Issues: Whether the civil appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, filed after the maximum permissible period after exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a certified copy, was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 62 prescribes forty-five days for an appeal, with a further condonable period not exceeding fifteen days. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is a special and self-contained statute whose limitation framework prevails over the appellate provisions of the Companies Act, 2013. The expression "date of receipt of such order" does not permit a litigant to defer commencement of limitation until it elects to apply for or collect a certified copy. Rule 91 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 treats pronouncement in open court as pronouncement of the order. Under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, only the interval between applying for a certified copy and its availability is excluded; the prior period of inaction is not excludable.

Analysis: Thirty-five days elapsed before the application for a certified copy, and forty-one further days elapsed after its receipt. Even after excluding the thirty-five days required for obtaining the copy, the appeal exceeded the absolute sixty-day limit comprising the statutory period and the maximum condonable period.

Conclusion: The appeal was barred by limitation, and delay beyond the maximum sixty-day period was not capable of condonation.

Issues: (i) Whether the Resolution Professional was required to collate and have the resolution plan address the appellants' late-filed homebuyer claims where no corresponding liability was reflected in the corporate debtor's records; and (ii) Whether the 369-day delay in lodging those claims warranted condonation and admission.

Issue (i): Whether the Resolution Professional was required to collate and have the resolution plan address the appellants' late-filed homebuyer claims where no corresponding liability was reflected in the corporate debtor's records.

Analysis: Regulation 12 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 operates within a time-bound corporate insolvency resolution process. Claims not timely filed may require disclosure in the information memorandum and consideration in the resolution plan where the liability is reflected in the corporate debtor's records. No payment by the appellants towards the claimed units was reflected in those records; the units had been transferred through the holding company, and the settlement relied upon did not bind the corporate debtor. The underlying transactions were also the subject of pending proceedings under Section 66 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Conclusion: The Resolution Professional was not required to collate the late-filed claims or have them considered in the information memorandum or resolution plan. This issue is decided against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the 369-day delay in lodging those claims warranted condonation and admission.

Analysis: Condonation required a genuine and sufficient cause, particularly in a time-bound insolvency process. The appellants had previously pursued delayed claims concerning other units, obtained condonation, received legal assistance, and participated in the creditors' committee. Their asserted misunderstanding about filing separate claims did not satisfactorily explain the prolonged delay, especially when the claims were lodged after approval of the resolution plan by the creditors' committee.

Conclusion: The 369-day delay was not supported by sufficient cause and the claims were not liable to be admitted. This issue is decided against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The disputed late-filed claims remain outside the corporate insolvency resolution process, with no requirement for their inclusion in the information memorandum or resolution plan.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution professional has no independent duty to collate a late claim not reflected in the corporate debtor's records, and condonation of delay requires a genuine and sufficient cause consistent with the time-bound insolvency process.

Issues: (i) Whether a five-day delay in forwarding the arrest order and supporting material to the Adjudicating Authority under Section 19(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 vitiated the arrest; (ii) Whether prolonged incarceration and the unlikely early completion of trial warranted bail notwithstanding the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether a five-day delay in forwarding the arrest order and supporting material to the Adjudicating Authority under Section 19(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 vitiated the arrest.

Analysis: Section 19(2) requires the arrest order and material to be forwarded immediately, but prescribes no fixed time limit. Immediate forwarding requires expeditious and substantially contemporaneous compliance, allowing time necessarily required to compile and transmit voluminous records and complete administrative requirements.

Conclusion: The five-day delay did not vitiate the arrest or the consequent custody; against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether prolonged incarceration and the unlikely early completion of trial warranted bail notwithstanding the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The twin conditions for bail under Section 45 cannot override the constitutional safeguard of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Completion of the investigation concerning the appellant, custody exceeding twenty months for an offence punishable up to seven years, and a trial involving extensive documentary evidence and numerous witnesses showed that its conclusion was not imminent. Continued custody in those circumstances would turn the process into punishment.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to release on bail despite Section 45; in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional protection against prolonged pre-trial detention prevailed where the investigation concerning the accused was complete and the trial could not be concluded within a reasonable time.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory restrictions on bail cannot displace Article 21 where continued pre-trial incarceration is prolonged and completion of trial is not reasonably foreseeable.

Issues: (i) Whether royalty paid by a partnership firm to its partner co-owners for use of a jointly owned trade mark constituted a taxable intellectual-property service; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period could sustain the demand.

