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Issues: (i) Whether ready-mix concrete produced at a batching plant constitutes an excisable manufactured product and renders the differential service-tax demand unsustainable; (ii) Whether the appellant correctly availed 60% abatement in determining the taxable value of the works contract; (iii) Whether Form 26AS figures alone can support a differential service-tax demand.
Issue (i): Whether ready-mix concrete produced at a batching plant constitutes an excisable manufactured product and renders the differential service-tax demand unsustainable.
Analysis: Ready-mix concrete produced through an automated batching process using cement, aggregates, water and admixtures possesses distinct marketable characteristics and is a manufactured product. The activity was therefore liable, if at all, to central excise duty rather than being treated as a service-taxable activity. The service tax already paid exceeded the central excise duty that would have arisen.
Conclusion: The ready-mix concrete was an excisable manufactured product, and the differential service-tax demand on its production was unsustainable. In favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the appellant correctly availed 60% abatement in determining the taxable value of the works contract.
Analysis: The contract involved supply of materials, with cement supplied by the recipient, and was treated as a works contract. Under Rule 2A(ii)(A), the value attributable to materials supplied for providing the service had to be excluded through the prescribed abatement while determining taxable value.
Conclusion: The 60% abatement was correctly availed in determining the taxable value of the works contract. In favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether Form 26AS figures alone can support a differential service-tax demand.
Analysis: The proposed differential demand was computed solely from receipts reflected in Form 26AS. No verification was undertaken to establish that those receipts represented consideration for any taxable service rendered.
Conclusion: Form 26AS figures, without verification of their nexus to taxable service consideration, could not sustain the differential demand. In favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The service-tax confirmation could not survive because the activity involved manufacture of ready-mix concrete and, alternatively, the works-contract valuation and alleged taxable receipts did not justify a differential levy.
Ratio Decidendi: A service-tax demand must be founded on verified consideration for a taxable service and, where the activity is a works contract, taxable value must be determined after allowing the statutory abatement.
Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit on moulds sent to job-workers under job-work challans was admissible. (ii) Whether the demand invoking the extended period of limitation was sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit on moulds sent to job-workers under job-work challans was admissible.
Analysis: The PP granules were cleared after reversal of credit for practical accounting reasons, whereas the moulds, being the appellant's capital goods and intellectual-property-linked assets, were sent under job-work challans and returned after use. This procedure did not contravene the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. Reversal of credit on moulds would have enabled the job-worker to avail corresponding credit, followed by credit being available again on return of the duty-paid goods; the arrangement was therefore revenue-neutral and did not yield double CENVAT credit. An unchallenged appellate order on the identical issue had also recognised eligibility for the credit.
Conclusion: CENVAT credit on the moulds sent under the job-work procedure was admissible, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the demand invoking the extended period of limitation was sustainable.
Analysis: The departmental officers were aware of the availment and reversal of credit on PP granules, the credit on moulds, and their clearance under job-work challans. In the revenue-neutral arrangement, suppression with intent to evade excise duty was not established.
Conclusion: The extended-period demand was time-barred, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The denial and recovery of credit in relation to the moulds could not be sustained either on merits or for limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: CENVAT credit cannot be denied merely because capital goods are sent under job-work challans while raw materials are separately cleared after reversal of credit, where the arrangement is revenue-neutral and does not result in double credit.
Issues: Whether service tax paid on commission-agent services connected with sales from depots is admissible as CENVAT credit when distributed through an Input Service Distributor.
Analysis: Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 covers services used by a manufacturer in connection with manufacture and clearance of final products up to the place of removal. Under Section 4(3)(c) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, a depot is a place of removal. The commission-agent services covered procurement of orders, dispatch from depots and collection of sale proceeds, and were directly connected with sales of the manufactured goods through those depots. The service-tax credit distributed by the head office consequently related to qualifying input services.
Conclusion: Commission-agent services relating to sales through depots qualify as input services, and the CENVAT credit distributed through the Input Service Distributor was admissible; the related credit disallowance, interest and penalty were unsustainable.
Issues: (i) Whether the composite EPC arrangements, despite separate supply and erection orders, were works contracts and when property in the goods passed; (ii) Whether the duty-paid goods incorporated in the systems qualified for CENVAT credit as capital goods received and used in the factory; (iii) Whether Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, Notification No. 12/2003-ST and the Explanation to Rule 3 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 barred the credit; (iv) Whether the extended limitation period was validly invoked; and (v) Whether interest and penalties survived.
Issue (i): Whether the composite EPC arrangements, despite separate supply and erection orders, were works contracts and when property in the goods passed.
Analysis: Article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution of India recognises the goods and service elements of a works contract. The letters of intent fixed a single inclusive price for supply, installation, testing and commissioning, while the corresponding supply and erection orders incorporated common contractual documents, schedules, security requirements, payment milestones and commissioning-linked obligations. The supply consideration was partly retained until erection, commissioning or formal completion. These features established one composite bargain for a functioning system, notwithstanding its documentation through separate orders. The records did not establish that the documentation was a sham. The contractors retained custody and risk over goods at site while performing their obligations, and no delivery by the assessee to the contractors was shown to support bailment. Property vested in the assessee no later than incorporation of the goods into the systems in its factory.
Conclusion: The issue is partly against the assessee: the arrangements were composite works contracts, and the separate-contract and bailment positions fail; the split documentation was not a sham, and property passed at the latest on incorporation.
Issue (ii): Whether the duty-paid goods incorporated in the systems qualified for CENVAT credit as capital goods received and used in the factory.
Analysis: Rule 2(a)(A) and Rule 3(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 require duty-paid capital goods to be received and used in the factory of manufacture of dutiable final products. The goods were consigned under duty-paying invoices to the assessee's factory, were installed in its plant and were used for manufacture of dutiable final products. Ownership at the point of receipt, the identity of the erector, and subsequent immovability of the installed plant are not prescribed conditions for capital-goods credit. The treatment of a turnkey plant as immovable for excisability does not negate the duty paid on, or credit eligibility of, its individual components. The notice did not dispute the relevant description, receipt or use of the goods on grounds permissible under the credit rules.
