Issues: (i) Whether the disputed Hyundai vehicle models were covered by Entry 52B of Notification No. 05/2017-Compensation Cess (Rate) dated 11.09.2017 and liable to Compensation Cess at 22%; (ii) Whether the differential Compensation Cess, interest and penalties were recoverable under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on the basis of suppression of facts with intent to evade tax.

Issue (i): Whether the disputed Hyundai vehicle models were covered by Entry 52B of Notification No. 05/2017-Compensation Cess (Rate) dated 11.09.2017 and liable to Compensation Cess at 22%.

Analysis: Entry 52B required cumulative fulfilment of the requirements concerning engine capacity, length, SUV identity and ground clearance. The engine-capacity and length conditions were undisputed, while manufacturer brochures, advertisements and product specifications established that the models were popularly known as SUVs. The 2023 amendment expressly defined ground clearance as unladen ground clearance and applied prospectively; however, its prospective operation did not prescribe laden measurement for the earlier period. A laden-condition qualification could not be read into the unamended fiscal entry through strict construction. Manufacturer specifications were relevant evidence of the vehicles' physical characteristics. ARAI certification remained technical evidence of measurement but was not conclusive of fiscal classification. The disclosed unladen ground clearances exceeded 170 mm.

Conclusion: Entry 52B applied and Compensation Cess was chargeable at 22%, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the differential Compensation Cess, interest and penalties were recoverable under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on the basis of suppression of facts with intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Self-assessment did not relieve the taxpayer of the independent statutory responsibility to determine and discharge the correct cess rate. The lower rate was applied despite the vehicles satisfying the higher-rate entry, and the short-payment was detected through investigation. The material was found sufficient to establish suppression of facts with intent to evade tax, supporting the statutory recovery consequences.

Conclusion: The differential Compensation Cess, statutory interest and penalties were recoverable, in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The lower 20% cess rate was unavailable because the vehicles fulfilled the higher-rate classification under Entry 52B using their unladen ground clearance, and the original fiscal liability consequently governs.

Ratio Decidendi: A loading-condition qualification absent from a fiscal classification entry cannot be read into it to obtain a lower rate; classification follows the product's commercial identity and relevant manufacturer specifications.

Issues: (i) Whether an alleged excess input tax credit claim can be sustained merely by comparing Form GSTR-3B with Form GSTR-2A without verifying input tax credit reversals and the net credit position; (ii) Whether the difference between Table 9 of Form GSTR-9 and Table 9P of Form GSTR-9C establishes short-paid output tax without reconciliation of the underlying records; (iii) Whether a demand for short reversal of input tax credit under Rules 42 and 43 can be sustained without identifying and segregating actual common credit.

Issue (i): Whether an alleged excess input tax credit claim can be sustained merely by comparing Form GSTR-3B with Form GSTR-2A without verifying input tax credit reversals and the net credit position.

Analysis: A demand under Section 73 requires verification of the actual net input tax credit position. The return data showed that input tax credit reversals in Table 4(B) of Form GSTR-3B exceeded the credit availed. A comparison of gross credit figures with Form GSTR-2A, while disregarding those reversals, did not determine whether any excess credit remained or whether there was an actual revenue loss.

Conclusion: The alleged excess input tax credit demand was unsustainable without giving effect to reversals and determining the net input tax credit position.

Issue (ii): Whether the difference between Table 9 of Form GSTR-9 and Table 9P of Form GSTR-9C establishes short-paid output tax without reconciliation of the underlying records.

Analysis: The two return fields reflected different reporting parameters, including the effect of input tax credit reversals. The disclosed reconciliation explanation was not scrutinised, and the difference was treated as unpaid tax without verification of sales ledgers, tax invoices, and financial books. A portal-based comparison alone was insufficient to determine output-tax liability.

Conclusion: The return mismatch did not by itself establish short-paid tax and required a detailed factual reconciliation.

Issue (iii): Whether a demand for short reversal of input tax credit under Rules 42 and 43 can be sustained without identifying and segregating actual common credit.

Analysis: Rules 42 and 43 require identification of specific credit and common credit before applying the exempt-to-taxable turnover ratio to the actual common input tax pool. The demand proceeded by treating the entire input tax credit as common credit and without verifying the substantial reversals disclosed in the returns.

Conclusion: The proposed proportional reversal was invalid because the requisite segregation and verification of common credit had not been undertaken.

