Issues: (i) Whether, following timely payment under Section 28(5), Section 28(6)(i) terminates confiscation proceedings and precludes redemption fine under Sections 111 and 125; (ii) Whether penalty under Section 114A can survive the deemed conclusion of proceedings under Section 28(6)(i).

Issue (i): Whether, following timely payment under Section 28(5), Section 28(6)(i) terminates confiscation proceedings and precludes redemption fine under Sections 111 and 125.

Analysis: Payment of duty, interest and the prescribed penalty within the statutory period causes proceedings in respect of all matters stated in the notice to be deemed concluded. The exceptions preserving proceedings under Sections 135, 135A and 140 are exhaustive and do not preserve confiscation proceedings under Section 111. Redemption fine is a substitute for a valid confiscation; therefore, where confiscation cannot continue, redemption fine cannot be imposed. The provisional release of goods does not preserve proceedings already concluded by statutory fiction, and the proviso to Section 125(1) does not revive that power.

Conclusion: Confiscation under Section 111 and redemption fine under Section 125 cannot be sustained after timely statutory payment. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 114A can survive the deemed conclusion of proceedings under Section 28(6)(i).

Analysis: Penalty under Section 114A was a matter stated in the notice and is not among the proceedings expressly excluded from the deemed conclusion under Section 28(6)(i). No discretion remains to continue or selectively sustain that penalty proceeding after the prescribed payment has been made.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114A cannot be imposed after the proceedings stand deemed concluded. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Timely payment under the statutory settlement mechanism brings all notice-based proceedings to finality except those expressly preserved, thereby precluding continued confiscation, redemption-fine and penalty proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Section 28(6)(i) deems proceedings under a notice concluded upon timely payment, proceedings for confiscation, redemption fine and penalty cannot continue unless expressly excepted by the statute.

Issues: (i) Whether the resolution plan complied with the requirement to demonstrate that it addresses the cause of default under Regulation 38(3)(a) and Section 30(2)(f); (ii) Whether plan value below liquidation value breached the dissenting financial creditor protection under Section 30(2)(b); (iii) Whether the direction for an investigation by the liquidator into the corporate debtor's affairs was sustainable; (iv) Whether the direction capping an assignee's distributable share was sustainable; (v) Whether the Adjudicating Authority was required to offer an opportunity to cure the plan or restore CIRP before ordering liquidation under the proviso to Section 31(2) and Section 33(1A).

Issue (i): Whether the resolution plan complied with the requirement to demonstrate that it addresses the cause of default under Regulation 38(3)(a) and Section 30(2)(f).

Analysis: Section 30(2)(f) incorporates mandatory requirements specified by the Board, including Regulation 38(3)(a). The Adjudicating Authority's review of such statutory compliance is distinct from reconsideration of the Committee of Creditors' commercial wisdom. The plan merely recorded the corporate debtor's losses, absence of turnover and excess liabilities, which were consequences rather than the cause of default, and proposed an undefined future business proposition. It neither identified why the default occurred nor provided a reasoned means of curing it. Approval by the Committee of Creditors could not cure the absence of this mandatory content.

Conclusion: The resolution plan violated Regulation 38(3)(a) and consequently Section 30(2)(f); its rejection on this ground was valid, against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether plan value below liquidation value breached the dissenting financial creditor protection under Section 30(2)(b).

Analysis: Section 30(2)(b), read with Section 53, protects a dissenting financial creditor's minimum liquidation entitlement; it does not require the aggregate plan value to equal or exceed liquidation value. The plan assured the dissenting creditor payment of the statutory minimum in cash and in priority to assenting creditors. The amount offered and its distribution otherwise fall within the Committee of Creditors' commercial wisdom.

Conclusion: A plan value below liquidation value did not by itself contravene Section 30(2)(b), and the contrary finding was unsustainable, in favour of the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether the direction for an investigation by the liquidator into the corporate debtor's affairs was sustainable.

Analysis: The corporate debtor was an asset-holding company without operations; substantial debts were assigned during CIRP, following which the assignee obtained overwhelming voting control and approved a plan that failed mandatory requirements. These circumstances justified an independent inquiry. The direction was confined to investigation and, where warranted, avoidance proceedings under Sections 43, 45, 50 and 66, with affected persons retaining an opportunity to be heard in such proceedings.