Conclusion: The goods qualified as capital goods received and used in the factory, and CENVAT credit was admissible in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, Notification No. 12/2003-ST and the Explanation to Rule 3 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 barred the credit.
Analysis: The Explanation to Rule 3 operates only where another rule or notification grants an exemption subject to non-availment of credit. In a works contract, the value of transferred goods is excluded from service tax as part of determining the taxable service element; Rule 2A is therefore a valuation mechanism, not a conditional exemption. Explanation 2 to Rule 2A addresses the works-contract service provider's credit and does not bar the recipient-manufacturer's capital-goods credit. Notification No. 12/2003-ST could not convert the goods element, which lay outside the service-tax levy, into an exemption capable of attracting the Explanation to Rule 3. Further, no evidence established that any contractor had actually claimed that notification in respect of the goods. A supplier's unadjudicated classification or valuation could not be attributed in the recipient's credit proceedings.
Conclusion: Neither Rule 2A, Notification No. 12/2003-ST nor the Explanation to Rule 3 barred the assessee's credit; this issue is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether the extended limitation period was validly invoked.
Analysis: Invocation of the extended period requires deliberate suppression or another specified culpable element. The credit was taken on duty-paying invoices naming the assessee as consignee, entered in statutory records and reflected in returns. The contractual documents and invoices relied upon in the investigation were maintained in the ordinary course, and no legal requirement required separate disclosure of the contractual structure. The notice identified no false declaration or positive act of concealment, while the credit issue was genuinely debatable.
Conclusion: The extended limitation period was invalidly invoked, and the demand beyond the normal period was time barred independently; this issue is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (v): Whether interest and penalties survived.
Analysis: Recovery of interest under Rule 14 and penalty under Rule 15 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 depend upon wrongful availment of credit. Penalty under Rule 15(2) read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 additionally requires the requisite fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression or intent to evade. Neither wrongful availment nor the required culpable element was established.
Conclusion: Interest and the penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The duty-paid capital-goods credit remains available, and the demand founded on its denial is not maintainable.
Ratio Decidendi: A recipient-manufacturer's credit on duty-paid capital goods received and used in its factory is not barred merely because the goods are incorporated under a works contract, since Rule 2A excludes the goods element for valuation and does not constitute a conditional exemption under the Explanation to Rule 3.
Issues: (i) Whether Entry 144's substitution to include Ready Mix Concrete under Notification No. 12/2016-Central Excise dated 01.03.2016 operates retrospectively and exempts site-manufactured Ready Mix Concrete for October 2014 to February 2016; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period for the duty demand was invocable.
Issue (i): Whether Entry 144's substitution to include Ready Mix Concrete under Notification No. 12/2016-Central Excise dated 01.03.2016 operates retrospectively and exempts site-manufactured Ready Mix Concrete for October 2014 to February 2016.
Analysis: Entry 144 of Notification No. 12/2012-Central Excise dated 17.03.2012 exempted concrete mix manufactured and used at the construction site. Notification No. 12/2016-Central Excise dated 01.03.2016 substituted the entry to expressly include Ready Mix Concrete. Binding authorities on substitution were applied to treat the amended entry as operating from the inception of the original exemption, particularly where it did not take away a substantive right or impose a penal consequence.
Conclusion: The substituted Entry 144 operated retrospectively from 17.03.2012, and the site-manufactured Ready Mix Concrete was exempt from central excise duty for the relevant period, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period for the duty demand was invocable.
Analysis: The accepted position was that the prevailing circulars and judicial views concerning excisability and exemption of Ready Mix Concrete created interpretative doubt, which did not justify invocation of the extended period under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The duty demand and the consequential interest and penalty cannot be sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: A substituted exemption entry may operate from the inception of the original entry where the substitution clarifies its scope without taking away substantive rights or imposing penal consequences.
Issues: (i) Whether the charge-sheet for offences under Sections 465, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 required prior sanction under Section 80 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003; (ii) Whether the charge-sheet warranted quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the grounds of delay, the petitioner not being named in the FIR, and factual denial of the transactions.
Issue (i): Whether the charge-sheet for offences under Sections 465, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 required prior sanction under Section 80 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.
Analysis: Section 80 restricts cognizance only of offences punishable under Sections 72 and 79 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The charge-sheet invoked independent offences of forgery and use of forged documents under the Indian Penal Code, 1860; consequently, the statutory sanction requirement was inapplicable.
Conclusion: Prior sanction under Section 80 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 was not required for the IPC prosecution. The issue was decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the charge-sheet warranted quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the grounds of delay, the petitioner not being named in the FIR, and factual denial of the transactions.
Analysis: The charge-sheet contained specific allegations concerning creation and use of e-sugam documents and tax evasion. The reassessment material relied upon related to a different period. Whether the alleged transactions occurred and whether the petitioner created or used forged documents are disputed factual matters requiring trial. A person may be arrayed as an accused upon investigation even if not named in the FIR, and no thirty-day restriction for filing a charge-sheet applied to the IPC offences.
Conclusion: No ground existed to invoke inherent jurisdiction to quash the charge-sheet. The issue was decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The forgery-related allegations connected with the asserted tax-evasion transactions remain triable in the criminal proceeding.
Ratio Decidendi: A sanction provision confined to specified fiscal offences does not govern independent IPC charges, and inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to quash a charge-sheet where its resolution requires adjudication of disputed facts at trial.
Issues: (i) Whether intent to evade tax was a necessary condition for a penalty under Section 129 governing the November 2021 transaction; (ii) Whether the absence of an e-way bill alone could sustain a Section 129 penalty where the consignment carried a genuine e-invoice and there was no evidence of evasion; and (iii) Whether a final penalty order made fifty-seven minutes after the show-cause notice denied the mandatory opportunity of hearing.
