Issues: (i) Whether transitional credit of CVD and additional duty on capital goods received after 1 July 2017 was admissible under Section 140(2); (ii) Whether central excise duty paid on goods cleared before GST but exported after 1 July 2017 was eligible for transitional credit; (iii) Whether interest was payable on inadmissible transitional credit; and (iv) Whether penalty for wrongful availment of the inadmissible credit was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether transitional credit of CVD and additional duty on capital goods received after 1 July 2017 was admissible under Section 140(2).

Analysis: Section 140(2) permits transition of unavailed CENVAT credit on capital goods that was not carried forward under the existing law, provided the credit was admissible under both the existing and GST regimes. Neither the provision nor Rule 117(2)(a) requires that credit must have been partly availed before the appointed day or restricts transition to fifty per cent of the eligible credit. The prescribed TRAN-1 particulars were furnished and the capital-goods credit fulfilled the statutory conditions.

Conclusion: The transitional credit of Rs. 2,90,845 is admissible under Section 140(2), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether central excise duty paid on goods cleared before GST but exported after 1 July 2017 was eligible for transitional credit.

Analysis: Table 7(a) concerns credit relating to inputs under specified categories of Section 140 and does not provide a residual route for transitioning central excise duty paid on goods cleared for export before GST. No provision of Section 140 authorises such duty to be converted into GST input tax credit. Section 174(2)(c) does not preserve a right to transitional credit where no such right had accrued under the existing law or the GST transitional framework.

Conclusion: The transitional credit of Rs. 6,99,004 is not admissible, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest was payable on inadmissible transitional credit.

Analysis: Interest follows the recoverability of wrongly availed input tax credit. Since the export-related transitional credit was inadmissible, interest is consequentially chargeable on that amount.

Conclusion: Interest is payable only on the inadmissible transitional credit, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty for wrongful availment of the inadmissible credit was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 73 applies to wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax credit in cases other than fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression. Upon determination of the inadmissible credit, Section 73(9) requires penalty at ten per cent of the tax determined; disclosure in TRAN-1 does not displace that consequence.

Conclusion: Penalty is sustainable at Rs. 69,900, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional framework preserves eligible unavailed capital-goods credit, but does not authorise conversion of central excise duty paid on pre-GST export clearances into GST credit.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 140(2) permits transition of eligible unavailed capital-goods credit not carried forward under the existing law, but transitional credit cannot be claimed where the statute provides no enabling category for the duty concerned.

Issues: (i) Validity of the appellate order for want of a reasoned determination of the appellant's submissions; (ii) Whether a notice under section 73 can be sustained where ineligible input tax credit is fully offset by excess output tax paid; (iii) Whether refund of excess output tax paid is subject to unjust enrichment; (iv) Sustainability of the sales-return demand where the adjudicating authority relied on a ground not stated in the show cause notice and credit/debit notes were not uploaded on the GST portal; (v) Sustainability of interest demand for delayed returns where the show cause notice lacked particulars and the quantified demand was unexplained.

Issue (i): Validity of the appellate order for want of a reasoned determination of the appellant's submissions.

Analysis: The appellate order rejected extensive submissions concerning tax set-off, credit/debit notes and delayed-return interest through a bare one-line observation. It did not address the material contentions or disclose any reasoned basis for confirming the demand. This failed the speaking-order requirement and breached the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The appellate order was invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a notice under section 73 can be sustained where ineligible input tax credit is fully offset by excess output tax paid.

Analysis: The excess output tax payment was undisputed and exceeded the disputed ineligible input tax credit. Section 73 is attracted only where tax remains unpaid or short paid, or credit is wrongly availed or utilised. Requiring payment of the disputed amount followed by a separate refund claim, despite an admitted excess payment, would defeat the permissible set-off of tax liability and produce no revenue loss.

Conclusion: No notice under section 73 lay where the admitted excess output tax payment fully offset the ineligible input tax credit; the related tax, interest and penalty demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether refund of excess output tax paid is subject to unjust enrichment.

