Issues: Classification of kitchen exhaust hoods exceeding 120 cm in horizontal side and incorporating an integral fan under Heading 8414.

Analysis: Heading 8414 separately recognises fans and ventilating or recycling hoods incorporating a fan. The tariff entry for hoods under Tariff Item 8414 60 00 is confined to hoods having a maximum horizontal side not exceeding 120 cm. The Explanatory Notes also treat ventilating or recycling hoods incorporating a fan as a distinct category from fans. The integrated fan was only one component of a larger assembly comprising casing, dampers, filters, grease-collection equipment, lighting and related fittings; the assembly consequently retained the essential character of a kitchen hood rather than a fan. Since the hoods exceeded 120 cm and no specific tariff entry applied, classification lay under the residual entry.

Conclusion: Kitchen exhaust hoods incorporating an integral fan and exceeding 120 cm in horizontal side are classifiable under Tariff Item 8414 80 90 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, and not under Tariff Item 8414 59 90.

Issues: (i) Whether the complaint for cheating disclosed a prima facie case warranting refusal to quash the proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction; (ii) Whether non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry requirement before issuing process against accused residing outside the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction required quashing or remittal; (iii) Whether the complaint lacked specific allegations against the director petitioners so as to preclude their prosecution.

Issue (i): Whether the complaint for cheating disclosed a prima facie case warranting refusal to quash the proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction.

Analysis: Inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. Material arising from the related cheque-dishonour proceedings, including the forensic opinion indicating alteration of the cheque date, furnished prima facie support for the allegation that the cheque had been forged and used to institute proceedings. The non-disclosure of these subsequent developments by the petitioners, coupled with the evidentiary dispute requiring trial, prevented a finding that continuation of the cheating complaint was an abuse of process.

Conclusion: The cheating complaint was not liable to be quashed at the threshold.

Issue (ii): Whether non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry requirement before issuing process against accused residing outside the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction required quashing or remittal.

Analysis: An inquiry or investigation before process is mandatory where the accused reside beyond the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction. Although that inquiry was not conducted, the complaint could not be treated as disclosing no offence in view of the prima facie material concerning alleged forgery and cheating. The procedural defect therefore required fresh consideration at the pre-process stage rather than termination of the complaint.

Conclusion: The summoning order was set aside and the matter was remitted for compliance with the mandatory inquiry requirement.

Issue (iii): Whether the complaint lacked specific allegations against the director petitioners so as to preclude their prosecution.

Analysis: Criminal liability of company officers cannot rest solely on vicarious liability unless the governing statute so provides; active involvement and criminal intent must be prima facie alleged. The complaint alleged a conspiracy by the accused persons, and the forensic material prima facie supported the accusation of alteration of the cheque and its use in proceedings. The allegations were therefore not wholly devoid of a case against the director petitioners.

Conclusion: There was no basis to exclude the director petitioners from the complaint at the threshold.

Final Conclusion: The complaint remains open for fresh pre-process scrutiny under the mandatory statutory procedure; the available prima facie material does not justify its termination.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to conduct a mandatory pre-process inquiry for out-of-jurisdiction accused requires remittal rather than quashing where the complaint and attendant material disclose a prima facie criminal case requiring further inquiry.

Issues: Whether the directions for a forensic audit extended to a general examination of the affairs of 17 banks.

Analysis: The audit directions were construed as principally concerning commercial transactions and relationships involving the judgment debtors, FHL, FHHPL and the banks. The relevant clauses did not authorise an unrestricted inquiry into the banks' affairs beyond those transactions.

Conclusion: The forensic audit is confined to transactions involving the judgment debtors, FHL, FHHPL and the banks, and does not permit a fishing and roving enquiry into the banks' entire affairs.

Issues: (i) Validity of the impugned restoration order passed under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act; (ii) Sustainability of interim directions enforcing the insolvency professional's undertaking against all project stakeholders; (iii) Constitution and remit of a monitoring committee.

Issue (i): Validity of the impugned restoration order passed under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act.