Issue (i): Whether royalty paid by a partnership firm to its partner co-owners for use of a jointly owned trade mark constituted a taxable intellectual-property service.

Analysis: Under the service-tax framework, taxability requires a service rendered by one person to another for consideration. The trade-mark rights were co-owned by the partners and were deployed for the partnership's common business. A partner's use or contribution of an asset for the mutual benefit of the partnership does not create a service provider-service recipient relationship or a distinct quid pro quo. The royalty arrangement was therefore in the nature of service to self.

Conclusion: The royalty received by the partners did not constitute a taxable intellectual-property service. This issue was decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period could sustain the demand.

Analysis: The royalty payments were disclosed in the accounts, and the records and returns had been regularly available to the department. There was no suppression of facts or intent to evade, particularly as any service tax paid by the partners would have been available as CENVAT credit to the partnership firm. The assessees' bona fide belief regarding absence of a taxable service relationship was also supported by the nature of the arrangement.

Conclusion: The extended limitation period was unavailable, and the demand for that period was unsustainable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The royalty arrangement lay outside the service-tax net and, independently, the extended-period demand lacked a legal basis.

Ratio Decidendi: A partner's deployment of property for the mutual benefit of a partnership, without a distinct service provider-service recipient relationship and quid pro quo for a specific service, is not a taxable service.

Issues: Whether accumulated Compensation Cess input tax credit on coal used in manufacturing leather products sold through domestic outward supplies not liable to Compensation Cess was refundable under the inverted tax structure category.

Analysis: Section 54(3)(ii) permits refund of unutilised input tax credit only where accumulation results from the rate of tax on inputs being higher than that on output supplies, subject to the statutory exclusions. Eligibility to avail Compensation Cess credit under Section 16 and the absence of a blocked-credit restriction under Section 17(5) establish neither an independent entitlement to cash refund nor compliance with Section 54(3). The restriction under the proviso to Section 11(2) of the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act, 2017 confines utilisation of Compensation Cess credit to payment of Compensation Cess; while this does not absolutely prohibit every refund, inability to utilise the credit against other liabilities cannot itself create a refund entitlement. Rule 89(5) is procedural and cannot create a substantive right absent satisfaction of Section 54(3). The cited circulars concern Compensation Cess credit attributable to qualifying zero-rated supplies and do not grant an unconditional refund for domestic supplies merely because the finished goods do not attract Compensation Cess.

Conclusion: The accumulated Compensation Cess credit relating to domestic supplies was not shown to satisfy the conditions for refund under Section 54(3)(ii) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the disputed refund claims were inadmissible.

Issues: (i) Whether the sale proceeds from the shares could be assessed as unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether an estimated commission at 3% of the sale proceeds could be added as unexplained expenditure under section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the sale proceeds from the shares could be assessed as unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The purchase and sale transactions were executed through recognised stock exchanges and registered brokers, supported by demat records, securities transaction tax payments, and banking-channel receipts. The documentary evidence remained uncontroverted and no assessee-specific material established participation in accommodation entries, price rigging, or manipulation. General investigation material concerning the scrip and assumptions drawn from the company's financials could not displace the evidentiary burden after the transactions had been substantiated. The short-term capital loss had also not been used for any tax set-off.

Conclusion: The sale-proceeds addition under section 68 was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an estimated commission at 3% of the sale proceeds could be added as unexplained expenditure under section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The estimated commission addition rested entirely on the assumption that the share-sale proceeds represented a non-genuine arrangement. With the foundational addition deleted and no evidence of any commission payment, the estimate had no independent basis.

Conclusion: The addition for estimated commission under section 69C was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order was set aside to the extent of the impugned additions.

Ratio Decidendi: Uncontroverted documentary evidence of stock-exchange transactions through recognised intermediaries and banking channels cannot be displaced by general investigation information or suspicion without material linking the assessee to a sham arrangement.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment notice and consequential assessment were invalid because the approval required under Section 151(ii) was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the specified higher authority; (ii) Whether the reassessment assessment was invalid for want of a notice under Section 143(2) after the original return was treated as a return filed in response to the notice under Section 148; (iii) Whether Section 56(2)(vii)(b) applied to the purchase of a flat where the agreement, payment and possession were completed in financial year 2012-13, though the conveyance was registered later.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment notice and consequential assessment were invalid because the approval required under Section 151(ii) was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the specified higher authority.

