Issues: (i) Whether long-term capital gain claimed as exempt on sale of penny-stock shares could be assessed as unexplained cash credit; (ii) Whether penalty for the resulting non-genuine share transaction was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether long-term capital gain claimed as exempt on sale of penny-stock shares could be assessed as unexplained cash credit.

Analysis: Under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the claim for exemption under Section 10(38) was tested against specific investigation material, the financial and market behaviour of the scrip, and the surrounding circumstances. Routing transactions through a recognised stock exchange and banking channels was not by itself conclusive of genuineness. The abnormal price appreciation, absence of comparable investment activity, and failure to rebut the investigation findings or substantiate the acquisition of shares sustained the Revenue's case on the preponderance of probabilities and evidential burden principles.

Conclusion: The claimed long-term capital gain was treated as non-genuine and the addition as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was sustained against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty for the resulting non-genuine share transaction was sustainable.

Analysis: The penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was founded on the same addition, which remained sustained. Disclosure of the share transactions in the return did not displace the finding that they were non-genuine accommodation entries.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustained against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption claim and its consequential penal liability failed because the impugned share receipts were not established as genuine transactions.

Ratio Decidendi: Stock-exchange routing and banking documentation do not by themselves establish the genuineness of a share transaction where specific investigation material and surrounding circumstances show it to be an accommodation entry and remain unrebutted.

Issues: Whether the claimed deduction for a political donation was allowable under Section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 80GGC permits deduction only for a genuine qualifying contribution. The investigation material, statements recorded during search, bank-trail analysis, and the established modus operandi of systematic layering of funds showed that the recipient political party was used for accommodation entries. Applying the test of human probabilities and preponderance of probabilities, payment through banking channels and production of a donation receipt did not establish the genuineness of the contribution or displace the evidence that the apparent transaction was not real.

Conclusion: The claimed political donation was not genuine and the deduction under Section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not allowable; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether deduction under Section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was allowable in respect of the claimed donation to a registered unrecognised political party.

Analysis: Section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits deduction only for a genuine qualifying political contribution. Payment through banking channels and production of a donation receipt were insufficient where investigation material, unrecanted statements, bank-trail analysis and the established modus operandi of the recipient political party demonstrated systematic accommodation-entry activity. Applying the test of human probabilities and preponderance of probabilities, the apparent transaction was found not to represent its real character.

Conclusion: The claimed contribution was not a genuine donation eligible for deduction under Section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the disallowance was sustained against the assessee.

Issues: Whether an addition of Rs. 8,00,000 as unexplained expenditure under Section 69C read with Section 115BBE could be sustained despite acceptance of presumptive income declared under Section 44AD.

Analysis: The declared turnover, sales and presumptive income computed at the prescribed rate under Section 44AD were accepted. Maintenance of books of account is not mandatory under that presumptive-taxation provision. In the absence of any disturbance to the accepted turnover or presumptive income, the absence of transportation particulars, GST details, cash-book entries or supporting purchase records could not, by itself, justify the addition. The precise nature of the facilitator's business was also not determinative of the claimed purchases.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 8,00,000 under Section 69C read with Section 115BBE was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether cash entries in a seized electronic worksheet, search statements and statutory presumptions could substantiate substantive additions as the individual assessee's undisclosed income; (ii) Whether the aggregate cash receipts in the seized worksheet could be wholly assessed as the assessee-company's undisclosed income or whether the restriction of additions to 25% was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether cash entries in a seized electronic worksheet, search statements and statutory presumptions could substantiate substantive additions as the individual assessee's undisclosed income.

Analysis: Sections 132(4A) and 292C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 create rebuttable evidentiary presumptions concerning seized material, while a statement under Section 132(4) is relevant evidence. However, neither the presumptions nor the statements establish personal beneficial ownership or attribution of income without material connecting the entries to the individual. The worksheet was found on a computer used by an employee at the assessee-company's premises; it did not identify the individual as recipient or beneficiary, and no corresponding undisclosed cash, asset, investment, personal expenditure or financial trail was found. The statements referred to company and group business transactions and did not contain an unequivocal admission of personal receipt or appropriation. The absence of a specific opportunity to answer the proposed personal attribution reinforced the evidentiary deficiency. Suspicion arising from managerial association could not take the place of proof.