Conclusion: The direction for investigation by the liquidator was valid, against the appellants.

Issue (iv): Whether the direction capping an assignee's distributable share was sustainable.

Analysis: The assignee's entitlement depended upon the outcome of the ordered investigation and the applicable facts and law. A determination restricting its share before completion of that process was premature.

Conclusion: The cap on the assignee's distributable share was set aside, with all substantive rights and contentions kept open, in favour of the appellants.

Issue (v): Whether the Adjudicating Authority was required to offer an opportunity to cure the plan or restore CIRP before ordering liquidation under the proviso to Section 31(2) and Section 33(1A).

Analysis: The proviso to Section 31(2) and Section 33(1A) are enabling provisions and do not mandate an opportunity to rectify or restoration of CIRP in every case. The deficiencies concerned mandatory plan content and were accompanied by circumstances requiring investigation, rather than minor curable drafting gaps. Although liquidation is a last resort, the CIRP had not produced a plan meeting Section 30(2) requirements.

Conclusion: No mandatory obligation existed to permit rectification or restoration before liquidation, and the liquidation direction was valid, against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The statutory deficiency in addressing the cause of default and the circumstances warranting investigation sustain the rejection of the plan and liquidation, while the assignee's ultimate entitlement remains to be determined after investigation.

Ratio Decidendi: Committee of Creditors approval and commercial wisdom cannot cure a resolution plan's failure to satisfy a mandatory requirement incorporated by Section 30(2)(f), including the requirement to demonstrate how the cause of default is addressed.

Issues: Whether works contracts for construction of water and effluent treatment plants executed for local bodies or governmental authorities were exempt from service tax under Sl. Nos. 12 and 13 of Notification No. 25/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012.

Analysis: Sl. Nos. 12 and 13 exempt specified construction and installation services supplied to the Government, local authorities or governmental authorities, including pollution control or sewage treatment plants not forming part of a factory. The undisputed record established that the contracts were composite turnkey works for water and effluent treatment plants executed for municipal corporations and a public health engineering department. The Revenue did not dispute either the nature of the works or the status of the recipients as local bodies or governmental authorities.

Conclusion: The works contracts were covered by the exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012, and the service-tax demands could not be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notices lacked the essential factual and legal foundation and whether the impugned order travelled beyond their scope; (ii) Whether operation of the on-site mess constituted Outdoor Catering Service; (iii) Whether service tax could be demanded on the gross receipts from the catering arrangement; (iv) Whether exemption under Notification No. 22/2006-ST dated 31.05.2006 was available; (v) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked; (vi) Whether interest was payable on the surviving tax liability; (vii) Whether penalties under Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were sustainable; (viii) Whether the gross receipts were eligible for Cum-Tax Benefit under Section 67(2) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notices lacked the essential factual and legal foundation and whether the impugned order travelled beyond their scope.

Analysis: The notices identified the registered taxable activity, the claim of exemption under Notification No. 22/2006-ST dated 31.05.2006, and the allegation that such exemption was inapplicable. These disclosures supplied the essential factual and legal basis necessary to meet the proposed demand. The reference to a canteen in the impugned order was part of the analysis and did not introduce a new basis of liability.

Conclusion: The notices were valid and the demand did not travel beyond their scope; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether operation of the on-site mess constituted Outdoor Catering Service.

Analysis: Sections 65(24), 65(76a) and 65(105)(zzt) of the Finance Act, 1994 cover supply of food and beverages through catering at a place other than the caterer's own. The mess operated at premises provided by the service recipient under a contract that fixed rates, provided subsidy, and prescribed reciprocal catering obligations. Continuous use of those premises did not convert them into the assessee's own place of business; employees and trainees were ultimate beneficiaries rather than the contracting service recipients.

Conclusion: The activity constituted taxable Outdoor Catering Service; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether service tax could be demanded on the gross receipts from the catering arrangement.

Analysis: The receipts arose from a composite contractual catering arrangement involving preparation and supply of food and beverages at the recipient's premises. Their linkage to food supplied did not establish that they exclusively represented sale of goods, and service tax on Outdoor Catering Service is distinct from tax on the sale of food and beverages.