Final Conclusion: The demand determinations rested on unreconciled return discrepancies and omitted essential verification of primary records; fresh de novo verification is necessary before any tax, interest, or penalty liability can be determined.

Ratio Decidendi: A GST demand founded on return discrepancies cannot be sustained without verification of the net input tax credit position after accounting for reversals and, under Rules 42 and 43, identification of actual common credit before applying proportional reversal.

Issues: (i) Whether the Company Court had jurisdiction in the winding-up to adjudicate title to seized paintings claimed by the liquidation estate; (ii) Whether five identified paintings formed part of the liquidation estate notwithstanding a rival claimant's asserted entitlement under family consent terms; and (iii) Whether sale of the five identified paintings should proceed through an expert-assisted art-auction process.

Issue (i): Whether the Company Court had jurisdiction in the winding-up to adjudicate title to seized paintings claimed by the liquidation estate.

Analysis: Sections 446(2)(b) and 446(2)(d), read with Section 456 of the Companies Act, 1956, empower the Company Court to take custody of property to which the company appears entitled and to determine the consequential question of title. The earlier determination of jurisdiction had attained finality and had not been disturbed in appeal.

Conclusion: The Company Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate title to the paintings for purposes of the winding-up.

Issue (ii): Whether five identified paintings formed part of the liquidation estate notwithstanding a rival claimant's asserted entitlement under family consent terms.

Analysis: The asset register, purchase vouchers, seizure record, police affidavits and gallery confirmation furnished a coherent and corroborated basis to identify the five paintings as company assets. The applicable standard was preponderance of probabilities. The rival claimant, despite repeated opportunities, adduced no evidence of title and declined to enter the witness box, warranting an adverse inference. The family consent terms concerned possession and enjoyment among family members, covered only the art then in dispute, and neither bound the company nor established title against it.

Conclusion: The five identified paintings form part of the liquidation estate, and the rival claim to them fails. No determination of title is made in respect of the remaining paintings.

Issue (iii): Whether sale of the five identified paintings should proceed through an expert-assisted art-auction process.

Analysis: Works of art require a specialised sale mechanism rather than a routine asset-auction platform. Engagement of an art expert and an appropriate art auction house would promote value maximisation and price discovery for the liquidation estate.

Conclusion: The five identified paintings may be sold through an expert-assisted art-auction process formulated by the Official Liquidator and the appointed expert.

Final Conclusion: The liquidation estate is entitled to realise the five identified assets for satisfaction of stakeholder claims, while competing claims concerning the remaining paintings are preserved for separate adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: In winding-up, the Company Court may determine title to property appearing to belong to the company on a preponderance of probabilities based on reliable corporate records and corroborative material, particularly where a rival claimant fails to substantiate title.

Issues: Whether the impugned properties could be retained under attachment as proceeds of crime under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Sections 2(u), 2(1)(y), and 3 require property alleged to be proceeds of crime to have a demonstrable nexus with criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The payments received under the debenture subscription agreements, consultancy arrangements, and dairy-business sale arrangement were independent commercial transactions. Significant payments preceded the relevant bank disbursement, and no material established a link between the later payments and any alleged criminal proceeds. Official banking investments and loans, without material showing illegality or diversion, could not by themselves be treated as proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The amounts and the attached properties were not shown to constitute proceeds of crime; continuation of the attachment was unwarranted.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order confirming input tax credit demand could stand without examining the objection that the demand overlapped with proceedings initiated by central GST officers and was barred by Section 6(2)(b) of the GST enactments.

Analysis: The objection concerned an overlapping tax demand and the statutory bar on parallel proceedings, as central GST notices were stated to cover, in part, the same period and input tax credit. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand, interest and penalty without examining that material contention. A reasoned adjudication required determination of the asserted overlap and statutory bar; the merits of the input tax credit demand were left open.

Conclusion: The adjudication made without deciding the overlapping-demand objection was set aside for fresh determination in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether delay in furnishing Form No. 10 for claiming accumulation under Section 11(2) could be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The claim for accumulation was disclosed in the original return filed within time and in the audit report in Form No. 10B; hence, the omission to furnish Form No. 10 was not an afterthought. The contemporaneous record supported the explanation of inadvertence, and there was no material to disbelieve it. The accumulated amount was recorded as invested in fixed deposits falling within the prescribed modes under Section 11(5). Furnishing Form No. 10 was treated as a directory procedural requirement, and its filing before issuance of the intimation constituted substantial compliance. Section 119(2)(b), being intended to mitigate undue hardship arising from non-wilful non-compliance, warranted condonation in view of the substantial adverse effect on the charitable trust's corpus and activities.

