Issues: (i) Whether the relevant date for limitation of refund of accumulated CENVAT credit attributable to export of services is the date of the export invoice or the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received; and (ii) Whether refund of CENVAT credit can be denied solely because the invoices relate to unregistered premises.

Issue (i): Whether the relevant date for limitation of refund of accumulated CENVAT credit attributable to export of services is the date of the export invoice or the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received.

Analysis: Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, read with Notification No. 27/2012-C.E. (N.T.) dated 18.06.2012, governed the refund. Although Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 applied to such refund claims, it did not prescribe a specific relevant date for export of services. The applicable principle fixed the relevant date as the last day of the quarter in which the export proceeds were received in foreign exchange. The date of the export invoice could not invariably be adopted, and the prospective character of the subsequent notification did not displace that principle.

Conclusion: The one-year limitation is to be reckoned from the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received, and not from the date of the export invoice. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund of CENVAT credit can be denied solely because the invoices relate to unregistered premises.

Analysis: Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, did not make registration of the premises a prerequisite for refund of unutilised CENVAT credit attributable to exported services. The requirement concerning the jurisdictional authority for filing the refund application could not operate as a prohibition on refund merely because the premises from which services were exported were unregistered. The jurisdictional High Court ruling on this point was binding.

Conclusion: Refund cannot be denied merely because the invoices pertain to unregistered premises. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The limitation objection based on the export-invoice date and the objection based solely on non-registration of premises cannot defeat the refund claim.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax on construction of the residential complex was sustainable under Construction of Residential Complex Service; (ii) Whether receipts accounted for as sub-contract and petty job receipts were liable to service tax under the same category; and (iii) Whether the demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether service tax on construction of the residential complex was sustainable under Construction of Residential Complex Service.

Analysis: The statutory definition of a residential complex required proof that the prescribed conditions, including the number of dwelling units, were satisfied. The material did not establish that the additional units were constructed by, or attributable to, the appellant. Further, the Explanation inserted in Section 65(105)(zzzh) with effect from 01.07.2010 could not be retrospectively applied to construction undertaken before that date. The contracts were composite contracts involving goods and services; such contracts could not be taxed under the construction-service categories, which applied to services simpliciter.

Conclusion: The construction-service demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts accounted for as sub-contract and petty job receipts were liable to service tax under the same category.

Analysis: The receipts were treated as consideration for construction services without establishing their precise nature or that they represented independently taxable services simpliciter. The absence of documents from the appellant did not displace the Department's obligation to prove the taxable service and its legal basis. The reasoning applicable to composite works contracts also precluded their taxation under the construction-service category.

Conclusion: The demand on sub-contract and petty job receipts was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was sustainable.

Analysis: Commercial letting alone did not establish the amount of tax payable. The eligibility for small service provider exemption, year-wise rental receipts, and the asserted tax payment on later receipts required verification. The allegations were not supported by sufficient evidence or cogent rebuttal of these matters; consequently, the evidentiary benefit enured to the appellant.

Conclusion: The demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The construction-related and rental demands lacked a sustainable legal and evidentiary basis, and the associated penalties could not survive.

Issues: (i) Whether sewage and drainage pumps were eligible for the concessional duty rate under Entry No. 235 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012; (ii) Whether the earlier audit objection or the principle of res judicata precluded Revenue from denying the concessional rate; (iii) Whether the penalty imposed for availing the concessional rate was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether sewage and drainage pumps were eligible for the concessional duty rate under Entry No. 235 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012.

Analysis: Entry No. 235 grants the concessional rate only to power-driven pumps primarily designed for handling water. As the expression "water" is undefined, it was construed in its common and commercial sense as clean water, and not as sewage or drainage water. A claimant for a concessional notification must establish clear compliance with its conditions. The material showed that sewage and drainage pumps had a different design and manufacturing process from pumps for handling water; the engineer's certificate only stated that the pumps could also handle clean water and did not establish design similarity.