Analysis: Excess output tax paid over the tax actually due was found to fall within the exception in section 54(8)(c). Accordingly, the statutory basis asserted for applying the test of unjust enrichment was unavailable.

Conclusion: Refund of excess output tax paid was not subject to the test of unjust enrichment, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Sustainability of the sales-return demand where the adjudicating authority relied on a ground not stated in the show cause notice and credit/debit notes were not uploaded on the GST portal.

Analysis: The show cause notice alleged absence of supporting documents, whereas the adjudication order confirmed the demand because the counterparty had not declared a debit note in its returns. The adjudication thereby travelled beyond the scope of the show cause notice. Further, for the disputed 2017-18 period, GSTR-2A was a reconciliation facility and portal declaration of the credit/debit notes was not mandatory; documents otherwise in order could not be invalidated merely for non-uploading.

Conclusion: The sales-return demand and consequential tax, interest and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Sustainability of interest demand for delayed returns where the show cause notice lacked particulars and the quantified demand was unexplained.

Analysis: The show cause notice did not identify the defaulting months, tax amounts, or period for which interest was claimed. Its stated interest amount also materially differed from the amount in the adjudication order without any disclosed basis. The demand lacked the specificity required by the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The interest demand for delayed filing of returns was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The asserted liabilities for tax, interest and penalty lacked legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 73 cannot be invoked where an admitted excess output tax payment fully offsets the disputed ineligible input tax credit and no net short payment of tax remains.

Issues: (i) Whether alleged excess input tax credit was sustainable when the updated GSTR-2A reconciliation, including import IGST credit, disclosed a surplus aggregate credit and IGST could offset CGST/SGST shortfalls; (ii) Whether the adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by denial of a personal hearing and failure to address the taxpayer's contentions.

Issue (i): Whether alleged excess input tax credit was sustainable when the updated GSTR-2A reconciliation, including import IGST credit, disclosed a surplus aggregate credit and IGST could offset CGST/SGST shortfalls.

Analysis: The reconciliation based on the latest GSTR-2A figures and IGST paid on imports was unrebutted and showed aggregate eligible credit exceeding the credit claimed. Section 49(5)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Kerala State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits surplus IGST credit, after payment of IGST liability, to be utilised towards CGST and SGST liabilities. The Fungibility of Input Tax Credit principle treats the electronic credit ledger as a unified resource for this purpose. Under Judicial Discipline, the applicable jurisdictional ruling on adjustment of IGST surplus against CGST/SGST shortfalls was required to be followed.

Conclusion: The alleged excess input tax credit was not sustainable; surplus IGST credit validly offset the CGST and SGST shortfalls, leaving no short payment of tax warranting proceedings under Section 73.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by denial of a personal hearing and failure to address the taxpayer's contentions.

Analysis: The original adjudication was passed without affording a Right to Personal Hearing and without considering the taxpayer's contentions. The appellate order mechanically affirmed the demand without analysing the contentions and evidence. Such adjudication breached the Principles of Natural Justice and the requirement of a Speaking Order.

Conclusion: The adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by breach of the Principles of Natural Justice and were null and void.

Final Conclusion: The alleged ITC mismatch had no factual or legal basis after complete reconciliation and permissible cross-utilisation of IGST credit, while the underlying proceedings were independently invalid for procedural unfairness.

Issues: (i) Whether a consolidated show cause notice and order covering multiple financial years is valid under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the disputed input tax credit demands are sustainable; (iii) Whether invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the consequential penalty are sustainable; (iv) Whether interest is payable under Section 50 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on tax determined as payable.

Issue (i): Whether a consolidated show cause notice and order covering multiple financial years is valid under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Sections 74(1), 74(2) and 74(10) prescribe the conditions and limitation for issuance of a demand notice and order, but do not require separate notices for each financial year. A consolidated notice covering more than one tax period is permissible where each period is within the prescribed limitation and the noticee suffers no prejudice to its right of defence or appeal.

Conclusion: A consolidated show cause notice and order for multiple financial years are valid. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the disputed input tax credit demands are sustainable.