Conclusion: The delay in furnishing Form No. 10 was liable to be condoned, and the claim for accumulation under Section 11(2) could not be denied solely because of delayed filing of that form.

Issues: (i) Whether the draft assessment order under Section 144C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, made after expiry of the limitation prescribed by Section 153, was without jurisdiction; (ii) Whether the availability of a statutory appeal barred exercise of writ jurisdiction where the assessment proceedings were alleged to be without jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether the draft assessment order under Section 144C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, made after expiry of the limitation prescribed by Section 153, was without jurisdiction.

Analysis: For the relevant assessment year, the period under the third proviso to Section 153(1), as extended by Section 153(4) upon reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer, expired on 31 December 2023. Section 144C(1) required the Assessing Officer to make and forward the draft assessment order within that applicable period. The draft order was made only thereafter. The subsequent final assessment order, demand notice and penalty notice were founded on that time-barred draft order. The later insertions in Sections 153 and 144C reinforced this construction, though the conclusion did not depend upon them.

Conclusion: The draft assessment order was barred by limitation and without jurisdiction; the consequential final assessment order, demand notice and penalty show-cause notice could not survive. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the availability of a statutory appeal barred exercise of writ jurisdiction where the assessment proceedings were alleged to be without jurisdiction.

Analysis: The availability of an alternative statutory remedy is a rule of judicial self-restraint and not an absolute bar to jurisdiction under Article 226. Where the impugned proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction, the writ court may entertain the challenge. The undisputed expiry of the assessment limitation established such a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The statutory appellate remedy did not preclude writ relief against proceedings that were without jurisdiction. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Expiry of the statutory period for making and forwarding the draft assessment order rendered the assessment process jurisdictionally invalid, notwithstanding the availability of an appellate remedy.

Ratio Decidendi: A draft assessment order under Section 144C(1) must be made and forwarded within the applicable limitation period under Section 153; a draft order made thereafter is without jurisdiction and cannot sustain consequential assessment proceedings.

Issues: Whether the aggregate disallowance of the claimed house-property loss and deductions under Sections 80C and 80D could be sustained on the evidence produced.

Analysis: The claims for house-property loss and Chapter VI-A deductions required evidentiary substantiation. The material produced was partly self-serving and contained inconsistencies, making it unsuitable for accepting the claims in full. Given the limited quantum involved, an ad hoc estimation of income at 10 per cent of the aggregate disallowance was considered appropriate.

Conclusion: The aggregate additions were restricted to Rs. 36,344, being 10 per cent of Rs. 3,63,437, taxable at normal rates rather than under Section 115BBE.

Issues: Whether the addition arising from the alleged cash transactions should be confined to an estimated 8% profit element rather than the entire amount.

Analysis: In the assessee's prior assessment years, the departmental authorities had accepted estimation of income at 8% in respect of similar cash transactions. Applying that consistent treatment to the year in question, the addition was directed to be computed only at 8% of the alleged transaction amount of Rs. 2,87,345.

Conclusion: The addition is restricted to Rs. 22,987, being 8% of Rs. 2,87,345; the balance of the addition cannot stand.

Issues: Whether reassessment could be sustained where no addition was made in respect of the income forming the recorded reason for reopening, but additions were made on other matters.

Analysis: Section 147, read with Explanation 3, permits assessment of other income noticed in a validly reopened proceeding, but does not remove the requirement that the income forming the recorded reason for reopening be assessed or reassessed. The long-term capital gains identified in the recorded reasons were not added; the disallowance under Section 54F and the addition under income from other sources were distinct matters. The binding jurisdictional rule therefore precluded sustaining the reassessment solely on those other additions.

Conclusion: The reassessment under Section 143(3) read with Section 147 was unsustainable and was quashed; the consequential additions, including the disallowance under Section 54F, could not survive.

Issues: (i) Whether reopening of the assessment was valid under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether an addition based on third-party statements without affording cross-examination was sustainable; (iii) Whether the loan-credit addition was sustainable on the evidence of genuineness and repayment.

