Issues: (i) Whether an e-way bill was mandatory for an intra-city stock transfer of goods exceeding the prescribed consignment value; (ii) Whether an internal transfer between the assessee's own godown and showroom constituted a taxable supply so as to sustain penalty under Section 129; (iii) Whether the absence of an e-way bill established deliberate intent to evade tax or clandestine removal warranting penalty under Section 129.

Issue (i): Whether an e-way bill was mandatory for an intra-city stock transfer of goods exceeding the prescribed consignment value.

Analysis: Rule 138 applies to movement of goods exceeding the prescribed value even where the movement is for reasons other than supply. A consignor using its own conveyance must generate the e-way bill and the person in charge must carry it along with the underlying document. Although a delivery challan may be issued for movement otherwise than by way of supply under Rule 55, it does not displace the e-way bill requirement. The limited distance-based relaxations concern conveyance details or weighbridge movements and do not exempt generation of the e-way bill for the transfer in question.

Conclusion: An e-way bill was mandatory for the stock transfer; carrying a delivery challan alone constituted a technical procedural breach. This finding is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an internal transfer between the assessee's own godown and showroom constituted a taxable supply so as to sustain penalty under Section 129.

Analysis: The movement was an undisputed transfer of tax-paid vehicles between the assessee's own premises, involving neither a second person nor consideration. It was therefore not a supply under Section 7 and did not attract the charging provision in Section 9. Since no tax was payable on the goods at the stage of this internal stock transfer, the penalty mechanism under Section 129, quantified by reference to tax payable, could not be invoked.

Conclusion: The internal stock transfer was not a taxable supply and did not attract penalty under Section 129. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the absence of an e-way bill established deliberate intent to evade tax or clandestine removal warranting penalty under Section 129.

Analysis: The vehicles were identifiable by engine and chassis numbers and could not practically be sold without statutory registration, insurance and supporting documentation. They had already been purchased against tax-paid invoices and remained fully traceable. The failure to generate an e-way bill resulted from a bona fide misunderstanding of the distance-related provisions, not an attempt to conceal a taxable transaction. The absence of tax liability in a stock transfer also afforded no basis to infer tax evasion or clandestine removal.

Conclusion: No mens rea, deliberate intent to evade tax, or clandestine removal was established; the Section 129 penalty was consequently unsustainable. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The continuing obligation to generate an e-way bill for stock transfers does not justify a Section 129 penalty where the movement is not a taxable supply, no tax is payable, and no intent to evade tax is proved.

Ratio Decidendi: A technical failure to carry an e-way bill during an internal stock transfer cannot sustain a Section 129 penalty where the transfer is not a taxable supply, no tax is payable, and the facts disclose no intent to evade tax.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitions were maintainable despite the earlier dismissal of a co-accused's writ petition; (ii) Whether the order assigning the company's investigation to the SFIO under Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 was legally sustainable, and the effect on consequential proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the petitions were maintainable despite the earlier dismissal of a co-accused's writ petition.

Analysis: The earlier writ petition had been dismissed as premature, without adjudication on merits, and with liberty to avail remedies at the appropriate stage. The present petitions had already been instituted and were protected by an interim order. The earlier dismissal therefore did not attract res judicata or bar scrutiny after the investigation report and prosecution complaint had been filed.

Conclusion: The petitions were maintainable, in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the order assigning the company's investigation to the SFIO under Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 was legally sustainable, and the effect on consequential proceedings.

Analysis: Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 requires formation of an opinion that investigation by the SFIO is necessary in public interest. Though the formation of opinion involves subjective satisfaction, it must rest on objective consideration of cogent and relevant material. The relevant circumstances, application of mind, and reasons warranting both investigation and assignment to the SFIO must be demonstrable from a speaking, reasoned order and remain subject to judicial review.

Analysis: The assignment order merely reproduced the statutory power and disclosed neither the material considered nor reasons establishing the necessity for an SFIO investigation. The statutory inspection and supplementary reports under Sections 206(5) and 208 of the Companies Act, 2013 disclosed only compoundable regulatory irregularities and did not find fraud, diversion, siphoning, defalcation, or misappropriation of funds. The additional material noted in the Oversight Committee minutes, including complaints, a bank monitoring report, a parliamentary communication, and a media report, did not independently furnish a relevant and sufficient basis for the statutory opinion. Subsequent minutes, affidavits, or investigation reports could not cure the defect through supplementation of reasons.