Issue (i): Whether intent to evade tax was a necessary condition for a penalty under Section 129 governing the November 2021 transaction.
Analysis: For the period before 1 January 2022, Section 129(6) linked unpaid detention demands to Section 130, which required intent to evade tax. Section 129 was consequently not a stand-alone strict-liability provision for the transaction in question. The subsequent statutory amendment severing that linkage did not govern the November 2021 movement. The genuine, traceable e-invoice, matching tax returns, payment of output tax, absence of discrepancies on verification, and lack of any finding of concealment or evasion established that the documentation omission was not accompanied by mens rea.
Conclusion: Intent to evade tax was a mandatory condition for imposing the Section 129 penalty in the applicable statutory regime, and its absence rendered the demand unsustainable. In favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the absence of an e-way bill alone could sustain a Section 129 penalty where the consignment carried a genuine e-invoice and there was no evidence of evasion.
Analysis: Each motorcycle was individually traceable through engine and chassis numbers recorded in the e-invoice, along with the invoice reference number, acknowledgement number, and QR code. The declared quantity, value, description, destination, and tax treatment matched the returns, and physical verification disclosed no discrepancy other than non-generation of the e-way bill. The regulated registration requirements for two-wheelers also made a clandestine untaxed sale implausible on these facts.
Conclusion: A Section 129 penalty could not be sustained solely for non-generation of the e-way bill where the transaction was genuine and no intent to evade tax was established. In favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether a final penalty order made fifty-seven minutes after the show-cause notice denied the mandatory opportunity of hearing.
Analysis: Section 75(4) required an opportunity of hearing before an adverse decision. The fifty-seven-minute interval between the notice and final order afforded no meaningful opportunity to respond to the proposed demand or for consideration of the explanation and supporting material. This denied the principles of natural justice and constituted a jurisdictional defect.
Conclusion: The order passed within fifty-seven minutes of the show-cause notice was vitiated for denial of the mandatory opportunity of hearing. In favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The tax-and-penalty demand lacked both the required evidentiary foundation of intent to evade tax and a valid adjudicatory process; the deposited amount is refundable with applicable interest, while lawful treatment of the documentation lapse remains open.
Ratio Decidendi: Under the pre-amendment Section 129 regime, an e-way-bill omission unsupported by intent to evade tax cannot sustain a penalty, particularly where the statutory hearing opportunity is illusory.
Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued after expiry of the ordinary limitation period was valid where the underlying information arose from a third-party search falling within the exclusion to the procedure under section 148A.
Analysis: The alleged escaped income was Rs. 2,50,000, below the threshold for the extended limitation period under section 149(1)(b); consequently, the notice under section 148 had to be issued by 31.03.2023 under section 149(1)(a). The Revenue relied on the period consumed in issuing and responding to the notice under section 148A(b) for exclusion of time. The information was, however, derived from documents and material obtained in a search of another person after 01.04.2021, placing the matter within clause (c) of the first proviso to section 148A, under which the section 148A procedure did not apply. The use of that excluded procedure could not generate an exclusion of time for limitation purposes. The Insight Portal was only the channel of communication and did not alter the search-derived character of the information. Participation in the proceedings and absence of prejudice could not cure the jurisdictional defect.
Conclusion: The notice under section 148 dated 12.04.2023 was time-barred and without jurisdiction, and the reassessment founded on it was quashed.
Issues: (i) Validity of revision under section 263 based on a Departmental Valuation Officer's report received after completion of assessment; (ii) Whether the Departmental Valuation Officer's report was invalid for having been received beyond six months.
Issue (i): Validity of revision under section 263 based on a Departmental Valuation Officer's report received after completion of assessment.
Analysis: The assessment accepted the declared cost of acquisition despite the Assessing Officer having made a valuation reference to verify that value. The subsequently received valuation report, available when the revisional record was examined, disclosed a material difference in valuation. Clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 263 includes all records available at the time of the Principal Commissioner's examination, including such subsequently received material.
Conclusion: The revision under section 263 was validly exercised because the assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the Departmental Valuation Officer's report was invalid for having been received beyond six months.
Analysis: Clause (v) of Explanation 1 to section 153 excludes, for limitation purposes, the period from the valuation reference until actual receipt of the valuation report. The statutory scheme therefore did not render the report a nullity merely because it was received after six months, and the assessment could have awaited its receipt.
Conclusion: The valuation report was not invalid merely because of its delayed receipt; against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The assessment is to be redetermined after examination of the valuation report and after affording the assessee an opportunity of hearing.
Ratio Decidendi: For revision under section 263, the record includes material available when the revisional authority examines it, and an assessment completed without considering a valuation report sought by the Assessing Officer may be revised where that omission is prejudicial to the Revenue.
Issues: Whether dividend of Rs. 1,02,83,600 received during the assessment year 2013-14 was eligible for exemption under Section 10(34) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: Exemption under Section 10(34) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to the dividend actually received during the relevant year. The corporate resolutions and financial statements established that dividend at Rs. 2.50 per share, pertaining to the year ended 31 March 2012, was approved on 3 August 2012 and received during the relevant assessment year. The amount adopted in the assessment represented a proposed dividend at Rs. 1 per share for the succeeding financial year and could not be substituted for the dividend actually received.
Conclusion: The entire dividend receipt of Rs. 1,02,83,600 was eligible for exemption under Section 10(34) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the disallowance of Rs. 62,16,690 was deleted.
Issues: (i) Whether notional interest on interest-free security deposits from tenants is taxable absent a contractual right to interest or suppressed rent; (ii) Whether a partnership firm can be assessed under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for capital introduced by an identified partner after the contribution is verified as having come from the partner's bank account; (iii) Whether cash deposits can be added to the extent they duplicate verified partner capital, and the treatment of the balance uncorrelated cash deposit; (iv) Whether an ad hoc expenditure disallowance under section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is sustainable where the assessee earned no exempt income and no specific expenditure defect was found.