Conclusion: The demand is not invalid merely because it was based on gross receipts from the catering arrangement; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether exemption under Notification No. 22/2006-ST dated 31.05.2006 was available.

Analysis: The notification exempted services provided to the Reserve Bank of India only where the Reserve Bank was liable to pay service tax under Section 68(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 read with Rule 2 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. Outdoor catering was not a service for which that liability had shifted to the Reserve Bank. Payment or subsidy by the Reserve Bank and its certificate could not override the express statutory condition.

Conclusion: Exemption under Notification No. 22/2006-ST dated 31.05.2006 is unavailable; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked.

Analysis: The issue involved an interpretative dispute, and the Bona Fide Belief in non-taxability was founded on the exemption notification and the certificate issued by the Reserve Bank establishment. In the absence of a positive and blameworthy act establishing Suppression of Facts or intent to evade tax, the prerequisites for the Extended Period of Limitation were not satisfied.

Conclusion: The extended period cannot be invoked and the demand beyond the normal period is set aside; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether interest was payable on the surviving tax liability.

Analysis: Service tax liability for the normal period remained payable. Interest under Section 75 of the Finance Act, 1994 follows as a statutory consequence of delayed payment and requires recalculation with the surviving tax demand.

Conclusion: Statutory Interest is payable on the tax liability for the normal period after correct quantification; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (vii): Whether penalties under Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were sustainable.

Analysis: The circumstances necessary to establish misdeclaration, suppression, or intent to evade were not proved. The ingredients required for the penalties consequently remained unestablished.

Conclusion: The penalties are set aside; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (viii): Whether the gross receipts were eligible for Cum-Tax Benefit under Section 67(2) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: Where the gross amount charged is inclusive of service tax, Section 67(2) requires the taxable value to be recomputed by extending Cum-Tax Benefit.

Conclusion: Cum-Tax Benefit is admissible and the tax liability requires re-quantification on that basis; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Tax is confined to the normal period and must be recalculated with Cum-Tax Benefit, with interest consequentially payable only on that recalculated liability; the extended-period demand and all penalties do not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A bona fide interpretative dispute, without a positive and blameworthy act establishing intent to evade tax, cannot justify invocation of the extended period of limitation.

Issues: Whether the goods transport agency receipts for financial year 2016-17, and the consequential penalties, were correctly assessed to service tax.

Analysis: Transportation of potato, being agricultural produce, was covered by the exemption under Entry No. 21(a) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST. Vehicle-hire services supplied to other goods transport agencies were covered by Entry No. 22 of that notification. For GTA services supplied to specified recipients, including body corporates, the reverse charge mechanism under Notification No. 30/2012-ST placed the tax liability on the recipient. The residual receipts qualified for the threshold exemption of Rs. 10 lakh and 70% abatement applicable to GTA services.

Conclusion: The service-tax demand was confined to Rs. 17,823, subject to verification, and the penalties under Sections 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were set aside.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order confirming a penalty not proposed in the show-cause notice is sustainable under Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 75(7) mandates that the adjudicating authority cannot confirm a tax, interest or penalty demand exceeding that specified in the show-cause notice. The notice proposed tax demand but no penalty, whereas the adjudication order confirmed an additional penalty. The statutory prohibition was mandatory, and its breach rendered the adjudication beyond jurisdiction.

Conclusion: An adjudicating authority cannot impose a penalty or confirm a demand beyond that proposed in the show-cause notice; the impugned adjudication was therefore invalid.

Issues: Whether the challenge to the show-cause notice under Section 74, as amended by a subsequent notice alleging suppression, warranted writ adjudication at that stage.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with directions to submit a reply to the amended show-cause notice, following which the authorities must grant a hearing and pass a reasoned order in accordance with law; questions of law, including jurisdiction, were kept open.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns should be revoked after the returns were filed.

Analysis: The filing of returns on 08.07.2026 was noted. No final adjudication was made on the validity of the cancellation or entitlement to revocation.

