Issues: (i) Whether refund of Rs. 1,23,35,198 could be denied because the tax was not paid during the claim quarter; (ii) Whether refund of Rs. 3,25,779 could be denied for want of service approval or Form A-1; (iii) Whether the refund of Rs. 48,82,536 was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether refund of Rs. 1,23,35,198 could be denied because the tax was not paid during the claim quarter.

Analysis: Notification No. 12/2013-ST permits only one refund claim per quarter but does not restrict that claim to tax paid in the same quarter. Amounts distributed by an input service distributor become available to the SEZ unit upon distribution. The reverse-charge payment stood on the same footing. Sections 26 and 51 of the Special Economic Zones Act protect the exemption against additional conditions not prescribed under SEZ law.

Conclusion: The refund could not be denied solely because the tax was paid outside the claim quarter, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund of Rs. 3,25,779 could be denied for want of service approval or Form A-1.

Analysis: The services appeared on the approved list, and their use for authorised operations was not disputed. The Form A-1 objection was outside the show cause notice. Rule 22 of the Special Economic Zones Rules does not prescribe that form as a condition of the exemption.

Conclusion: The refund could not be denied for want of service approval or Form A-1, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the refund of Rs. 48,82,536 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: For common services paid for by the head office, the SEZ unit's entitlement to the distributed amount arises upon issue of the input service distributor invoice. The notification's limitation provision could not be applied by starting time before the distributed amount became claimable.

Conclusion: The refund was not time-barred, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to Rs. 1,26,60,977 in refund with admissible interest, subject only to verification that no part has already been refunded.

Ratio Decidendi: Conditions in a service-tax notification cannot curtail an SEZ exemption by imposing requirements beyond those prescribed under SEZ law.

Issues: Whether target-based and non-target-based incentives and claims received by a vehicle dealer are liable to service tax.

Analysis: Under the Finance Act, 1994, a service involves an activity carried out for another for consideration and includes declared services, but excludes a mere transfer of title in goods. The adopted reasoning distinguishes transaction-specific consideration for services from incentives linked to overall trading performance. Trade and quantity discounts, including discounts credited after purchase or reimbursed after sale to customers, relate to principal-to-principal trading transactions rather than a separate service.

Conclusion: The incentives and claims are not liable to service tax. The demand, interest and penalties, including the employee's penalty, are set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Trade discounts and incentives linked to principal-to-principal purchases and sales of goods are not consideration for a taxable service merely because they are calculated or credited after the transaction.

Issues: (i) Whether common input-service credit was admissible at one unit despite the absence of input service distributor registration; (ii) whether the extended limitation period and consequential interest and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether common input-service credit was admissible at one unit despite the absence of input service distributor registration.

Analysis: The common services were received by units under the same ownership, the credit was supported by records, and there was no finding of excess or double availment. The applicable credit-distribution rule had to be assessed as it stood during the relevant period; a subsequently introduced proportionate-distribution restriction could not be applied retrospectively. The applicable distinction was between substantive eligibility and a procedural registration lapse. The prior reversal of part of the credit, without prejudice, was not an admission of liability.

Conclusion: The credit was admissible and its denial was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period and consequential interest and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: The entire demand fell outside the normal limitation period. Credit entries and invoices were available in the records, and the partial reversal had been communicated before the notice. Audit alone did not establish departmental knowledge of every entry, but invocation of the extended period required evidence of deliberate suppression or wilful misstatement; mere erroneous availment was insufficient.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable, the demand was time-barred, and the consequential interest and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The substantive credit remained admissible, and recovery was independently barred by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Absence of input service distributor registration does not by itself defeat otherwise eligible and verifiable CENVAT credit.

Issues: (i) Whether duty-free inputs remained exempt when the goods manufactured from them failed quality testing and were destroyed without export. (ii) Whether the duty demand was barred by limitation despite the executed bond. (iii) Whether a penalty was imposable for non-fulfilment of the exemption conditions.

Issue (i): Whether duty-free inputs remained exempt when the goods manufactured from them failed quality testing and were destroyed without export.