Issue (i): Whether notional interest on interest-free security deposits from tenants is taxable absent a contractual right to interest or suppressed rent.
Analysis: The deposits were interest-free, received from the same tenants whose rental payments had been offered to tax, and no contractual entitlement to interest was established. There was also no finding that the rent was understated or that the deposits replaced rental income. Taxability requires real income to have accrued or arisen, rather than a hypothetical return from a commercial advantage.
Conclusion: The notional-interest addition is unsustainable and must be deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether a partnership firm can be assessed under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for capital introduced by an identified partner after the contribution is verified as having come from the partner's bank account.
Analysis: The partner's identity was undisputed and the remand verification confirmed that the capital reached the firm from the partner's bank accounts. In the absence of material showing that the funds actually belonged to the firm and were routed through the partner, an inquiry into the ultimate source in the partner's hands cannot support an addition in the firm's assessment.
Conclusion: The section 68 addition for the partner's capital contribution cannot be sustained and must be deleted to the extent of the amount subsisting after rectification, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether cash deposits can be added to the extent they duplicate verified partner capital, and the treatment of the balance uncorrelated cash deposit.
Analysis: The amount of Rs. 7,58,500 was part of the partner's capital contribution already considered in the assessment, and no independent source was shown for a separate addition. The remaining Rs. 1,60,000 was not correlated with the capital contribution to the same extent; the cash-book figures and supporting material required reconciliation.
Conclusion: The cash-deposit addition must be deleted to the extent of Rs. 7,58,500, in favour of the assessee; the balance Rs. 1,60,000 requires fresh verification by the Assessing Officer.
Issue (iv): Whether an ad hoc expenditure disallowance under section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is sustainable where the assessee earned no exempt income and no specific expenditure defect was found.
Analysis: Exempt income during the relevant year is a necessary precondition for invoking section 14A. No exempt income was earned, and the ad hoc disallowance was made without identifying any non-business expenditure or a specific defect in the supporting evidence, most of the expenditure having been incurred through banking channels.
Conclusion: The ad hoc disallowance is unsustainable and must be deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The assessment must exclude the notional interest, the verified partner-capital addition, the duplicate cash-deposit addition, and the ad hoc expenditure disallowance, while the uncorrelated balance cash deposit remains subject to fresh verification.
Issues: (i) Validity of the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Limitation for the final assessment under sections 144C and 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (iii) Deductibility of HO/OB direct expenses under section 37(1) rather than the section 44C limitation; (iv) Independent Indian taxation of interest paid by Indian branches to the HO/OB under the India-France DTAA; (v) Arm's-length adjustment for derivative-marketing remuneration; (vi) Arm's-length adjustment for ECB marketing/support remuneration; (vii) Arm's-length adjustment for back-to-back guarantee commission; (viii) Nil ALP determination for HO cost allocation; (ix) Taxation of ECB interest of HO/OB after PE attribution; (x) Surcharge and health and education cess over treaty rates; (xi) Grant of tax deducted at source credit on interest, FTS, and ECB interest; (xii) Treaty rate on section 244A interest; (xiii) Interest under sections 234A, 234B, and 234C.
Issue (i): Validity of the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The assessment record and DRP directions recorded issuance of a notice on 31 May 2023, whereas the challenge referred to a different notice dated 23 June 2024. No material reconciled this discrepancy or established that the assessment was founded solely on the latter notice.
Conclusion: Against the assessee; the challenge to the notice under section 143(2) fails.
Issue (ii): Limitation for the final assessment under sections 144C and 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The final order was passed within the period specified by section 144C(13) after the DRP directions. The controversy concerning the interaction between sections 144C and 153 remained unresolved by a binding majority decision, following a split verdict. On the facts, the limitation plea could not be accepted.
Conclusion: Against the assessee; the final assessment is not barred by limitation.
Issue (iii): Deductibility of HO/OB direct expenses under section 37(1) rather than the section 44C limitation.
Analysis: Direct expenditure incurred by the HO/OB for, and attributable to, the Indian branch is distinguishable from general head-office expenditure. The principle of consistency applied because no factual or legal distinction from the earlier years was shown. Such direct expenditure is governed by section 37(1), subject to verification of supporting invoices and allocation to the Indian branch, rather than the limitation in section 44C.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee; the direct expenses are allowable under section 37(1), subject to verification.
Issue (iv): Independent Indian taxation of interest paid by Indian branches to the HO/OB under the India-France DTAA.
Analysis: Although the domestic-law amendment to section 9(1)(v) deems the interest to accrue in India, the more beneficial treaty treatment under Article 12(5) read with Article 7 prevails. Interest paid by the Indian PE to the HO/OB cannot be independently taxed in the hands of the same enterprise under the treaty.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee; the additions for interest paid by the Indian branch to the HO/OB are deleted.
Issue (v): Arm's-length adjustment for derivative-marketing remuneration.
Analysis: The Indian branch performed marketing functions, while the HO/OB bore the trading risks. Attribution of the entire commercial mark-up or initial dealer spread to the Indian branch was made without application of a prescribed method for arm's-length price determination.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee; the transfer-pricing adjustments for derivative-marketing remuneration are deleted.
Issue (vi): Arm's-length adjustment for ECB marketing/support remuneration.
Analysis: The earlier accepted methodology required application of 20% only to fees and other charges, excluding interest, with credit for remuneration already offered. An adjustment cannot survive where the remuneration already offered equals or exceeds the arm's-length remuneration so determined.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee to the extent of remand; the ECB remuneration adjustment is restored for recomputation under the specified methodology.
Issue (vii): Arm's-length adjustment for back-to-back guarantee commission.
Analysis: The guarantee arrangement involved reissuance by the Indian branch against counter-guarantees of the HO/OB, requiring fresh benchmarking with reference to the actual functions, assets, risks, volume, and risk differences. The Chartered Accountant's certificate and other contemporaneous material require consideration, including while testing any internal comparable uncontrolled price.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee to the extent of remand; the guarantee-commission transaction is restored for de novo benchmarking.