Analysis: Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 permits restoration only to a claimant having a legitimate interest and a quantifiable loss, subject to good faith and absence of involvement in money-laundering. Rule 2(b) and Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Restoration of Confiscated Property) Rules, 2016 require an eligible claimant, framing of charge, prescribed notice and an opportunity of hearing to the owner. The statutory appellate process also creates a deemed embargo on restoration while challenges to attachment remain unresolved. A homebuyers' association, being neither a purchaser nor a person that itself suffered loss, could not qualify as a claimant. The insolvency professional's undertaking under an insolvency circular could not confer a role in restoration proceedings concerning assets belonging to former promoters or third parties rather than to the corporate debtor. The insolvency and money-laundering regimes concern distinct asset pools and cannot be merged through such an undertaking.

Conclusion: The impugned restoration order was set aside.

Issue (ii): Sustainability of interim directions enforcing the insolvency professional's undertaking against all project stakeholders.

Analysis: The undertaking recorded by the Supreme Court arose from proceedings concerning an individual homebuyer and protected that appellant's interest; it was not an undertaking in rem applicable to all homebuyers or stakeholders. The interim directions proceeded on the incorrect premise that the undertaking and the impugned restoration order bound all concerned persons, although affected homebuyers had not been heard and the restoration order was legally untenable.

Conclusion: The interim directions were recalled and vacated.

Issue (iii): Constitution and remit of a monitoring committee.

Analysis: Given the large number of competing homebuyer claims and disputed attachments, a neutral mechanism was required to verify genuine homebuyers and payments made to either developer. The committee's present role is confined to claim verification and maintenance of particulars, attachment status and valuation of assets. No authority to liquidate, restore or otherwise deal with attached assets was assigned at this stage. The committee cannot interfere with the ongoing corporate insolvency process, and the insolvency professional has no role before it; homebuyers' rights in insolvency proceedings remain unaffected.

Conclusion: A monitoring committee was constituted to undertake time-bound verification and asset-status functions, with further directions on attached assets deferred.

Final Conclusion: Any future restoration of attached assets remains subject to the statutory money-laundering framework, while a court-supervised verification mechanism will identify genuine homebuyers and preserve an updated record of the attached assets.

Ratio Decidendi: Restoration of attached property during trial requires a qualifying claimant and strict compliance with the statutory conditions for restoration; insolvency arrangements cannot vest an insolvency professional with authority over attached assets that do not belong to the corporate debtor.

Issues: (i) Whether a 100% penalty under Section 129 could be imposed solely because Part-B of the e-way bill was not populated before movement, despite genuine invoices, Part-A particulars and no proof of intent to evade tax; and (ii) Whether failure to issue a final speaking order in Form GST MOV-09 under Section 129(3) vitiated the penalty demand.

Issue (i): Whether a 100% penalty under Section 129 could be imposed solely because Part-B of the e-way bill was not populated before movement, despite genuine invoices, Part-A particulars and no proof of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 129 was construed as penal in character and not as imposing mechanical liability for every documentation lapse. A technical omission in Part-B cannot by itself establish an intention to evade tax. The genuine invoices, valid Part-A particulars, identifiable destination, tax-paid transaction and absence of evidence of diversion or evasion demonstrated that the lapse was inadvertent. Legacy check-post decisions applying absolute statutory regimes were distinguished from the GST framework, in which penalties require examination of the surrounding facts and deliberate tax evasion.

Conclusion: The 100% penalty under Section 129 was unsustainable in the absence of proven intent to evade tax and was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether failure to issue a final speaking order in Form GST MOV-09 under Section 129(3) vitiated the penalty demand.

Analysis: Section 129(3) requires a final speaking adjudication quantifying tax and penalty after considering objections and affording an opportunity of hearing. Non-issuance of Form GST MOV-09 bypassed this mandatory adjudicatory safeguard and prejudiced the assessee's statutory rights.

Conclusion: Failure to issue the mandatory final order in Form GST MOV-09 vitiated the penalty demand and was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A penalty for an unfilled Part-B of the e-way bill cannot be sustained where intentional tax evasion is unproved and the mandatory statutory adjudication procedure has not been followed.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under Section 129 requires proof of an intention to evade tax; a bona fide technical documentation lapse, unsupported by such proof, cannot attract penal consequences.