Analysis: As the reassessment notice was issued beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, Section 151(ii) required prior sanction from the Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, or other specified higher authority. Approval by the Principal Commissioner did not satisfy that jurisdictional requirement.

Conclusion: The approval, reassessment notice and consequential assessment were invalid and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the reassessment assessment was invalid for want of a notice under Section 143(2) after the original return was treated as a return filed in response to the notice under Section 148.

Analysis: The assessee's communication requesting that the original return be treated as the return in response to the notice under Section 148 constituted compliance with that notice. Once such return was available on record, issuance of notice under Section 143(2) was mandatory before completing the assessment.

Conclusion: The assessment made without a notice under Section 143(2) was invalid and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 56(2)(vii)(b) applied to the purchase of a flat where the agreement, payment and possession were completed in financial year 2012-13, though the conveyance was registered later.

Analysis: The agreement for purchase, full payment of consideration and possession of the flat occurred in financial year 2012-13, relevant to assessment year 2013-14. The expanded provision covering acquisition of immovable property for inadequate consideration became effective only from assessment year 2014-15; subsequent registration did not alter the year in which the substantive purchase transaction was completed.

Conclusion: Section 56(2)(vii)(b) was inapplicable, and the addition was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment failed for independent jurisdictional and procedural defects, and the addition relating to the flat purchase could not be sustained under the subsequently effective provision.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment under Section 147, rather than proceedings under Section 153C, was valid; (ii) Whether the addition for alleged bogus purchases should be sustained and, if so, to what extent.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment under Section 147, rather than proceedings under Section 153C, was valid.

Analysis: The reopening was based on information received from the Investigation Wing concerning the assessee's transactions and modus operandi, rather than on seized material obtained in the third-party search. In those circumstances, recourse to Section 153C was not required and reassessment under Section 147 was proper.

Conclusion: The reassessment under Section 147 was valid. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition for alleged bogus purchases should be sustained and, if so, to what extent.

Analysis: The purchase particulars were doubtful and the modus operandi was similar to that considered in relation to accommodation entries connected with the searched group. A consistent approach required estimation of profit embedded in the disputed purchases instead of sustaining the entire purchase amount.

Conclusion: The addition is sustained at 6% of the disputed purchases. This issue is decided partly in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment remains valid and an addition at 6% of the disputed purchases survives.

Ratio Decidendi: Information derived from a third-party search, without reliance on seized material from that search, may support reassessment under Section 147 without attracting proceedings under Section 153C.

Issues: Validity of a reassessment notice issued beyond three years where the alleged escaped income was below Rs. 50 lakh.

Analysis: Section 149(1)(a) bars issuance of a notice under Section 148 after three years from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the conditions for the extended period under Section 149(1)(b) are met. For the extended period, the escaped income represented by an asset, expenditure, or book entry must amount to or be likely to amount to Rs. 50 lakh or more. The notice for assessment year 2016-17 was issued after five years, while the alleged escapement was quantified at Rs. 12,35,500.

Conclusion: The notice was barred by limitation under Section 149(1)(b), and the reassessment proceedings were quashed.

Issues: Whether reassessment under Section 147 was valid where the recorded reasons relied on investigation information concerning alleged circular transactions and deemed dividend without demonstrated independent inquiry or application of mind.

Analysis: Reassessment requires the Assessing Officer to form an independent reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Information received from an investigation wing may trigger examination, but cannot by itself establish escapement in the assessee's hands. The recorded reasons did not disclose any independent verification of the assessee's actual receipt of amounts, his specific role in the group-company transactions, or fulfilment of the statutory conditions for deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e). A prima facie nexus between the information and taxable income escaping assessment was therefore absent; mere suspicion could not substitute reason to believe.

Conclusion: The reopening under Section 147 was invalid in law. The reassessment order and the appellate order sustaining the reassessment and consequential addition were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether share capital and share premium received from corporate subscribers constituted unexplained cash credits under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether unsecured loans received during the relevant year constituted unexplained cash credits under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (iii) Whether the industrial incentives received under the applicable incentive schemes were capital receipts excludible in computing income under the normal provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961; and (iv) Whether transport subsidy and remission of VAT and CST, being capital receipts, were excludible from book profit under Section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether share capital and share premium received from corporate subscribers constituted unexplained cash credits under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 68 requires proof of the identity and creditworthiness of the subscribers and the genuineness of the transactions. The two remand reports recorded that the subscriber companies had responded to notices under Section 133(6), furnished tax, financial and banking records, and explained the source of funds and, where examined, the source of source. The directors subsequently appeared in response to summons and gave statements. The documentary traceability, financial capacity and banking trail were verified without any adverse finding. The burden of proof was consequently discharged, and the earlier non-appearance of directors could not override the verified remand findings or justify an addition founded on suspicion.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the additions for share capital and share premium under Section 68 were deleted.