Issue (viii): Nil ALP determination for HO cost allocation.
Analysis: Once an international transaction for allocation or recharge of common costs exists, its arm's-length price must be determined under a prescribed method. The ALP cannot be fixed at nil merely upon a subjective view of commercial expediency or the benefit test without examining evidence of services, the cost base, allocation keys, and mark-up. Verification remains necessary for shareholder, stewardship, duplicative costs, allocation keys, and overlap with the section 44C restriction, so that the same cost is not disallowed twice.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee to the extent of remand; the nil ALP determination is set aside for fresh determination under a prescribed method without duplicate disallowance.
Issue (ix): Taxation of ECB interest of HO/OB after PE attribution.
Analysis: The taxable amount of ECB interest requires recomputation after giving effect to income already attributed to the Indian PE. The computation must avoid double taxation of the same income, including the component considered with reference to section 194LC.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee to the extent of remand; the ECB-interest taxability is restored for recomputation after PE attribution.
Issue (x): Surcharge and health and education cess over treaty rates.
Analysis: Where the applicable treaty article prescribes the maximum rate at which interest or FTS may be taxed in India, surcharge and health and education cess cannot be separately added so as to exceed that treaty rate ceiling.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee; tax on the relevant interest and FTS income must be computed at the treaty rate without separate surcharge and cess.
Issue (xi): Grant of tax deducted at source credit on interest, FTS, and ECB interest.
Analysis: Tax deducted at source credit requires verification from Form 26AS, withholding certificates, and other supporting evidence. Consequential credit arising from the determinations in this order must also be allowed in accordance with law.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee to the extent of verification; due tax deducted at source credit must be granted in accordance with law.
Issue (xii): Treaty rate on section 244A interest.
Analysis: The binding treatment in the assessee's earlier years requires tax on interest received under section 244A to be computed at the rate prescribed under the India-France DTAA.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee; section 244A interest must be taxed at the applicable treaty rate.
Issue (xiii): Interest under sections 234A, 234B, and 234C.
Analysis: Interest under these provisions is mandatory and consequential upon the correct computation of assessed income and tax. The claim concerning timely filing of the return also requires verification for section 234A purposes.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee to the extent of recomputation; interest is to be recomputed, if leviable, while giving effect to the assessment revisions.
Final Conclusion: The assessments require deletion of unsustainable additions, application of treaty protection and treaty rates, and fresh verification or recomputation of the remanded transfer-pricing, ECB-interest, credit, and consequential-interest matters; the notice-validity and limitation objections remain rejected.
Issues: Whether penalty for under-reporting of income in consequence of misreporting under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable in respect of depreciation and amortisation claimed on transactions treated as bogus.
Analysis: Section 270A(9) covers misrepresentation or suppression of facts and recording of false entries in books of account. The material obtained during survey and subsequent independent enquiries established that the counterparty was a non-existent accommodation-entry provider and that the claimed transactions lacked genuine business substance. The assessee surrendered the expenditure only after detection of the adverse material and did not revise its return to disclose the additional income. Such surrender was not a voluntary disclosure merely because it was stated to have been made to buy peace or avoid litigation. Section 270A(8) overrides the protection otherwise available under Section 270A(6) where under-reported income results from misreporting.
Conclusion: The penalty for under-reporting of income consequent upon misreporting under Section 270A(9) was rightly sustained against the assessee.
Issues: (i) Whether deduction under Section 54F was available for the entire investment in a new residential flat purchased within one year before transfer of the original asset, notwithstanding that the flat was financed through a loan; (ii) Whether the addition for unexplained cash deposits was sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether deduction under Section 54F was available for the entire investment in a new residential flat purchased within one year before transfer of the original asset, notwithstanding that the flat was financed through a loan.
Analysis: The new residential flat was purchased before the transfer of the original asset and fell within the one-year period prescribed by Section 54F. Section 54F does not require that the consideration received on transfer of the original asset must itself be used to acquire the new asset. Financing the acquisition through a loan did not curtail the eligible investment. Since the investment in the new asset exceeded the capital gain, no capital-gains addition survived.
Conclusion: Deduction under Section 54F was allowable for the entire investment in the new residential flat, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the addition for unexplained cash deposits was sustainable.
Analysis: No documentary material was produced to establish the source of the cash deposits or rebut the findings that the explanations regarding the deposits were inconsistent.
Conclusion: The addition for unexplained cash deposits was sustained, against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Full capital-gains exemption was available on the qualifying residential investment, while the addition relating to unexplained cash deposits remained undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 54F does not require a direct nexus between the sale proceeds of the original asset and the funds used to acquire the new residential asset within the prescribed period.
Issues: Whether the attached property constituted direct or indirect proceeds of crime, or the value thereof, and was consequently liable for confirmation of attachment.
Analysis: Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 encompasses property derived or obtained directly or indirectly from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, including its value. Registration of scheduled offences does not by itself establish that every asset is proceeds of crime; however, the cumulative money trail, rather than isolated transactions, may establish the requisite prima facie nexus. The bank-account analysis and statements recorded under Section 50 showed that project escrow funds were utilised towards acquisition of the property. The existence of independent business income, accounting disclosure of the investment, and the fact that only part of the consideration originated from the project account did not sever that nexus. The material furnished sufficient reason to believe under Section 5(1) and justified confirmation under Section 8.
Conclusion: The attached property constituted proceeds of crime or its value and was liable to be attached under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Issues: Whether the adjudication and appellate orders required interference where the show-cause notice was uploaded only under the portal tab "Additional Notice and Orders", the appeal was dismissed as time-barred, and the merits were not considered.