Issues: Whether non-updation of Part-B of an e-way bill, despite genuine transaction documents and absence of evidence of intended tax evasion, can independently justify penalty under Section 129(3).

Analysis: Section 129(3) was applied in the context of the digital GST framework as a measure directed against intentional tax evasion, not an inadvertent clerical or portal-related documentation lapse. Precedents arising from manual check-post regimes were distinguished. Where the tax invoice, Part-A e-way bill, goods particulars and underlying transaction were genuine and accounted for, an unupdated Part-B did not establish an attempt to evade tax. The burden lay on the Revenue to record and support a positive finding of such intent before imposing the penal consequence.

Conclusion: In the absence of a positive finding or evidence of intent to evade tax, non-updating of Part-B alone cannot attract penalty under Section 129(3); the penalty order and its appellate confirmation were legally unsustainable.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was justified where the e-way bill had expired owing to an erroneous entry of the consignor's pin code.

Analysis: Section 129 is a machinery provision intended to prevent tax evasion; mens rea must therefore be established before imposing penalty for a breach during transit. The binding departmental instructions distinguish substantive violations from minor or procedural lapses. The consignment was accompanied by an e-way bill and delivery challan, physical verification matched the goods with the documents, and the incorrect pin code reduced the e-way bill validity by recording a shorter distance. No intention to evade tax was alleged or established.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 129 and the consequential penalty were invalid and unjustified; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interest on wrongly availed IGST input tax credit had to be determined by reference to the aggregate balance available in the electronic credit ledger under the IGST, CGST and SGST heads in accordance with Circular No. 192/04/2023-GST dated 17.07.2023.

Analysis: Section 50(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with Section 20 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 88B(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, as clarified by the Circular, requires the combined ITC balance under IGST, CGST and SGST to be considered. Interest does not arise where that aggregate balance has not fallen below the wrongly availed IGST credit during the period from availment to reversal; where it falls below that amount, interest is attracted to the extent of the shortfall.

Conclusion: The interest liability requires fresh determination by applying the aggregate electronic-credit-ledger balance test under the Circular after affording the assessee a personal hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether the amended recovery claim based on the memorandum of compromise and the added damages relief were barred by limitation; (ii) Whether non-withdrawal of the suit under the memorandum of compromise precluded recovery; (iii) Whether defendants 1 to 3 and defendant 4 were liable for the compromised debt.

Issue (i): Whether the amended recovery claim based on the memorandum of compromise and the added damages relief were barred by limitation.

Analysis: Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits amendment of pleadings for determination of the real controversy. The original recovery suit was timely instituted on the construction agreement. The subsequent compromise arose from that same underlying transaction, recorded part-payment, and reduced the subsisting recovery claim to the unpaid balance. It did not introduce a distinct or fresh cause of action. The damages claim, however, was introduced for the first time by amendment and was time-barred.

Conclusion: The amended monetary recovery claim was within limitation, while the damages claim was barred by limitation; the finding was in favour of the plaintiff on recovery and against the plaintiff on damages.

Issue (ii): Whether non-withdrawal of the suit under the memorandum of compromise precluded recovery.

Analysis: Although the plaintiff did not withdraw the suit as contemplated by the compromise, the first defendant had itself failed to honour the post-dated cheque for the agreed outstanding amount. Its own non-performance of the compromise obligations prevented it from relying on the plaintiff's non-withdrawal to resist the recovery claim.

Conclusion: Non-withdrawal of the suit did not preclude recovery; the finding was in favour of the plaintiff.

Issue (iii): Whether defendants 1 to 3 and defendant 4 were liable for the compromised debt.

Analysis: The compromise quantified the principal settlement at Rs. 1.25 crore, of which Rs. 70 lakh remained unpaid after dishonour of the cheque; the separate compromise crystallised past interest. The defence evidence challenging the transaction was unsupported, and the deposition tendered on behalf of the first defendant lacked corporate authorisation. Defendants 1 to 3 were liable for the outstanding compromised debt. Defendant 4, though a director when the original transaction arose, was not a party to the compromise forming the basis of the amended claim and had ceased to be a director before it was made.