Conclusion: The substantive additions as the individual assessee's undisclosed income were unsustainable and were rightly deleted in full, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the aggregate cash receipts in the seized worksheet could be wholly assessed as the assessee-company's undisclosed income or whether the restriction of additions to 25% was sustainable.

Analysis: The seized worksheet, the search statements and the physical cash found supported the existence of cash transactions outside the regular accounts. Nevertheless, the worksheet contained negative balances, discontinuities and arithmetical inconsistencies, and comprised receipts and payments involving withdrawals from disclosed sources, multiple group entities and possible cash recycling. The approximate correspondence between the worksheet's closing balance and cash found established only a relevant corroborative circumstance, not that every gross receipt was fresh taxable income. Although the books were not rejected under Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, that circumstance was not conclusive; the decisive deficiency was the failure to identify specific fictitious expenditure, correlate it with claimed deductions, segregate entity-wise transactions, or establish the net income component. The presumptions under Sections 132(4A) and 292C did not convert gross running cash entries into taxable income. In these circumstances, estimation of the unaccounted income element at 25% was a permissible assessment of the available evidence.

Conclusion: The restriction of additions to 25% of the recorded amounts and deletion of the remaining 75% were sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The seized material could support only an estimated addition in the assessee-company's hands, while it did not establish that any part of the recorded transactions was income personally attributable to the individual assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Rebuttable presumptions attached to seized documents and search statements do not dispense with proof of the person to whom income is attributable or the taxable character and quantum of running cash entries; aggregate receipts cannot be assessed as income without a reliable nexus to the relevant taxable transaction.

Issues: (i) Whether an earlier decision concerning classification of a cement unit under IPR 2007 governs the VAT-reimbursement claim; (ii) Whether refusal to consider an existing unit's claim for downstream Thrust Sector recognition and VAT reimbursement solely because it was not a new industrial unit is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether an earlier decision concerning classification of a cement unit under IPR 2007 governs the VAT-reimbursement claim.

Analysis: The earlier ruling requires Negative List classification to be based on the unit's actual industrial activity and value addition, rather than on grinding or mixing as an isolated component of the manufacturing process. However, that matter involved an issued eligibility certificate and a sanctioned reimbursement, whereas the present claim had not reached final sanction or quantification.

Conclusion: The earlier decision is relevant to the classification exercise but does not establish an automatic entitlement to VAT reimbursement.

Issue (ii): Whether refusal to consider an existing unit's claim for downstream Thrust Sector recognition and VAT reimbursement solely because it was not a new industrial unit is sustainable.

Analysis: Clause 18.4(iv) of IPR 2007 covers existing industrial units undertaking expansion, modernisation or diversification. The retrospective amendment deleting the word "new" from the relevant Annexure entries removed the sole basis stated for withholding consideration. The verification and inspection reports recorded substantial post-policy expansion investment, increased capacity, employment, and utilisation of waste products, providing material support for downstream industry status and eligibility for fiscal incentives. Those materials did not, however, amount to a final sanction or quantify the reimbursement. The remaining prescribed criteria require a reasoned administrative decision.

Conclusion: The refusal founded solely on the original unit not being new is unsustainable; downstream Thrust Sector eligibility must be determined on the applicable criteria, followed by determination of admissible VAT reimbursement if such status is affirmed.

Final Conclusion: The retrospective removal of the new-unit condition requires a merits-based determination of downstream Thrust Sector eligibility, after which any reimbursement admissible for increased commercial production is to be quantified under IPR 2007.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an industrial policy retrospectively removes a new-unit requirement and expressly covers expansion of existing units, eligibility cannot be denied solely because the original unit pre-dated the policy; the remaining eligibility conditions must be assessed on the unit's actual operations and record.

Issues: Whether the plaint could be amended to add claims for compensation awarded in cheque-dishonour proceedings, interest, and litigation expenses.