Conclusion: Sewage and drainage pumps were not eligible for the concessional rate under Entry No. 235; the differential duty and applicable interest were rightly sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier audit objection or the principle of res judicata precluded Revenue from denying the concessional rate.

Analysis: The audit objection was neither implemented through adjudication nor accepted by the assessee, which continued to pay duty at the full rate until March 2016. It therefore did not constitute a concluded determination capable of binding Revenue. Further, res judicata does not apply to distinct tax periods in the manner asserted, and a different position may be adopted where the prior view is not a binding final decision.

Conclusion: The earlier audit objection did not bar Revenue from denying the concessional rate, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the penalty imposed for availing the concessional rate was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee had initially paid duty at the full rate and began claiming the concession after the audit objection. Revenue subsequently reversed its position and demanded differential duty. These circumstances did not disclose evidence warranting the penalty retained by the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The differential duty together with interest remains enforceable, while no penalty is exigible.

Ratio Decidendi: A claimant for a concessional excise notification must establish strict satisfaction of its conditions, and an undefined product expression is to be understood in its common-parlance meaning.

Issues: (i) Whether the claimed transitional input tax credit attributable to input services, exceeding the closing balance reflected in the ER-1 and ST-3 returns, required verification. (ii) Whether the notice under section 74(1) could be sustained on the alleged wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed transitional input tax credit attributable to input services, exceeding the closing balance reflected in the ER-1 and ST-3 returns, required verification.

Analysis: Section 140(1) permits carry-forward of eligible credit under the existing law. The difference between the credit declared in TRAN-1 and the balance reported in the pre-GST returns required verification against the relevant records before entitlement could be determined.

Conclusion: The transitional credit claim is to be verified by the Proper Officer/Adjudicating Authority through a reasoned order.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice under section 74(1) could be sustained on the alleged wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Analysis: Invocation of section 74(1) requires material establishing fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with a deliberate intent to evade tax. Mere incorrect information or an ordinary non-declaration does not by itself establish those elements. No investigation or evidence establishing such deliberate intent was on record.

Conclusion: The notice issued under section 74(1) was not sustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional-credit claim remains subject to factual verification, but the fraud-based notice cannot be maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: An incorrect declaration, without material evidence of a deliberate intent to evade tax, does not establish wilful misstatement or suppression of facts for invoking section 74(1).

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked on an allegation of suppression of facts.

Analysis: The differential demand arose from an audit-based verification of the assessee's books of account and invoices, with a prior departmental communication quantifying the liability. The record disclosed no material establishing deliberate suppression of facts or an intent to evade tax. Mere delayed payment and detection upon scrutiny of accounts were insufficient to invoke the extended period of limitation. A show-cause notice issued beyond the normal limitation period raises a jurisdictional challenge and cannot sustain the demand.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; the show-cause notice and consequential demand were time-barred, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to nil or concessional interest for belated payment of tax on outward supplies under Circular No. 136/06/2020-GST.

Analysis: The circular prescribed nil or reduced interest only where GSTR-3B returns were filed and tax was paid within the dates stipulated in the relevant notifications. The record established that the petitioner had not complied with those stipulated timelines. The interest demand was therefore consistent with the circular and disclosed no infirmity warranting judicial-review interference.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to nil or concessional interest under the circular; the interest imposed for delayed payment of tax was valid, against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating jurisdiction of Jurisdictional Assessing Officers, was constitutional; (ii) Whether proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had to be initiated through the faceless and automated mechanism under Section 151A and the Scheme of 2022; (iii) Whether Section 147A could validly be inserted into the repealed Income-tax Act, 1961 after its repeal took effect.

Issue (i): Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating jurisdiction of Jurisdictional Assessing Officers, was constitutional.

Analysis: Section 147A purported to deem the Assessing Officer for Sections 148 and 148A to be an officer other than the National Faceless Assessment Centre or an assessment unit, notwithstanding Section 151A and schemes framed under it. Retrospective validation is permissible only where a competent legislature removes the statutory defect or foundational basis of the prior judicial determination. The governing Scheme of 2022 continued to include issuance of notice under Section 148 through automated allocation and faceless assessment, and its statutory basis remained unamended. The amendment therefore sought to displace prior jurisdictional rulings without removing their foundation, contrary to the separation of powers and the rule of law.