Conclusion: Defendants 1 to 3 were jointly and severally liable to pay Rs. 1,10,24,520.54 with interest at 12% per annum from 14.07.2023 until the order and thereafter at 9% per annum until realisation; defendant 4 was not liable. The finding was in favour of the plaintiff against defendants 1 to 3 and in favour of defendant 4.

Final Conclusion: The compromise-supported outstanding debt remained enforceable against defendants 1 to 3, whereas the belated damages claim and the claim against defendant 4 could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: An amendment reducing a timely monetary claim to reflect a compromise arising from the same underlying transaction does not introduce a new cause of action subject to independent limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellate order was invalid because the assessee had died before issuance of the first hearing notice; (ii) Whether the classification of guest-house receipts as business income and disallowance of related expenses required fresh adjudication in light of the material tendered under Rule 46A; (iii) Whether the challenge to initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A was premature.

Issue (i): Whether the appellate order was invalid because the assessee had died before issuance of the first hearing notice.

Analysis: The appellate record recorded that written submissions had been furnished during the proceedings. No material established that notices had been issued to a deceased person, that the appellate authority had been informed of the death, or that the asserted defect had been raised before that authority.

Conclusion: The challenge to the validity of the appellate order was rejected (against the assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether the classification of guest-house receipts as business income and disallowance of related expenses required fresh adjudication in light of the material tendered under Rule 46A.

Analysis: The additional material relating to the expenditure was rejected on the technical basis that no separate Rule 46A application had been filed. The appellate authority neither independently adjudicated the evidentiary claim nor addressed on merits the assessee's contention regarding the proper head of income and entitlement to corresponding expenditure. This amounted to a failure to discharge the statutory appellate duty.

Conclusion: The issues concerning the head of income and related expenditure were remitted for de novo adjudication after adequate opportunity to the assessee (in favour of the assessee).

Issue (iii): Whether the challenge to initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A was premature.

Analysis: No penalty order had been passed. Penalty proceedings are separate proceedings, and their initiation could not be adjudicated in advance in the assessment appeal.

Conclusion: The challenge to the initiation of penalty proceedings was dismissed as premature (against the assessee).

Final Conclusion: The appellate order remains valid, while the income-classification and expenditure issues require fresh appellate determination; the penalty challenge cannot be entertained before a penalty order is made.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate authority must independently adjudicate material claims on merits and cannot dispose of them solely through a technical rejection of supporting evidence without providing an effective opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether a 1,277-day delay in filing the appeal should be condoned; (ii) Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption of the full leave-encashment amount of Rs. 9,04,669 under Section 10(10AA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether a 1,277-day delay in filing the appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: The delay resulted from the tax consultant's failure to communicate the appellate order or pursue the further appeal. As the assessee was a retired person unfamiliar with tax law and had relied on professional assistance, the consultant's negligence could not be attributed to her. Limitation provisions governing condonation require liberal interpretation to advance substantial justice.

Conclusion: The 1,277-day delay was condoned.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption of the full leave-encashment amount of Rs. 9,04,669 under Section 10(10AA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 10(10AA) governs exemption for leave encashment received on retirement. Notification No. 31/2023 dated 24.05.2023 enhanced the exemption ceiling to Rs. 25,00,000. The enhanced limit, being beneficial to the assessee, was applied in accordance with the coordinate decisions addressing the same issue.

Conclusion: The entire leave-encashment amount of Rs. 9,04,669 was exempt under Section 10(10AA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the claimed exemption was required to be allowed.

Final Conclusion: The enhanced exemption ceiling governed the assessee's leave-encashment claim and removed the disputed disallowance.

Ratio Decidendi: A beneficial notification enhancing the statutory ceiling for leave-encashment exemption applies to a claim falling within the revised ceiling.

Issues: Whether the reference of disclosed interest on fully and compulsorily convertible debentures to the Transfer Pricing Officer under paragraph 3.3(a) of CBDT Instruction No. 3/2016 was valid and could sustain the transfer pricing adjustment.