Analysis: The prior-year input tax credit reflected in the subsequent year's return was not rejected on legal ineligibility, but for want of proof that the benefit had not already been granted. Verification of that factual position is required. The claims concerning payment under an incorrect tax head and credit availed under incorrect heads also require verification of revenue impact and compliance with Section 49 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 88A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017. A fair opportunity to furnish supporting evidence is required.

Conclusion: The three disputed input tax credit components require fresh factual verification and determination in accordance with law; no final tax liability is fixed on these components.

Issue (iii): Whether invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the consequential penalty are sustainable.

Analysis: Section 74 applies only where non-payment, short-payment, erroneous refund, or wrongful availment of input tax credit is attributable to fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. The show cause notice must disclose foundational facts supporting such allegations; mechanical recitation of those expressions is insufficient. The burden of proving mala fides lies on the Department. The relevant input tax credit particulars were disclosed in statutory returns, and the notice did not establish fraud, deliberate suppression, or mens rea to evade tax.

Conclusion: The confirmation of demand and penalty under Section 74 is set aside in favour of the assessee. Tax, interest and penalty, if any, shall be determined under Section 75(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 as if the notice had been issued under Section 73(1).

Issue (iv): Whether interest is payable under Section 50 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on tax determined as payable.

Analysis: Interest under Section 50 is a statutory consequence of tax validly determined as payable.

Conclusion: Interest is payable on the tax ultimately determined as payable. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Consolidation of tax periods does not invalidate the demand proceedings, but liability must be determined after factual verification under the ordinary demand framework, with statutory interest following the lawful determination of tax.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 74 can be invoked only where the show cause notice discloses foundational facts establishing fraud, wilful misstatement, or deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax; a bare allegation founded on disclosed return particulars is insufficient.

Issues: Whether the Appellate Authority could direct the adjudicating authority to verify reconciliation workings and delete input tax credit demand, interest and penalty to the extent of eligible credit.

Analysis: Section 107(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 empowers the Appellate Authority to make further inquiry and to confirm, modify or annul the appealed order, while expressly prohibiting it from referring the case back to the adjudicating authority. The conditional direction for verification and consequential deletion of demand required the adjudicating authority to perform the inquiry that the Appellate Authority itself was required to undertake. There was no dispute regarding the need to verify the taxpayer's reconciliation workings.

Conclusion: The referral to the adjudicating authority was impermissible under Section 107(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and the issue was decided in favour of Revenue.

Issues: Whether input tax credit proposed to be disallowed under Section 16(2)(aa) in the show-cause notice could be denied under Section 16(2)(c) on the ground of non-payment of tax by suppliers, merely because the latter provision was reproduced in the notice.

Analysis: The scope of the show-cause notice was confined to alleged non-compliance with Section 16(2)(aa), which was inapplicable to the relevant period. It contained no allegation or factual basis that tax on the disputed supplies had not actually been paid to the Government, as required for invoking Section 16(2)(c). The adjudication order nevertheless disallowed input tax credit on that distinct ground. Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of a demand on grounds other than those specified in the notice. A bare recital of a statutory provision, without identifying its contravention, does not give effective notice of a charge. Such substitution of the basis of demand also violates principles of natural justice. Section 160(1) does not cure a proceeding that is substantively inconsistent with the statutory requirements.

Conclusion: Confirmation of the demand under Section 16(2)(c) was outside the show-cause notice and invalid; mere reproduction of that provision did not constitute a charge or put the taxpayer on notice. The proceedings and demand were set aside.

Issues: Whether an airline is entitled to refund of GST paid on cancelled air tickets where the fare, including GST, was refunded to passengers and the corresponding credit notes could not be adjusted against output tax liability.

Analysis: Section 34(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits adjustment through credit notes, while Circular No. 137/07/2020-GST dated 13.04.2020 permits a refund claim under the category of excess payment of tax where no output liability exists for such adjustment. The ticket number and passenger details consistently linked the air ticket, tax invoice, refund voucher and credit note, and the billing settlement records corroborated the refund mechanism. These records sufficiently established that the fare and GST were returned to the respective passengers and that no incidence of tax was retained or passed on. As the transactions were predominantly business-to-consumer supplies, input tax credit reversal did not arise; the later amendment concerning recipient credit reversal was inapplicable to the relevant period.

