii) Whether penalty for failure to furnish a return could be sustained against the dissolved firm for the relevant assessment year.

Issue (i): Whether cash deposits and credit entries in a bank account could be assessed as unexplained money in the hands of a partnership firm that had been dissolved before the relevant previous year.

Analysis: Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits assessment of unexplained money in the hands of the person to whom the money is properly attributable, while Section 115BBE governs its tax treatment. The dissolution deed showed that the firm had ceased to exist and that its assets and liabilities were taken over by a former partner, who continued the business as a proprietorship. The bank certificate linked the disputed accounts with that individual's PAN, and the individual had accounted for the transactions in the return and balance sheet. The remand verification also supported these facts. Mere continuance of an account number formerly used by the firm did not establish that post-dissolution transactions belonged to the firm. The assessment had to be made in the correct hands.

Conclusion: The cash deposits and credit entries could not be assessed in the hands of the dissolved firm and the additions were deleted.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty for failure to furnish a return could be sustained against the dissolved firm for the relevant assessment year.

Analysis: Section 271F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerns penalty for failure to furnish a return of income. The firm had been dissolved before the relevant year and had no assessable income during that year; the business and banking transactions belonged to the former partner in the individual proprietorship capacity.

Conclusion: The penalty for failure to furnish a return was unsustainable and was deleted.

Final Conclusion: Post-dissolution banking transactions attributable to the former partner's proprietorship could not be taxed, nor could return-filing default be penalised, in the hands of the erstwhile firm.

Ratio Decidendi: A dissolved partnership firm cannot be assessed or penalised merely because a bank account previously used by it continued, where reliable evidence establishes that the account and its post-dissolution transactions belonged to and were accounted for by a former partner in an individual capacity.

Issues: Whether the addition for unexplained investment under Section 69B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, based on the valuation of shares, was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 69B permits application of its Deeming Fiction only where actual investment exceeding the amount recorded in the books is established. The investment was recorded at the contracted price, and no material established payment of consideration beyond that recorded amount. A valuation report determining a higher Fair Market Value, without proof of excess expenditure, could not discharge the burden of proof required for invoking Section 69B. The valuation was also founded on an incorrect treatment of the franchise fee as a capital asset, although it was revenue expenditure, and the royalty-relief method was inapplicable because the relevant brand could not be sublicensed. Further, Section 56(2)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had only prospective operation from 01.06.2010 and did not apply to the relevant assessment year.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition under Section 69B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether consideration received for assignment of Indian trademark rights constituted royalty taxable in India or gains from alienation taxable only in the State of residence under the India-Switzerland Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

Analysis: Article 12(3) distinguishes consideration for use of, or the right to use, intellectual property from consideration for transfer of its ownership. Paragraph 6 of the Protocol separately recognises gains from alienation of intellectual property, except where consideration is contingent upon profits, productivity or use. Article 13(6) allocates gains from alienation of property not covered by the preceding paragraphs to the State of which the alienator is resident.

Analysis: The assignment deeds transferred all right, title, interest, goodwill, registration, use and enforcement rights in the specified Indian trademarks to the purchasers absolutely and perpetually, while extinguishing the transferor's rights in India. Territorial restrictions, product-related covenants, trade-dress exclusions and protective remedies defined the scope of the Indian property transferred or safeguarded contractual boundaries; they did not reserve proprietorship in the Indian marks. Registry records recognising the purchasers as proprietors corroborated the transfer of ownership. The fixed consideration was not contingent on future profits, productivity or use. The absence of an acquisition cost for self-generated marks and prior commercial arrangements did not alter the character of the assignments.

Conclusion: The consideration arose from alienation of trademark rights, not from use of or a right to use trademarks, and therefore was not royalty taxable in India. The resulting gains fell under Article 13(6) and were taxable only in Switzerland.

Issues: (i) Whether bonus under clause 2A was payable after accounting for the 138-day extension under clause 5.2. (ii) Whether the arbitral award of interest on Claim No. 2, which had not been claimed, was valid and severable. (iii) Whether the direction to reimburse GST actually payable or paid on the awarded amount warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether bonus under clause 2A was payable after accounting for the 138-day extension under clause 5.2.

Analysis: Clause 2A makes early-completion bonus payable where work is completed before the stipulated or justified extended completion date. Clause 5.2 covers delays arising from force majeure and similar events and only bars a claim for damages arising from extension of time; it does not prohibit bonus. The acknowledged hindrance period under clause 5.2 therefore affected the completion deadline for determining whether the work was completed early. Interpretation of contractual terms falls within the arbitral domain, and interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is unavailable where the interpretation is plausible and does not disclose patent illegality, public-policy violation, absence of evidence, or absence of reasons.