Issue (i): Whether reopening of the assessment was valid under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Reassessment jurisdiction requires an independent reason to believe, founded on relevant material, that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The recorded reasons neither identified a failure to disclose material facts nor demonstrated independent verification of the existing assessment records. They proceeded on factually incorrect material and borrowed satisfaction, without tangible material establishing escapement of income.

Conclusion: The reopening was invalid and is quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an addition based on third-party statements without affording cross-examination was sustainable.

Analysis: Where an addition rests on third-party statements or material, principles of natural justice require disclosure of such material and an effective opportunity to rebut it, including cross-examination of the persons whose statements are relied upon. The absence of that opportunity left the material untested.

Conclusion: The addition founded on third-party statements without cross-examination was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the loan-credit addition was sustainable on the evidence of genuineness and repayment.

Analysis: The loan transactions were recorded in the books and supported by ledger accounts, PAN particulars, bank statements, confirmations, and repayment details. Subsequent repayment of the loans supported the genuineness of the credits and did not justify their treatment as unexplained cash credits.

Conclusion: The loan-credit addition was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The invalid reopening and the independent defects in the loan-credit addition render the reassessment demand unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment jurisdiction cannot be invoked on borrowed satisfaction or factually incorrect reasons lacking independently verified tangible material establishing escapement of income.

Issues: Whether an addition for unexplained money could be sustained solely on an unsigned excel sheet recovered from a third party, without cross-examination of the relevant persons or independent corroborative evidence.

Analysis: The material relied upon consisted of an unsigned third-party excel sheet that did not identify or bear the signature of the assessee. An adverse addition founded on such material required an opportunity to cross-examine the persons connected with it and independent evidence establishing that the alleged cash payment had actually been made. In the absence of cross-examination and corroboration, the excel sheet remained an unreliable third-party document incapable of supporting the addition.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 69A read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was unsustainable and was deleted.

Issues: Whether cash receipts recorded in the regular books as collections from identified business debtors could be treated as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 69A applies where money is established to be unexplained. The disputed receipts were recorded in the regular books and were supported by party-wise ledgers, identified debtor particulars, audited accounts, sales and purchase registers, stock records and VAT returns. No defect was identified in the underlying business records, the books were not rejected, and no independent verification was undertaken from the identified parties. The absence of debtor confirmations alone could not displace the documentary evidence or establish unexplained money. Acceptance of Specified Bank Notes during demonetisation, without contrary material connecting the receipts to undisclosed income, also did not establish an unexplained source. Suspicion could not substitute proof.

Conclusion: The receipts were not established to be unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition for unexplained investment in intangible assets and the consequential depreciation disallowance required verification; (ii) Whether the assessed-income computation, based on adjustments in the intimation under section 143(1), involved duplication of disallowances.

Issue (i): Whether the addition for unexplained investment in intangible assets and the consequential depreciation disallowance required verification.

Analysis: Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies to investments whose nature and source remain unexplained, while section 115BBE governs their taxation. The difference between the recorded cost of intangible assets and the supporting documents produced could not be determined without examining the books of account, invoices, agreements, ledgers, payment records, salary records, and evidence concerning software customisation and development. The depreciation disallowance was consequential to the addition.

Conclusion: The addition for unexplained investment and the consequential depreciation disallowance are remitted for fresh verification and adjudication.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessed-income computation, based on adjustments in the intimation under section 143(1), involved duplication of disallowances.

Analysis: Verification was required by comparing the original and revised returns, the intimation under section 143(1), the computation of income, tax audit report, and assessment order to ascertain whether the disputed expenses had already been disallowed and whether the assessment duplicated those disallowances.

Conclusion: The computation issue is remitted for verification and fresh adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The disputed additions and computation adjustments must be reconsidered on verification of the relevant records after providing a reasonable opportunity to furnish supporting evidence and explanations.

Issues: (i) Whether the relevant date of import for applying an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy is the date of shipment or dispatch or the date of filing of the Bill of Entry or clearance for home consumption; (ii) Whether Notification No. 02/2026-27 applies to goods dispatched and arrived in India before its electronic Gazette publication merely because the Bills of Entry were filed thereafter.

Issue (i): Whether the relevant date of import for applying an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy is the date of shipment or dispatch or the date of filing of the Bill of Entry or clearance for home consumption.