Analysis: The appellate remedy under Section 107 was rejected solely on limitation. Uploading the show-cause notice only in the specified portal tab without separate intimation prevented a response to the notice and constituted a violation of principles of natural justice. The circumstances warranted interference and a merits-based reconsideration.
Conclusion: The adjudication order and the limitation-based appellate order were quashed, and the appeal was directed to be reconsidered on merits after affording a hearing to the assessee. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issues: Whether the adjudication order under Section 74, allegedly uploaded only under the Additional Notice and Orders tab without separate intimation and without a post-reply hearing, warranted interference.
Analysis: The order records a prima facie case based on the manner of uploading the adjudication order and the absence of separate intimation. No determination was made on the underlying tax demand or the alleged statutory violations; reconsideration was directed after considering the reply and affording a hearing.
Outcome: The adjudication order was set aside for fresh reasoned adjudication after an opportunity of hearing.
Issues: Whether the show-cause notice and consequential adjudication and appellate orders were liable to be set aside for denial of natural justice arising from portal-only communication of the notice, despite dismissal of the statutory appeal on limitation.
Analysis: The show-cause notice was uploaded only under the portal tab titled "Additional Notice and Orders", without separate intimation. This prevented the petitioner from responding to the notice and constituted a violation of the principles of natural justice. The appellate remedy under Section 107 had been rejected solely on limitation and without adjudication on merits; in the peculiar circumstances, judicial interference was warranted.
Conclusion: The show-cause notice, adjudication order and appellate order were quashed, with directions for issuance of a fresh notice, opportunity of hearing and fresh reasoned adjudication in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether a discrepancy between the operative portion of an order-in-original and the consequential Form GST DRC-07 is rectifiable under Section 161 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: The second proviso to Section 161 excludes the six-month limitation where rectification is purely for a clerical or arithmetical error arising from an accidental slip or omission. The adjudicating authority had itself recorded a discrepancy between the operative order and Form GST DRC-07, but treated it as not being a patent or undisputed error. The discrepancy in the tax demand stated in Form GST DRC-07, as against the demand and adjustments recorded in the detailed order, constituted an error apparent on the face of the record.
Conclusion: The mismatch between the order-in-original and Form GST DRC-07 is a rectifiable apparent error within Section 161 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the conclusion is in favour of the assessee.
Issues: Whether the setting aside of tax and penalty solely on a chart correlating cancelled E-Way Bills with fresh E-Way Bills, without portal-based factual verification, was sustainable.
Analysis: Cancellation of an E-Way Bill does not by itself establish transport of goods without payment of tax; equally, generation of a fresh E-Way Bill does not conclusively prove that the cancelled bill was never used. The chart furnished by the dealer required transaction-wise verification against contemporaneous electronic records, including the reasons and timing of cancellation, corresponding fresh bills, identity of transaction particulars, actual movement of goods, and any nexus between cancelled bills and transportation. The Department must establish such nexus through appropriate factual verification, while the dealer must be afforded an opportunity to substantiate its explanation and supporting documents.
Conclusion: The prior appellate and adjudication orders could not be sustained without the required factual verification; the actual tax liability must be determined afresh after transaction-wise examination of the electronic records and opportunity of hearing.
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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether amendments to the trust deed and non-compliance with section 12A(ab) justified cancellation of registration under section 12AA(4).
2. Whether loans raised in the personal names of trustees (including from banks, finance companies and individuals) and repaid out of trust funds amounted to violation of section 13(1)(d) warranting cancellation of registration.
3. Whether late filing of return of income and audit report in Form 10B attracted section 12A(1)(ba) so as to permit cancellation of registration under section 12AA(4).
4. Whether alleged falsification or misstatement in books (including loan from another trust, alleged wrongful depreciation claim, loans standing in trustees' names) and survey disclosure of income established that activities were not genuine or not in accordance with objects so as to justify cancellation under section 12AA(4).
5. Whether alleged non-maintenance of regular books of account and payment of salary to relatives of trustees in violation of section 13(1) constituted grounds for cancellation of registration.
6. Whether characterisation of the entity as a private trust in collateral litigation between trustees affected the subsisting registration as a charitable trust under section 12A / 12AA(4).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Amendments to trust deed and alleged non-compliance with section 12A(ab)
Legal framework (as discussed)
1. Section 12AA(4) empowers the Commissioner to cancel registration if it is noticed that the activities of the trust are being carried out in a manner that sections 11 and 12 do not apply due to operation of section 13(1), or (post 1-9-2019) for certain non-compliance with other laws, subject to a proviso regarding "reasonable cause".
2. Section 12A(ab) (effective from 1-4-2018) requires application for fresh registration where modifications of objects do not conform to the conditions of registration; it does not prescribe prior approval for amendment of trust deed.
Interpretation and reasoning
3. The trust was granted registration under section 12A on 12-1-1999 with effect from 1-4-1998 without any express condition that prior approval of the Commissioner was required for any amendment to the trust deed.
4. The Court examined the original trust deed (10-3-1980) and subsequent supplementary/amended deeds (11-8-1994, 19-10-1998, 23-9-2000 and 20-11-2014). The amendments primarily (i) extended educational activities to include medical, dental, nursing, engineering and other professional colleges, and (ii) enlarged beneficiaries from only Christian minorities to all communities irrespective of caste, creed or religion, and inducted new trustees.
5. None of the amendments were shown to be contrary to, or a deviation from, the original dominant object of education or to violate sections 11, 12 or 13. Rather, the amendments merely clarified and expanded the educational and charitable scope within the same charitable field.
6. The Court relied on the principle that where original objects are wide enough to cover charitable activities (education, medical aid, relief to poor, etc.), subsequent clarificatory or amplificatory objects do not change the basic charitable character; this aligns with the approach adopted in binding precedent cited in the judgment.
7. Even under section 12A(ab), the requirement is for intimation and fresh registration where modifications do not conform to original conditions; the provision does not mandate prior approval, nor was it in force at the time of earlier amendments. The Commissioner proceeded on an erroneous assumption that any amendment without prior approval itself warranted cancellation.