Conclusion: The bonus awarded under Claim No. 1 was valid; the challenge to that component failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the arbitral award of interest on Claim No. 2, which had not been claimed, was valid and severable.

Analysis: Interest had been sought only in relation to Claim No. 1. The grant of interest on Claim No. 2 consequently travelled beyond the scope of the arbitral reference. Under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an invalid component may be severed from an otherwise valid award where it is separable.

Conclusion: The interest awarded on Claim No. 2 was invalid and was set aside as a severable part of the award.

Issue (iii): Whether the direction to reimburse GST actually payable or paid on the awarded amount warranted interference.

Analysis: Tax consequences of arbitral awards depend upon the character of each awarded component. Amounts constituting consideration for additional work, escalation, or revision of contract value may attract GST, whereas compensation for breach, delay, loss, or damages may not constitute a supply. The direction was limited to reimbursement of GST only where it was actually payable or paid.

Conclusion: The GST reimbursement direction under Claim No. 7 was retained; the challenge to that component failed.

Final Conclusion: Only the severable interest component relating to unclaimed Claim No. 2 was annulled; the early-completion bonus and the direction for reimbursement of GST, if payable, remain operative.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 34, a severable arbitral-award component granting relief outside the arbitral reference may be set aside without disturbing valid components founded on a plausible contractual interpretation.

Issues: Whether reassessment of an assessee, based exclusively on incriminating material found during a search of third parties, could be initiated under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 instead of Section 153C of that Act.

Analysis: The statutory scheme for search assessments treats Section 153C as the special mechanism where material relating to an other person is found during a search. Its invocation requires the prescribed satisfaction to be recorded by the Assessing Officer of the searched person and communicated to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The general reassessment provisions under Sections 147 and 148 are unavailable where the sole basis is such transmitted search material; they may apply only where independent material from another source indicates escaped income. The reassessment here rested solely on search material, without a satisfaction note or independent material.

Conclusion: The reopening under Section 148 was without jurisdiction. Assessment or reassessment founded solely on the search material could proceed, if at all, under Section 153C upon compliance with its satisfaction requirement, while Sections 147 and 148 could be invoked only on independent material.

Ratio Decidendi: Where search material concerning an other person is the exclusive basis for reassessment, the special procedure under Section 153C, subject to recorded satisfaction, excludes recourse to Sections 147 and 148 unless independent material supports such reassessment.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the GST Act could be imposed for transporting goods with an expired e-way bill without proof of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 129(1) authorises detention and penalty where goods are transported in contravention of the Act or the rules. The provision does not make proof of intent to evade tax a condition for imposition of penalty; the penalty concerns breach of a civil statutory obligation. Rule 138(10) permitted extension of the e-way bill validity within the stipulated period, but no extension was obtained. Although the accompanying invoice, bilty, and particulars of the goods were undisputed, the vehicle was found in transit nearly three days after expiry of the e-way bill. The GPS report concerned a different vehicle number and was generated after interception. The repair documents were estimates, unsigned credit memoranda, or otherwise unreliable documents and did not credibly establish the alleged breakdown. The subsequent disclosure of breakdown also lacked contemporaneous support. Circular No. 64 dated 14.09.2018 did not exempt transportation under an expired e-way bill from proceedings under Section 129.

Conclusion: Proof of intent to evade tax is not necessary for penalty under Section 129(1)(a), and transportation after expiry of the e-way bill without credible justification attracted the provision. The issue was answered against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Validity of the reassessment notices and resulting reassessments based on erroneous investigation information and previously examined share transactions; (ii) Legality of the addition under Sections 69 and 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerning recorded purchases of equity shares; (iii) Legality of the addition under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of equity-share sale proceeds already recorded and offered to tax.

Issue (i): Validity of the reassessment notices and resulting reassessments based on erroneous investigation information and previously examined share transactions.

Analysis: Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 require a reason to believe founded on tangible material, and do not permit review of a completed scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3) on a mere change of opinion. The recorded reasons misstated the quantum and nature of the share transactions, relied mechanically on investigation information and a subsequently retracted statement, and overlooked that the transactions, supporting documents and source of funds had already been specifically examined in the original scrutiny assessment. The reopening therefore rested on borrowed satisfaction, non-application of mind and material already considered.

Conclusion: The reassessment notices and consequent reassessments were invalid and were quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Legality of the addition under Sections 69 and 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerning recorded purchases of equity shares.