Analysis: The compensation had been determined in criminal proceedings and was recoverable through the statutory enforcement procedure under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, rather than through the pending civil recovery suit. The proposed claim founded on the criminal compensation order, as well as the claim for expenses incurred in criminal litigation, arose from a cause of action distinct from that pleaded in the suit. Although amendments necessary to resolve the real controversy are ordinarily permissible, an amendment introducing an entirely new cause of action or changing the nature of the suit is impermissible.

Conclusion: The proposed amendment was impermissible; the criminal compensation could not be recovered through the civil suit, and the litigation-expense claim rested on a distinct cause of action.

Issues: (i) Validity of the provisional attachments of the petitioner's bank accounts under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Attachability of balances in RBI-regulated escrow accounts as the petitioner's property under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Validity of the provisional attachments of the petitioner's bank accounts under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 83 permits provisional attachment only upon formation of an opinion, founded on tangible material, that attachment is necessary to protect Government revenue. The power is draconian and must be exercised with proportionality; necessity cannot be equated with expediency or a mere prima facie suspicion. The attachment orders did not identify any GST liability of the petitioner, its role in any identified tax evasion, the specific transactions involved, or material establishing that the petitioner fell within the statutory classes whose property could be attached. Vague allegations concerning third-party online gaming entities, money laundering, and alleged non-cooperation did not establish the statutory preconditions. Reasons not contained in the attachment orders could not be supplied through an affidavit-in-reply.

Conclusion: The statutory preconditions for provisional attachment, including tangible material and a reasoned opinion of necessity, were absent; the provisional attachments were unlawful.

Issue (ii): Attachability of balances in RBI-regulated escrow accounts as the petitioner's property under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 83 authorises attachment only of property belonging to a taxable person or a person covered by Section 122(1A). The escrow balances represented merchant settlement amounts payable to identified beneficiaries and were impressed with a trust. They did not belong to the petitioner. A prospective liability of third-party merchants could not justify attachment of a payment aggregator's escrow funds in the absence of material showing the aggregator's own GST liability.

Conclusion: The escrow balances were not attachable as property of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: Investigative suspicion regarding third-party tax evasion, without substantiated material linking the petitioner to a GST liability or demonstrating the necessity of attachment, could not sustain the account freezes.

Ratio Decidendi: Provisional attachment under Section 83 requires tangible material establishing both the statutory status of the person concerned and the necessity of attachment to protect Government revenue; vague suspicion and unsupported allegations of non-cooperation are insufficient.

Issues: Whether the appeal should be admitted for regular hearing despite delay, and whether recovery of the balance demand is deemed stayed upon payment of the stipulated pre-deposit.

Analysis: The explanation for delay was found prima facie bona fide. The record confirmed payment of 20% of the stipulated pre-deposit; consequently, the statutory consequence under Section 112(9) applied, deeming recovery proceedings for the balance amount stayed pending dismissal of the appeal.

Outcome: The appeal was admitted for regular hearing, and the respondents were directed to comply with the statutory stay of recovery. The merits remain pending adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether input tax credit can be denied to a purchasing taxpayer possessing valid transaction and transport documents and banking-payment proof merely because the supplier was subsequently found non-existent? (ii) Whether penalty proceedings for wrongful availment of input tax credit can be sustained without proof of the purchaser's collusion or active participation in fraud?

Issue (i): Whether input tax credit can be denied to a purchasing taxpayer possessing valid transaction and transport documents and banking-payment proof merely because the supplier was subsequently found non-existent?

Analysis: The conditions for input tax credit required proof of a valid invoice and actual receipt of goods. The purchaser produced the tax invoice, e-way bill, consignment note and verifiable banking payments, while consumption of the raw material in manufacturing finished goods remained undisputed. The supplier was registered with a valid GSTIN when the transaction occurred. A subsequent finding that the supplier was non-existent or retrospective cancellation of its registration did not, by itself, displace the evidence of actual receipt or the purchaser's bona fides.

Conclusion: Input tax credit could not be denied to the purchaser solely because the supplier was subsequently found non-existent; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty proceedings for wrongful availment of input tax credit can be sustained without proof of the purchaser's collusion or active participation in fraud?

