Issues: Whether Swachh Bharat Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess paid on input services used for export of goods are refundable under Notification No. 41/2012-ST.

Analysis: Sections 119(2) and 119(5) of the Finance Act, 2015, and Sections 161(2) and 161(5) of the Finance Act, 2016, create a statutory deeming fiction by treating the cesses as service tax and extending the service-tax refund provisions to them. Notification No. 41/2012-ST grants refund of service tax paid on taxable services used for export of goods. A harmonious construction requires the notification to cover these cesses; their exclusion would defeat the statutory treatment and the tax export-neutrality principle.

Conclusion: Swachh Bharat Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess paid on eligible input services used for export of goods are refundable under Notification No. 41/2012-ST.

Issues: Whether consideration received for repair and renewal of public roads undertaken for the Public Works Department was exempt from service tax.

Analysis: Entry No. 13 of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 exempts services by way of construction, repair, maintenance, renovation or alteration of a road for use by the general public. The work orders and Form 26AS records established that the disputed receipts for the relevant financial year related to repair and renewal of public roads executed for the Public Works Department. The contrary finding had relied on a work order pertaining to a different financial year.

Conclusion: The services of repair and renewal of public roads were exempt from service tax under Entry No. 13 of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012; the demand could not be sustained.

Issues: Whether token amounts collected from designated roadside establishments under the passenger-facility scheme constituted consideration for a taxable declared service.

Analysis: Taxability under Section 66B read with Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires an activity undertaken by one person for another for consideration. The arrangement required designated establishments to provide prescribed passenger amenities and enabled regulated halts for safety, hygiene and administrative control. No identifiable service-provider and service-recipient relationship, or quid pro quo, existed between the transport undertaking and the establishments. Stopping buses at approved locations was integral to passenger transportation and did not confer an exclusive right, amount to promotion or marketing, or involve renting of property.

Conclusion: The token amounts were not consideration for a taxable declared service, and the service-tax demand was unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether reimbursement of actual diesel costs incurred for government departments constituted consideration subject to service tax; and (ii) Whether a service-tax demand based solely on unverified third-party income-tax data and assumed taxable value was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether reimbursement of actual diesel costs incurred for government departments constituted consideration subject to service tax.

Analysis: The documentary arrangement required diesel to be supplied at actual market cost, with monthly payment against petrol-pump bills. The amount received represented reimbursement of actual expenses incurred as a pure agent rather than consideration for a taxable service.

Conclusion: Reimbursement of the actual diesel costs did not constitute taxable consideration and was not liable to service tax, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a service-tax demand based solely on unverified third-party income-tax data and assumed taxable value was sustainable.

Analysis: The departmental data from the Income Tax Department was not independently verified through inquiry, summons, or examination of the assessee's records. The demand was raised without establishing the services actually provided, their recipients, or the taxable value, and was therefore founded on presumption and assumption rather than evidentiary verification.

Conclusion: A service-tax demand founded solely on unverified third-party data and assumed taxable value was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demands lacked a verified factual and taxable foundation.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid on commission to overseas agents for procuring export orders is admissible as input-service credit.

Analysis: Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 includes sales-promotion services within the scope of input service. The binding precedent relied upon recognises that services of commission agents procuring orders and facilitating sales have an element of sales promotion; the subsequent explanation clarifies the legislative intent to extend credit to such commission-agent services.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit on the commission paid to overseas service providers for procuring export orders is admissible.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant is entitled to interest on Rs. 7,52,249/- from the date of deposit to the date of refund; (ii) Whether the appellant is entitled to interest on Rs. 4,93,345/- from the date of deposit until it was treated as pre-deposit; and (iii) Whether interest is payable at 12% per annum.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant is entitled to interest on Rs. 7,52,249/- from the date of deposit to the date of refund.

