Issues: Whether proceedings to reopen deemed assessments under Section 27 of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 were barred by limitation, and whether the dealer's request for copies of assessment records could extend the statutory period.

Analysis: The returns having been filed with the prescribed documents and proof of tax payment, the assessments stood deemed completed under Section 22(2) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006. The power to reopen such assessments for escaped turnover or wrong availment of input tax credit under Section 27 was subject to the six-year statutory limitation. The dealer's subsequent communication seeking copies of assessment records could neither extend, enlarge nor revive that limitation; statutory jurisdiction cannot be enlarged by correspondence or conduct.

Conclusion: The reopening proceedings and consequential assessment orders, having been initiated beyond the prescribed six-year period, were barred by limitation and without jurisdiction, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the enhanced additional court fee at 1% under the notification effective from 01.04.2016 applies to tax appeals and revisions in which the taxing lis commenced before that date.

Analysis: Section 76(1) authorises levy of additional court fee, while the notification enhancing its rate took effect from 01.04.2016 and contains no express or necessarily implied retrospective operation. The obligation to pay court fee as a condition of appeal forms part of the vested right of appeal and cannot be made more onerous after commencement of the lis. In tax proceedings, the lis commences when, upon dissatisfaction with the return, the assessing authority calls for material or evidence, including through a pre-assessment notice; it does not depend merely on the assessment year, the date of assessment order, or the date of filing the appeal.

Conclusion: The enhanced 1% additional court fee is payable only where the taxing lis commenced on or after 01.04.2016; appeals or revisions arising from a lis commenced before that date remain governed by the earlier rate. Where the commencement date is not established, the concerned appellate or revisional authority must determine it.

Ratio Decidendi: An enhanced court-fee condition affecting a vested right of appeal operates prospectively, absent express or necessarily implied retrospectivity, and its applicability in tax matters is determined by the date on which the lis commenced.

Issues: Whether the Committee of Creditors may withdraw an approved resolution plan before its approval by the Adjudicating Authority on the ground that the corporate debtor's financial position has subsequently improved.

Analysis: A resolution plan approved under Section 30(4) derives binding force from the statutory insolvency framework between the Committee of Creditors and the successful resolution applicant even before approval under Section 31(1). Section 12-A, read with Regulations 30-A and 18(2), permits withdrawal only until approval of the plan by the Committee of Creditors; the Committee's continued role pending implementation does not extend to decisions affecting a plan already placed before the Adjudicating Authority. The commercial wisdom of the Committee cannot override this binding effect. The Adjudicating Authority's review remains confined to statutory compliance under Sections 30(2) and 31(1), and improved profitability alone does not justify refusal of an otherwise compliant plan.

Conclusion: The Committee of Creditors cannot withdraw its approved resolution plan after its submission to the Adjudicating Authority merely because the corporate debtor's financial position has improved; such improvement alone cannot warrant refusal of approval where the plan satisfies Section 30(2).

Issues: (i) Whether the IBC moratorium barred the arbitral tribunal from entertaining the second application under Section 17 and modifying the status quo arrangement while the corporate debtor's counterclaim was pending. (ii) Whether the tribunal's erroneous statement of the scope of the Section 29A extension order invalidated the impugned order. (iii) Whether the Adjudicating Authority had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) read with Section 63 of the IBC.

Issue (i): Whether the IBC moratorium barred the arbitral tribunal from entertaining the second application under Section 17 and modifying the status quo arrangement while the corporate debtor's counterclaim was pending.

Analysis: Section 14(1)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 prohibits proceedings against a corporate debtor, but does not prohibit proceedings initiated by it. A counterclaim by the corporate debtor may augment its estate if successful and does not impose a pecuniary liability upon it if unsuccessful. The expression "by or against" in Section 60(6) cannot be read into Section 14(1)(a) to create a bar on the counterclaim. The termination of the development agreement preceded the CIRP; the contractual conditions for possession had not been fulfilled, and the terminated agreement was not property of the corporate debtor protected by Section 14(1)(d). The interim status quo arrangement was a voluntary pro tem measure and could be reconsidered as an arbitral interim measure in aid of the surviving counterclaim.