Analysis: The exemption notifications and the bond required duty-free inputs to be used for manufacture and export. The inputs were used in manufacture, but the finished goods failed quality testing and were destroyed without intimation to the authorities. Exemption notifications are to be construed strictly.

Conclusion: The exemption was unavailable, and the duty demand with interest was sustained against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the duty demand was barred by limitation despite the executed bond.

Analysis: The bond bound the assessee to pay duty and interest if the specified use and export conditions were not fulfilled. The obligation under the bond was continuing, and the normal limitation period did not apply to its enforcement.

Conclusion: The demand was not barred by limitation, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether a penalty was imposable for non-fulfilment of the exemption conditions.

Analysis: There was no element suggesting an intention to evade duty. The assessee had reversed the credit on duty-paid inputs with interest after the audit objection, and the exemption notifications required payment of duty and interest without mandating a penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The liability for duty and interest remains, but the penalty does not.

Ratio Decidendi: An export-oriented unit that fails to fulfil the export condition attached to duty-free inputs is liable under its bond for the duty foregone; enforcement of the continuing bond obligation is not barred by the normal limitation period.

Issues: (i) Whether an adjudication order is void merely because it was passed more than six months after notice; (ii) whether service tax on a factory-land lease premium qualifies for input service credit; (iii) whether admissible credit is recoverable because it was entered under another registration of the same person; and (iv) whether interest and penalty are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether an adjudication order is void merely because it was passed more than six months after notice.

Analysis: Section 73(4B) prescribes the six-month period where it is possible to comply, while requiring adjudication within a reasonable time. The reasonableness of the unexplained delay in this case was not determined.

Conclusion: The order was not void merely because it was passed after six months. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax on a factory-land lease premium qualifies for input service credit.

Analysis: Rule 2(l) retained its main definition covering services used directly or indirectly in relation to manufacture after the deletion of "setting up" from its inclusive part. Renting of immovable property was not excluded, and the leased land had a demonstrated nexus with manufacturing. Neither the absence of production when the credit was taken nor later factory registration defeated that nexus.

Conclusion: The lease service qualified as an input service. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether admissible credit is recoverable because it was entered under another registration of the same person.

Analysis: The lease lacked a nexus with the output services of the registration where it was recorded, but credit entitlement belonged to the same legal person as manufacturer. Input service distribution or entry at the factory was the proper course; the absence of distributor registration was a curable irregularity. Account balances remained sufficient to cover the lease credit until reversal, and limited deemed use under the then-applicable opening-balance rule did not make otherwise admissible cross-utilisation impermissible.

Conclusion: The credit was not recoverable merely because it was first entered under another registration of the same person. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether interest and penalty are sustainable.

Analysis: Rule 14 provided for interest where credit was both wrongly taken and utilised. The applicable penalty provisions required the prescribed notice or, under the earlier provisions, fraud, deliberate suppression or intent to evade. The credit was disclosed in a revised return, and no deliberate suppression or intent to evade was established. A penalty also cannot be based on a ground absent from the show cause notice.

Conclusion: Neither interest nor penalty was sustainable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The admissible lease credit was not lost through its initial accounting under another registration of the same person. It cannot be taken again or refunded at that registration; the validity of fresh availment at the factory remains unadjudicated.

Ratio Decidendi: Deletion of "setting up" from the inclusive definition of input service does not exclude a factory-land lease satisfying the manufacturing nexus, and admissible credit is not wrongly taken solely because it is recorded under another registration of the same legal person.

Issues: (i) Whether a State may levy a surcharge calculated on valid sales tax under the former Entry 54 of List II. (ii) Whether the larger-bench reference requires further adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether a State may levy a surcharge calculated on valid sales tax under the former Entry 54 of List II.

Analysis: Article 246 and the former Entry 54 of List II governed State legislative competence to tax sales or purchases of goods. The subject of a tax is distinct from the measure used to calculate it. A surcharge computed as a percentage of sales tax varies with taxable turnover, not the dealer's income; a prohibition on passing it to purchasers does not change that character. Binding precedent had addressed a materially similar levy.

Conclusion: The former Entry 54 permitted a surcharge calculated on valid sales tax as an enhancement of that tax.

Issue (ii): Whether the larger-bench reference requires further adjudication.