Analysis: The amount deposited during investigation and adjudication was not appropriated towards duty and was never treated as pre-deposit. It consequently retained the character of a revenue deposit. Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which governs refund of duty, and Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which provides interest on delayed statutory refunds, do not govern refund of a revenue deposit. The applicable binding precedent recognises interest on such deposits despite the absence of a prescribed statutory rate.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to interest on Rs. 7,52,249/- from the date of deposit until refund, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant is entitled to interest on Rs. 4,93,345/- from the date of deposit until it was treated as pre-deposit.

Analysis: Although the amount was subsequently treated as pre-deposit under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, it remained a revenue deposit from the date of payment until that treatment. The statutory regime governing pre-deposits did not displace the character of the amount during the intervening period.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to interest on Rs. 4,93,345/- from the date of deposit until it was treated as pre-deposit, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest is payable at 12% per annum.

Analysis: No statutory rate is prescribed for refund of a revenue deposit. The applicable precedent establishes that interest at 12% per annum is payable on such deposit for the period during which it retained that character.

Conclusion: Interest is payable at 12% per annum on both amounts for their respective revenue-deposit periods, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Amounts paid during investigation or adjudication and not appropriated towards duty remain revenue deposits, attracting interest at 12% per annum until refund or, where applicable, until conversion into a statutory pre-deposit.

Ratio Decidendi: A deposit not appropriated towards duty is a revenue deposit outside the statutory refund framework and carries interest at 12% per annum for the period it retains that character.

Issues: Whether a secured creditor with a prior registered security interest has statutory priority over the State's sales tax charge, thereby entitling the auction purchaser to an encumbrance-free transfer of the secured asset.

Analysis: Section 26E of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 accords priority to the debts of a secured creditor over government revenues, taxes, cesses and other dues once the security interest is registered. The secured interest had been registered with the Central Registry before the State's attempt to register its charge. The State's first charge under Section 37 of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act could not displace that statutory priority. Further, the State did not establish compliance with the prescribed procedure for public proclamation of attachment under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

Conclusion: The secured creditor's dues have priority over the State tax dues; the State notices and attachment cannot burden the secured asset, and the auction purchaser is entitled to transfer of the asset free from those encumbrances.

Issues: (i) Whether a pending civil dispute over the premises or the lessor's constitution permits rejection of an amendment to add an additional place of business; (ii) What documents and verification are required for rented premises, and whether the application was assessed on those requirements; (iii) Whether reliance on undisclosed third-party material and failure to address material contentions rendered the appellate order procedurally defective; and (iv) What relief follows from the invalid rejection.

Issue (i): Whether a pending civil dispute over the premises or the lessor's constitution permits rejection of an amendment to add an additional place of business.

Analysis: Section 2(85) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 identifies a place of business by its commercial use, including storage of goods in a godown. Section 28 and Rule 19 require due verification of the reported amendment, the existence and description of the premises, its use for business or storage, and the applicant's occupation under the prescribed documentation. A registration entry neither confers title nor determines the validity of a lease. The officer's jurisdiction does not extend to title adjudication, and those jurisdictional limits preclude making the outcome of civil title litigation a condition for recording a place of business.

Conclusion: A pending civil dispute concerning title to the premises or the lessor's constitution is not, by itself, a lawful ground to reject the amendment application.

Issue (ii): What documents and verification are required for rented premises, and whether the application was assessed on those requirements.

Analysis: The prescribed list in Form GST REG-01 requires, for rented or leased premises, a valid rent or lease agreement and one listed document supporting the lessor's ownership, such as an electricity bill, property-tax receipt, or municipal record. Where the agreement is unregistered, the lessor's identity proof may also be required. Verification must address whether the documents relate to the claimed godown, whether the premises are accurately described, and whether the applicant uses them for business or storage. It cannot demand conclusive title proof, a civil decree, or the original of a deed held in civil-court custody where a certified copy is available. The civil court's limited acceptance of an unregistered document for a collateral purpose did not determine title or lease validity. The rule against non-supplementation of reasons also precluded reliance on inspection observations not adopted as grounds in the rejection order.