Conclusion: The moratorium did not deprive the arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction to entertain the second Section 17 application and modify the status quo arrangement in relation to the counterclaim. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the tribunal's erroneous statement of the scope of the Section 29A extension order invalidated the impugned order.

Analysis: The Section 29A extension order had attained finality and permitted continuation of the corporate debtor's counterclaim, not the claim against it. Although the impugned order incorrectly described that order as permitting both claims to proceed, the second interim application was referable to the counterclaim. The misstatement therefore did not affect the tribunal's jurisdiction to determine the appropriate interlocutory arrangement.

Conclusion: The erroneous description of the Section 29A order did not invalidate the impugned order. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether the Adjudicating Authority had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) read with Section 63 of the IBC.

Analysis: Section 60(5)(c) confers limited residuary jurisdiction over disputes arising out of or relating to insolvency resolution. That jurisdiction is unavailable for a contractual termination founded on pre-insolvency non-performance and unconnected with the CIRP. Since the termination notice preceded the CIRP and was not occasioned by insolvency, the necessary nexus for invoking the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction was absent. Consequently, the jurisdictional bar under Section 63 did not arise.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority did not have exclusive jurisdiction, and the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction was not ousted. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral process may continue on the corporate debtor's counterclaim, with interlocutory measures remaining within the arbitral tribunal's competence; the IBC moratorium neither preserves the terminated development agreement as estate property nor transfers this contractual dispute exclusively to the Adjudicating Authority.

Ratio Decidendi: The IBC moratorium and the Adjudicating Authority's residuary jurisdiction do not displace arbitral adjudication of a corporate debtor's own counterclaim where the contractual termination preceded, and is unrelated to, the CIRP.

Issues: Whether bleaching, dyeing and processing of fabrics received from handloom or powerloom manufacturers on job-work basis constitute manufacture attracting textile cess under Section 5A of the Textiles Committee Act, 1963.

Analysis: Section 5A levies cess on textiles and textile machinery manufactured in India, while exempting textiles manufactured out of handloom or powerloom industry. As "manufacture" is undefined in the Textiles Committee Act, 1963, its specialised definition under another enactment cannot be imported absent legislative reference, incorporation, or statutes being in pari materia. On its common-parlance meaning in the statutory context, bleaching and dyeing undertaken on job-work basis merely process and refine fabrics supplied by powerloom or handloom manufacturers and returned to them; they do not result in manufacture of a new textile by the processor.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: job-work processing of the fabrics does not amount to manufacture under Section 5A of the Textiles Committee Act, 1963, and the processor is not liable to textile cess.

Issues: Whether the appellant's residual liability to the assignee should be fixed for a full and final settlement despite unresolved challenges to the NPA classification and assignment of debt.

Analysis: The validity of the NPA classification, the assignment, and the basis for calculating compensation on debt value or acquisition value were expressly left open. The report had assessed possible returns on the assignee's investment after accounting for payments already made, while relevant financial information and borrowing details were not furnished by the assignee. In the peculiar circumstances, including the need to preserve the running concern, equitable balancing warranted a conclusive monetary settlement rather than adjudication of the disputed legal issues.

Conclusion: The appellant shall pay an additional Rs.125 crores within 12 weeks, over and above Rs.250 crores already paid, as full and final settlement of the assignee's debt claims. Upon payment, the respondents must release the securities and guarantees and return the title deeds; the pending insolvency and debt-recovery proceedings shall stand disposed of. On default, the respondents may revive proceedings and the appellant will lose the benefit of the settlement directions.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 129(3) can be sustained where the physical verification confirms that the goods fully match the valid tax invoice and e-way bill; (ii) Whether an uncorroborated driver's statement can establish that goods were loaded from an undeclared place of business.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 129(3) can be sustained where the physical verification confirms that the goods fully match the valid tax invoice and e-way bill.

Analysis: Section 129 is an anti-evasion measure applicable to movement of goods unsupported by genuine statutory documents. Physical verification recorded no discrepancy in the description, quantity, quality, weight or value of the goods vis-a -vis the tax invoice and e-way bill. The declared dispatch premises stood approved as an additional place of business, the vehicle was travelling towards the declared destination, and no material showed diversion, unaccounted stock, or an unrecorded supply. A technical or administrative variation, without evidence of an intent to evade tax, could not establish the basis for penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 129(3) was unsustainable; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an uncorroborated driver's statement can establish that goods were loaded from an undeclared place of business.