Conclusion: The assignment order was invalid for non-application of mind and absence of demonstrable relevant circumstances; the order and all proceedings consequential to it were quashed, in favour of the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The SFIO investigation and prosecution lacked a valid statutory foundation because the mandatory jurisdictional conditions for invoking Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 were not satisfied.

Ratio Decidendi: An SFIO investigation under Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 is valid only where the assignment order itself discloses demonstrable relevant circumstances, independent application of mind, and reasons establishing the necessity of investigation by the SFIO; subsequent material cannot validate an unreasoned foundational order.

Issues: (i) Whether the payment made under the failed share-purchase arrangement constituted a financial debt, making the Appellant a financial creditor; (ii) Whether clerical errors in the impugned order justified appellate interference.

Issue (i): Whether the payment made under the failed share-purchase arrangement constituted a financial debt, making the Appellant a financial creditor.

Analysis: Section 7 requires proof of a financial debt and default. Under Section 5(8), a financial debt must arise from a disbursement against consideration for the time value of money. The tripartite MOU showed that the payment formed part of the consideration for acquisition of shares and discharge of the corporate debtor's liabilities; it contained no repayment obligation or return for use of money. The alleged subsequent oral conversion into an interest-bearing loan lacked proof of its making, authorised representatives, or mutually accepted terms.

Analysis: Subsequent balance-sheet classification, balance confirmations, interest entries and tax deduction under Section 194A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could at most evidence accounting treatment or acknowledgment of an amount. They could not alter the original character of the payment or independently establish disbursement for time value of money. The absence of any actual interest payment further supported the conclusion that the payment was not lent for a return. The disputed oral arrangement could not be adjudicated in the summary jurisdiction under Section 7.

Conclusion: The payment was not a financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the Appellant was not a financial creditor in respect of it. This issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether clerical errors in the impugned order justified appellate interference.

Analysis: The incorrect recording of counsel appearances and attribution of written submissions were errors of description. The pleadings, documents and submissions of both sides were independently assessed, and no resulting prejudice was established.

Conclusion: The clerical errors did not warrant interference with the decision on merits. This issue was decided against the Appellant.

Final Conclusion: Recovery of the amount paid, if otherwise legally available, must be pursued before the appropriate forum and cannot be sought through the corporate insolvency process.

Ratio Decidendi: A payment made as consideration under a share-purchase arrangement does not become a financial debt merely because it is later recorded as an unsecured loan and attracts interest or tax-deduction entries; disbursement for the time value of money must be independently established.

Issues: (i) Whether the retrospective exclusion of cement manufacturing and grinding units from net SGST reimbursement under Clause 5.4.5(a) of IPR 2015 was valid; (ii) Whether the application for provisional Priority Sector status stood deemed approved under Section 11 of the Orissa Industries (Facilitation) Act, 2004 and the applicable guidelines; and (iii) Whether the Negative List precluded Priority Sector status and consequential SGST reimbursement.

Issue (i): Whether the retrospective exclusion of cement manufacturing and grinding units from net SGST reimbursement under Clause 5.4.5(a) of IPR 2015 was valid.

Analysis: The Industrial Policy Resolution, 2015 permitted review or modification of incentives, but that power did not by itself authorise deprivation of an incentive for a period preceding the amendment. The industrial project had progressed through approvals, investment, application for Priority Sector status and commencement of production under the existing policy. Financial implications could justify a prospective policy revision, but did not establish overriding public interest or a sufficient basis for retrospectively withdrawing accrued fiscal rights. The selective retrospective exclusion of cement and specified units was arbitrary and attracted the doctrines of Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation.

Conclusion: The retrospective exclusion from net SGST reimbursement with effect from 1 July 2017 was arbitrary, unconstitutional and unenforceable against the assessee for the period before the Resolution dated 18 August 2020; the policy change could operate only prospectively.

Issue (ii): Whether the application for provisional Priority Sector status stood deemed approved under Section 11 of the Orissa Industries (Facilitation) Act, 2004 and the applicable guidelines.