Conclusions
8. There was no change in the basic charitable object, no violation of sections 11, 12 or 13 and no legal requirement of prior approval for the amendments as applied by the Commissioner.
9. The amendments to the trust deed and alleged non-compliance with section 12A(ab) did not constitute valid grounds for cancellation of registration under section 12AA(4).
Issue 2: Loans in trustees' names repaid by trust and alleged violation of section 13(1)(d)
Legal framework (as discussed)
10. Section 12AA(4) permits cancellation where activities are carried out in such manner that sections 11 and 12 do not apply due to section 13(1). The Commissioner proceeded under section 13(1)(d) alleging benefit to specified persons.
Interpretation and reasoning - loans from Standard Chartered Bank and Muthoot Finance
11. The factual matrix, relied upon by the Court, showed that at the relevant time the trust was in acute financial distress, with substantial funds locked in capital projects and an inability to raise further institutional finance in its own name.
12. Trustees in their personal capacity borrowed funds from Standard Chartered Bank (mortgaging their personal immovable properties) and from Muthoot Finance (pledging their personal gold), introduced those funds into the trust, and such introductions were duly recorded as liabilities in the trust's books and applied for trust purposes.
13. The Commissioner did not dispute that the funds were brought into the trust, recorded in its accounts, and used for charitable purposes; the sole allegation was that repayment of these loans from trust funds conferred personal benefit on trustees.
14. The Court held that, since the funds were raised at personal risk of trustees (personal assets mortgaged/pledged) and were wholly utilised for the trust, repayment by the trust merely discharged a legitimate liability for funds used for its own charitable objects; it did not result in any undue benefit to trustees.
15. No material was brought on record by the Commissioner to show misapplication, diversion, personal use or non-charitable application of the borrowed funds.
Interpretation and reasoning - loan from Mr. K. Girish
16. A loan received from an individual, Mr. K. Girish, was introduced into the trust's bank account, treated as unsecured loan in the trust's balance sheet and used for trust purposes; the same was later repaid via banking channels.
17. The Commissioner's allegation that such loan related to a personal property transaction of a trustee and was repaid out of trust funds was not supported by corroborative evidence. The trust's books consistently reflected it as a borrowing by the trust and a corresponding liability.
18. The Court treated the transaction as a straightforward borrowing by the trust and its repayment. Even assuming any separate personal dealings between a trustee and the lender, so long as the trust borrowed, used the funds for charitable purposes and repaid through banking channels, there was no demonstrated personal benefit or misuse by the trust for the purposes of section 13(1).
Interpretation and reasoning - other loans standing in trustees' names
19. The Commissioner disbelieved various loans shown in trustees' names for lack of supporting evidence. The Court noted that loans were old, routed through banking channels, reflected in audited financial statements and assessed in earlier years; no evidence was produced to show they were fictitious or used for non-charitable purposes.
20. The Court found that the Commissioner's conclusions were based on suspicion without documentary support, and there was no basis to invoke section 13(1) for these items.
Conclusions
21. The transactions in question showed trustees putting personal assets at risk to raise funds for the trust, with those funds used for its charitable purposes and repayments made by the trust as a normal commercial obligation.
22. No personal or undue benefit to trustees or violation of section 13(1)(d) was established; consequently, these loan transactions could not be used to cancel registration under section 12AA(4).
Issue 3: Late filing of returns and Form 10B and applicability of section 12A(1)(ba)
Legal framework (as discussed)
23. Section 12A(1)(ba), effective from 1-4-2018, links exemption to filing of return and audit report within prescribed time.
24. Section 12AA(4) allows cancellation where activities are such that sections 11 and 12 do not apply due to section 13(1) or (post-amendment) for specified non-compliance with other laws.
Interpretation and reasoning
25. The Commissioner treated delayed filing of returns and Form 10B for assessment years 2013-14 to 2018-19 as a ground for cancellation.
26. The Court held that the provision in section 12A(1)(ba) is operative only from 1-4-2018 and could not be invoked retrospectively for earlier years forming the basis of cancellation.
27. Mere delay in filing return/audit report is a procedural lapse and does not, by itself, demonstrate that the activities are not genuine or not in accordance with the objects of the trust, particularly when returns were ultimately filed, accompanied by audit reports, and books were maintained and audited.
28. It is not the Revenue's case that the trust failed to file returns at all or that returns revealed non-genuine activities; any impact of delay is to be considered at the assessment stage while granting exemption, not through cancellation of registration.
Conclusions
29. Belated filing of returns and Form 10B did not fall within the mischief of section 12AA(4) and could not justify cancellation of registration.
Issue 4: Alleged falsification / misstatement in books, survey disclosure and genuineness of activities
(a) Loan from Kuriakose Trust and alleged falsification
Interpretation and reasoning
30. The Commissioner alleged falsification on the ground that a loan appearing in the books as payable to another trust had in fact been repaid in 2013, relying on statements of an ex-trustee (Mr. Nahar) that he had personally discharged the loan.
31. The Court observed that the Commissioner relied solely on the third-party statement without (i) examining the lender trust, (ii) obtaining independent confirmation under section 133(6), or (iii) checking the books/records of either entity to corroborate repayment.
32. In the trust's books, the loan continued to be shown as outstanding; there was no confirmation from the lender that it had received repayment from the trust and by what mode.
33. The Court noted that criminal and civil proceedings regarding alleged fraudulent actions of that ex-trustee were pending and that any unilateral repayment by him from his own funds, without authority, could not ipso facto be treated as repayment by the trust or falsification by the trust.
Conclusions
34. In the absence of corroborative evidence, the allegation of falsification based on the Kuriakose Trust loan was speculative and could not support cancellation of registration.
(b) Alleged wrongful depreciation claim on Nelamangala property
Interpretation and reasoning
35. The Commissioner alleged that the trust had wrongly claimed depreciation on a property under construction/abandoned, treating this as misstatement.