Outcome: The petitioner was permitted to apply for revocation within two weeks, and the concerned authority was directed to pass a reasoned order in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration rendered the recipient's input tax credit inadmissible under Section 16(2)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 36(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017; (ii) Whether the condition of actual tax payment under Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was met and could be disputed on a ground absent from the show cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration rendered the recipient's input tax credit inadmissible under Section 16(2)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 36(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: The requirement that an invoice be issued by a registered supplier is to be assessed on the date of its issue. The supplier was shown as registered on the common portal when the invoices were issued and carried a valid GSTIN. Sections 29(2) and 29(3) permit retrospective cancellation and preserve the supplier's liability for prior tax dues, but do not deem prior invoices never to have been issued or automatically withdraw a recipient's credit. Paragraph 7 of Annexure B to Instruction No. 02/2022-GST is only a scrutiny parameter and cannot add a disqualification not contained in Section 16. The invoices, portal disclosures, ledger entries and bank payments were undisputed, while no allegation of sham supplies, non-receipt of goods or fraud was made.

Conclusion: Retrospective cancellation, by itself, did not invalidate the invoices or render the recipient's input tax credit inadmissible. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the condition of actual tax payment under Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was met and could be disputed on a ground absent from the show cause notice.

Analysis: The invoices appeared in FORM GSTR-2A and the supplier had filed FORM GSTR-3B for the relevant months. The Department admitted that the supplier had deposited the tax. Neither the show cause notice nor the adjudication order alleged non-payment of tax on the relevant invoices; therefore, Section 75(7) precluded sustaining the demand on that different ground. Although the credit claimant bears the burden under Section 155, the genuineness of receipt or movement of goods was never put in issue, and the documentary material produced by the recipient remained unchallenged.

Conclusion: The actual-tax-payment condition stood satisfied, and the credit could not be denied on an unpleaded and unsubstantiated doubt regarding the supplier's tax payment. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A recipient who transacts with a supplier shown as registered and meets the statutory credit conditions retains eligible input tax credit; a later retrospective cancellation may warrant enquiry but cannot alone disallow the credit or consequential liabilities.

Ratio Decidendi: Eligibility for input tax credit is determined by compliance with statutory conditions at the time of supply, and retrospective cancellation of a supplier's registration does not, without proof of a statutory deficiency properly alleged in the notice, extinguish the recipient's credit.

Issues: Whether detained jewellery could be released pending the department's revision where no interim stay operated against the Order-in-Appeal, upon the petitioner complying with the conditions imposed therein.

Analysis: The departmental revision had been heard, but no revisional order or interim protection staying the Order-in-Appeal had been issued. Non-receipt of the revisional order could not impede release of the detained goods in the absence of a stay, though the release remained subject to the eventual outcome of the revision and compliance with the imposed conditions.

Conclusion: Upon compliance with the conditions within the stipulated period, the request for release of the jewellery must be considered within two weeks; the pending revision does not bar such release in the absence of an interim stay.

Issues: Whether steel imports covered by bills of lading showing shipment on board on or before 30 June 2026 were entitled to exemption from Quality Control Order compliance and generation of an Automatic Registration Number where registration was sought after that date but within the prescribed arrival-based period.

Analysis: Clause 2 of the order dated 8 April 2026 made the Quality Control Order exemption depend upon the bill of lading recording shipment on board on or before 30 June 2026. The notice dated 19 February 2026 independently required ARN registration not earlier than 60 days and not later than three days before the expected arrival of the consignment, with ARN validity of 75 days. Neither instrument imposed a condition that ARN must be generated by 30 June 2026. The consignments satisfied the shipment-date condition, and the ARN applications were made within the notice's prescribed window measured from their expected arrival dates. An additional registration deadline could not be introduced contrary to the express terms of the exemption and registration framework.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to the QCO exemption and ARN generation; denial of those benefits on the ground that ARN was not obtained by 30 June 2026 was invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellants, merely named as consignees but having neither filed a bill of entry nor claimed ownership, were importers liable to penalties under Sections 112(a) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether the shipping manager's untested statement and uncertified electronic correspondence established the appellants' knowing involvement in the improper import.

Issue (i): Whether the appellants, merely named as consignees but having neither filed a bill of entry nor claimed ownership, were importers liable to penalties under Sections 112(a) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Sections 2(25) and 2(26) distinguish action in rem against imported goods from personal penal liability. Personal penalty required proof that the appellants were owners or importers under the definition applicable at the material time, and that they committed or abetted an act rendering the goods liable to confiscation with the requisite mens rea or knowledge. No bill of entry was filed by the appellants, they never claimed ownership, and their statements consistently denied ordering or owning the goods. The adjudication applied an altered definition of importer and did not establish the appellants' requisite status or culpable act.