Issue (ii): Whether unsecured loans received during the relevant year constituted unexplained cash credits under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The loan creditors' identifying particulars, confirmations, audited financial statements and bank records were furnished, and the loans were repaid in the current or subsequent years. No defect was identified in this material, nor was an effective enquiry made into it. Reliance on an undisclosed inspector's report without an opportunity of cross-examination was contrary to natural justice.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the unsecured-loan addition under Section 68 was deleted.

Issue (iii): Whether the industrial incentives received under the applicable incentive schemes were capital receipts excludible in computing income under the normal provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Applying the Purpose Test, the excise-duty exemption, transport subsidy, interest subsidy, insurance subsidy, and VAT and CST remission were intended to induce establishment and expansion of industries in the North-Eastern region, generate employment and promote regional industrial development. Their connection with excise duty, transport costs, working capital, insurance or indirect-tax remission did not alter their character, since the incentives were not granted merely to supplement operational profits.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the relevant industrial incentives were held to be capital receipts and were directed to be excluded from computation of income under the normal provisions.

Issue (iv): Whether transport subsidy and remission of VAT and CST, being capital receipts, were excludible from book profit under Section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: A capital receipt that lacks the character of income cannot be included in book profit merely because it is reflected in the accounts. Accordingly, the transport subsidy and VAT and CST remission, having been found to be capital receipts, could not form part of book profit for Minimum Alternate Tax purposes.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the transport subsidy and VAT and CST remission were directed to be excluded from book profit under Section 115JB.

Final Conclusion: The cash-credit additions were unsustainable on the verified evidence, and the industrial-development incentives received under the applicable schemes were accorded the character of non-taxable capital receipts, including the corresponding book-profit adjustment where adjudicated.

Issues: Whether redevelopment of a co-operative housing society may proceed in respect of an ED-attached flat while maintaining the attachment and the enforcement interests in the replacement flat and redevelopment benefits.

Analysis: The existing attachment had been confirmed under Section 8(3) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2000. The safeguards undertaken for redevelopment preserved the attached flat's status through a specifically identified replacement flat, continued attachment and possession in favour of the Enforcement Directorate, disclosure of the attachment in redevelopment documents, prohibition on transfer or encumbrance, and direct deposit of all redevelopment accruals into an account designated by the Enforcement Directorate. These measures adequately protected the enforcement interest. A bank guarantee was not warranted, as it would impose financial pressure on the society when the developer and redevelopment terms had not yet been finalised. The development documents are required to be vetted by the Enforcement Directorate insofar as they concern the attached flat, and the concerned Special Court is to be apprised of the arrangement.

Conclusion: Redevelopment was permitted, and issuance of a no-objection certificate was directed, subject to strict compliance with the safeguards preserving the attachment, replacement flat, and all associated accruals for the Enforcement Directorate.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was disposed of, with the Appellate Authority permitted to consider delay condonation liberally.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment's input tax credit determination under Section 16(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could stand; (ii) Whether the assessment on the remaining issues was vitiated by failure to afford effective notice and a personal hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the assessment's input tax credit determination under Section 16(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could stand.

Analysis: The limitation issue concerning input tax credit under Section 16(4) was covered by the prior common decision relied upon in the order, under which the corresponding departmental determination had been quashed.

Conclusion: The impugned determination concerning input tax credit limitation under Section 16(4) was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment on the remaining issues was vitiated by failure to afford effective notice and a personal hearing.

Analysis: The show-cause notice and subsequent communications had only been uploaded on the common portal. Where no response is received and alternative statutory modes of service are available, an effective mode of service must be adopted instead of repeatedly placing notices on the portal. The absence of effective service deprived the assessee of an opportunity to respond and be heard.