Analysis: A larger-bench reference serves to resolve a genuine uncertainty in binding law. The perceived conflict concerned decisions dealing with different levies and legislative fields. A subsequent larger-bench decision displaced the premise that royalty was a tax, while the governing sales-tax precedent remained authoritative. The constitutional and statutory transition also limited the question's prospective significance.

Conclusion: No. The reference has become academic.

Concurring Opinion: Justice K. V. Viswanathan separately concluded that the governing sales-tax precedent was correctly decided and required no reconsideration.

Final Conclusion: The settled principle governs the legislative-competence question; the individual matters remain pending for determination on their merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A surcharge calculated on valid sales tax retains the character of sales tax and falls within the same legislative taxing power.

Issues: (i) Whether a parent company is liable for its subsidiary's operational debt arising from a contract to which the parent was not a party. (ii) Whether the business transfer agreement and subsequent letter, part-payment and cheques transferred or acknowledged the subsidiary's debt as the parent company's operational debt.

Issue (i): Whether a parent company is liable for its subsidiary's operational debt arising from a contract to which the parent was not a party.

Analysis: A parent company and its subsidiary have separate corporate personalities. The underlying contract was signed by the subsidiary, and the record did not establish that the parent received the supplies giving rise to the claim.

Conclusion: No. The parent was not liable for the subsidiary's debt merely because of their corporate relationship. This issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the business transfer agreement and subsequent letter, part-payment and cheques transferred or acknowledged the subsidiary's debt as the parent company's operational debt.

Analysis: The business transfer agreement excluded liabilities arising before the closing date and addressed contracts not novated by that date. The debit note concerned supplies from the preceding period, and the subsequent letter described the amount as owed by the subsidiary. The parent had also made a part-payment and issued post-dated cheques. Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code cannot be substituted for recovery or adjudication of a disputed commercial claim.

Conclusion: No. The alleged operational debt was not established as due from the parent, and admission of the insolvency application could not be sustained. This issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The corporate debtor is released from the corporate insolvency resolution process and may function through its board of directors.

Ratio Decidendi: A parent company does not incur its subsidiary's operational debt merely through their corporate relationship, and a unilateral letter does not itself effect novation of the underlying contract.

Issues: Whether a direct appeal against a provisional attachment order is maintainable before the Appellate Tribunal.

Analysis: Under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, provisional attachment is subject to adjudication by the Adjudicating Authority, while the statutory appellate provision identifies the orders against which an appeal lies. The direction to treat the writ petition as an appeal required consideration in accordance with law, and the Tribunal could not exercise jurisdiction outside the statutory framework.

Conclusion: A direct appeal against the provisional attachment order is not maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: The Appellate Tribunal cannot entertain a direct appeal against a provisional attachment order where the statute does not confer such appellate jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether show cause notices issued after the omission of Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 had statutory backing.

Analysis: Rule 96(10) was omitted on 8 October 2024 without a saving clause. The applicable Supreme Court precedent establishes that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 does not apply to the omission of a rule and that proceedings under an omitted rule can continue only if preserved by an express provision or legal device.

Conclusion: The show cause notices issued after the omission lacked statutory backing and were non est.

Ratio Decidendi: An omitted rule cannot provide statutory authority for a show cause notice issued after its omission where no saving clause or other legal device preserves its operation.

Issues: (i) Whether the input tax credit demand for financial year 2018-19 could be based on section 16(2)(aa) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the demand could be confirmed under section 16(2)(c) on a ground not specified in the show cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether the input tax credit demand for financial year 2018-19 could be based on section 16(2)(aa) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The notice invoked section 16(2)(aa), which took effect on 1 January 2022, after the financial year concerned.

Conclusion: The demand could not be based on that provision for financial year 2018-19. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand could be confirmed under section 16(2)(c) on a ground not specified in the show cause notice.

Analysis: Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of a demand on grounds other than those specified in the notice. The notice alleged non-filing of supplier returns, while the adjudication introduced the distinct charge of non-payment of tax by suppliers without putting it to the assessee. This was not merely an omission to identify a statutory sub-clause and deprived the assessee of notice of the charge.