Analysis: Section 11 of the Orissa Industries (Facilitation) Act, 2004, read with Clause 4.2 of the Industrial Policy Resolution, 2015 and the time-bound Operational Guidelines, attaches a deemed-approval consequence where a covered application is not decided within the prescribed period. The application was acknowledged, inspected, verified and forwarded by the Regional Industries Centre to the competent authority, but no rejection was communicated within time. A later request for documents while the application remained pending could not defeat the statutory consequence, since otherwise deemed approval could be nullified by indefinitely withholding a formal certificate.

Conclusion: The application for provisional Priority Sector status stood deemed approved under Section 11 of the Orissa Industries (Facilitation) Act, 2004 and the applicable guidelines, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the Negative List precluded Priority Sector status and consequential SGST reimbursement.

Analysis: Serial No. 36 of the Negative List applies to specified size-reducing, separating, grinding and mixing units having plant-and-machinery investment below the prescribed threshold, while excepting manufacture of cement with clinker. The material showed investment above that threshold and a manufacturing process involving clinker. The verification report also recorded that the unit did not fall within the Negative List. No sufficient basis was established to disregard that verification or categorically apply the exclusion.

Conclusion: The Negative List objection does not preclude Priority Sector status or consideration of SGST reimbursement, subject to verification of the reimbursement amount and compliance with the remaining conditions of IPR 2015, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Eligible net SGST reimbursement, together with applicable interest, must be determined and released under IPR 2015 without reopening deemed provisional status or relying on the retrospective exclusion.

Ratio Decidendi: A State may prospectively modify an industrial incentive policy, but cannot retrospectively withdraw an accrued fiscal incentive from an industrial unit that has acted on the policy representation without demonstrated overriding public interest; statutory deemed approval cannot be defeated by administrative inaction in issuing formal clearance.

Issues: Whether assessment and recovery proceedings could stand where notices were uploaded only in the Additional Notices and Orders section of the GST portal, depriving the petitioner of notice and an opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: Notices and the order were not placed in the designated "View Notices and Orders" window of the GST portal, but in the Additional Notices and Orders section. This placement did not afford the petitioner effective notice or an opportunity to respond. The requirement of a fair hearing under the principles of natural justice was therefore not satisfied.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment and consequential recovery proceedings were quashed, with the matter to be adjudicated afresh after permitting the petitioner to file a reply. The issue of limitation of the show-cause notice was left open for determination by the adjudicating authority.

Issues: (i) Whether deferred ITC relating to FY 2017-18 could be claimed in GSTR-3B filed in FY 2019-20?; (ii) Whether ITC on banking services availed in FY 2019-20 was blocked under Section 17(5)?

Issue (i): Whether deferred ITC relating to FY 2017-18 could be claimed in GSTR-3B filed in FY 2019-20?

Analysis: Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 retrospectively permits ITC relating to FY 2017-18 through FY 2020-21 to be taken in a return under Section 39 filed up to 30 November 2021, notwithstanding the limitation under Section 16(4). The deferred credit was supported by disclosed returns, verifiable accounts, tax invoices and payment evidence. A mismatch between GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B is a reconciliation discrepancy and cannot, by itself, justify reversal where the underlying supply and tax payment are verifiable.

Conclusion: The deferred ITC was validly claimable in FY 2019-20; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether ITC on banking services availed in FY 2019-20 was blocked under Section 17(5)?

Analysis: Section 17(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 restricts credit only for the specified categories of goods and services. Banking services used in furtherance of business did not fall within any blocked-credit category.

Conclusion: ITC on the banking services was admissible; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deferred ITC and the ITC on banking services remain allowable, and the related tax demand, interest and penalty do not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the conditions of Section 16(5) are met and the ITC claim is substantiated, credit cannot be denied merely because it was claimed in a later return or does not correspond with GSTR-2A.

Issues: Whether refund of IGST paid twice on export supplies could be denied because the initial payment was reported in the wrong table of the GSTR-3B return and the second payment was subsequently refunded through the Customs automated system.