Conclusion: The assessment determinations on the remaining issues were set aside for fresh adjudication after affording an opportunity to file objections and receive a personal hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The limitation-based input tax credit determination cannot survive, while the remaining tax controversies require adjudication afresh consistently with natural justice.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory alternatives for service are available and a taxpayer has not responded to portal-uploaded notices, the authority must employ an effective mode of service and afford a meaningful opportunity of hearing before making an adverse assessment.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to payment of the admitted differential 6% GST amount for the civil construction works executed.

Analysis: The liability to pay the differential 6% GST was admitted by the concerned authority, which also confirmed that the payment was due and would be made within three weeks.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to payment of the differential 6% GST within three weeks.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires proof of intent to evade tax; (ii) Whether the six-day expiry of the e-way bills justified detention and penalty despite the asserted vehicle breakdown and stock-transfer nature of the movement; and (iii) Whether the alleged procedural lapses and the cited circulars invalidated the penalty proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires proof of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 129(1) is attracted where goods are transported in contravention of the Act or Rules. Its text does not make tax evasion or mens rea a precondition for detention or penalty. The provision imposes civil consequences for breach of statutory obligations, for which guilty intention is not an essential ingredient.

Conclusion: Proof of intent to evade tax is not required for imposition of penalty under Section 129(1)(a), against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the six-day expiry of the e-way bills justified detention and penalty despite the asserted vehicle breakdown and stock-transfer nature of the movement.

Analysis: Rule 138(10) permits extension of e-way-bill validity within eight hours of expiry. The e-way bills had expired six days before interception, and no reliable repair records or other evidence substantiated the claimed breakdown. Neither the supplier, recipient nor transporter sought amendment or extension during that period. Interstate stock transfer and accompanying invoices did not create an exemption from the obligation to maintain a valid e-way bill. Withholding available supporting evidence warranted an adverse inference.

Conclusion: Transportation under e-way bills that remained expired for six days constituted contravention warranting penalty under Section 129(1)(a), against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the alleged procedural lapses and the cited circulars invalidated the penalty proceedings.

Analysis: Any asserted deficiency concerning notice, hearing or prescribed forms caused no prejudice because full opportunity was available before the final fact-finding forum to produce explanations and evidence. Circular No. 64/38/2018-GST protects specified minor discrepancies where a valid e-way bill accompanies the consignment; it does not cover transportation with an expired e-way bill.

Conclusion: The alleged procedural lapses and cited circulars did not invalidate the penalty proceedings, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme governing transit documentation applied to the movements in question, and the prolonged failure to maintain valid e-way bills attracted the prescribed civil consequences.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under Section 129(1) follows from transportation of goods in contravention of statutory transit-document requirements and does not depend on proof of an intention to evade tax.

Issues: Whether accumulated Compensation Cess input tax credit on coal used in manufacturing leather products for domestic supplies not liable to Compensation Cess qualifies for refund under the inverted tax structure category.

Analysis: Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 confines refund of unutilised input tax credit to the specified statutory categories. For refund on account of an inverted duty structure, the accumulation must arise from the rate of tax on inputs being higher than that on output supplies, subject to the exclusion relating to nil-rated or fully exempt supplies. Accumulation resulting from Compensation Cess on coal and absence of Compensation Cess on domestic outward supplies does not, by itself, establish satisfaction of that test. Eligibility to avail input tax credit under Sections 16 and 17(5), its restricted utilisation under the proviso to Section 11(2) of the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act, 2017, and entitlement to refund are distinct matters. The utilisation restriction does not by itself absolutely bar refund, but neither does it create an independent refund entitlement. Rule 89(5) provides a computation mechanism only after the substantive conditions under Section 54(3) are fulfilled. The cited circulars concern qualifying zero-rated supplies and do not establish refund eligibility for the domestic supplies in question.

Conclusion: The accumulated Compensation Cess input tax credit was not shown to meet the statutory conditions for refund under Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and was not refundable under the inverted tax structure category.

Ratio Decidendi: Availability of input tax credit and its restricted utilisation do not, without fulfilment of the independent conditions prescribed for refund, confer a right to refund unutilised credit.

Issues: (i) Whether the plea of non-service of FORM GST MOV-07 was sustainable and whether procedural deficiencies permitted affirmation of the existing adjudication; (ii) Whether a confined fresh adjudication by the original adjudicating authority was legally warranted; and (iii) Whether the payment made for release constituted a waiver or final determination of liability.

Issue (i): Whether the plea of non-service of FORM GST MOV-07 was sustainable and whether procedural deficiencies permitted affirmation of the existing adjudication.