Conclusion: The demand could not be confirmed on the new ground. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The challenged input tax credit demand and its associated interest and penalty do not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A tax demand cannot be confirmed on a distinct ground not specified in the show cause notice and not put to the noticee.

Issues: (i) Whether confiscation of the gold bullion and jewellery was justified on the basis that they were smuggled or made from smuggled gold; (ii) whether the seized currency was liable to confiscation as sale proceeds of smuggled goods.

Issue (i): Whether confiscation of the gold bullion and jewellery was justified on the basis that they were smuggled or made from smuggled gold.

Analysis: Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 places the burden of proving that seized gold and its manufactures are not smuggled on the possessor where seizure is made on reasonable belief. The valuation did not identify the purity or number of individual bullion pieces, and the SAM-marked cut piece had no recorded purity or biscuit number. Invoices, stock records and supplier statements supported local sourcing, while the department did not adequately investigate or rebut that evidence. Other bullion bore Indian marks, and comparable stock at the business premises was not seized.

Conclusion: Confiscation of the bullion and jewellery was not justified. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the seized currency was liable to confiscation as sale proceeds of smuggled goods.

Analysis: Section 121 of the Customs Act, 1962 concerns confiscation of sale proceeds of smuggled goods. The record contained no evidence linking the currency to smuggled gold; concealment of cash alone did not establish such a link.

Conclusion: The currency was not liable to confiscation as sale proceeds of smuggled goods. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The findings support consequential relief in respect of the seized gold, currency and penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: In an inland seizure of gold, credible evidence of lawful local acquisition may shift the evidential burden to the customs authorities to establish smuggled origin.

Issues: Whether the appeal was correctly dismissed for non-payment of the required pre-deposit.

Outcome: The dismissal was set aside and the matter remitted for verification of the deposit. No final finding was made on whether the deposit had been paid.

Issues: (i) Whether the service tax demand could be sustained on unverified third-party income-tax data. (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation was available for the demand.

Issue (i): Whether the service tax demand could be sustained on unverified third-party income-tax data.

Analysis: The demand was based on income-tax data without investigation or verification of the receipts. The Department had not used its powers to obtain information from the assessee or inspect the premises.

Conclusion: The demand is unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation was available for the demand.

Analysis: The extended period requires the statutory ingredients of suppression or misstatement. The figures were drawn from income-tax returns and accounts treated as public documents, and no evidence of mala fide non-payment was identified.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable and the demand was time-barred, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed tax, interest and penalties no longer survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A service tax demand cannot rest solely on third-party income-tax data without verification or investigation of the receipts.

Issues: Whether an appeal concerning the taxability of services on a reverse charge basis was maintainable before the High Court.

Analysis: Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 excludes from the High Court's appellate jurisdiction Tribunal orders involving questions relating to the rate of duty or value for assessment. Section 35L provides for appeals to the Supreme Court and includes taxability within questions relating to the rate of duty. The Tribunal's determination concerned the taxability of computer reservation services on a reverse charge basis.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable before the High Court.

Ratio Decidendi: An appeal from a Tribunal determination of taxability falls outside the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 35G and within the appellate route provided by Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Issues: Whether service line and development charges recovered for electricity distribution infrastructure are taxable as consideration for the transfer of the right to use goods.

Analysis: Section 4(8) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 taxes transfers of the right to use goods. Sections 42, 43 and 46 of the Electricity Act, 2003 govern the distribution licensee's duties and recovery of expenses for providing electricity infrastructure. Recovery of equipment costs alone does not establish a transfer; control, operation and maintenance are relevant. The licensee retained ownership and control, while consumers could not independently operate the equipment. The infrastructure was developed for specified applicants, its cost was recovered from them, and its installation was an ancillary activity connected with electricity supply.

Conclusion: The transactions constituted transfers of the right to use goods, and the recovered value was taxable under Section 4(8), in favour of the Revenue.

Ratio Decidendi: Recovery of the cost of dedicated electricity distribution infrastructure can constitute consideration for a taxable transfer of the right to use goods despite the licensee's retention of ownership and control.

Issues: Whether the accused applicant should be granted bail pending trial.