Analysis: The export turnover and IGST liability were correctly disclosed in the GSTR-1 returns, but the original IGST payments were entered against non-zero-rated supplies instead of zero-rated supplies in the relevant GSTR-3B returns. This mismatch prevented automated processing of the export refund. The assessee consequently paid the same IGST again in a later return, upon which the Customs system processed refund of that later payment. The records established that the original IGST payments remained unrefunded and constituted excess payment. Retention of tax paid twice, despite absence of any contrary evidence from Revenue, would offend Article 265 of the Constitution of India. A clerical reporting error and procedural infraction could not justify withholding tax not legally due.

Conclusion: The excess IGST paid on the exports was refundable and could not be denied on account of the clerical error in the GSTR-3B returns. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether input tax credit on joinery, carpentry and painting services used for furnishing rented retail shops is barred by Section 17(5)(d) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The services were used to install wooden and glass shelves for storage and display of taxable goods at registered retail premises and bore a direct nexus with the furtherance of business, satisfying Section 16(1). A challenge to the supplier's classification of services could not be introduced at the credit-recipient stage when no such dispute was raised in the show-cause notice. Although construction includes renovation, additions and alterations under Explanation 1 to Section 17(5), the restriction applies only to the extent of capitalisation of the tax component. The chartered accountant's certificate established that the CGST and SGST components were separately accounted for as input tax credit, were not added to the cost of fixed assets, and were not subjected to depreciation.

Conclusion: Input tax credit on the four invoices is admissible; the CGST and SGST components are not barred by Section 17(5)(d) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: Whether input tax credit could be disallowed merely because the supplier was alleged to be bogus and the actual movement and receipt of goods were disputed.

Analysis: Eligibility for input tax credit had to be determined from the statutory conditions and the evidence concerning the recipient's transactions, rather than solely from allegations against the supplier. Purchase orders, tax invoices, e-way bills, banking-payment records, books of account, stock registers, consignment documents, vehicle particulars, supplier returns, and tax-payment records supported actual purchase, transportation, and receipt of goods. The supplier's registration had also been restored, and the departmental authority had been given an opportunity to examine the documents and submitted its report; consequently, no breach of principles of natural justice was established.

Conclusion: Input tax credit was rightly allowed; the allegation that the supplier was bogus did not warrant disallowance on the evidence available. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether proceedings for confiscation and penalty under Section 130(2) read with Section 122 are sustainable where excess or unaccounted goods are found during a survey of business premises, instead of proceedings for tax determination under Sections 73 and 74.

Analysis: Section 35(1) requires maintenance of true and correct accounts. Under Section 35(6), where goods or services are unaccounted, the tax payable is to be determined by treating them as supplied, with Sections 73 and 74 applying for such determination. This statutory scheme governs excess or unaccounted stock found during survey and does not permit direct invocation of confiscation provisions.

Conclusion: The question is answered in the negative. On discovery of excess or unaccounted stock at business premises, proceedings under Section 130(2) read with Section 122 are unsustainable; the liability must be determined under Sections 73 and 74.

Issues: (i) Whether the departmental appeal was maintainable despite the prescribed monetary threshold where it involved a recurring question concerning eligibility for input tax credit; (ii) Whether input tax credit could be sustained without a reasoned verification of actual movement and receipt of goods where the supplier's genuineness was disputed.

Issue (i): Whether the departmental appeal was maintainable despite the prescribed monetary threshold where it involved a recurring question concerning eligibility for input tax credit.

Analysis: The monetary-limit circular permits examination of matters involving recurring issues of interpretation. The dispute raised a recurring question regarding the recipient's obligation to establish actual receipt of goods for claiming input tax credit, and the requisite departmental approval for pursuing the appeal was available.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was maintainable notwithstanding the monetary threshold.

Issue (ii): Whether input tax credit could be sustained without a reasoned verification of actual movement and receipt of goods where the supplier's genuineness was disputed.

Analysis: Eligibility for input tax credit depends on cumulative compliance with the statutory conditions, including actual receipt of goods and payment of tax. The burden to establish eligibility lies on the claimant. An active registration, invoices, portal entries and banking payments may be relevant evidence, but do not by themselves conclusively prove actual receipt of goods when the genuineness of the supply is disputed. Equally, the supplier's later non-availability at its declared premises does not conclusively establish that no supply occurred during the transaction period. The evidence concerning invoices, e-way bills, transport records and other material required proper verification and a reasoned evaluation, which was absent from the orders below.