Analysis: Fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression or collusion was required for invocation of the penalty provision. Although the claimant initially bore the burden of proving eligibility for credit, that burden was discharged through documentary evidence of the purchase, transport, payment and consumption of inputs. No direct material established that the purchaser knew of, participated in, or colluded with any fraudulent invoicing arrangement of the supplier.

Conclusion: Penalty proceedings could not be sustained without evidence of the purchaser's fraud, collusion or active complicity; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reversal of input tax credit and consequential tax, interest and penalty demand were unsustainable, and the relief granted in first appeal remained operative.

Ratio Decidendi: A bona fide purchaser that establishes actual receipt of goods and payment through reliable contemporaneous documentation cannot be denied input tax credit or subjected to fraud-based penalty merely because the supplier is later found non-existent, absent proof of the purchaser's collusion or complicity.

Issues: Whether appeals pending before multiple State Benches and involving an identical question of law fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Principal Bench.

Analysis: Section 109(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises notification of classes of cases to be heard only by the Principal Bench. Notification No. S.O. 4219(E) dated 17.09.2025 covers cases pending before two or more State Benches where the President is satisfied that an identical question of law is involved. Such notified cases are outside the jurisdiction of the State Benches. The recorded satisfaction was that the appeals raised the same legal question concerning input tax credit eligibility in relation to telecom towers.

Conclusion: The appeals fall within the notified class and are required to be heard exclusively by the Principal Bench.

Issues: (i) Whether an e-way bill was mandatory for an intra-city stock transfer of goods exceeding the prescribed consignment value; (ii) Whether an internal transfer between the assessee's own godown and showroom constituted a taxable supply so as to sustain penalty under Section 129; (iii) Whether the absence of an e-way bill established deliberate intent to evade tax or clandestine removal warranting penalty under Section 129.

Issue (i): Whether an e-way bill was mandatory for an intra-city stock transfer of goods exceeding the prescribed consignment value.

Analysis: Rule 138 applies to movement of goods exceeding the prescribed value even where the movement is for reasons other than supply. A consignor using its own conveyance must generate the e-way bill and the person in charge must carry it along with the underlying document. Although a delivery challan may be issued for movement otherwise than by way of supply under Rule 55, it does not displace the e-way bill requirement. The limited distance-based relaxations concern conveyance details or weighbridge movements and do not exempt generation of the e-way bill for the transfer in question.

Conclusion: An e-way bill was mandatory for the stock transfer; carrying a delivery challan alone constituted a technical procedural breach. This finding is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an internal transfer between the assessee's own godown and showroom constituted a taxable supply so as to sustain penalty under Section 129.

Analysis: The movement was an undisputed transfer of tax-paid vehicles between the assessee's own premises, involving neither a second person nor consideration. It was therefore not a supply under Section 7 and did not attract the charging provision in Section 9. Since no tax was payable on the goods at the stage of this internal stock transfer, the penalty mechanism under Section 129, quantified by reference to tax payable, could not be invoked.

Conclusion: The internal stock transfer was not a taxable supply and did not attract penalty under Section 129. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the absence of an e-way bill established deliberate intent to evade tax or clandestine removal warranting penalty under Section 129.

Analysis: The vehicles were identifiable by engine and chassis numbers and could not practically be sold without statutory registration, insurance and supporting documentation. They had already been purchased against tax-paid invoices and remained fully traceable. The failure to generate an e-way bill resulted from a bona fide misunderstanding of the distance-related provisions, not an attempt to conceal a taxable transaction. The absence of tax liability in a stock transfer also afforded no basis to infer tax evasion or clandestine removal.

Conclusion: No mens rea, deliberate intent to evade tax, or clandestine removal was established; the Section 129 penalty was consequently unsustainable. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The continuing obligation to generate an e-way bill for stock transfers does not justify a Section 129 penalty where the movement is not a taxable supply, no tax is payable, and no intent to evade tax is proved.