Analysis: The equity-share purchases were made through recognised stock exchanges and a registered broker, and were supported by contract notes, broker ledgers, bank records and evidence of source of funds. The investments were recorded in the books and had also been examined in the original assessment. The addition was based principally on a retracted third-party statement that was neither supplied to the assessee nor subjected to cross-examination. On the reasoning adopted, Section 69A could not be invoked for recorded investments whose source had been explained.

Conclusion: The addition for alleged unexplained investment was unsustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Legality of the addition under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of equity-share sale proceeds already recorded and offered to tax.

Analysis: The disputed amount represented sale proceeds of equity shares, rather than an investment, and the sales were executed through recognised stock exchanges and a registered broker. Contract notes, bank statements, broker records and sale details were available, while the corresponding income had been accounted for in the books and offered to tax. Treating the gross sale proceeds as unexplained investment under Section 69A was factually and legally untenable and resulted in double taxation.

Conclusion: The addition of the recorded sale proceeds was unsustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment jurisdiction was unavailable on the recorded reasons, and neither the recorded share purchases nor the accounted sale proceeds could be brought to tax as unexplained amounts.

Issues: Validity of cancellation of GST registration for failure to furnish a rent agreement for an additional place of business.

Analysis: Section 29(2)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits cancellation only for prescribed contraventions. Rule 21(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 makes registration liable to cancellation where the registered person does not conduct business from the declared place of business. Form GST REG-01, read with Rule 8, requires upload of documents establishing the principal place of business and does not require a rent agreement for an additional place of business. The show-cause notice and cancellation order rested solely on the absence of a rent agreement for the additional place, while the principal place of business was supported by the required rent agreement. That ground neither established a prescribed contravention nor showed that business was not conducted from the declared place of business.

Conclusion: Cancellation of the GST registration for non-submission of a rent agreement relating to the additional place of business was contrary to the statutory scheme; the notice and cancellation order were invalid, and restoration of registration from the date of suspension was required.

Issues: (i) Whether retention money, previously included in income and written off as irrecoverable, was deductible as bad debt under Section 36(1)(vii) read with Section 36(2). (ii) Whether the entire rent paid to related parties could be disallowed under Section 40A(2)(b) absent material establishing excessiveness or unreasonableness having regard to fair market value.

Issue (i): Whether retention money, previously included in income and written off as irrecoverable, was deductible as bad debt under Section 36(1)(vii) read with Section 36(2).

Analysis: The retained sums formed part of the gross invoice amounts recognised as income in the relevant earlier years and were reflected as receivables. On forfeiture by the contracting authority, the amounts were written off in the accounts for the relevant previous year. Following the post-1989 position under Section 36(1)(vii), proof that the debt became irrecoverable in a particular year was not required once it was actually written off; the requirement of prior inclusion in income under Section 36(2) stood satisfied.

Conclusion: The bad-debt claim was allowable and the disallowance was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the entire rent paid to related parties could be disallowed under Section 40A(2)(b) absent material establishing excessiveness or unreasonableness having regard to fair market value.

Analysis: Section 40A(2)(b) permits disallowance only to the extent a related-party payment is excessive or unreasonable having regard to the fair market value of the goods, services or facilities. No comparable material or other evidence established that the rent was excessive or unreasonable. A disallowance founded merely on suspicion or an allegation that the transaction was not revenue-neutral lacked a factual foundation under the provision.

Conclusion: The rent disallowance was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disallowances of bad debts and related-party rent payments cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether global-ranking support, institutional facilitation and coordination services constituted business activities eligible for presumptive taxation under section 44AD rather than a specified profession attracting section 44ADA.

Analysis: Section 44ADA applies only where the assessee carries on a profession referred to in section 44AA(1). The statutory test is the substance and actual nature of the services, not merely the use of expressions such as advisory or consultancy in agreements, nor the payer's withholding treatment under section 194J. The services comprised institutional support, stakeholder coordination, data organisation, reporting, benchmarking and operational guidance for improving educational rankings. They did not amount to legal, medical, engineering, architectural, accountancy, interior-decoration, technical consultancy, or any notified profession. The material also did not establish commission, brokerage or agency business excluded under section 44AD(6). Since the premise that section 44ADA applied was unsustainable, the estimation of income at 70% of gross receipts on that basis lacked a sustainable statutory foundation.

Conclusion: The services were business activities and not a specified profession under section 44AA(1); section 44ADA and the consequential 70% income estimation were unsustainable, and the income offered under section 44AD was required to be accepted.

Issues: Whether non-deduction of tax under Section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 justified disallowance under Section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of commission paid to a United States non-resident entity.