Conclusion: The application was not assessed on the prescribed documentary and verification requirements; compliance with those requirements requires a fresh determination without insisting on conclusive ownership evidence.

Issue (iii): Whether reliance on undisclosed third-party material and failure to address material contentions rendered the appellate order procedurally defective.

Analysis: The appellate order relied on a third-party representation received after the hearing without supplying it to the applicant or allowing a response, contrary to audi alteram partem. It also failed to address the prescribed document list, the uploaded ownership-supporting document, and the material relating to the lease deed. A speaking order must disclose a rational connection between the applicable statutory requirements, the material considered, and the result reached.

Conclusion: The appellate order was procedurally defective because it relied on undisclosed material and failed to give reasoned consideration to material contentions and documents.

Issue (iv): What relief follows from the invalid rejection.

Analysis: Section 113(1) permits annulment of the impugned decisions and a reference for fresh decision. Outstanding factual matters, including the correspondence of the ownership-supporting document with the godown, the description of the premises, and the adequacy of the lease documentation, require initial due verification by the proper officer. Those matters concern registration requirements only and not title or the merits of civil proceedings.

Conclusion: A fresh, limited statutory verification is required rather than immediate approval, with specific deficiencies to be notified, third-party material disclosed, an opportunity of hearing given, and a reasoned decision made within the stipulated period.

Final Conclusion: GST registration amendments must be determined through statutory verification of the actual business premises and prescribed occupancy documentation, while civil title disputes remain for determination by the competent civil courts and cannot be converted into an additional registration condition.

Ratio Decidendi: For amendment of GST registration to include rented premises, due verification is confined to the prescribed evidence of occupation, support for the lessor's ownership, and actual business use; a pending third-party title dispute cannot supply a non-statutory ground for rejection.

Issues: (i) Whether unavailed input tax credit relating to FY 2018-19 could be claimed in the April 2019 GSTR-3B despite its mismatch with the April 2019 GSTR-2A; (ii) Whether the original and appellate orders were vitiated by breach of natural justice and statutory requirements governing hearing and reasoned appellate orders.

Issue (i): Whether unavailed input tax credit relating to FY 2018-19 could be claimed in the April 2019 GSTR-3B despite its mismatch with the April 2019 GSTR-2A.

Analysis: Sections 16(4) and 39(9) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permitted a registered person to rectify an omission and claim input tax credit for the preceding financial year within the prescribed period. The invoices, e-way bills, transport documents and GSTR-2A details substantiated that input tax credit of Rs. 1,62,818.76 related to genuine inward supplies of FY 2018-19 and had been omitted inadvertently from the corresponding returns. The credit of Rs. 25,056 reflected in the April 2019 GSTR-2A related to a separate supply received in May 2019 and claimed in June 2019. For the disputed period, GSTR-2A was facilitative and input tax credit remained available on a self-assessment basis; a GSTR-2A mismatch alone did not establish ineligibility where the underlying entitlement was verified.

Conclusion: The input tax credit of Rs. 1,62,818.76 was validly claimed in the April 2019 GSTR-3B, and the GSTR-2A mismatch did not justify its reversal. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the original and appellate orders were vitiated by breach of natural justice and statutory requirements governing hearing and reasoned appellate orders.

Analysis: Notices were uploaded in the secondary "Additional Notices & Orders" portal tab rather than the primary notices tab, impairing effective communication. Further, the show-cause notice and reminder marked the hearing particulars as "NA", although Section 75(4) required an opportunity of hearing where an adverse decision was contemplated. Both orders were passed on later dates that had neither been fixed nor communicated. The appellate order also failed to address the grounds and documentary material in the appeal memorandum or provide the points for determination and reasons required by Section 107(12), contrary to the principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem.