Conclusion: The airline is entitled to refund of the GST relating to cancelled tickets, the documentary evidence establishes absence of unjust enrichment, and the refund claim was validly made as excess payment of tax.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand for the period up to 30 September 2016 was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether works-contract supplies to Sintex Prefab and Infra Ltd. and Sintex Industries Ltd. attracted service tax for the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 June 2017; (iii) Whether commission earned on Vodafone distributorship was exempt from service tax; and (iv) Whether VAT-paid supplies of plastic dustbins, portolet toilets and similar goods to local bodies and State Governments attracted service tax.

Issue (i): Whether the demand for the period up to 30 September 2016 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The show-cause notice was issued on 22 October 2021. The demand pertaining to the period found to be beyond the five-year extended limitation period could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The demand up to 30 September 2016 is time-barred and is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether works-contract supplies to Sintex Prefab and Infra Ltd. and Sintex Industries Ltd. attracted service tax for the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 June 2017.

Analysis: The taxable works-contract component was confined to the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 June 2017 and quantified at 33% of the gross amount received.

Conclusion: Service tax at 33% of the gross amount received, with interest, is payable for the specified period; no penalty is imposable.

Issue (iii): Whether commission earned on Vodafone distributorship was exempt from service tax.

Analysis: The commission from Vodafone distributorship fell within Serial No. 29(f) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012.

Conclusion: The commission is exempt from service tax and the entire demand on that account is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether VAT-paid supplies of plastic dustbins, portolet toilets and similar goods to local bodies and State Governments attracted service tax.

Analysis: The invoices established sale and supply of goods on which VAT had been paid, rather than provision of a taxable service.

Conclusion: The VAT-paid supplies of goods are not liable to service tax and the demand on that account is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Only the non-time-barred works-contract receipts remain chargeable to service tax with interest; the demands relating to Vodafone commission and VAT-paid supplies of goods do not survive, and no penalty is payable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where invoices establish a VAT-paid sale of goods rather than provision of a service, the related receipts are not chargeable to service tax.

Issues: Whether GST registration could be cancelled retrospectively from 2 July 2017 when the show-cause notice issued under Rule 21(a) did not propose retrospective cancellation.

Analysis: The show-cause notice alleged that no business was conducted from the declared place of business, but contained no indication that cancellation was proposed with retrospective effect. Cancellation from 2 July 2017 therefore exceeded the scope of the notice. The earlier cancellation for the same period had been revoked, and the subsequent penalty adjudication recorded that the input tax credit availed was genuine under Section 16 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: Retrospective cancellation without prior notice was unsustainable; the cancellation order was set aside, the registration was revived, and the show-cause notice was directed to be adjudicated afresh after the petitioner responds.

Issues: Whether the transfer applications relating to 450 appeals involving an identical question of law were required to be placed before the Principal Bench.

Analysis: The appeals raised a common question concerning GST on royalty payments under mining leases and consequential refund claims. Under the third proviso to Section 109(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with the notification dated 17.09.2026, the Principal Bench had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the common question.

Conclusion: The Principal Bench has exclusive jurisdiction over the 450 appeals, which shall be listed and heard before the appropriate Bench of the Principal Bench.

Issues: Whether an appeal remaining defective despite notice and repeated opportunities, coupled with the appellant's continued non-appearance, may be rejected under the Tribunal's inherent and procedural powers.

Analysis: Rule 24 of the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2025 permits the Bench to reject an appeal where notified defects remain unrectified after the prescribed scrutiny process. Rule 10 preserves the Tribunal's inherent powers to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process. Persistent failure to cure defects, absence on successive listings, and lack of any explanation demonstrated abandonment of the appellate proceedings. Retaining such defective proceedings would unjustifiably burden the Tribunal's docket.