Analysis: The allegation of loading from an undeclared location rested principally on the driver's statement, without corroborative evidence and without an opportunity to cross-examine the driver. That statement could not override the approved registration particulars and the certified evidence concerning operation of the weighbridge. The Revenue did not produce contemporaneous verification material, photographs, independent witness evidence, or other objective proof to support its allegation.

Conclusion: The driver's uncorroborated statement was insufficient to prove the alleged contravention; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory preconditions for imposing a transit penalty were not established, and the penalty remained unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under Section 129(3) cannot rest on technical irregularities or an uncorroborated driver's statement where valid transit documents correspond with the goods and the evidence does not establish an intent to evade tax.

Issues: Whether a short administrative delay in posting genuine stock transactions, supported by contemporaneous records and statutory returns, constitutes failure to account for goods warranting confiscation under Section 130(1)(ii).

Analysis: Section 130(1)(ii) imposes the severe consequence of confiscation only where the facts establish deliberate tax evasion through unaccounted goods. The disputed stock was supported by a pre-survey invoice, was subsequently verifiable in the regular books and statutory returns, and the delay in posting was attributable to the accountant's temporary absence. A delayed entry of a genuine commercial transaction is distinct from non-accountal intended for clandestine removal. The physical-stock allegation was also based on visual approximations rather than standard weighment, while the separate assessment under Section 74 substantially accepted the explanation and treated only a minor quantity as discrepant. Treating the same transactions as reconcilable under Section 74 and as confiscable under Section 130 was legally inconsistent.

Conclusion: A short, bona fide bookkeeping delay supported by contemporaneous commercial records does not amount to unaccounted goods or a confiscable offence under Section 130(1)(ii).

Issues: Whether revocation of the customs broker licence, forfeiture of security deposit, and penalty were sustainable for alleged contraventions of Regulations 1(4), 10(b), 10(d), and 10(e) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018.

Analysis: Regulation 1(4) prohibits sale or transfer of a customs broker licence. Handling an import transaction referred by a clearing and forwarding agent did not establish that the licence had been sold or transferred. Likewise, dealing with stakeholders in an import transaction did not, by itself, establish that business was transacted through an unauthorised person under Regulation 10(b).

Analysis: The alleged quantity of over-debiting in the show-cause notice materially differed from the quantity ultimately attributed to the customs broker, whose role was confined to a negligible part of the imports and did not extend to the earlier consignments. Under Public Notice No. 66/2023, the actual debit entries and their verification were functions of the customs officers at the designated service centre and officers granting out-of-charge. No invalid or forged licence was supplied, and the evidence did not establish a failure to advise the importer or exercise due diligence under Regulations 10(d) and 10(e).

Conclusion: None of the alleged contraventions was established; the revocation of licence, forfeiture of security deposit, and penalty were legally unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised to entertain a belated jurisdictional challenge to a show-cause notice after participation in adjudication; (ii) Whether the adjudication order was vitiated by denial of a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing.

Issue (i): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised to entertain a belated jurisdictional challenge to a show-cause notice after participation in adjudication.

Analysis: The extraordinary writ remedy was declined for a jurisdictional challenge raised after participation in the proceedings and substantial delay, particularly when an alternative statutory remedy was available. The jurisdictional objection was left to be addressed in the statutory adjudicatory process.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional challenge was not entertained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudication order was vitiated by denial of a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing.

Analysis: Section 75(5) requires a reasonable opportunity of hearing in adjudication. The notified hearing did not conclude the proceedings, yet no further hearing notice or date was provided for several months before an ex parte order was made on the basis of the reply. This denied the assessee a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing and breached principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The adjudication order was unsustainable for denial of a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Fresh adjudication must be undertaken in accordance with law after affording hearing and addressing the jurisdictional objection under Section 74.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudication order cannot be sustained where, after the notified hearing does not conclude the proceedings, no further hearing opportunity is given before an ex parte determination is made.

Issues: Whether compensation received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 is exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was applied to compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019. Identical claims by similarly placed BSNL employees had been accepted in earlier coordinate-bench decisions, and Revenue did not distinguish those decisions on facts or law. The applicable approach also accords with the obligation of tax authorities not to deny a lawful relief merely because the assessee was unaware of the entitlement.