Conclusion: Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is unconstitutional and void. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had to be initiated through the faceless and automated mechanism under Section 151A and the Scheme of 2022.

Analysis: Section 151A authorised a scheme for reassessment, issuance of notice under Section 148, and pre-notice action under Section 148A. Clause 3 of the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 required reassessment under Section 147 and issuance of notice under Section 148 to be undertaken through automated allocation and in a faceless manner to the extent provided by Section 144B. The mandatory language of the Scheme, the continued inclusion of Section 148, and the absence of automated allocation for case identification precluded initiation by Jurisdictional Assessing Officers. The pre-notice procedure under Section 148A is inseparable from issuance of a Section 148 notice and could not be retained with the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer merely because Section 148A was not separately specified in clause 3. Concurrent-jurisdiction notifications could not override the statutory faceless scheme, and transfer of a case to the National Faceless Assessment Centre without compliance with Section 127 did not cure the jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: Jurisdictional Assessing Officers lacked jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 outside the faceless mechanism. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 147A could validly be inserted into the repealed Income-tax Act, 1961 after its repeal took effect.

Analysis: Although the Finance Act, 2026 received Presidential assent before repeal, its express commencement date under Section 2(a) was 1 April 2026. The Income-tax Act, 1961 stood repealed at the end of 31 March 2026, while the Income-tax Act, 2025 came into force from 1 April 2026. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act did not advance the commencement date where the enactment expressly fixed one. The repeal-and-savings provisions preserved pending proceedings and the existing faceless scheme under the repealed enactment, but did not sustain insertion of Section 147A into that repealed Act after repeal.

Conclusion: Section 147A could not validly be inserted into the repealed Income-tax Act, 1961 and has no legal sanctity. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The operative statutory scheme required reassessment initiation through automated allocation and faceless procedure, and the unamended scheme could not be displaced by a retrospective provision that failed to remove the basis of the jurisdictional defect.

Ratio Decidendi: A retrospective validating provision is valid only where a competent legislature removes the statutory foundation of the earlier decision; it cannot merely override judicial determinations while the unamended governing scheme mandates a faceless and automated process.

Issues: Whether an appeal concerning classification of imported goods and consequential duty liability lies to the High Court under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 130 excludes appeals to the High Court involving determination of questions relating to the rate of customs duty or the value of goods for assessment. Section 130E provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court from an Appellate Tribunal order determining such questions. The classification dispute concerns the applicable rate of duty and consequently falls within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Conclusion: The appeal lies before the Supreme Court under Section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962, and not before the High Court.

Issues: Whether interest paid on a bill of entry is refundable where duty payment was initiated on time but was not reflected due to continuing ICEGATE technical failure.

Analysis: The Customs (Waiver of Interest) 3rd Order dated 17.04.2023 restricted waiver to bills of entry filed up to 13.04.2023. However, the advisory dated 27.07.2023 acknowledged that the system inability continued until that date, and the bank record established that payment had been initiated on 20.04.2023. The principle applicable to delays in crediting payment caused by technical failure supported waiver of interest notwithstanding the stated cut-off date.

Conclusion: The interest was liable to be waived and refunded, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the absence of a CFSL report and the non-summoning of panch witnesses vitiated reliance on the seized documents? (ii) Whether the evidence established contravention of Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 despite retracted statements, health records, non-recovery of foreign currency, and subsequent misplacement of records? (iii) Whether the penalty of Rs. 1 crore was sustainable?

Issue (i): Whether the absence of a CFSL report and the non-summoning of panch witnesses vitiated reliance on the seized documents?

Analysis: The seized documents were recovered under a panchnama bearing the appellant's signature. No specific case of fabrication, forgery, or non-recovery from the appellant was made out. In the absence of a genuine dispute as to the documents' authenticity or recovery, neither forensic verification nor examination of panch witnesses was necessary.