Conclusion: The Tribunal may exercise its powers under Rules 10 and 24 to reject a defective appeal where the appellant fails to remove defects and abandons its prosecution; no opinion is expressed on the underlying merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the State Bench could adjudicate a jurisdictional challenge to an advance ruling when the ruling was unappealed and the challenge was absent from the show-cause notices and grounds of appeal; (ii) Whether the unchallenged advance ruling remained binding on the jurisdictional officer despite the subsequent circular; (iii) Whether GST at 18% for the relevant period could be determined through the circular and whether the refund was consequently erroneous; and (iv) Whether Revenue could raise, at the second-appellate stage, the grounds that only the supplier could claim refund and that the claim was barred by unjust enrichment.

Issue (i): Whether the State Bench could adjudicate a jurisdictional challenge to an advance ruling when the ruling was unappealed and the challenge was absent from the show-cause notices and grounds of appeal.

Analysis: The statutory appellate hierarchy under Sections 100 to 104 provides specific remedies against an advance ruling, including appeal, rectification, and declaration of voidness for fraud or suppression. The jurisdictional challenge was not raised before the Authority, in the show-cause notices, or in the authorised grounds of appeal, and was introduced only through rejoinder. Section 75(7) precludes a demand on grounds outside the notice, while Section 109(4) does not empower a State Bench to test the validity of an unchallenged ruling of the Authority.

Conclusion: The belated jurisdictional challenge to the advance ruling could not be adjudicated by the State Bench. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the unchallenged advance ruling remained binding on the jurisdictional officer despite the subsequent circular.

Analysis: Section 103(1) makes the ruling binding on the applicant and the concerned or jurisdictional officer. The ruling was neither appealed against, rectified, nor declared void. The later circular was an administrative instruction under Section 168 and not a change in the Act, Rules, or rate notification for purposes of Section 103(2). A later adverse administrative circular could not retrospectively displace the finality of a quasi-judicial ruling.

Conclusion: The advance ruling continued to bind the jurisdictional officer, and the circular did not permit Revenue to resile from it. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether GST at 18% for the relevant period could be determined through the circular and whether the refund was consequently erroneous.

Analysis: Section 9(1) requires the GST rate to be prescribed by Government notification on the recommendation of the Council. Under Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate), the relevant licensing service attracted the rate applicable to like goods involving transfer of title; the applicable rate was 5% for the period up to 31.12.2018. The 18% rate was notified only with effect from 01.01.2019. An administrative circular cannot create a levy or substitute for a rate notification, consistently with Article 265 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The circular could not fix the rate at 18% for the relevant period; the refund was lawfully sanctioned and was not an erroneous refund. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether Revenue could raise, at the second-appellate stage, the grounds that only the supplier could claim refund and that the claim was barred by unjust enrichment.

Analysis: These grounds were not contained in the show-cause notices or adjudication orders and were barred by the show-cause notice limitation in Section 75(7). In any event, the recipient had borne the incidence of tax, furnished the prescribed chartered accountant certificate under Rule 89(2)(m), and reversed the corresponding input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger. The requirements for payment of refund to the applicant under Section 54(8)(e) were satisfied.

Conclusion: Revenue could not introduce those new grounds at the second-appellate stage, and unjust enrichment was not attracted. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The unchallenged and binding advance ruling governed the applicable rate for the disputed period, and the absence of a notified 18% levy preserved the legality of the refund; the demands treating it as erroneous could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an unappealed advance ruling fixes the applicable GST rate under a notification, a subsequent administrative circular cannot displace that binding ruling or create a contrary levy without authority of law.

Issues: Whether an inordinate delay of 1,141 days in filing the appeal was supported by sufficient cause for condonation.

Analysis: The order-in-original had been duly communicated to the appellant in July 2021. Remote working, internal communication failures, subsequent resignation of an employee, and failure to capture the order in the litigation-tracking system did not establish that the appellant was prevented from filing the appeal within the prescribed period. The appellant also remained inactive after responsibility for the matter was transferred in 2022. COVID-19 disruptions could not justify the delay, particularly as normalcy had returned by the time of communication and the appellant had been represented in the adjudication proceedings. Examination of the merits was unnecessary for deciding limitation.