36. The trust clarified, and the Court accepted, that no depreciation was actually claimed in the books or as application of income under section 11(1); an alternative plea for depreciation had only been raised in rectification proceedings when the assessing officer disallowed capital expenditure as application of income.
37. The Commissioner produced no evidence that depreciation was in fact claimed or allowed. Even otherwise, advancing an alternative legal claim in assessment could not convert charitable activities into non-genuine activities or attract section 12AA(4).
Conclusions
38. The alleged depreciation issue did not establish any misuse or non-genuine activity and could not justify cancellation.
(c) Other loans standing in trustees' names and allegation of bogus entries
Interpretation and reasoning
39. The Commissioner questioned various loans recorded in trustees' names, but did not provide evidence that they were fictitious, unaccounted, or used for non-charitable purposes.
40. The Court noted that these loans were old, routed through bank channels, reflected consistently in audited financials and subjected to assessment in earlier years; the allegation rested on mere suspicion without proof.
Conclusions
41. No violation of section 13(1) or lack of genuineness was demonstrated from these loans; they could not ground cancellation under section 12AA(4).
(d) Survey disclosure of income by trustee and impact on genuineness of activities
Interpretation and reasoning
42. During survey under section 133A, a trustee made a disclosure of income of Rs. 5.87 crores for three years and deposited Rs. 1 crore as tax. The Commissioner treated this as evidence of mismanagement and non-genuine activities.
43. The Court examined the nature of the disclosure: it related to capital expenditure and unpaid salary provisions allegedly not eligible as application of income. It was not the Revenue's case that such expenses were bogus or unconnected with the trust's educational objects.
44. The trustee's statement was recorded at about 4:00 AM during survey, raising questions about voluntariness; moreover, the disclosed amounts were not offered to tax in the returns filed under section 148, indicating that, after professional advice, the trust did not accept such treatment.
45. No corroborative evidence was brought on record to show that the admitted items represented non-genuine or non-charitable expenditure. Under trust law, genuine capital expenditure on trust assets and legitimate provisions for expenses can constitute application of income under section 11.
46. The Court held that a mistaken or pressured admission regarding taxability of capital expenditure or unpaid salaries, without evidence of bogusness or diversion, cannot convert otherwise charitable educational activity into non-genuine activity for purposes of section 12AA(4).
Conclusions
47. The survey disclosure, in the absence of independent supporting material showing non-charitable or bogus expenditure, did not establish that the activities of the trust were not genuine or not in accordance with its objects and could not support cancellation of registration.
Issue 5: Alleged non-maintenance of books and salaries to relatives of trustees
(a) Non-maintenance of regular books of account
Interpretation and reasoning
48. The Commissioner alleged that the trust did not maintain regular books, relying on the assessing officer's proposal stating that minutes books were not found at the time of survey.
49. The Court held that a minutes book is not a "books of account"; absence of minutes at the time of survey does not demonstrate absence of books.
50. The trust had consistently filed returns of income with audited accounts and audit reports under section 12A(b); there were no adverse auditor remarks about non-maintenance of accounts. This contradicted the Commissioner's allegation.
51. The Commissioner carried the allegation forward without any independent inquiry or evidence that proper books were not maintained, whereas the material on record showed the contrary.
52. Even assuming some procedural lapses, section 12AA(4) targets misuse of charitable status, not technical defects in record-keeping in the absence of a finding that activities are not genuine or not according to objects.
Conclusions
53. The allegation of non-maintenance of books was unsupported by evidence and, in any case, did not meet the statutory threshold for cancellation under section 12AA(4).
(b) Salaries to relatives of trustees and alleged violation of section 13(1)
Interpretation and reasoning
54. The Commissioner objected to salary payments to family members of trustees for earlier assessment years, alleging misapplication under section 13(1)(d), without specifying in the show cause notice the particular payments or evidence of excessiveness or lack of services.
55. The Court noted that at least one such person (e.g., a medically qualified trustee/relative) was a doctor and assistant professor and that the trust was running nursing and pharmacy institutions; payment of salary for legitimate services was supported by board resolutions and was not shown to exceed reasonable remuneration.
56. No material was brought on record to (i) establish the alleged relationships in terms of section 13, (ii) show that the payments were in excess of market rates, or (iii) show they were not for real services rendered.
57. Allegations were based on assumptions and conjecture, without proof that any undue benefit was conferred in violation of section 13(1).
Conclusions
58. The payments to alleged relatives of trustees were not shown to constitute prohibited benefits under section 13(1); thus they could not form a valid basis for cancellation of registration under section 12AA(4).
Issue 6: Effect of characterisation as private trust in collateral trustee dispute
Interpretation and reasoning
59. In separate litigation between rival trustees before the High Court, one party had asserted that the entity was a private trust. The Commissioner relied on this to question its public charitable character and cancel registration.
60. The Court observed that the entity had been granted registration under section 12A as a charitable trust satisfying section 2(15), and had been consistently assessed as such from 1999 till at least 2015.
61. A unilateral statement made by one disputing trustee in collateral proceedings could not override the statutory registration and long-standing treatment as a public charitable trust, nor by itself justify cancellation under section 12AA(4).
Conclusions
62. The collateral description of the trust as "private" in trustee disputes did not affect its registered status as a charitable trust under the Income-tax Act and could not be used as a ground for cancellation.
Overall Conclusion
63. None of the reasons invoked by the Commissioner-amendments to the trust deed, alleged violations of section 13(1)(d) through loan repayments or remuneration, procedural lapses in return/audit filing, alleged falsification or survey disclosure, or characterisation as a private trust-established that the activities of the trust were not genuine or not carried out in accordance with its charitable objects in the manner contemplated by section 12AA(4).
64. The conditions for cancellation under section 12AA(4) were not met; the order cancelling registration with effect from assessment year 2015-16 and the consequential direction to apply section 115TD were unsustainable and were therefore quashed, and the appeal was allowed.
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