Conclusion: Reliance on the seized documents was valid; the procedural objections fail against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the evidence established contravention of Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 despite retracted statements, health records, non-recovery of foreign currency, and subsequent misplacement of records?

Analysis: The medical material did not displace the evidence that the appellant was present at the premises during the search and recording of the statement. Recovery of foreign currency was not a pre-condition for proving the contravention where seized documents disclosed foreign-currency and gold transactions. A retracted statement required corroboration, which was supplied by the seized documents and statements of connected persons. The belated retraction by a witness was treated as an afterthought. Subsequent misplacement of the departmental record did not negate the material on which the adjudicating authority had based its order.

Conclusion: Contravention of Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 was established against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the penalty of Rs. 1 crore was sustainable?

Analysis: The amount of contravention had not been quantified, and the penalty was excessive having regard to the seized amount, the proved circumstances, and the appellant's health condition. A reduced monetary sanction was considered proportionate.

Conclusion: The penalty is reduced from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 15 lakhs, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: Liability for the foreign-exchange contravention remains sustained, with the monetary sanction recalibrated to Rs. 15 lakhs.

Ratio Decidendi: A retracted statement cannot by itself establish a foreign-exchange contravention and must be supported by corroborative evidence.

Issues: Whether the attached properties could be sold and the provisional attachment substituted by an escrow arrangement securing the quantified proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The quantified balance of proceeds of crime was Rs. 189.92 crore after accounting for Rs. 55 crore realised from earlier sales. The assets related to investment schemes involving several entities, and continuation of attachment affected interests beyond those attributable to the quantified amount. An arrangement securing the amount while permitting sale of the properties was accepted as protecting investors' interests and preserving the amount for the pending trial. An additional amount of 50% of the quantified proceeds, namely Rs. 95 crore, was fixed to make the arrangement equitable.

Conclusion: The appellant may sell the attached properties through a joint escrow account, with sale proceeds retained until Rs. 284.92 crore is secured. Attachment shall be lifted proportionately upon sale and entirely upon receipt of the full amount, which shall be placed in fixed deposit pending the trial.

Issues: Whether the appeals concerning service-taxability and valuation of interest on bill-discounting facilities lie before the High Court or directly before the Supreme Court.

Analysis: Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as applied through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, was treated as covering determinations relating to taxability and valuation for assessment. The question was considered prima facie to fall within the direct appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Further submissions on the jurisdictional issue were permitted.

Outcome: The matters were listed for orders.

Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 35G to entertain an appeal involving determination of the value of taxable service for assessment.

Analysis: Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 excludes High Court appeals concerning questions relating to the rate of duty or value of goods for assessment. Section 35L assigns appeals involving such valuation-related questions to the Supreme Court. The proposed questions substantially concerned valuation of service under the applicable service-tax valuation mechanism.

Conclusion: The appeal concerning determination of value for assessment lay before the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and was not maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G.

Issues: Whether the appellant had discharged the Education Cess and Secondary and Higher Education Cess payable on Tea Cess for the relevant period.

Analysis: The Chartered Accountant's certificate and month-wise payment particulars evidenced payment of Rs. 1,96,583 towards Education Cess and Secondary and Higher Education Cess during 2004-05 to 2013-14. The material showed that the cess was calculated on Tea Cess at the time of despatch from the factory, accounted for as garden expenditure, and not recovered from buyers.

Conclusion: The Education Cess and Secondary and Higher Education Cess stood paid in the normal course; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the GST appellate authority could dismiss the appeal for an alleged pre-deposit shortfall without issuing a defect memo, notice, or hearing, despite the petitioner's prior deposit during investigation.

Analysis: The governing requirement of statutory pre-deposit must be applied consistently with principles of natural justice. The prior deposit of Rs. 1.50 crore, which exceeded the required pre-deposit, was a material fact requiring consideration. Where an appellate authority perceives a shortfall in pre-deposit, it must issue a defect memo, notice, or afford an opportunity of hearing to enable the appellant to cure the asserted deficiency before dismissing the appeal.