Conclusion: The original and appellate orders were vitiated by breach of natural justice and non-compliance with Sections 75(4) and 107(12) and were unsustainable. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reversal of verified input tax credit and the consequential tax, interest and penalty liability lacked a legal foundation.

Issues: Whether accumulated input tax credit attributable to higher-taxed packaging materials is refundable under Section 54(3)(ii) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, where bulk tea and packaged tea are both taxable at 5%, notwithstanding circulars restricting refund where input and output supplies are the same.

Analysis: Section 54(3)(ii) permits refund where input tax credit accumulates because the tax rate on inputs exceeds that on output supplies. Packaging materials, PET containers and printed flexible packaging used for marketing packaged tea are inputs within Section 2(59) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; their 18% tax rate against the 5% output rate creates an inverted duty structure. Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 31.03.2020 applies to cases involving reduction of tax rate on the same goods at different points of time and does not govern this situation. A circular issued under Section 168(1) cannot introduce a restriction that curtails a refund otherwise available under the statute.

Conclusion: Accumulated input tax credit on the higher-taxed packaging inputs is refundable under Section 54(3)(ii) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and the cited circulars do not bar the refund.

Issues: Whether credit notes issued and reported during the relevant refund period are deductible from adjusted total turnover for computing refund of accumulated input tax credit.

Analysis: The credit notes were verified against the GSTR-1 statements, voucher register and the Chartered Accountant certificate, which established that they were issued during the relevant period and within the time stipulated under Section 34(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Under Section 34(1), where supplies are returned or the taxable value requires reduction, the corresponding credit note reduces the taxable value of outward supplies. Excluding such credit notes from the adjustment would artificially inflate adjusted total turnover for the refund formula under Rule 89(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Conclusion: Credit notes validly issued during the refund period must be deducted from outward taxable supply while determining adjusted total turnover; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether credit notes issued during the refund period under Section 34 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are deductible from gross turnover while computing adjusted total turnover for refund under Rule 89(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Section 34(1) recognises issuance of credit notes where, inter alia, supplied goods are returned, thereby requiring corresponding adjustment of taxable turnover; Section 34(2) governs the permissible time for such adjustment. The credit notes were issued during the relevant period, within the prescribed time, and their particulars matched the GSTR-1 statements and the Chartered Accountant's certificate. Their exclusion would artificially enhance turnover even though the taxable value stood reduced through the credit notes.

Conclusion: Valid credit notes issued during the relevant period must be deducted from turnover in computing adjusted total turnover under Rule 89(5).

Issues: (i) Whether refund of accumulated input tax credit under the inverted duty structure is available where the principal input and output attract the same rate of tax, but other inputs attract higher rates of tax; (ii) Whether Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST and Circular No. 173/05/2022-GST apply to deny the refund claim.

Issue (i): Whether refund of accumulated input tax credit under the inverted duty structure is available where the principal input and output attract the same rate of tax, but other inputs attract higher rates of tax.

Analysis: Section 54(3)(ii) permits refund where credit accumulates because the tax rate on inputs exceeds that on output supplies. The plural expression "inputs" is not confined to a principal input, and Section 2(59) gives input a broad meaning covering goods used in the course or furtherance of business other than capital goods. The principal raw materials and manufactured stone aggregates were found to be distinct despite their classification under the same HSN and tax rate. The manufacturing activity also used several other inputs taxable at 18% and 28%, while the output was taxable at 5%.

Conclusion: Refund of accumulated input tax credit under the inverted duty structure is admissible. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST and Circular No. 173/05/2022-GST apply to deny the refund claim.

Analysis: Paragraph 3 of Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST concerns accumulation arising from a reduction in the GST rate on the same goods at different points in time. That circumstance was absent, since the principal input and output were taxed at the same rate and the accumulated credit arose from other higher-taxed inputs. Circular No. 173/05/2022-GST, being clarificatory of the earlier circular and concerning concessional supplies, was also inapplicable. A circular issued for uniform implementation cannot curtail a refund entitlement conferred by the statute.