Conclusion: Compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019 is exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; taxable income and consequential refund are to be recomputed accordingly.

Issues: Whether penalty for misreporting under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained solely on disallowance of employees' PF/ESI contributions.

Analysis: Penalty for misreporting requires that the case fall within a specific category prescribed under Section 270A(9) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. A mere disallowance of a claim does not, by itself, establish misreporting. The record did not demonstrate that the delayed employees' PF/ESI contribution fell within any statutory category of misreporting.

Conclusion: The penalty for misreporting was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the re-determination of FOB value pursuant to the unchallenged remand order, by applying Rules 5 to 8 of the Valuation Rules, 1988, warranted interference.

Analysis: The earlier remand order had attained finality and conclusively determined that the declared FOB values were rightly doubted, that the Revenue had discharged its burden regarding misdeclaration, and that the values required re-determination. The scope of remand was therefore confined to verifying whether the prescribed valuation procedure had been followed; the concluded question of re-determination could not be reopened. The Commissioner had considered the values of the different goods in detail and re-determined them under the applicable valuation rules.

Conclusion: The re-determination of FOB value was in accordance with the binding remand directions and required no interference.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax could be levied on a builder's construction of residential complex or works contract services before 1 July 2010; (ii) Whether service tax was payable on such services rendered from 1 July 2010.

Issue (i): Whether service tax could be levied on a builder's construction of residential complex or works contract services before 1 July 2010.

Analysis: The Explanation inserted in Section 65(105)(zzzzh) and Section 65(105)(zzzzq) by the Finance Act, 2010 treated specified construction intended for sale as a deemed service. The applicable circular treated a builder's pre-1 July 2010 construction as self-service. The deeming fiction widened the tax net and operated prospectively, applying equally to construction-of-complex and works-contract classifications.

Conclusion: No service tax was leviable under either classification for the period before 1 July 2010; the related demands and penalties were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax was payable on such services rendered from 1 July 2010.

Analysis: From 1 July 2010, the amended statutory scheme brought covered builder services within taxability. The surviving demand related to the period from July 2010 to March 2011.

Conclusion: The service-tax demand of Rs. 9,96,156 with interest for July 2010 to March 2011 was confirmed, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The amendment governs builder services prospectively: pre-1 July 2010 demands under the two service categories do not survive, whereas tax liability arising after that date remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory deeming provision bringing a builder's pre-completion construction for sale within the service-tax net applies prospectively from its stated effective date; before that date, the activity is self-service and cannot be taxed as either construction-of-complex or works-contract service.

Issues: (i) Whether the denial of an opportunity to rebut the verification report breached the principles of natural justice; (ii) Whether non-disclosure of gross receipts justified invocation of the extended period of limitation and imposition of penalties; (iii) Whether the composite maintenance-and-repair contracts were chargeable before 1 June 2007 and, thereafter, the applicable method for valuing the works-contract service.

Issue (i): Whether the denial of an opportunity to rebut the verification report breached the principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The remand directions required a reasonable opportunity of hearing and permitted additional evidence. Four hearings were fixed, and the assessee ultimately requested a decision on the existing written record. The verification report relied only on facts and calculations already forming part of the show-cause notice, and no specific inaccuracy in that report was identified.

Conclusion: No breach of the principles of natural justice was established; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether non-disclosure of gross receipts justified invocation of the extended period of limitation and imposition of penalties.

Analysis: The receipts reflected in the service recipient's tax-deduction records exceeded the values declared in the service-tax returns. Service tax is chargeable on the gross amount charged and cannot be reduced by payments made to subcontractors. The failure to disclose the full consideration amounted to suppression of value.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was validly invoked. Penalties under Sections 76 and 77 remain sustainable, while the penalty under Section 78 is to be recomputed with the redetermined tax; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the composite maintenance-and-repair contracts were chargeable before 1 June 2007 and, thereafter, the applicable method for valuing the works-contract service.