Conclusion: The appellate rejection without considering the prior deposit or granting an opportunity to address the alleged pre-deposit shortfall was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether proceedings and orders founded on Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 could survive after its omission without a saving clause.

Analysis: Rule 96(10) was omitted by Notification No. 20/2024-Central Tax with effect from 08.10.2024. The binding position accepted by the revenue was that, in the absence of an express saving clause or other legal mechanism preserving pending proceedings, the omitted rule could not be applied to proceedings pending on the date of omission. The departmental memorandum also accepted that the restrictions under the omitted rule could not govern such pending proceedings.

Conclusion: The proceedings and consequential orders based on Rule 96(10) were vitiated and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether later e-way bills generated against the same invoices evidenced separate consignments and additional outward supplies not disclosed for tax purposes; (ii) Whether the appellant established that the later e-way bills merely continued the physical consignments covered by the earlier e-way bills; and (iii) Whether the confirmed IGST demand, interest and penalty warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether later e-way bills generated against the same invoices evidenced separate consignments and additional outward supplies not disclosed for tax purposes.

Analysis: Rule 138 permits change of conveyance through Part-B updating and permits extension of an existing e-way bill in exceptional circumstances. A later e-way bill does not by itself create a conclusive presumption of a second taxable supply; however, separately generated e-way bills with distinct electronic bill numbers, validity periods and movement particulars are independent contemporaneous declarations. Although the burden to establish tax short-payment under Section 73 remains with the Department, the facts concerning continuity of movement, trans-shipment and vehicle changes are especially within the taxpayer's knowledge.

Conclusion: The later e-way bills, considered with their separate movement particulars and the unreconciled record, evidenced separate consignments and additional outward supplies not disclosed for tax purposes.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant established that the later e-way bills merely continued the physical consignments covered by the earlier e-way bills.

Analysis: For the first invoice, the original e-way bill expired without a recorded extension, whereas the subsequent e-way bill was generated afresh from the original dispatch point. For the second invoice, the original e-way bill showed repeated vehicle updates and an extension, but the later e-way bill declared a new vehicle, fresh validity cycle and the full original journey. Changes in transport-document dates, the inconsistent route narrative and the absence of delivery acknowledgments, transporter continuity records, recipient confirmation, toll records or other contemporaneous evidence left the claimed continuity unproved.

Conclusion: The appellant failed to discharge the evidentiary burden of proving that the later e-way bills continued the same physical consignments.

Issue (iii): Whether the confirmed IGST demand, interest and penalty warranted interference.

Analysis: Section 73 applies to tax not paid or short-paid otherwise than by fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression; absence of fraudulent intent therefore does not negate a tax liability established under that provision. The additional outward movements were not shown to have been separately accounted for or taxed. Interest followed from delayed payment, and the penalty conformed to Section 73(9), with the adjudicated tax remaining below the amount proposed in the notice.

Conclusion: The confirmed IGST, interest and penalty were legally sustainable and required no interference.

Final Conclusion: The statutory e-way bill framework and the unreconciled transport record justified treating the later electronic declarations as additional taxable outward movements with corresponding fiscal liability.

Ratio Decidendi: Separately generated e-way bills against the same invoice can support an inference of additional taxable movements under Section 73 where distinct movement particulars remain unreconciled and the taxpayer fails to establish continuity through contemporaneous transport evidence.

Issues: Whether the eight appeals involving an identical question of law should be heard by the Principal Bench of the GSTAT.

Analysis: Section 109(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with Notification No. S.O. 4219(E) dated 17.09.2025, provides for the Principal Bench to hear cases pending before different State Benches where an identical question of law is involved and the President is satisfied of such identity. The appeals raised the same question concerning refund of interest paid on tax discharged through the electronic credit ledger following retrospective substitution of the proviso to Section 50(1).

Conclusion: The appeals involve an identical question of law and are required to be heard by a Division Bench of the Principal Bench, GSTAT.