Ratio Decidendi: A technical failure to carry an e-way bill during an internal stock transfer cannot sustain a Section 129 penalty where the transfer is not a taxable supply, no tax is payable, and the facts disclose no intent to evade tax.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitions were maintainable despite the earlier dismissal of a co-accused's writ petition; (ii) Whether the order assigning the company's investigation to the SFIO under Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 was legally sustainable, and the effect on consequential proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the petitions were maintainable despite the earlier dismissal of a co-accused's writ petition.

Analysis: The earlier writ petition had been dismissed as premature, without adjudication on merits, and with liberty to avail remedies at the appropriate stage. The present petitions had already been instituted and were protected by an interim order. The earlier dismissal therefore did not attract res judicata or bar scrutiny after the investigation report and prosecution complaint had been filed.

Conclusion: The petitions were maintainable, in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the order assigning the company's investigation to the SFIO under Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 was legally sustainable, and the effect on consequential proceedings.

Analysis: Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 requires formation of an opinion that investigation by the SFIO is necessary in public interest. Though the formation of opinion involves subjective satisfaction, it must rest on objective consideration of cogent and relevant material. The relevant circumstances, application of mind, and reasons warranting both investigation and assignment to the SFIO must be demonstrable from a speaking, reasoned order and remain subject to judicial review.

Analysis: The assignment order merely reproduced the statutory power and disclosed neither the material considered nor reasons establishing the necessity for an SFIO investigation. The statutory inspection and supplementary reports under Sections 206(5) and 208 of the Companies Act, 2013 disclosed only compoundable regulatory irregularities and did not find fraud, diversion, siphoning, defalcation, or misappropriation of funds. The additional material noted in the Oversight Committee minutes, including complaints, a bank monitoring report, a parliamentary communication, and a media report, did not independently furnish a relevant and sufficient basis for the statutory opinion. Subsequent minutes, affidavits, or investigation reports could not cure the defect through supplementation of reasons.

Conclusion: The assignment order was invalid for non-application of mind and absence of demonstrable relevant circumstances; the order and all proceedings consequential to it were quashed, in favour of the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The SFIO investigation and prosecution lacked a valid statutory foundation because the mandatory jurisdictional conditions for invoking Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 were not satisfied.

Ratio Decidendi: An SFIO investigation under Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 is valid only where the assignment order itself discloses demonstrable relevant circumstances, independent application of mind, and reasons establishing the necessity of investigation by the SFIO; subsequent material cannot validate an unreasoned foundational order.

Issues: (i) Whether the payment made under the failed share-purchase arrangement constituted a financial debt, making the Appellant a financial creditor; (ii) Whether clerical errors in the impugned order justified appellate interference.

Issue (i): Whether the payment made under the failed share-purchase arrangement constituted a financial debt, making the Appellant a financial creditor.

Analysis: Section 7 requires proof of a financial debt and default. Under Section 5(8), a financial debt must arise from a disbursement against consideration for the time value of money. The tripartite MOU showed that the payment formed part of the consideration for acquisition of shares and discharge of the corporate debtor's liabilities; it contained no repayment obligation or return for use of money. The alleged subsequent oral conversion into an interest-bearing loan lacked proof of its making, authorised representatives, or mutually accepted terms.

Analysis: Subsequent balance-sheet classification, balance confirmations, interest entries and tax deduction under Section 194A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could at most evidence accounting treatment or acknowledgment of an amount. They could not alter the original character of the payment or independently establish disbursement for time value of money. The absence of any actual interest payment further supported the conclusion that the payment was not lent for a return. The disputed oral arrangement could not be adjudicated in the summary jurisdiction under Section 7.

Conclusion: The payment was not a financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the Appellant was not a financial creditor in respect of it. This issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether clerical errors in the impugned order justified appellate interference.

Analysis: The incorrect recording of counsel appearances and attribution of written submissions were errors of description. The pleadings, documents and submissions of both sides were independently assessed, and no resulting prejudice was established.

Conclusion: The clerical errors did not warrant interference with the decision on merits. This issue was decided against the Appellant.

Final Conclusion: Recovery of the amount paid, if otherwise legally available, must be pursued before the appropriate forum and cannot be sought through the corporate insolvency process.