Analysis: The obligation to withhold tax under Section 195 arises only where the remitted sum is chargeable to tax in India. A Tax Residency Certificate is relevant to claiming treaty relief under Section 90(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, but its absence does not itself create a domestic tax charge where the income is otherwise not chargeable. The material showed that the commission was for services rendered outside India and that the recipient had no business operations, office, or Permanent Establishment in India. Revenue established neither rendition of services in India nor a sufficient nexus for the commission income to accrue or arise in India. The description of the remittance as consulting services in Form 15CB was not determinative; the transaction's substance had to be ascertained from the underlying agreement, invoices, and actual services.

Conclusion: The commission paid to the non-resident entity was not chargeable to tax in India; consequently, no tax was deductible under Section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the corresponding disallowance under Section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 112(a)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed for an act rendering the goods liable to confiscation or for abetment of such act; (ii) Whether penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed for knowingly or intentionally making, signing, using, or causing the use of a false document.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 112(a)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed for an act rendering the goods liable to confiscation or for abetment of such act.

Analysis: Section 112(a)(i) requires proof that the person committed or omitted an act that rendered the goods liable to confiscation, or abetted such act. The respondent was neither the importer, declarant, nor Customs Broker, and had only introduced persons and forwarded documents to the licensed Customs Broker. The concealment and misdeclaration had occurred before that role. No evidence established that the respondent knew of the import or concealment, was a beneficiary, or participated in or abetted the acts rendering the goods confiscable.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 112(a)(i) was not sustainable; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed for knowingly or intentionally making, signing, using, or causing the use of a false document.

Analysis: Section 114AA applies only where knowing or intentional involvement in making, signing, using, or causing use of a false document is proved. The record did not establish that the respondent prepared any invoice or declaration, knew of the concealed goods, or knowingly used or caused the use of any false document.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114AA was not sustainable; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The essential statutory prerequisites for imposing either penalty were not established by evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalties for abetment of acts rendering goods confiscable and for false documents require proof of the person's knowing participation in the relevant prohibited act or document; mere introduction of persons or forwarding of documents is insufficient.

Issues: Whether a service-tax demand for the extended period can be sustained solely on Form 26AS and income-tax-return data without independent corroborative evidence of taxable services.

Analysis: Form 26AS and income-tax-return figures, maintained for tax-deduction purposes on a receipt basis, do not by themselves establish the taxable value or rendition of taxable services for service-tax purposes. Independent verification of the nature of receipts and corroborative evidence are necessary. The adjudicating authority had not properly addressed the explanation regarding differences between billing-based service-tax liability and figures reflected in Form 26AS.

Conclusion: The demand confirmed for the extended period solely on CBDT data was set aside; service-tax liability, if any, for the normal period together with interest remained payable.

Issues: (i) Whether road transportation without issue of a consignment note is taxable as Goods Transport Agency service; and (ii) whether transportation of food-grains is taxable as Goods Transport Agency service.

Issue (i): Whether road transportation without issue of a consignment note is taxable as Goods Transport Agency service.

Analysis: Section 65B(26) of the Finance Act, 1994 defines a Goods Transport Agency as a person providing road transport service who issues a consignment note. Since no consignment notes were issued, the activity did not qualify as Goods Transport Agency service. Transportation of goods by road other than by a Goods Transport Agency or courier agency falls within the negative list under Section 66D(p)(i) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The road transportation activity was not taxable as Goods Transport Agency service and was in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether transportation of food-grains is taxable as Goods Transport Agency service.

Analysis: The receipts related to transportation of food-grains. The activity was held not liable to service tax.

Conclusion: Transportation of food-grains was not taxable as Goods Transport Agency service and was in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The entire service-tax demand, with consequential interest, penalties and late fee, was unsustainable, and the tax already paid became refundable.

Ratio Decidendi: Road transportation without issuance of a consignment note does not constitute Goods Transport Agency service and falls within the negative-list exclusion from service tax.

Issues: Whether the withholding of used multifunction print and copying machines on the basis of the model-wise import restriction was sustainable despite the absence of a centralised all-India monitoring mechanism and the furnishing of security for the entire consignment.

Analysis: The relevant policy framework treated the 100-unit criterion as applicable collectively to a particular model imported through all ports and by all importers. No centralised mechanism had been evolved to monitor that criterion, resulting in inconsistent port-wise practices. A prior decision on identical facts, directing provisional release against a provisional duty bond and bank guarantee, had attained finality following dismissal of the departmental challenge and implementation by the Department. Since security covered the whole consignment, there was no valid basis to retain any part of it.

Conclusion: The direction for provisional release of the withheld machines upon the stipulated security was valid.