Analysis: The reference was expressly founded on paragraph 3.3(a), which permits a transfer pricing reference in a case selected on non-transfer-pricing parameters only where the accountant's report under section 92E has not been filed or the relevant international transaction has not been disclosed in that report. Form 3CEB disclosed and quantified the interest on the debentures at Rs. 4,24,32,635, being the very transaction subjected to adjustment. The differing figures in the return and financial statements did not establish any separate undisclosed international transaction, and the figures attributed to Form 3CEB were inconsistent. Procedural compliance, including notice, consideration of objections and approval, could not cure the absence of the substantive conditions precedent for the transfer pricing reference.

Conclusion: The reference concerning the disclosed debenture-interest transaction was invalid, and the consequential transfer pricing adjustment of Rs. 4,24,32,635 was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable where the notice does not identify the applicable clause of section 270A(2). (ii) Whether penalty under section 271AAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable for expenditure recorded in kaccha books during an ongoing financial year and later entered in regular books, where the notice does not identify the applicable penalty clause.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable where the notice does not identify the applicable clause of section 270A(2).

Analysis: Section 270A(2) specifies distinct circumstances in clauses (a) to (g) in which income is regarded as under-reported. A notice referring only to "under-reporting of income", without identifying the particular statutory circumstance invoked, does not communicate the precise charge or afford a meaningful opportunity to respond. Identification of the applicable clause for the first time in the penalty order cannot cure the defect at initiation.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 270A was invalid and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under section 271AAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable for expenditure recorded in kaccha books during an ongoing financial year and later entered in regular books, where the notice does not identify the applicable penalty clause.

Analysis: Penalty under section 271AAB requires the amount to first satisfy the statutory definition of undisclosed income. An admission in a statement under section 132(4), without more, does not establish that requirement. The expenditure was recorded in kaccha books during a financial year that had not closed, was subsequently entered in the regular books before year-end, and was accounted for in the return accepted in assessment. Further, the notice did not identify the particular statutory clause under which penalty was proposed, leaving the charge unspecified.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 271AAB was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Penalty exposure must rest on a clearly communicated statutory charge and, in search-related proceedings, on an amount that first meets the statutory character of undisclosed income.

Issues: Whether additions in an assessment under Section 153A may be sustained solely on a statement recorded under Section 132(4), without corroborative incriminating material found during the search.

Analysis: The applicable Section 153A framework requires incriminating material discovered during search to support additions. A statement recorded under Section 132(4) has evidentiary value, but does not by itself constitute incriminating material. It may support an assessment only when it has a nexus with independently discovered incriminating evidence. The deletion of additions was a factual determination not open to reappreciation under Section 260A.

Conclusion: Additions could not be sustained solely on the statement without corroborative incriminating material; the issue was resolved in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether block assessments under Section 158BD were valid in the absence of search material evidencing undisclosed income of the assessees.

Analysis: Chapter XIV-B permits a block assessment against a person other than the searched person only where undisclosed income is unearthed from material found during the search and a jurisdictional satisfaction is recorded that such income belongs to that other person. The additions were based on transactions already recorded in the books of account and reflected in returns subjected to regular assessment; no incriminating material revealing undisclosed income of the assessees was found during the search. No basis or satisfaction note supporting assumption of jurisdiction against one of the assessees was produced.

Conclusion: The block assessments under Section 158BD were invalid because they were unsupported by search material evidencing undisclosed income.

Issues: Whether foreign tax credit for taxes paid in the United States was allowable under Section 90 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Article 25 of the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

Analysis: The return was filed within time, Form 67 and supporting proof of United States tax payment were furnished before the return, and the prescribed requirements for claiming foreign tax credit stood satisfied. The credit was denied in processing without prior communication. Section 90, read with the applicable treaty relief provision, permits credit for taxes paid abroad on income subjected to tax in both jurisdictions.

Conclusion: Foreign tax credit in respect of United States taxes is allowable under Section 90 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the three-day delay in filing the appeal should be condoned; (ii) Whether mark-to-market loss on available-for-sale investments, computed under RBI guidelines and ICDS VIII Part B, was deductible; (iii) Whether provision for bad and doubtful debts on standard assets was deductible under Section 36(1)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the three-day delay in filing the appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: The explanation relating to the professional's religious engagement and subsequent illness constituted sufficient cause. The governing approach requires liberal construction of sufficient cause to advance substantial justice, particularly where the delay is minor and is not shown to be deliberate or mala fide.