Issues: (i) Whether full CENVAT credit was available on specified input services used for both taxable management, maintenance and repair services and exempt renting of immovable property services for 16.06.2005 to 01.06.2007; (ii) Whether CENVAT credit relating to renting of immovable property services after 01.06.2007 could be denied under Board Circular No. 98/1/2008-ST dated 04.01.2008; and (iii) Whether fit-out charges forming part of leased office premises were liable to service tax despite payment of VAT.

Issue (i): Whether full CENVAT credit was available on specified input services used for both taxable management, maintenance and repair services and exempt renting of immovable property services for 16.06.2005 to 01.06.2007.

Analysis: Rule 6(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 permits whole credit of service tax on the specified taxable services notwithstanding Rule 6(1) to Rule 6(3), except where the input service is used exclusively in relation to exempt goods or exempt services. Management, maintenance and repair services were taxable output services, and the credit was used for both those services and renting of immovable property services. The requirement of exclusive use for exempt services was therefore not met, notwithstanding that separate credit accounts were not maintained.

Conclusion: Full CENVAT credit was available under Rule 6(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether CENVAT credit relating to renting of immovable property services after 01.06.2007 could be denied under Board Circular No. 98/1/2008-ST dated 04.01.2008.

Analysis: After 01.06.2007, renting of immovable property was a taxable output service. The Circular incorrectly addressed eligibility of input-service credit with reference to immovable property rather than the taxable output service of renting. Eligibility was required to be determined by the nexus between the input services and the output service under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Conclusion: The Circular could not justify denial of the credit, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether fit-out charges forming part of leased office premises were liable to service tax despite payment of VAT.

Analysis: The lease documentation showed that the fit-outs included infrastructure forming part of the leased office premises, rather than merely movable articles independently supplied to tenants. The related consideration formed part of the value of the leasing arrangement. Payment of VAT does not, by itself, exclude service-tax liability where the factual requirements for both levies are satisfied; additionally, proof of VAT payment on the fit-outs was absent.

Conclusion: Fit-out charges were liable to service tax, in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's common-credit claims for the relevant periods remain valid, but consideration attributable to fit-outs supplied as part of the leased premises is includible for service-tax purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: Full CENVAT credit under Rule 6(5) is available where the specified input service is used for both taxable and exempt output services, unless its use is exclusively attributable to exempt services.

Issues: Whether the hospital fulfilled the requirement of existing solely for philanthropic purposes and not for purposes of profit, and was consequently eligible for approval under Section 10(23C)(via) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 10(23C)(via) does not impose a requirement that a hospital's receipts and expenditure must exactly balance every year. An incidental surplus is relevant but not conclusive; its source, deployment and the institution's actual objects and activities determine whether a profit motive exists. Capital expenditure on medical equipment and hospital facilities represents application of income towards medical relief, while depreciation recognises the consumption of those assets. Both were relevant for determining the institution's real financial position during the relevant years.

Analysis: The hospital's governing instruments confined its funds to medical objects, prohibited distribution of profits to members and dedicated its residual assets to charitable purposes on dissolution. Its funds were applied to hospital infrastructure, equipment and medical services, without evidence of private diversion or disguised distribution of profits. The provision of consultation rooms, collection of consultants' fees, retention of charges for hospital facilities, and payment of professional fees for medical services did not establish a separate commercial activity or private benefit.

Analysis: Philanthropic purpose is not confined to free treatment of indigent patients, and treatment of paying patients does not by itself negate medical philanthropy. Section 10(23C)(via) prescribes no minimum ratio of free or concessional treatment to total receipts. Compliance with statutory obligations for indigent and weaker-section patients, coupled with the application of funds to medical care, supported the hospital's philanthropic character. Earlier recognition of its charitable character did not create an automatic entitlement but required consistency in tax treatment unless a material change in facts or law justified departure.

Conclusion: The hospital existed solely for philanthropic purposes and not for purposes of profit, satisfying Section 10(23C)(via) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The refusals of approval for the relevant assessment years were unsustainable.