Analysis: Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, read with paragraphs 2.17(a) and 11.11 of the Handbook of Procedures, 2023, defines the date of import by reference to shipment or dispatch from the supplying country. For air imports, the relevant Airway Bill evidencing departure from the last airport in the exporting country is determinative. The Bill of Entry or out-of-charge date is relevant under Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962 for determining the rate of customs duty, but does not govern the applicability of an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy.

Conclusion: The relevant date of import for the import-policy restriction is the shipment or dispatch date determined under the Foreign Trade Policy and Handbook of Procedures, not the post-notification Bill of Entry or clearance date. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Notification No. 02/2026-27 applies to goods dispatched and arrived in India before its electronic Gazette publication merely because the Bills of Entry were filed thereafter.

Analysis: A notification acquires legal force only upon its electronic Gazette publication and cannot operate retrospectively without statutory authority. The restrictive notification could therefore operate only prospectively and could not affect goods already dispatched and arrived before publication. Its clauses excluding transitional arrangements did not alter this position. A subsequent executive memorandum lacked statutory force and could neither override the policy-defined date of import nor retrospectively expand the notification's application; conditional import authorisations did not redress that entitlement.

Conclusion: No. The restrictive notification is inapplicable to goods dispatched and arrived before its electronic Gazette publication, notwithstanding subsequent filing of Bills of Entry. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Goods whose shipment or dispatch predates the effective publication of a restrictive import-policy amendment remain governed by the pre-existing import policy, and that position cannot be altered through a subsequent executive clarification.

Ratio Decidendi: For import restrictions under the Foreign Trade Policy, the policy-defined shipment or dispatch date governs the date of import; the customs clearance date applicable to duty assessment and an executive clarification cannot retrospectively vary that policy framework.

Issues: Whether cognizance for an alleged contravention of Section 217(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 was liable to be quashed.

Analysis: At the cognizance stage, scrutiny is confined to the complaint and supporting material for determining whether a prima facie case exists; defence material and explanations cannot be evaluated through a mini-trial. The complaint and supporting documents disclosed allegations of non-cooperation with the investigation, and the cognizance order reflected application of mind to that material.

Conclusion: The cognizance and issuance of process for the alleged offence under Section 217(4), punishable under Section 217(6), of the Companies Act, 2013 were not liable to be quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone a delayed appeal beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department's appeal remained maintainable after it implemented the order restoring registration.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone a delayed appeal beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes a three-month period for filing an appeal, while Section 107(4) permits condonation only for a further one month upon sufficient cause. The First Appellate Authority, being a statutory authority, has no inherent or plenary power to extend the outer limitation period. Directions issued by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the facts of particular writ proceedings do not enlarge the Authority's jurisdiction. Equity or hardship cannot override an express statutory limitation.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the maximum period under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department's appeal remained maintainable after it implemented the order restoring registration.

Analysis: The Department had acted upon the impugned order, restored the registration, and enabled continuation of business and return filing. Reversal after such implementation would unsettle the assessee's intervening commercial transactions and legal position. Estoppel and orderly administration precluded the Department from seeking ineffective relief against an order it had already implemented.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain its challenge after implementing the restoration of registration, as no effective relief could be granted. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Although the condonation of delay exceeded the First Appellate Authority's statutory jurisdiction, the restoration of registration remains unaffected because the Department's own implementation precludes effective appellate relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot condone delay beyond the express outer limit fixed by law; however, where the Department has implemented the impugned restoration of registration, it cannot subsequently obtain relief that would unsettle that implemented position.

Issues: (i) Whether additions for unexplained capital introduction and unreconciled bank credits could be sustained without verification of the assessee's claimed sources and bank entries; (ii) Whether GST late fee for delayed payment is disallowable as expenditure incurred for a purpose that is an offence or prohibited by law.

Issue (i): Whether additions for unexplained capital introduction and unreconciled bank credits could be sustained without verification of the assessee's claimed sources and bank entries.

Analysis: Section 69 applies where an investment is unrecorded and the assessee fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of its nature and source. The capital introduced in the proprietary business was disclosed, and the assessee identified personal-bank funds, loan repayment, LIC maturity proceeds and FD/OD withdrawals as sources. Reconciliation of bank entries, borrower confirmation and documents supporting the stated receipts were material to verification of the explanation. If those records establish the claimed sources, the addition under section 69 and the bank-credit difference addition cannot survive.