Analysis: A composite contract involving services and materials is a works contract. Such contracts were not chargeable under the pre-existing taxable-service categories before works contract service was introduced with effect from 1 June 2007; consequently, the claimed pre-introduction abatement is immaterial. For the subsequent period, the composition scheme was unavailable because no option for it was established. As the value of goods transferred in execution of the contracts was not determinable, Rule 2A(ii) applies, under which maintenance and repair works are valued at 70% of the gross amount charged. Free supplies by the service recipient are excluded from the gross amount, while subcontractor payments are not deductible. The resulting amount is to receive cum-tax treatment, with tax already paid adjusted.

Conclusion: The demand for the period before 1 June 2007 is unsustainable. For the subsequent period, tax is payable on 70% of the gross amount charged, excluding free supplies and allowing cum-tax benefit; this issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The enforceable tax liability is confined to the post-1 June 2007 works-contract period and must be recomputed on the prescribed valuation basis, with consequential revision of the Section 78 penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite contract involving service and materials is chargeable as works contract service only from its statutory introduction; where composition was not elected and the goods value is not determinable, the prescribed percentage valuation applies.

Issues: Whether cash refund of service tax erroneously paid on invoices raised for a period in which no service was rendered is barred by the limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, or by the absence of a credit note under Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Analysis: Although invoices were issued and service tax was paid, no service was rendered during the relevant period. Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 permitted credit of tax paid where services were not rendered and imposed no time limit for taking that credit. Following the introduction of GST and repeal of the earlier service-tax regime, Section 142(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 required the amount otherwise available as credit to be refunded in cash. The limitation under Section 11B could not apply to such a transitional cash refund. A credit note was unnecessary because there was no contract, service, or payment from the service recipient during the period concerned.

Conclusion: The cash refund was admissible and was neither time-barred under Section 11B nor deniable for want of a credit note.

Issues: (i) Validity of the sanction granted under Section 151(i) on 1 April 2022 after expiry of three years, including the temporal operation of the Finance Act 2023 proviso to Section 151; (ii) Whether third-party survey material established a live link between the assessee and alleged unaccounted sale consideration.

Issue (i): Validity of the sanction granted under Section 151(i) on 1 April 2022 after expiry of three years, including the temporal operation of the Finance Act 2023 proviso to Section 151.

Analysis: Sections 149(1)(a), 149(2), and 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 prescribe the limitation framework and identify the specified authority competent to approve reassessment. The three-year period for the relevant assessment year ended on 31 March 2022. Approval granted on 1 April 2022 by the authority under Section 151(i) did not meet the requirement applicable after expiry of that period. The time allowed for response under Section 148A(b) could not cure the jurisdictional defect under the unamended Section 151. The proviso inserted in Section 151 with effect from 1 April 2023 altered the computation of the three-year threshold for identifying the approving authority; it was a substantive jurisdictional change and was expressly prospective.

Conclusion: The sanction under Section 151(i) was without jurisdiction, and the Finance Act 2023 proviso to Section 151 did not retrospectively validate it. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether third-party survey material established a live link between the assessee and alleged unaccounted sale consideration.

Analysis: The impounded loose papers from a third-party survey contained neither the assessee's name nor particulars directly connecting her with the alleged on-money. The assessee had not sold the land to the person whose statement was relied upon, and no material established that person as her broker or otherwise connected her to the third-party transaction. The material was impounded nearly two years after the sale, without any demonstrated nexus to the assessee.

Conclusion: The third-party material did not establish a live link with the assessee or provide a sustainable basis for reassessment. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory safeguard governing approval for reassessment remained applicable under the law in force on the relevant date, and the evidentiary foundation for reopening was independently insufficient.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory amendment altering the computation for identifying the competent reassessment-sanctioning authority cannot retrospectively cure a jurisdictionally invalid sanction unless the legislature clearly provides for retrospective operation.

Issues: (i) Whether software imported and supplied to educational institutions was customized software eligible for exemption or packaged software; (ii) Whether RSP/MRP assessment applied to such software despite the institutional or industrial consumer claim; (iii) Whether RSP could be determined from downstream invoices under the valuation rules; (iv) Whether extended limitation, confiscation, and penalties were justified.

Issue (i): Whether software imported and supplied to educational institutions was customized software eligible for exemption or packaged software.

Analysis: The material from software suppliers, educational institutions, and the importer's personnel established that the products were standard electronic-design and simulation tools with common functionality, supplied to varied users. Customer consultations, installation, training, and technical support did not establish client-specific development or alteration of the software. The products consequently met the definition of packaged or canned software under the applicable exemption notification.