Conclusion: Neither circular applies to deny the refund claim. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory conditions for refund on account of an inverted duty structure stand satisfied, and the refund entitlement is unaffected by the cited circulars.

Ratio Decidendi: Refund of accumulated input tax credit under an inverted duty structure is determined with reference to all inputs used in the course or furtherance of business, and an administrative circular cannot restrict the statutory refund entitlement.

Issues: Whether the civil appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, filed after the maximum permissible period after exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a certified copy, was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 62 prescribes forty-five days for an appeal, with a further condonable period not exceeding fifteen days. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is a special and self-contained statute whose limitation framework prevails over the appellate provisions of the Companies Act, 2013. The expression "date of receipt of such order" does not permit a litigant to defer commencement of limitation until it elects to apply for or collect a certified copy. Rule 91 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 treats pronouncement in open court as pronouncement of the order. Under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, only the interval between applying for a certified copy and its availability is excluded; the prior period of inaction is not excludable.

Analysis: Thirty-five days elapsed before the application for a certified copy, and forty-one further days elapsed after its receipt. Even after excluding the thirty-five days required for obtaining the copy, the appeal exceeded the absolute sixty-day limit comprising the statutory period and the maximum condonable period.

Conclusion: The appeal was barred by limitation, and delay beyond the maximum sixty-day period was not capable of condonation.

Issues: (i) Whether the Resolution Professional was required to collate and have the resolution plan address the appellants' late-filed homebuyer claims where no corresponding liability was reflected in the corporate debtor's records; and (ii) Whether the 369-day delay in lodging those claims warranted condonation and admission.

Issue (i): Whether the Resolution Professional was required to collate and have the resolution plan address the appellants' late-filed homebuyer claims where no corresponding liability was reflected in the corporate debtor's records.

Analysis: Regulation 12 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 operates within a time-bound corporate insolvency resolution process. Claims not timely filed may require disclosure in the information memorandum and consideration in the resolution plan where the liability is reflected in the corporate debtor's records. No payment by the appellants towards the claimed units was reflected in those records; the units had been transferred through the holding company, and the settlement relied upon did not bind the corporate debtor. The underlying transactions were also the subject of pending proceedings under Section 66 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Conclusion: The Resolution Professional was not required to collate the late-filed claims or have them considered in the information memorandum or resolution plan. This issue is decided against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the 369-day delay in lodging those claims warranted condonation and admission.

Analysis: Condonation required a genuine and sufficient cause, particularly in a time-bound insolvency process. The appellants had previously pursued delayed claims concerning other units, obtained condonation, received legal assistance, and participated in the creditors' committee. Their asserted misunderstanding about filing separate claims did not satisfactorily explain the prolonged delay, especially when the claims were lodged after approval of the resolution plan by the creditors' committee.

Conclusion: The 369-day delay was not supported by sufficient cause and the claims were not liable to be admitted. This issue is decided against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The disputed late-filed claims remain outside the corporate insolvency resolution process, with no requirement for their inclusion in the information memorandum or resolution plan.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution professional has no independent duty to collate a late claim not reflected in the corporate debtor's records, and condonation of delay requires a genuine and sufficient cause consistent with the time-bound insolvency process.

Issues: (i) Whether a five-day delay in forwarding the arrest order and supporting material to the Adjudicating Authority under Section 19(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 vitiated the arrest; (ii) Whether prolonged incarceration and the unlikely early completion of trial warranted bail notwithstanding the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether a five-day delay in forwarding the arrest order and supporting material to the Adjudicating Authority under Section 19(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 vitiated the arrest.

Analysis: Section 19(2) requires the arrest order and material to be forwarded immediately, but prescribes no fixed time limit. Immediate forwarding requires expeditious and substantially contemporaneous compliance, allowing time necessarily required to compile and transmit voluminous records and complete administrative requirements.