Analysis: Section 160(2) applies where the recipient has acted upon the notice. The contemporaneous MOV records recorded service, and the appeal materials and written representation evidenced a response to the notice in the detention proceeding. The absence of a copy of MOV-07 in the appellate record did not displace that cumulative material. However, Sections 129(3) and 129(4) require notice, an opportunity of hearing, and reasoned adjudication of the explanation. The unidentified enclosure to MOV-09, unresolved primary records, and material errors in the appellate chronology prevented reliance on the existing findings as a reliable determination of the defence.

Conclusion: The service objection to FORM GST MOV-07 was rejected against the assessee, but the existing adjudication could not be affirmed without a proper determination of the representation and procedural safeguards.

Issue (ii): Whether a confined fresh adjudication by the original adjudicating authority was legally warranted.

Analysis: Section 113(1) of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises a direct reference to the original adjudicating authority, whereas Section 107(11) does not confer that power on the first appellate authority. The actual movement, route, destination, timing of the alleged diversion, and the point at which e-way bill compliance was required could not be reliably resolved without contemporaneous primary material. Later e-way bills cannot retrospectively cure an established breach, but neither can liability be founded on disputed secondary recitals. An independent mens rea requirement is not built into Section 129; nevertheless, penalty is not automatic and requires an assessment of the established breach, bona fides, and whether any lapse was technical or substantive.

Conclusion: A confined fresh adjudication by the original adjudicating authority was legally warranted on the existing notice and original allegation, with disclosure of relied-upon contemporaneous material and a reasonable opportunity of hearing; the merits of liability remain undecided.

Issue (iii): Whether the payment made for release constituted a waiver or final determination of liability.

Analysis: Payment made to secure release after submission of objections does not displace the statutory requirement of adjudication or extinguish the challenge to the demand. Section 129(5) does not convert such payment into a waiver of the statutory remedy or a conclusive determination of liability.

Conclusion: The release payment was neither a waiver nor a final determination of liability and must be reconciled against the fresh determination, with consequential adjustment or refund if due.

Final Conclusion: The service objection is closed, while the existence and character of any transit contravention and the resulting fiscal liability must be resolved through a procedurally fair, evidence-based determination of the original defence.

Ratio Decidendi: Detention penalty under Section 129 requires an established transport contravention and reasoned consideration of the assessee's explanation; independent proof of intent to evade is unnecessary, but penalty is not automatic.

Issues: (i) Whether delayed additional invoices and bilties were sufficient to establish the genuineness of transportation of the goods; (ii) Whether the appellant established that the goods belonged to genuine buyers or sellers and were moved from Delhi to Gwalior via Uttar Pradesh; (iii) Whether the transit-state precedent relied upon by the appellant applied to the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether delayed additional invoices and bilties were sufficient to establish the genuineness of transportation of the goods.

Analysis: The legal framework requires goods in transit to be supported by reliable accompanying documents. The documents initially produced did not cover the goods found on physical verification, and the driver had stated that all documents in his possession had been produced. The subsequently produced invoices and bilties lacked corroboration connecting them to the undeclared goods; their delayed production, discrepancies in invoicing and transport documents, and the absence of reliable supporting evidence undermined their credibility.

Conclusion: The delayed invoices and bilties did not establish that the undeclared goods were genuinely covered by valid transportation documents. This issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant established that the goods belonged to genuine buyers or sellers and were moved from Delhi to Gwalior via Uttar Pradesh.

Analysis: The asserted inter-State movement required credible proof of the identity and business credentials of the buyers and sellers, their connection with the consignment, and the stated destination. No buyer or seller acknowledged the transaction or claimed the goods, and no satisfactory material established their genuineness, authority, or business presence. The documentary material did not reliably establish either ownership or the claimed out-of-State destination.

Conclusion: The appellant failed to prove that the goods belonged to genuine transacting parties or were genuinely being transported from Delhi to Gwalior through Uttar Pradesh. This issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the transit-state precedent relied upon by the appellant applied to the facts of the case.

Analysis: The relied-upon precedent concerned documented transactions involving identifiable registered parties, acknowledged transactions and an established destination outside the transit State. Those foundational facts were absent here because the goods were found undeclared and the later documents were not shown to be genuine or connected with the consignment. The precedent was therefore factually distinguishable.