Conclusion: The prior orders could not stand without specific and reasoned findings on the actual movement and receipt of goods. The input tax credit claim requires fresh adjudication after verification of the relevant documentary evidence and an effective opportunity to the claimant.

Final Conclusion: Entitlement to input tax credit must be determined on the cumulative statutory requirements and the verified evidence of genuine supply, rather than solely on supplier registration status, invoices, portal reflection or payment records.

Ratio Decidendi: A claimant of input tax credit bears the burden of proving actual receipt of goods and fulfilment of all statutory conditions; invoices, registration status and banking payments alone do not conclusively establish a genuine supply where the transaction is disputed.

Issues: Whether rejection of a delayed first appeal under the amnesty notification solely because the prescribed pre-deposit was debited from the electronic credit ledger instead of the electronic cash ledger, where a portal technical glitch was asserted, was legally sustainable.

Analysis: The amnesty notification enabled admission of delayed appeals subject to payment of the prescribed pre-deposit, including its stipulated cash component. The entire pre-deposit had been secured through the electronic credit ledger because of the asserted portal impediment. A taxpayer cannot be prejudiced by technical defects on the official portal. Misallocation or shortfall in the cash component of a pre-deposit is a curable procedural defect and does not defeat substantial compliance with the pre-deposit requirement. A reasonable opportunity must be afforded to cure the defect before denying the statutory appellate remedy.

Conclusion: Rejection of the first appeal as time-barred solely for debit from the electronic credit ledger was not legally sustainable. The portal glitch could not prejudice the statutory remedy of appeal, and the taxpayer was entitled to cure the prescribed cash-component shortfall and obtain adjudication of the first appeal on merits.

Issues: Whether hiring transit mixture machines for transportation of ready-mix concrete constituted supply of tangible goods service rather than goods transport agency service.

Analysis: Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994 applies where tangible goods are supplied for use without transfer of both possession and effective control. The relevant determination depends upon the contractual and operational control over the equipment. The transit mixture machines were supplied with the driver, maintenance and diesel remaining the supplier's responsibility, and no evidence of issuance of consignment notes or provision of goods transport agency service was produced.

Conclusion: The hiring receipts were taxable as supply of tangible goods service and not as goods transport agency service; the demand was rightly sustained, in favour of Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether the recipient's eligibility to avail Cenvat credit of service tax payable under reverse charge extinguishes its service-tax liability; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation and penalty under Section 78 were sustainable where tax payable under reverse charge would be creditable.

Issue (i): Whether the recipient's eligibility to avail Cenvat credit of service tax payable under reverse charge extinguishes its service-tax liability.

Analysis: Service-tax liability under reverse charge arises independently of the recipient's entitlement to Cenvat credit. Credit under Rule 3(1)(vii) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 becomes available only upon actual payment of tax, with payment being a condition precedent under Rules 4(7) and 9. Eligibility to subsequently avail credit is therefore not a basis to avoid the statutory tax liability.

Conclusion: Eligibility to avail Cenvat credit does not extinguish service-tax liability under reverse charge; the recipient remains liable to pay the tax. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation and penalty under Section 78 were sustainable where tax payable under reverse charge would be creditable.

Analysis: Where tax payable by a service recipient under reverse charge would be available to that recipient as Cenvat credit, the transaction is revenue neutral. In such circumstances, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked for recovery.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period is unsustainable and the penalty under Section 78 is set aside; demand for the normal period, if any, and penalty under Section 77 remain sustainable. In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Service-tax recovery survives only to the extent falling within the normal period, while the extended-period recovery and the penalty under Section 78 cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether service-tax demand for the extended period could be sustained solely on Form 26AS and income-tax-return data without corroborative evidence of taxable services; (ii) Whether service-tax liability for 2017-18 could be confirmed through proportionate allocation of annual income without supporting data and without such basis being proposed in the show-cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether service-tax demand for the extended period could be sustained solely on Form 26AS and income-tax-return data without corroborative evidence of taxable services.