Ratio Decidendi: A payment made as consideration under a share-purchase arrangement does not become a financial debt merely because it is later recorded as an unsecured loan and attracts interest or tax-deduction entries; disbursement for the time value of money must be independently established.

Issues: (i) Whether the retrospective exclusion of cement manufacturing and grinding units from net SGST reimbursement under Clause 5.4.5(a) of IPR 2015 was valid; (ii) Whether the application for provisional Priority Sector status stood deemed approved under Section 11 of the Orissa Industries (Facilitation) Act, 2004 and the applicable guidelines; and (iii) Whether the Negative List precluded Priority Sector status and consequential SGST reimbursement.

Issue (i): Whether the retrospective exclusion of cement manufacturing and grinding units from net SGST reimbursement under Clause 5.4.5(a) of IPR 2015 was valid.

Analysis: The Industrial Policy Resolution, 2015 permitted review or modification of incentives, but that power did not by itself authorise deprivation of an incentive for a period preceding the amendment. The industrial project had progressed through approvals, investment, application for Priority Sector status and commencement of production under the existing policy. Financial implications could justify a prospective policy revision, but did not establish overriding public interest or a sufficient basis for retrospectively withdrawing accrued fiscal rights. The selective retrospective exclusion of cement and specified units was arbitrary and attracted the doctrines of Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation.

Conclusion: The retrospective exclusion from net SGST reimbursement with effect from 1 July 2017 was arbitrary, unconstitutional and unenforceable against the assessee for the period before the Resolution dated 18 August 2020; the policy change could operate only prospectively.

Issue (ii): Whether the application for provisional Priority Sector status stood deemed approved under Section 11 of the Orissa Industries (Facilitation) Act, 2004 and the applicable guidelines.

Analysis: Section 11 of the Orissa Industries (Facilitation) Act, 2004, read with Clause 4.2 of the Industrial Policy Resolution, 2015 and the time-bound Operational Guidelines, attaches a deemed-approval consequence where a covered application is not decided within the prescribed period. The application was acknowledged, inspected, verified and forwarded by the Regional Industries Centre to the competent authority, but no rejection was communicated within time. A later request for documents while the application remained pending could not defeat the statutory consequence, since otherwise deemed approval could be nullified by indefinitely withholding a formal certificate.

Conclusion: The application for provisional Priority Sector status stood deemed approved under Section 11 of the Orissa Industries (Facilitation) Act, 2004 and the applicable guidelines, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the Negative List precluded Priority Sector status and consequential SGST reimbursement.

Analysis: Serial No. 36 of the Negative List applies to specified size-reducing, separating, grinding and mixing units having plant-and-machinery investment below the prescribed threshold, while excepting manufacture of cement with clinker. The material showed investment above that threshold and a manufacturing process involving clinker. The verification report also recorded that the unit did not fall within the Negative List. No sufficient basis was established to disregard that verification or categorically apply the exclusion.

Conclusion: The Negative List objection does not preclude Priority Sector status or consideration of SGST reimbursement, subject to verification of the reimbursement amount and compliance with the remaining conditions of IPR 2015, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Eligible net SGST reimbursement, together with applicable interest, must be determined and released under IPR 2015 without reopening deemed provisional status or relying on the retrospective exclusion.

Ratio Decidendi: A State may prospectively modify an industrial incentive policy, but cannot retrospectively withdraw an accrued fiscal incentive from an industrial unit that has acted on the policy representation without demonstrated overriding public interest; statutory deemed approval cannot be defeated by administrative inaction in issuing formal clearance.

Issues: Whether assessment and recovery proceedings could stand where notices were uploaded only in the Additional Notices and Orders section of the GST portal, depriving the petitioner of notice and an opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: Notices and the order were not placed in the designated "View Notices and Orders" window of the GST portal, but in the Additional Notices and Orders section. This placement did not afford the petitioner effective notice or an opportunity to respond. The requirement of a fair hearing under the principles of natural justice was therefore not satisfied.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment and consequential recovery proceedings were quashed, with the matter to be adjudicated afresh after permitting the petitioner to file a reply. The issue of limitation of the show-cause notice was left open for determination by the adjudicating authority.