Conclusion: The five-day delay did not vitiate the arrest or the consequent custody; against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether prolonged incarceration and the unlikely early completion of trial warranted bail notwithstanding the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The twin conditions for bail under Section 45 cannot override the constitutional safeguard of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Completion of the investigation concerning the appellant, custody exceeding twenty months for an offence punishable up to seven years, and a trial involving extensive documentary evidence and numerous witnesses showed that its conclusion was not imminent. Continued custody in those circumstances would turn the process into punishment.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to release on bail despite Section 45; in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional protection against prolonged pre-trial detention prevailed where the investigation concerning the accused was complete and the trial could not be concluded within a reasonable time.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory restrictions on bail cannot displace Article 21 where continued pre-trial incarceration is prolonged and completion of trial is not reasonably foreseeable.

Issues: (i) Whether royalty paid by a partnership firm to its partner co-owners for use of a jointly owned trade mark constituted a taxable intellectual-property service; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period could sustain the demand.

Issue (i): Whether royalty paid by a partnership firm to its partner co-owners for use of a jointly owned trade mark constituted a taxable intellectual-property service.

Analysis: Under the service-tax framework, taxability requires a service rendered by one person to another for consideration. The trade-mark rights were co-owned by the partners and were deployed for the partnership's common business. A partner's use or contribution of an asset for the mutual benefit of the partnership does not create a service provider-service recipient relationship or a distinct quid pro quo. The royalty arrangement was therefore in the nature of service to self.

Conclusion: The royalty received by the partners did not constitute a taxable intellectual-property service. This issue was decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period could sustain the demand.

Analysis: The royalty payments were disclosed in the accounts, and the records and returns had been regularly available to the department. There was no suppression of facts or intent to evade, particularly as any service tax paid by the partners would have been available as CENVAT credit to the partnership firm. The assessees' bona fide belief regarding absence of a taxable service relationship was also supported by the nature of the arrangement.

Conclusion: The extended limitation period was unavailable, and the demand for that period was unsustainable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The royalty arrangement lay outside the service-tax net and, independently, the extended-period demand lacked a legal basis.

Ratio Decidendi: A partner's deployment of property for the mutual benefit of a partnership, without a distinct service provider-service recipient relationship and quid pro quo for a specific service, is not a taxable service.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was disposed of, with the Appellate Authority permitted to consider delay condonation liberally.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment's input tax credit determination under Section 16(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could stand; (ii) Whether the assessment on the remaining issues was vitiated by failure to afford effective notice and a personal hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the assessment's input tax credit determination under Section 16(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could stand.

Analysis: The limitation issue concerning input tax credit under Section 16(4) was covered by the prior common decision relied upon in the order, under which the corresponding departmental determination had been quashed.

Conclusion: The impugned determination concerning input tax credit limitation under Section 16(4) was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment on the remaining issues was vitiated by failure to afford effective notice and a personal hearing.

Analysis: The show-cause notice and subsequent communications had only been uploaded on the common portal. Where no response is received and alternative statutory modes of service are available, an effective mode of service must be adopted instead of repeatedly placing notices on the portal. The absence of effective service deprived the assessee of an opportunity to respond and be heard.

Conclusion: The assessment determinations on the remaining issues were set aside for fresh adjudication after affording an opportunity to file objections and receive a personal hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The limitation-based input tax credit determination cannot survive, while the remaining tax controversies require adjudication afresh consistently with natural justice.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory alternatives for service are available and a taxpayer has not responded to portal-uploaded notices, the authority must employ an effective mode of service and afford a meaningful opportunity of hearing before making an adverse assessment.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to payment of the admitted differential 6% GST amount for the civil construction works executed.

Analysis: The liability to pay the differential 6% GST was admitted by the concerned authority, which also confirmed that the payment was due and would be made within three weeks.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to payment of the differential 6% GST within three weeks.