Analysis: Service-tax liability must rest on evidence establishing the rendition and value of taxable services. Form 26AS and income-tax-return information, being third-party tax data, do not by themselves establish taxable turnover. The appellant was registered and regularly filed service-tax returns; the demand was raised solely from mismatch with income-tax data, without independent verification or corroborative evidence. Such material could not sustain invocation of the extended period.

Conclusion: The extended-period demand of Rs.12,32,030 was set aside in favour of the assessee. Service tax, if any, for the normal period remains payable with interest after proper quantification.

Issue (ii): Whether service-tax liability for 2017-18 could be confirmed through proportionate allocation of annual income without supporting data and without such basis being proposed in the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The liability for the first three months was computed by proportionately allocating annual data despite the absence of data supporting that period. This computational method was not proposed in the show-cause notice, and a demand could not be confirmed on that unproposed basis.

Conclusion: The service-tax demand of Rs.2,01,232 for 2017-18 was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Third-party income-tax data alone cannot found an extended-period service-tax demand, and liability cannot be sustained through a method of computation not proposed in the show-cause notice.

Ratio Decidendi: A service-tax demand founded solely on Form 26AS or income-tax data requires independent corroborative evidence of taxable services and cannot sustain invocation of the extended period of limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether a temporary trustee could validly gift temple inam land to the Government and whether registration of that gift was legally effective; (ii) Whether the Government could continue as lessee of the temple land and the appropriate fair lease rent.

Issue (i): Whether a temporary trustee could validly gift temple inam land to the Government and whether registration of that gift was legally effective.

Analysis: The subject land was an inam granted for the deity's support and maintenance. Section 34(5) excluded such inams from Section 34, making Section 41 applicable. Section 41(1) declares a gift of such inam land null and void and permits governmental sanction for specified transactions other than a gift; therefore, a gift could not be validated by sanction. Section 22-A(1)(ii) of the Registration Act, 1908 also precluded registration of a transfer of religious-institution property without the requisite statutory sanction. Sections 23, 27 and 28 impose statutory custodianship upon the State and a fiduciary duty upon trustees, requiring administration under the prudent person standard for the institution's benefit. A gratuitous transfer of temple property is inconsistent with those obligations, and registration cannot validate a transaction declared void by the governing enactment.

Conclusion: The gift deed was void ab initio, its registration had no legal effect, and the subject land remained vested in the Temple.

Issue (ii): Whether the Government could continue as lessee of the temple land and the appropriate fair lease rent.

Analysis: Although the Government had constructed and was operating a Taluk Office on the land, its occupation could continue only as a lease from the Temple. Section 34-A requires fair rent determination with reference to prevailing market rental value. Applying the prescribed committee formula, including 225% of the guideline or market value under the applicable Government Order and the depreciated value of the building, produced a monthly rent of Rs. 31,000. Lease renewal and all future terms remain subject to a fresh determination in the best interests of the trust.

Conclusion: The Government may continue only as lessee, with monthly rent fixed at Rs. 31,000 from 08.03.2019, subject to triennial refixation and lease terms determined by the Temple for its benefit.

Final Conclusion: The Temple's ownership and control over its inam property were preserved; the State's occupation was confined to a compensatory leasehold arrangement, with arrears payable to the Temple and mandatory compliance with the statutory safeguards governing religious endowment property.

Ratio Decidendi: A gift of inam property dedicated to a religious institution is void where the governing statute expressly prohibits gifts and permits no sanction for them; registration cannot cure the statutory invalidity, and the State as statutory custodian cannot acquire such property gratuitously.

Issues: (i) Whether a bail order obtained without disclosure of parallel proceedings and refusals of release may remain final; (ii) Whether a direction to list a petition "two weeks hence" requires vacation to be excluded where the two-week period expires during court vacation.

Issue (i): Whether a bail order obtained without disclosure of parallel proceedings and refusals of release may remain final.

Analysis: While the prosecuting authority was not wholly unrepresented at the bail hearing, its standing counsel could not appear and material facts were not placed before the High Court. The accused pursued successive and parallel remedies for bail or release before the Sessions Court, the High Court and the writ court, without disclosing the rejection of bail and refusal of ad-interim release when seeking urgent listing of the pending bail petition. This conduct amounted to forum shopping, suppression of material facts and abuse of process, defeating the uberrima fides required for discretionary bail.