Conclusion: The delay was not supported by sufficient cause and was not liable to be condoned.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings could validly be initiated solely on third-party information without independent inquiry, verification, or application of mind by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires the Assessing Officer to form a reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Information received from another departmental authority may be relevant material, but does not by itself establish the required belief. The material did not demonstrate any independent examination or preliminary verification linking the third-party information to escapement of income in the assessee's case; the recorded reasons therefore reflected only a reason to suspect.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were invalid for want of demonstrated independent application of mind and a legally sustainable reason to believe. The reassessment orders were set aside and the additions deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether estimated income based on rejection of books for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 should be computed at 5% or 2% of sales; (ii) Whether additions of unsecured loans as unexplained cash credits under section 68 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether estimated income based on rejection of books for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 should be computed at 5% or 2% of sales.

Analysis: The 5% estimation for the two years departed from the rate adopted in the original assessment and from the 2% rate accepted for the immediately preceding year on substantially similar facts. Consistency required computation on the 2% basis after rejection of books of account.

Conclusion: The estimated addition for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 is restricted to 2% of sales, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether additions of unsecured loans as unexplained cash credits under section 68 were sustainable.

Analysis: Banking channels, confirmations, returns and repayment documentation established only a paper trail and did not establish genuine creditworthiness or genuineness. The lenders did not comply with repeated summons, their directors had admitted that the entities were accommodation-entry providers, and the assessee failed to produce them for verification. Applying the burden of proof and human-probabilities test, the surrounding evidence outweighed the apparent documentation.

Conclusion: The unsecured-loan additions under section 68 are sustained, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Income estimation for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 must be recomputed at 2% of sales, while the cash-credit additions and related interest disallowance remain undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Banking documentation does not discharge the assessee's burden to prove creditworthiness and genuineness of a cash credit where independent evidence establishes that the creditors are accommodation-entry providers and they fail to verify the transactions.

Issues: Whether a tax demand could be confirmed on a ground not proposed in the show-cause notice, consistently with Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of a demand on a ground different from that specified in the show-cause notice. The DRC-01 proposed tax at 14% on a specified turnover, whereas the subsequent DRC-07 and adjudication order confirmed tax at 9% on a different turnover without confirming the demand originally proposed. The confirmed demand therefore rested on an unnotified ground.

Conclusion: Confirmation of the demand on a ground not proposed in the show-cause notice violated Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and was invalid.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the statutory appeal could be condoned in the circumstances stated by the petitioner.

Analysis: The appellate authority had rejected the appeal as time-barred on the basis that the delay exceeded the period condonable under Section 107(1) of the Goods and Services Tax Act. The appeal memorandum attributed the delay to the serious illness and subsequent death of the proprietor's husband, for whom she was the sole caregiver. The State accepted that the matter could be heard on merits upon compensation by costs.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned, the appellate order rejecting the appeal on limitation was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the appellate authority for a fresh decision on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the notification retrospectively impaired a vested right to export stock acquired but not shipped before its effective date.
(ii) Whether the earlier free-export policy or export tenders created a legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel against the policy change.
(iii) Whether the notification is arbitrary or imposes an unreasonable restriction on trade for want of a separate grace period.
(iv) Whether Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 is invalid for confining transitional protection to exporters holding an Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit.
(v) Whether the licensing authority may indefinitely defer a restricted-export authorisation application pending policy review.

Issue (i): Whether the notification retrospectively impaired a vested right to export stock acquired but not shipped before its effective date.

Analysis: Sections 3 and 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 and Paragraphs 1.05(b) and 2.01 of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 make the policy prevailing on the date of export applicable prospectively. Procurement, payment, storage at port, or possession of stock, without shipping bills, loading, or final export clearances before the effective date, does not create an accrued right to export under the earlier policy.

Conclusion: The notification operates prospectively and does not impair a vested right to export unshipped stock.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier free-export policy or export tenders created a legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel against the policy change.