Conclusion: The appellants were not shown to be importers or owners liable to personal penalties under Sections 112(a) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962, in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the shipping manager's untested statement and uncertified electronic correspondence established the appellants' knowing involvement in the improper import.

Analysis: The electronic material was not collected or proved in compliance with the safeguards under Section 138C of the Customs Act, 1962. The shipping manager was not examined or made available for cross-examination, and no reliable material established that the appellants operated the supplier-domain email account, placed orders, or otherwise caused the import. A bill of lading naming a consignee, without reliable corroborative evidence, did not discharge the Department's burden of proving knowing participation.

Conclusion: The untested statement and electronic correspondence did not prove the appellants' knowing involvement in the improper import or the use of false declarations, in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: Personal penal liability could not be sustained merely from the appellants' description as consignees, while the in rem confiscation of the offending goods remained distinct from such liability.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for improper import requires proof that the noticee was an importer or committed or abetted the offending act with the requisite mens rea; a consignee's name in a bill of lading, unsupported by reliable and admissible corroborative evidence, is insufficient.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported electric steering-lock assemblies are classifiable under CTH 8708 94 00 as parts of steering wheels, steering columns or steering boxes, or under CTH 8708 99 00 as other motor-vehicle parts and accessories; (ii) Whether the consequential denial of preferential-duty benefit, differential duty demand, confiscation, redemption fine and penalties are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the imported electric steering-lock assemblies are classifiable under CTH 8708 94 00 as parts of steering wheels, steering columns or steering boxes, or under CTH 8708 99 00 as other motor-vehicle parts and accessories.

Analysis: The burden of proof in tariff classification rested on the Revenue to displace the declared classification through cogent technical evidence. Under Section Note 3 to Section XVII and the competing tariff entries, classification depended on the functional identity of the goods and the distinction between a part and an accessory. The expression "parts thereof" in CTH 8708 94 00 was confined to components integral to, or essential for, steering wheels, steering columns or steering boxes. The lock assembly did not transmit steering force or participate in directional control; it immobilised the steering mechanism only after vehicle operation had ceased for anti-theft purposes. AIS-075 and the HSN material did not establish that an anti-theft lock was a steering-system part, while the absence of technical evidence left the proposed reclassification unsubstantiated. The residual tariff entry under CTH 8708 99 00 covered the security accessory.

Conclusion: The electric steering-lock assemblies are classifiable under CTH 8708 99 00 as other parts and accessories of motor vehicles, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the consequential denial of preferential-duty benefit, differential duty demand, confiscation, redemption fine and penalties are sustainable.

Analysis: The denial of notification benefit and differential duty demand depended upon the rejected reclassification. The complete description of the goods had been declared, and the bona fide interpretational dispute did not establish misdeclaration for confiscation under Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962. Since the goods had already been cleared for home consumption and were unavailable for confiscation, redemption fine under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 was not maintainable. The absence of fraud, suppression, wilful misstatement, mens rea, or other culpable conduct also defeated the extended period of limitation and penalties under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The denial of preferential-duty benefit, differential duty demands, confiscation, redemption fine and penalties are unsustainable and are set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The correct residual classification preserves the applicable preferential customs-duty treatment and eliminates the fiscal and penal consequences founded on the rejected reclassification.

Ratio Decidendi: An anti-theft device that does not participate in the essential operation of a steering system is an accessory rather than a part thereof and cannot be classified under a specific steering-parts tariff entry merely because it is fitted to the steering column.

Issues: (i) Whether a properly raised alternative classification and exemption claim must be adjudicated in a differential-duty proceeding; (ii) Whether redemption fine is sustainable after the goods have been cleared and are unavailable for confiscation; (iii) Whether penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 is sustainable absent misdeclaration, suppression, or deliberate evasion.

Issue (i): Whether a properly raised alternative classification and exemption claim must be adjudicated in a differential-duty proceeding.