Conclusion: The final disposal of the bail petition was set aside and the petition was revived for fresh consideration on merits; the accused shall remain on interim bail on the earlier terms pending further orders.

Issue (ii): Whether a direction to list a petition "two weeks hence" requires vacation to be excluded where the two-week period expires during court vacation.

Analysis: A general direction for listing after two weeks does not ordinarily require vacation listing where the expiry falls during a court vacation, unless the matter is made returnable on a specific vacation date or listing before the Vacation Bench is directed.

Conclusion: The two-week period should ordinarily be computed excluding the vacation period, subject to the applicable High Court rules.

Final Conclusion: The bail application requires a fresh and fully informed determination after completion of pleadings, while the stated approach to vacation listing is to be applied ordinarily.

Ratio Decidendi: A litigant seeking discretionary bail must disclose all parallel proceedings and material orders; suppression of such facts constitutes abuse of process warranting reconsideration of the bail determination.

Issues: (i) Whether transitional credit of CVD and additional duty on capital goods received after 1 July 2017 was admissible under Section 140(2); (ii) Whether central excise duty paid on goods cleared before GST but exported after 1 July 2017 was eligible for transitional credit; (iii) Whether interest was payable on inadmissible transitional credit; and (iv) Whether penalty for wrongful availment of the inadmissible credit was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether transitional credit of CVD and additional duty on capital goods received after 1 July 2017 was admissible under Section 140(2).

Analysis: Section 140(2) permits transition of unavailed CENVAT credit on capital goods that was not carried forward under the existing law, provided the credit was admissible under both the existing and GST regimes. Neither the provision nor Rule 117(2)(a) requires that credit must have been partly availed before the appointed day or restricts transition to fifty per cent of the eligible credit. The prescribed TRAN-1 particulars were furnished and the capital-goods credit fulfilled the statutory conditions.

Conclusion: The transitional credit of Rs. 2,90,845 is admissible under Section 140(2), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether central excise duty paid on goods cleared before GST but exported after 1 July 2017 was eligible for transitional credit.

Analysis: Table 7(a) concerns credit relating to inputs under specified categories of Section 140 and does not provide a residual route for transitioning central excise duty paid on goods cleared for export before GST. No provision of Section 140 authorises such duty to be converted into GST input tax credit. Section 174(2)(c) does not preserve a right to transitional credit where no such right had accrued under the existing law or the GST transitional framework.

Conclusion: The transitional credit of Rs. 6,99,004 is not admissible, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest was payable on inadmissible transitional credit.

Analysis: Interest follows the recoverability of wrongly availed input tax credit. Since the export-related transitional credit was inadmissible, interest is consequentially chargeable on that amount.

Conclusion: Interest is payable only on the inadmissible transitional credit, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty for wrongful availment of the inadmissible credit was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 73 applies to wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax credit in cases other than fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression. Upon determination of the inadmissible credit, Section 73(9) requires penalty at ten per cent of the tax determined; disclosure in TRAN-1 does not displace that consequence.

Conclusion: Penalty is sustainable at Rs. 69,900, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional framework preserves eligible unavailed capital-goods credit, but does not authorise conversion of central excise duty paid on pre-GST export clearances into GST credit.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 140(2) permits transition of eligible unavailed capital-goods credit not carried forward under the existing law, but transitional credit cannot be claimed where the statute provides no enabling category for the duty concerned.

Issues: (i) Validity of the appellate order for want of a reasoned determination of the appellant's submissions; (ii) Whether a notice under section 73 can be sustained where ineligible input tax credit is fully offset by excess output tax paid; (iii) Whether refund of excess output tax paid is subject to unjust enrichment; (iv) Sustainability of the sales-return demand where the adjudicating authority relied on a ground not stated in the show cause notice and credit/debit notes were not uploaded on the GST portal; (v) Sustainability of interest demand for delayed returns where the show cause notice lacked particulars and the quantified demand was unexplained.

Issue (i): Validity of the appellate order for want of a reasoned determination of the appellant's submissions.