Analysis: Prima facie, no implicating material was apparent apart from the applicant's disclosure statement. The merits of the prosecution were not adjudicated.

Conclusion: Bail is granted on furnishing a personal bond and two sureties, with a requirement to cooperate in the judicial process. The criminal trial remains pending.

Issues: Whether omission of the date, time and venue of personal hearing from the show-cause notice vitiated the adjudication proceedings.

Analysis: The notice under the GST legislation required a reply but did not specify the date, time or venue of personal hearing. Procedural fairness required an opportunity of hearing before adjudication.

Conclusion: The adjudication proceedings were procedurally vitiated.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax adjudication is procedurally vitiated where the show-cause notice specifies no date, time or venue for personal hearing and no opportunity of hearing is afforded.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice for cancellation of GST registration contained sufficient particulars and statutory grounds; (ii) whether the appellate authority could sustain the cancellation by relying on additional evidence and statutory grounds not disclosed in the notice.

Issue (i): Whether the notice for cancellation of GST registration contained sufficient particulars and statutory grounds.

Analysis: Section 29 and Rule 22 provide the framework for cancellation of registration. The notice alleged wrongful input tax credit but omitted supplier details, registration numbers and the relevant periods, and did not invoke the cancellation provisions. Cancellation proceedings are distinct from tax determination proceedings. The subsequent omission of wrongful input tax credit as a cancellation ground was also treated as a relevant consideration.

Conclusion: The cancellation notice was legally deficient, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate authority could sustain the cancellation by relying on additional evidence and statutory grounds not disclosed in the notice.

Analysis: Rule 112 restricts the admission of additional evidence on appeal. Natural justice requires an effective opportunity to rebut material relied upon. The appellate authority relied on an inquiry report and invoked a statutory provision absent from the cancellation notice, without recording an effective opportunity for rebuttal.

Conclusion: The appellate order could not sustain the cancellation, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The registration stands restored without any determination in the separate tax proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: GST registration cancellation requires a notice specifying the statutory grounds and material particulars; an appellate authority cannot cure a defective notice by introducing new grounds or evidence, particularly without an effective opportunity to rebut that evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether cancellation of GST registration was sustainable on the show cause notice issued. (ii) Whether the appellate authority could sustain cancellation using an inquiry report without an effective opportunity to rebut it.

Issue (i): Whether cancellation of GST registration was sustainable on the show cause notice issued.

Analysis: Section 29 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 22 of the corresponding Rules govern cancellation and its procedure. The notice alleged wrongful input tax credit but omitted supplier identities, registration numbers, relevant periods and the statutory cancellation grounds. A reference to an oral intimation did not supply those particulars, and later invocation of statutory provisions could not cure the notice. Proceedings concerning cancellation and those under Section 74A are distinct. The subsequent omission of wrongful credit availment from the relevant cancellation provision was also noted as a relevant consideration.

Conclusion: The cancellation was unsustainable, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate authority could sustain cancellation using an inquiry report without an effective opportunity to rebut it.

Analysis: The appellate authority relied on an inquiry report not disclosed in the cancellation notice, with no recorded effective opportunity for rebuttal. Rule 112 regulates admission of additional evidence, and natural justice requires a reasonable opportunity to address adverse material. Appellate proceedings are not ordinarily a fresh investigation to remedy deficiencies in the original adjudication.

Conclusion: The appellate order sustaining cancellation was unsustainable, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The registration stands restored. No finding was made on the separate proceedings concerning alleged wrongful input tax credit.

Ratio Decidendi: A GST registration cancellation notice must disclose the statutory grounds and essential particulars of the alleged contravention; its defects cannot be cured on appeal, and adverse additional evidence requires a fair opportunity of rebuttal.

Issues: Whether an appeal involving tax or input tax credit of Rs. 14,182 warranted admission despite being below the statutory monetary threshold.

Analysis: Section 112 confers discretion to refuse admission where the relevant amount does not exceed Rs. 50,000. The amount involved was Rs. 14,182.

Conclusion: Admission was refused. The substantive dispute was not examined on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: The Tribunal may exercise its discretion to refuse admission of an appeal where the relevant amount does not exceed the statutory monetary threshold.