Analysis: Correct duty assessment in a differential-duty proceeding requires determination of the applicable classification and rate of duty. An assessee may contest the duty demand by raising an alternative classification, including where the Department has reopened the assessment. The alternative classification plea having been raised before the adjudicating authority, its merits required examination along with the related exemption claim.

Conclusion: The alternative classification and exemption claim required determination on merits, with any duty liability confined to the normal period.

Issue (ii): Whether redemption fine is sustainable after the goods have been cleared and are unavailable for confiscation.

Analysis: Redemption fine requires the goods to be available for confiscation. The goods had been cleared for home consumption and were not available for confiscation.

Conclusion: The redemption fine was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 is sustainable absent misdeclaration, suppression, or deliberate evasion.

Analysis: The dispute concerned classification and exemption entitlement and was interpretational in nature. There was no allegation or evidence of misdeclaration of description, quantity, or value, suppression of facts, wilful intent, or other deliberate conduct to evade duty. A mere erroneous exemption claim does not establish the ingredients for penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The unresolved classification and exemption entitlement require fresh merits determination, while the penal and confiscatory consequences cannot survive on the established record.

Ratio Decidendi: In a differential-duty proceeding, a properly raised alternative classification claim must be adjudicated to arrive at the legally correct duty assessment.

Issues: Whether penalties under Section 112(a)(i), Section 112(a)(ii) and Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained against the appellant on the basis of co-accused statements and WhatsApp-chat material, without proof of knowledge or intentional involvement in the import of prohibited or misdeclared goods.

Analysis: Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962 requires that statements relied upon in adjudication be tested through the prescribed process; uncorroborated statements of co-accused, where the makers were not subjected to cross-examination, could not constitute reliable evidence. The printed WhatsApp-chat data retrieved from the seized mobile phone was also not reliable or cogent evidence. There was no independent evidence establishing that the appellant knew the contents of the containers, abetted the acts rendering the goods liable to confiscation, or knowingly made, signed or used a false declaration or document. The essential ingredients for penalty under Section 112(a)(i), Section 112(a)(ii) and Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were therefore not established.

Conclusion: The penalties imposed under Section 112(a)(i), Section 112(a)(ii) and Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were unsustainable and were set aside.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit could be denied for payment of excise duty during the period of default under Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, where the defaulted duty was subsequently paid with interest.

Analysis: Rule 8(3A) had been declared ultra vires, and the consistently followed view was that a manufacturer cannot be compelled to make duty payment only in cash or be denied use of CENVAT credit during the default period. The defaulted duty had also been made good with interest.

Conclusion: Denial of utilisation of CENVAT credit during the default period was impermissible; the demand founded on Rule 8(3A) was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the refund claim for duty paid on stolen goods was barred by limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Section 11B prescribes a one-year period for filing a refund claim from the relevant date. The duty had been paid because the goods were stolen and could not be used in manufacture. Upon recovery of the goods, the judicial release order directing their return created the cause of action for seeking refund. The relevant date was therefore the date of the release order, rather than the date on which duty had been paid.

Conclusion: The refund claim, having been filed within one year of the release order, was within limitation and was allowable in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether mobile chargers sold in single-MRP composite packs with cellular phones are separately taxable at the residual rate; (ii) Whether toner and cartridges fall under the concessional entries for computer systems, peripherals, parts and accessories or under the residual entry; (iii) Whether the remanded issues concerning trade discount, entry-tax set-off, D-IX declarations, interest and demand computation warrant further interference; (iv) Whether alleged defects in the show-cause notice and the asserted non-speaking nature of the orders warrant interference.

Issue (i): Whether mobile chargers sold in single-MRP composite packs with cellular phones are separately taxable at the residual rate.

Analysis: Entry 14 of Part II of Schedule III of the Bihar Value Added Tax Act, 2005 applies to cellular phones. Binding Supreme Court precedent, followed by a coordinate-Bench decision under the same statute, establishes that a mobile charger remains an independently marketable accessory and not a part of the handset despite being supplied in a composite pack. A single MRP, exclusive compatibility, warranty requirements and the commercial intention behind a bundled sale do not alter that classification. Judicial discipline required adherence to that binding position. The absence of a separate statutory mechanism for splitting the pack did not negate the residual classification, and no arbitrariness in the best-judgment valuation of the charger was established.