Analysis: The appellate order rejected extensive submissions concerning tax set-off, credit/debit notes and delayed-return interest through a bare one-line observation. It did not address the material contentions or disclose any reasoned basis for confirming the demand. This failed the speaking-order requirement and breached the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The appellate order was invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a notice under section 73 can be sustained where ineligible input tax credit is fully offset by excess output tax paid.

Analysis: The excess output tax payment was undisputed and exceeded the disputed ineligible input tax credit. Section 73 is attracted only where tax remains unpaid or short paid, or credit is wrongly availed or utilised. Requiring payment of the disputed amount followed by a separate refund claim, despite an admitted excess payment, would defeat the permissible set-off of tax liability and produce no revenue loss.

Conclusion: No notice under section 73 lay where the admitted excess output tax payment fully offset the ineligible input tax credit; the related tax, interest and penalty demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether refund of excess output tax paid is subject to unjust enrichment.

Analysis: Excess output tax paid over the tax actually due was found to fall within the exception in section 54(8)(c). Accordingly, the statutory basis asserted for applying the test of unjust enrichment was unavailable.

Conclusion: Refund of excess output tax paid was not subject to the test of unjust enrichment, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Sustainability of the sales-return demand where the adjudicating authority relied on a ground not stated in the show cause notice and credit/debit notes were not uploaded on the GST portal.

Analysis: The show cause notice alleged absence of supporting documents, whereas the adjudication order confirmed the demand because the counterparty had not declared a debit note in its returns. The adjudication thereby travelled beyond the scope of the show cause notice. Further, for the disputed 2017-18 period, GSTR-2A was a reconciliation facility and portal declaration of the credit/debit notes was not mandatory; documents otherwise in order could not be invalidated merely for non-uploading.

Conclusion: The sales-return demand and consequential tax, interest and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Sustainability of interest demand for delayed returns where the show cause notice lacked particulars and the quantified demand was unexplained.

Analysis: The show cause notice did not identify the defaulting months, tax amounts, or period for which interest was claimed. Its stated interest amount also materially differed from the amount in the adjudication order without any disclosed basis. The demand lacked the specificity required by the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The interest demand for delayed filing of returns was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The asserted liabilities for tax, interest and penalty lacked legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 73 cannot be invoked where an admitted excess output tax payment fully offsets the disputed ineligible input tax credit and no net short payment of tax remains.

Issues: (i) Whether alleged excess input tax credit was sustainable when the updated GSTR-2A reconciliation, including import IGST credit, disclosed a surplus aggregate credit and IGST could offset CGST/SGST shortfalls; (ii) Whether the adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by denial of a personal hearing and failure to address the taxpayer's contentions.

Issue (i): Whether alleged excess input tax credit was sustainable when the updated GSTR-2A reconciliation, including import IGST credit, disclosed a surplus aggregate credit and IGST could offset CGST/SGST shortfalls.

Analysis: The reconciliation based on the latest GSTR-2A figures and IGST paid on imports was unrebutted and showed aggregate eligible credit exceeding the credit claimed. Section 49(5)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Kerala State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits surplus IGST credit, after payment of IGST liability, to be utilised towards CGST and SGST liabilities. The Fungibility of Input Tax Credit principle treats the electronic credit ledger as a unified resource for this purpose. Under Judicial Discipline, the applicable jurisdictional ruling on adjustment of IGST surplus against CGST/SGST shortfalls was required to be followed.

Conclusion: The alleged excess input tax credit was not sustainable; surplus IGST credit validly offset the CGST and SGST shortfalls, leaving no short payment of tax warranting proceedings under Section 73.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by denial of a personal hearing and failure to address the taxpayer's contentions.

Analysis: The original adjudication was passed without affording a Right to Personal Hearing and without considering the taxpayer's contentions. The appellate order mechanically affirmed the demand without analysing the contentions and evidence. Such adjudication breached the Principles of Natural Justice and the requirement of a Speaking Order.

Conclusion: The adjudication and first appellate orders were vitiated by breach of the Principles of Natural Justice and were null and void.

Final Conclusion: The alleged ITC mismatch had no factual or legal basis after complete reconciliation and permissible cross-utilisation of IGST credit, while the underlying proceedings were independently invalid for procedural unfairness.