Security cheque disputes may still support Section 138 prosecution where prima facie liability exists and factual defences require trial.
A cheque described as a security cheque can still support prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act where the complaint and surrounding documents prima facie show an existing enforceable liability; disputed assertions about discharge, failed transaction, or absence of debt are questions for trial and not for quashing. The complaint was also held sufficient against directors under Section 141 because it specifically alleged that they were in charge of and responsible for the company's day-to-day affairs. On that basis, the inherent jurisdiction was declined and the dishonour complaint was allowed to proceed.
Issues: (i) Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the summoning order were liable to be quashed on the ground that the cheque was issued only as security and there was no legally enforceable debt or subsisting liability; (ii) Whether the complaint disclosed sufficient averments to prosecute the directors under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Issue (i): Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the summoning order were liable to be quashed on the ground that the cheque was issued only as security and there was no legally enforceable debt or subsisting liability.
Analysis: The loan arrangement was found to be a continuation of the earlier commercial transaction, and the amount earlier advanced was expressly carried forward and acknowledged in the later loan agreement. The cheque in question, though asserted to be a security cheque, had prima facie fructified against an existing liability under the loan agreement. The defence that the payment was stopped because the transaction had failed, that the liability had been discharged by alleged losses, or that the cheque was not supported by enforceable debt, was held to raise disputed questions of fact. Such defences were held to be matters for trial and not for exercise of inherent jurisdiction at the stage of quashing. The subsequent arbitral findings also supported the existence of liability to repay the balance amount.
Conclusion: The complaint was not liable to be quashed on the ground of absence of legally enforceable debt; the finding was against the petitioners.
Issue (ii): Whether the complaint disclosed sufficient averments to prosecute the directors under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Analysis: The complaint specifically alleged that the directors and officers were in charge of the company's day-to-day affairs and were responsible for its decisions. For vicarious liability under Section 141, it was sufficient at the threshold that the complaint contained such averments, particularly where the chairman and managing director was directly involved in the transactions. The court held that the sufficiency of the directors' defence could not be tested at the quashing stage, and the complaint was not required to reproduce the statutory language verbatim so long as the substance of the role attributed to the accused was clear.
Conclusion: The complaint disclosed sufficient basis to proceed against the directors; the finding was against the petitioners.
Final Conclusion: The inherent jurisdiction was not warranted because the dishonour complaint disclosed a prima facie case under the negotiable instruments law, and the challenge to the summoning order failed.
Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of quashing a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a cheque asserted to be security may still attract criminal liability if the complaint and surrounding documents prima facie show an existing enforceable liability, while disputed questions regarding contractual breach or discharge of liability must be left to trial; for directors, specific averments that they in charge of and responsible for the company's affairs are sufficient to proceed under Section 141.