Conclusion: The transit-state precedent was inapplicable to the facts of the case. This issue was decided against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The finding that the goods were undeclared and unsupported by reliable evidence justified sustaining the penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim of inter-State transit cannot defeat action concerning undeclared goods unless the transporter establishes, through reliable contemporaneous evidence, the genuineness of the documents, transacting parties and stated destination.

Issues: (i) Whether intention to evade tax is a jurisdictional pre-condition under Section 129(1); (ii) The effect of Section 10(1)(b) to the claimed onward sale during transit, and the movement-document requirements; (iii) Whether the still-live first e-way bill covered the movement after diversion from Bhilai towards the location of interception or Raipur; (iv) Whether the second e-way bill truthfully and validly corresponded to that movement, having regard to its Bhilai dispatch declaration, expiry and the interception location; (v) Whether the cumulative defects were merely technical or constituted substantive contravention; and (vi) The effect of DRC-03 payment and whether the impugned order calls for interference.

Issue (i): Whether intention to evade tax is a jurisdictional pre-condition under Section 129(1).

Analysis: Section 129(1) is attracted where goods in transit are transported or stored in contravention of the Act or the rules. Unlike confiscation provisions, it does not make intention to evade tax an independent condition. Nevertheless, the explanation for the alleged contravention must be considered, and penalty cannot follow automatically from every minor discrepancy.

Conclusion: Intention to evade tax is not an independent jurisdictional pre-condition for penalty under Section 129(1).

Issue (ii): The effect of Section 10(1)(b) to the claimed onward sale during transit, and the movement-document requirements.

Analysis: Section 10(1)(b) of the IGST Act permits an intermediate purchaser to make an onward supply during transit without first taking physical delivery. That place-of-supply deeming provision does not alter the actual destination in existing transport records or dispense with Section 68 and the requirements under Rules 138 and 138A that movement documents accurately correspond to the physical movement.

Conclusion: The onward sale during transit was legally permissible, but it did not exempt the movement from valid and accurate e-way-bill documentation.

Issue (iii): Whether the still-live first e-way bill covered the movement after diversion from Bhilai towards the location of interception or Raipur.

Analysis: The first e-way bill remained valid in time and correctly described the original dispatch from Visakhapatnam to Bhilai. The contemporaneous movement record, subsequent invoice and second e-way bill produced at interception established that the destination had changed towards Raipur. Temporal validity alone could not make the first e-way bill correspond to the diverted movement.

Conclusion: The first e-way bill did not cover the altered movement merely because it had not expired.

Issue (iv): Whether the second e-way bill truthfully and validly corresponded to that movement, having regard to its Bhilai dispatch declaration, expiry and the interception location.

Analysis: The second e-way bill described a regular movement originating from Bhilai although the goods admittedly never reached Bhilai. It had expired before interception, with no extension, replacement document, exceptional circumstance, or contemporaneous transport record explaining the continued movement. The recorded interception location and route were not displaced by the alternative map evidence.

Conclusion: The second e-way bill was materially inaccurate as to its physical origin and was invalid on account of expiry at the time of interception.

Issue (v): Whether the cumulative defects were merely technical or constituted substantive contravention.

Analysis: The original e-way bill retained the displaced Bhilai destination, while the onward e-way bill falsely declared dispatch from Bhilai and had expired. The actual route was unsupported by contemporaneous time-stamped transport material. Matching goods description, quantity and vehicle number did not reconcile the conflicting origin and destination declarations or establish an uninterrupted movement.

Conclusion: The combined defects constituted substantive contravention of the movement-document requirements, not a technical or venial breach.

Issue (vi): The effect of DRC-03 payment and whether the impugned order calls for interference.

Analysis: Payment through DRC-03 to procure release of goods and conveyance neither constituted a conclusive admission nor extinguished the statutory right of appeal. On independent scrutiny, the established substantive contraventions attracted the prescribed penalty; the payment remained liable to be appropriated against that liability.

Conclusion: The payment did not bar appellate review, but no interference with the penalty was warranted.

Final Conclusion: A change in the actual destination during transit must be supported by valid movement documents that truthfully describe the physical journey; an expired e-way bill containing a materially incorrect dispatch point attracts penalty under Section 129(1)(a) without separate proof of mens rea.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 129(1) applies where the e-way bill fails to validly and truthfully correspond to the actual movement of goods, and proof of intention to evade tax is not an independent requirement for such civil penalty.