Analysis: A free classification under the policy is not a clear governmental assurance that the classification will remain unchanged. The statutory framework permits policy amendment in public interest, and export tenders issued by a State undertaking do not amount to an assurance by the Union that export policy will not change. The strategic-resource and national-security rationale supplies an overriding public-interest basis for the regulatory change.

Conclusion: Neither legitimate expectation nor promissory estoppel restrains the policy change.

Issue (iii): Whether the notification is arbitrary or imposes an unreasonable restriction on trade for want of a separate grace period.

Analysis: A general export-policy notification issued under Sections 3 and 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 need not record its reasons on its face where a rational basis exists. Conservation of depleted strategic mineral reserves, national security, and resource planning provide such a basis. The measure regulates exports through licensing rather than imposing an absolute prohibition, and Paragraph 1.05(b) already supplies a defined transition mechanism. Judicial deference is warranted in economic and strategic policy, and the licensing regime bears a rational and proportionate connection to the public-interest objective under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The notification is valid, non-arbitrary, and constitutes a reasonable restriction on trade.

Issue (iv): Whether Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 is invalid for confining transitional protection to exporters holding an Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit.

Analysis: Paragraph 1.05(b) creates a limited exception to the ordinary rule that the policy on the export date governs. An Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit is bank-backed, objectively verifiable, and not readily alterable or cancellable, unlike private purchase orders or other payment arrangements. This provides an intelligible basis for distinguishing qualifying commitments from other commercial arrangements and bears a rational nexus to preventing unverifiable claims for transition. The absence of an Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit on the effective date determines eligibility; no exporter is required to anticipate a future regulatory change.

Conclusion: Paragraph 1.05(b) is constitutionally valid, and exporters without a valid Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit on the effective date are not entitled to its transitional protection.

Issue (v): Whether the licensing authority may indefinitely defer a restricted-export authorisation application pending policy review.

Analysis: Section 3(2) of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 permits export restrictions, but an open-ended freeze on all licensing applications would convert the chosen licensing regime into a prohibition in practice. A restricted-export authorisation application must receive timely, individual, and reasoned consideration after a personal hearing, with due regard to the pre-existing procurement, economic hardship, absence of an alternative domestic market, shipping disruption, and national-security considerations.

Conclusion: The licensing authority cannot indefinitely defer the restricted-export authorisation application solely because a policy review is pending and must decide it by a reasoned order after hearing the applicants.

Final Conclusion: The restrictive export regime and its Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit-based transitional framework remain operative, while the statutory licensing mechanism must be exercised through timely, individual, reasoned consideration.

Ratio Decidendi: A prospective export-policy restriction validly governs unshipped goods, and a transitional exception confined to objectively verifiable irrevocable commitments satisfies reasonable-classification requirements.

Issues: Whether alleged inclusion in one unit's assessment of turnover already taxed in another separately registered unit constitutes a rectifiable mistake.

Analysis: Section 161 permits correction of a mistake where overlapping turnover has resulted in the same turnover being subjected to tax more than once. The departmental records relating to separately registered units must be examined holistically to verify the claimed overlap and ensure that turnover is taxed only once. The alleged overlap requires factual verification through the assessee's computation and the records of both units.

Conclusion: If established, double taxation of the same turnover is a rectifiable mistake. The impugned decision was set aside solely for fresh examination and reworking of turnover on the alleged overlap.

Issues: Whether the impugned order could confirm tax proposals for GSTR-1/GSTR-3B reconciliation and excess input tax credit that had already been dealt with in an earlier order under appeal.

Analysis: Legal framework: a later tax adjudication cannot sustain duplicative confirmation of the same tax proposals already determined by an earlier order that is pending in appeal. Comparison of the orders showed complete overlap in respect of the proposals concerning reconciliation of GSTR-1 with GSTR-3B and excess input tax credit claimed in GSTR-3B vis-a -vis auto-populated GSTR-2A.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed insofar as it confirmed the duplicated proposals relating to GSTR reconciliation and excess input tax credit.