Conclusion: Mobile chargers supplied with cellular phones in composite packs are independently taxable accessories falling under the residual entry. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether toner and cartridges fall under the concessional entries for computer systems, peripherals, parts and accessories or under the residual entry.

Analysis: Entries 3 and 4 of Part II of Schedule III cover computer systems, peripherals and their parts or accessories. Entry 97 of Part I of Schedule III expressly excludes toner and cartridges from printing ink. That exclusion, read with strict construction of taxing statutes, indicated that toner and cartridges were not intended to receive concessional treatment under the computer-peripheral entries. Applying the functional and common-parlance tests, toner and cartridges are consumables that are exhausted and periodically replaced, rather than permanent or integral parts or accessories of a printer. Decisions under differently worded State schedules did not govern the Bihar Schedule.

Conclusion: Toner and cartridges are unspecified goods taxable under the residual entry and do not fall under Entries 3 and 4 of Part II of Schedule III. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the remanded issues concerning trade discount, entry-tax set-off, D-IX declarations, interest and demand computation warrant further interference.

Analysis: The factual claims relating to trade discount, entry-tax set-off and D-IX declarations require verification by the assessing authority. Under the second proviso to Section 3(2) of the Bihar Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1993, entry-tax set-off depends upon actual VAT liability arising from sale or manufacture and sale; closing stock does not generate set-off for that year. Liability cannot be imposed on D-IX discrepancies merely by presumption without proof of actual suppression or misuse. Interest under Section 39(4) of the Bihar Value Added Tax Act, 2005 requires recomputation after determination of the remanded claims. The treatment of the recovered amount as tax-exclusive was sustained.

Conclusion: The remand directions and the demand-computation finding remain operative; the identified factual issues must be freshly determined and liabilities recomputed after affording a hearing. This issue is against the assessee insofar as no further interference is warranted.

Issue (iv): Whether alleged defects in the show-cause notice and the asserted non-speaking nature of the orders warrant interference.

Analysis: Full participation in assessment and appellate proceedings, submission of replies and production of documents demonstrated adequate opportunity to present the case. No actual prejudice from the show-cause notice was established. The appellate reasoning, though capable of greater elaboration, addressed the material classification contentions through binding precedent and the functional-consumable distinction. Natural justice requires prejudice, not merely procedural objection.

Conclusion: No violation of natural justice or deficiency in the orders justified interference. This issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The residual-rate classifications of mobile chargers and toner and cartridges stand, while the specified factual claims remain subject to fresh statutory assessment and consequential recomputation.

Ratio Decidendi: Concessional classification of a principal product or its qualifying parts does not extend to a separately identifiable accessory or to a consumable expressly excluded by the statutory schedule.

Issues: Whether interim protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was warranted to secure the petitioner's monetary claim pending arbitration on account of a strong possibility that the respondent's assets available for execution may diminish or become insufficient.

Analysis: The invoices contained arbitration clauses, and the material prima facie showed acceptance of supplies, correspondence recording substantial outstanding balances, balance confirmation, and assurances of payment. Although disputes concerning reconciliation, credit notes, rebates, interest, and the nature and effect of the dishonoured cheque required determination in arbitration, they did not negate the prima facie basis for protection. The respondent's audited financial statements showed substantial losses, negative reserves, significant borrowings and trade payables, and minimal cash availability. Its disclosed immovable properties were of substantially lower gross value than the claim and were stated to be encumbered. Section 9 is preventive and does not require proof of dishonest intent; objective material establishing a strong possibility of diminution or insufficiency of assets available for execution is sufficient. The prima facie case, balance of convenience, and risk of serious prejudice supported preservation of the disputed amount rather than pre-award recovery.

Conclusion: The respondent must secure Rs. 32,60,37,480 by deposit with the Court or by furnishing an acceptable bank guarantee, pending the arbitral determination; the underlying monetary liability and all reconciliation-related disputes remain open before the Arbitral Tribunal.

Issues: Validity and jurisdiction of the amended show-cause notice alleging suppression under Section 74 of the CGST/UPGST Acts, 2017.

Outcome: No final adjudication was made; the petitioner may reply to the amended notice, and the authority must decide the matter after hearing while all questions of law, including jurisdiction, remain open.