Conclusion: The three-day delay was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether mark-to-market loss on available-for-sale investments, computed under RBI guidelines and ICDS VIII Part B, was deductible.

Analysis: Available-for-sale securities held by the bank were required under the applicable RBI guidelines to be valued at cost or market value, whichever was lower. The resulting depreciation was therefore reflected through mark-to-market valuation. ICDS VIII Part B specifically governed banks and required classification, recognition and measurement of securities in accordance with RBI guidelines. The general clarification in CBDT Circular No. 10/2017 concerning recognition of mark-to-market amounts under ICDS I did not displace the sector-specific standard applicable to banks.

Conclusion: The mark-to-market loss on available-for-sale investments was allowable as a deduction; the disallowance was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether provision for bad and doubtful debts on standard assets was deductible under Section 36(1)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(viia) allows the specified deduction for a provision made for bad and doubtful debts and does not confine the deduction only to advances already classified as bad or doubtful. A provision on standard assets may represent anticipated credit-risk losses and is allowable within the statutory limits applicable to banks.

Conclusion: The provision for bad and doubtful debts on standard assets was allowable under Section 36(1)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both claimed deductions were required to be allowed in computing the assessee's taxable income.

Issues: Whether a reassessment order creating tax liability for assessment year 2014-15 could survive after approval of a resolution plan that extinguished tax liabilities relating to periods before the specified cut-off date.

Analysis: The approved resolution plan extinguished liabilities relating to periods before 15.10.2018, and the relevant assessment year fell wholly within that period. Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 makes an approved resolution plan binding upon all stakeholders, including government authorities; statutory dues not provided for in the plan stand extinguished. Reassessment proceedings under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be used to revive an extinguished pre-resolution claim. Subsequent quantification through an assessment order does not convert the underlying pre-resolution claim into a fresh enforceable liability.

Conclusion: The reassessment order for assessment year 2014-15 was annulled and the consequential tax demand was quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether appellate proceedings against an original assessment can continue after that assessment has been set aside under section 263 and replaced by a fresh assessment; (ii) Whether the assessee may contest additions in the fresh assessment independently.

Issue (i): Whether appellate proceedings against an original assessment can continue after that assessment has been set aside under section 263 and replaced by a fresh assessment.

Analysis: An appeal under section 246A is founded on the particular assessment order challenged. Where the competent revisional authority sets aside that assessment under section 263 and directs a fresh assessment, the original assessment ceases to be operative. Consequently, appellate proceedings exclusively arising from the superseded assessment have no surviving foundation. Parallel consideration of the same addition under the superseded and fresh assessments could also produce conflicting findings and overlapping consequences.

Conclusion: The appeal arising from the original assessment had become infructuous, and the appellate order passed in relation to that non-operative assessment could not be sustained. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee may contest additions in the fresh assessment independently.

Analysis: A fresh assessment framed pursuant to cancellation of the original assessment under section 263 is an appealable assessment and gives rise to a fresh cause of action. The assessee's statutory right to challenge additions made in that fresh assessment remains intact and must be adjudicated independently on merits.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to pursue all factual and legal challenges against the fresh assessment in the pending appellate proceedings. This is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The merits of the alleged cash-receipts addition must be determined only in the appellate proceedings arising from the operative fresh assessment, without reliance on findings made in relation to the superseded assessment.

Ratio Decidendi: Once an assessment is set aside under revisional jurisdiction and replaced by a fresh assessment, an appeal founded solely on the superseded assessment becomes infructuous, while the fresh assessment gives rise to an independent right of appeal.

Issues: Whether the bank's decision to keep the assessee's accounts on hold solely upon an intimation from the Income Tax Department was legally sustainable.

Analysis: The initiation of proceedings under the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not by itself warrant automatic withholding of an assessee's bank accounts. The bank's action was based solely on the departmental intimation, without any prior enquiry or due proceeding, and was not shown to have been taken under any provision of law or rules. The validity of the income-tax proceedings and penalty was left open.

Conclusion: The letter directing the holding of the two bank accounts was set aside, and the bank was directed to restore the accounts as operational.