Conclusion: The source-of-capital and bank-credit additions were restored for fresh verification after giving the assessee an opportunity to furnish relevant evidence, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether GST late fee for delayed payment is disallowable as expenditure incurred for a purpose that is an offence or prohibited by law.

Analysis: Explanation 1 to section 37(1) excludes an expense only where its purpose is itself an offence or is prohibited by law. GST late fee is a statutory payment for delay in payment of tax and compensates for the consequence of such delay; it is not expenditure incurred for an unlawful purpose.

Conclusion: GST late fee is allowable as business expenditure and its disallowance was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The capital-source and bank-credit matters require evidence-based verification, whereas the statutory GST late fee remains deductible.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory late fee paid for delayed tax payment is not expenditure incurred for a purpose that is an offence or prohibited by law merely because it arises from a delay under the taxing statute.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned on sufficient cause; (ii) Whether the indexed cost of acquisition must include the cost of the building transferred along with the land; (iii) Whether deduction under section 54 is available for investment in two adjoining residential flats purchased as a single residential accommodation for assessment year 2012-13.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned on sufficient cause.

Analysis: The assessee's advanced age, difficulty in accessing electronic communications, and prompt action after becoming aware of the appellate order established bona fide and sufficient cause. No material indicated mala fides or a deliberate delay. Limitation provisions were applied liberally to advance substantial justice.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the indexed cost of acquisition must include the cost of the building transferred along with the land.

Analysis: The transferred property comprised both land and the structure standing on it. Although the Assessing Officer had accepted the historical cost attributable to the building, the indexed cost computation omitted that component without any basis. The building's existence and its accepted cost were not disputed; hence, excluding its indexed cost produced an inconsistent capital-gains computation.

Conclusion: The indexed cost must include the building's accepted and allowable cost with corresponding indexation. The Assessing Officer was directed to recompute the capital gains, and the issue was allowed for statistical purposes in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether deduction under section 54 is available for investment in two adjoining residential flats purchased as a single residential accommodation for assessment year 2012-13.

Analysis: For the relevant assessment year, section 54 did not contain the later express restriction of investment in one residential house in India. The expression "a residential house" permitted exemption where multiple units substantively formed one residential accommodation. The flats were adjoining, purchased on the same date, and intended for use as one residential unit; the later amendment effective from 01.04.2015 did not apply.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 54 was allowable for investment in both adjoining flats, subject to verification of the actual investment and satisfaction of the remaining statutory conditions, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The capital gains require recomputation after granting indexation for the allowable building cost and deduction for investment in both adjoining flats.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the pre-amendment section 54 regime, investment in adjoining residential units acquired and intended as a single residential accommodation may qualify for exemption as investment in a residential house.

Issues: (i) Whether input tax credit relating to acquisition of leasehold rights in an industrial plot could be denied as blocked credit under Section 17(5)(d) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether proceedings under Section 74(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be invoked on allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression in respect of such credit.

Issue (i): Whether input tax credit relating to acquisition of leasehold rights in an industrial plot could be denied as blocked credit under Section 17(5)(d) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Assignment or transfer of leasehold rights in a plot allotted by the industrial development corporation constitutes transfer of benefits arising from immovable property and does not qualify as a supply under Section 7(1)(a), read with Clause 5(b) of Schedule II and Clause 5 of Schedule III, nor is it chargeable under Section 9. Section 17(5)(d) presupposes a lawfully taxable inward supply and applies only to goods or services received for construction of immovable property. No construction activity was involved in the transfer of leasehold rights.

Conclusion: The input tax credit could not be characterised as blocked credit under Section 17(5)(d). The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings under Section 74(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be invoked on allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression in respect of such credit.

Analysis: Since the underlying transaction was not taxable and the credit was not ineligible under Section 17(5)(d), the statutory prerequisites for fraud-based recovery under Section 74(1) were absent. The tax collected on the subsequent transfer of leasehold rights had also been deposited with the Government.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 74(1) on allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression was unsustainable. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A demand founded on the premise that acquisition of leasehold rights constitutes taxable construction-related inward supply lacks statutory basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Transfer of leasehold rights in land is a transfer of benefits arising from immovable property, not a taxable supply; consequently, the blocked-credit restriction for construction of immovable property cannot be applied to such a transaction.