Conclusion: The educational software was packaged software, not customized software, and was ineligible for the customized-software exemption; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether RSP/MRP assessment applied to such software despite the institutional or industrial consumer claim.

Analysis: Retail sale under the Legal Metrology framework includes distribution or delivery through agencies or other instrumentalities for consumption by a group of individuals; it is not confined to sales through retail shops. The software was delivered as such to varied customers and was capable of off-the-shelf sale. After the relevant amendment, institutional or industrial consumer treatment additionally required a "not for retail sale" declaration on the package, which was absent. RSP-based assessment was therefore attracted under Section 4A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, read with Section 3(2) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Conclusion: RSP/MRP-based assessment validly applied to the imported packaged software; against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether RSP could be determined from downstream invoices under the valuation rules.

Analysis: Sales invoices of distributors and sub-resellers supplied contemporaneous market evidence of the maximum price at which the software was sold. The invoices did not segregate alleged support-service charges, while customer confirmations indicated that installation and training were provided without separate charge. Those invoices could consequently be used for RSP determination under Rule 6, with the prescribed abatement.

Conclusion: The RSP re-determination based on downstream sales invoices was valid; against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether extended limitation, confiscation, and penalties were justified.

Analysis: The absence of the mandatory "not for retail sale" declaration, coupled with commencement of MRP declarations after departmental objection and the established nature of the software as packaged software, supported an intention to evade duty. These circumstances sustained invocation of the extended period and the consequential confiscation and penalties.

Conclusion: The extended period, confiscation, and penalties were rightly sustained; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The RSP-based CVD re-determination and the related fiscal liabilities remain legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Standard software developed for varied users does not become customized software merely because customer consultations, installation, training, or technical support are provided; where it is capable of off-the-shelf sale and statutory retail-package requirements apply, it is assessable on the RSP basis.

Issues: Whether the service-tax demand on unaccounted cash receipts from flat purchasers was sustainable on the basis of recovered pen-drive data, signed printouts, and statements of the accounts manager and director.

Analysis: The pen drives were recovered under panchnama from the accounts manager, who explained their contents and signed the printouts. His statement was reaffirmed after eleven months and was also confirmed by the company director. Under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proof concerning facts within their exclusive knowledge rested on persons maintaining the records. The statements recorded under Section 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were voluntary statements and remained usable evidence; their retraction only in the reply to the show-cause notice was a delayed retraction and an afterthought. The recovered electronic records and signed printouts provided corroborative documentary evidence of cash receipts, notwithstanding the absence of bank entries or buyer statements.

Conclusion: The unaccounted cash receipts and consequent service-tax liability were established; the order setting aside the demand was erroneous, and the original order confirming the demand, interest, and penalties was restored.

Issues: (i) Whether supplying food from premises provided by a hospital constituted taxable outdoor catering service notwithstanding payment of VAT; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether supplying food from premises provided by a hospital constituted taxable outdoor catering service notwithstanding payment of VAT.

Analysis: Under Sections 65(24), 65(76a), and 65(105)(zzt) of the Finance Act, 1994, a person supplying food in connection with catering from premises provided by the recipient falls within outdoor catering service. The food was supplied from hospital premises, bringing the activity within the expanded definition applicable from 16.06.2005. Payment of VAT established taxation of the goods component alone; statutory abatements had already excluded the permissible goods value from the taxable value. The earlier exemption for outdoor caterers in medical establishments had also been rescinded with effect from 01.03.2006.

Conclusion: The supply constituted taxable outdoor catering service, and payment of VAT did not displace service-tax liability on the service component. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: The demand was founded on records maintained by the assessee. Mere failure to declare facts did not establish wilful suppression; invocation of the extended period required deliberate conduct intended to evade tax. The existence of reasonable cause under Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 also precluded penalties for the relevant period.

Conclusion: The demand for the extended period and all penalties were unsustainable. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Service-tax liability remains confined to the normal limitation period with applicable interest, while penalties do not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Food supplied under an institutional arrangement from premises provided by the recipient falls within outdoor catering service, and VAT paid on the goods component does not preclude service tax on the separately taxable service component.