Issues: (i) Whether deferred ITC relating to FY 2017-18 could be claimed in GSTR-3B filed in FY 2019-20?; (ii) Whether ITC on banking services availed in FY 2019-20 was blocked under Section 17(5)?

Issue (i): Whether deferred ITC relating to FY 2017-18 could be claimed in GSTR-3B filed in FY 2019-20?

Analysis: Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 retrospectively permits ITC relating to FY 2017-18 through FY 2020-21 to be taken in a return under Section 39 filed up to 30 November 2021, notwithstanding the limitation under Section 16(4). The deferred credit was supported by disclosed returns, verifiable accounts, tax invoices and payment evidence. A mismatch between GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B is a reconciliation discrepancy and cannot, by itself, justify reversal where the underlying supply and tax payment are verifiable.

Conclusion: The deferred ITC was validly claimable in FY 2019-20; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether ITC on banking services availed in FY 2019-20 was blocked under Section 17(5)?

Analysis: Section 17(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 restricts credit only for the specified categories of goods and services. Banking services used in furtherance of business did not fall within any blocked-credit category.

Conclusion: ITC on the banking services was admissible; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deferred ITC and the ITC on banking services remain allowable, and the related tax demand, interest and penalty do not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the conditions of Section 16(5) are met and the ITC claim is substantiated, credit cannot be denied merely because it was claimed in a later return or does not correspond with GSTR-2A.

Issues: Whether refund of IGST paid twice on export supplies could be denied because the initial payment was reported in the wrong table of the GSTR-3B return and the second payment was subsequently refunded through the Customs automated system.

Analysis: The export turnover and IGST liability were correctly disclosed in the GSTR-1 returns, but the original IGST payments were entered against non-zero-rated supplies instead of zero-rated supplies in the relevant GSTR-3B returns. This mismatch prevented automated processing of the export refund. The assessee consequently paid the same IGST again in a later return, upon which the Customs system processed refund of that later payment. The records established that the original IGST payments remained unrefunded and constituted excess payment. Retention of tax paid twice, despite absence of any contrary evidence from Revenue, would offend Article 265 of the Constitution of India. A clerical reporting error and procedural infraction could not justify withholding tax not legally due.

Conclusion: The excess IGST paid on the exports was refundable and could not be denied on account of the clerical error in the GSTR-3B returns. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether input tax credit on joinery, carpentry and painting services used for furnishing rented retail shops is barred by Section 17(5)(d) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The services were used to install wooden and glass shelves for storage and display of taxable goods at registered retail premises and bore a direct nexus with the furtherance of business, satisfying Section 16(1). A challenge to the supplier's classification of services could not be introduced at the credit-recipient stage when no such dispute was raised in the show-cause notice. Although construction includes renovation, additions and alterations under Explanation 1 to Section 17(5), the restriction applies only to the extent of capitalisation of the tax component. The chartered accountant's certificate established that the CGST and SGST components were separately accounted for as input tax credit, were not added to the cost of fixed assets, and were not subjected to depreciation.

Conclusion: Input tax credit on the four invoices is admissible; the CGST and SGST components are not barred by Section 17(5)(d) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: Whether input tax credit could be disallowed merely because the supplier was alleged to be bogus and the actual movement and receipt of goods were disputed.

Analysis: Eligibility for input tax credit had to be determined from the statutory conditions and the evidence concerning the recipient's transactions, rather than solely from allegations against the supplier. Purchase orders, tax invoices, e-way bills, banking-payment records, books of account, stock registers, consignment documents, vehicle particulars, supplier returns, and tax-payment records supported actual purchase, transportation, and receipt of goods. The supplier's registration had also been restored, and the departmental authority had been given an opportunity to examine the documents and submitted its report; consequently, no breach of principles of natural justice was established.

Conclusion: Input tax credit was rightly allowed; the allegation that the supplier was bogus did not warrant disallowance on the evidence available. The finding is in favour of the assessee.