Vicarious liability in cheque dishonour cases requires specific factual averments and supporting material, not a bare assertion of partnership.
A bare allegation that accused persons were partners and were in charge of a firm is insufficient to sustain prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act when partnership is promptly denied and the complainant produces no supporting deed or material. Vicarious liability also requires specific averments of consent, connivance, or neglect where the accused are said not to be partners or responsible persons; absent those factual foundations, proceedings cannot be sustained. An order refusing to drop such proceedings is not merely interlocutory if it finally determines the accused's liability on that issue, so revision remains maintainable.
Issues: (i) Whether a mere averment that the petitioners were partners and were in charge of the business was sufficient to sustain prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act when the petitioners had denied partnership at the earliest stage. (ii) Whether the revision was barred as arising from an interlocutory order.
Issue (i): Whether a mere averment that the petitioners were partners and were in charge of the business was sufficient to sustain prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act when the petitioners had denied partnership at the earliest stage.
Analysis: The complaint contained only a bare assertion that the petitioners were partners and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the firm. The petitioners had, even before the complaint, denied that they were partners and stated that they had no role in the business. The complainant relied on a partnership deed but did not produce it, though the pleading itself stated that the petitioners were partners according to that document. In such a situation, the Court held that a mere allegation, unsupported by the foundational document or other material, was insufficient to fasten liability. As the complaint also lacked any averment that, if the petitioners were not partners, the cheque was issued with their consent, connivance, or neglect, the requirements of vicarious liability were not satisfied.
Conclusion: The prosecution against the petitioners was not sustainable under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the proceedings were liable to be quashed.
Issue (ii): Whether the revision was barred as arising from an interlocutory order.
Analysis: An order that finally determines the liability of an accused on a particular issue is not merely interlocutory. The order rejecting the request to drop proceedings conclusively affected the petitioners' rights in relation to the criminal complaint. On that footing, the revision was held to be maintainable.
Conclusion: The revision was maintainable and not hit by the bar applicable to interlocutory orders.
Final Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to have the criminal proceedings quashed, as the complaint did not contain the necessary factual foundation for their prosecution and the challenge was competent in revision.
Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution for dishonour of cheque against persons said to be partners or persons in charge of a firm, a bare assertion in the complaint is insufficient where partnership and responsibility are specifically denied at the earliest stage and the complainant fails to produce the document or material on which such liability is founded; where the complaint also lacks the requisite averments of consent, connivance, or neglect, proceedings cannot be sustained.