Issues: Whether the transfer applications relating to 450 appeals involving an identical question of law were required to be placed before the Principal Bench.

Analysis: The appeals raised a common question concerning GST on royalty payments under mining leases and consequential refund claims. Under the third proviso to Section 109(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with the notification dated 17.09.2026, the Principal Bench had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the common question.

Conclusion: The Principal Bench has exclusive jurisdiction over the 450 appeals, which shall be listed and heard before the appropriate Bench of the Principal Bench.

Issues: Whether an appeal remaining defective despite notice and repeated opportunities, coupled with the appellant's continued non-appearance, may be rejected under the Tribunal's inherent and procedural powers.

Analysis: Rule 24 of the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2025 permits the Bench to reject an appeal where notified defects remain unrectified after the prescribed scrutiny process. Rule 10 preserves the Tribunal's inherent powers to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process. Persistent failure to cure defects, absence on successive listings, and lack of any explanation demonstrated abandonment of the appellate proceedings. Retaining such defective proceedings would unjustifiably burden the Tribunal's docket.

Conclusion: The Tribunal may exercise its powers under Rules 10 and 24 to reject a defective appeal where the appellant fails to remove defects and abandons its prosecution; no opinion is expressed on the underlying merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the State Bench could adjudicate a jurisdictional challenge to an advance ruling when the ruling was unappealed and the challenge was absent from the show-cause notices and grounds of appeal; (ii) Whether the unchallenged advance ruling remained binding on the jurisdictional officer despite the subsequent circular; (iii) Whether GST at 18% for the relevant period could be determined through the circular and whether the refund was consequently erroneous; and (iv) Whether Revenue could raise, at the second-appellate stage, the grounds that only the supplier could claim refund and that the claim was barred by unjust enrichment.

Issue (i): Whether the State Bench could adjudicate a jurisdictional challenge to an advance ruling when the ruling was unappealed and the challenge was absent from the show-cause notices and grounds of appeal.

Analysis: The statutory appellate hierarchy under Sections 100 to 104 provides specific remedies against an advance ruling, including appeal, rectification, and declaration of voidness for fraud or suppression. The jurisdictional challenge was not raised before the Authority, in the show-cause notices, or in the authorised grounds of appeal, and was introduced only through rejoinder. Section 75(7) precludes a demand on grounds outside the notice, while Section 109(4) does not empower a State Bench to test the validity of an unchallenged ruling of the Authority.

Conclusion: The belated jurisdictional challenge to the advance ruling could not be adjudicated by the State Bench. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the unchallenged advance ruling remained binding on the jurisdictional officer despite the subsequent circular.

Analysis: Section 103(1) makes the ruling binding on the applicant and the concerned or jurisdictional officer. The ruling was neither appealed against, rectified, nor declared void. The later circular was an administrative instruction under Section 168 and not a change in the Act, Rules, or rate notification for purposes of Section 103(2). A later adverse administrative circular could not retrospectively displace the finality of a quasi-judicial ruling.

Conclusion: The advance ruling continued to bind the jurisdictional officer, and the circular did not permit Revenue to resile from it. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether GST at 18% for the relevant period could be determined through the circular and whether the refund was consequently erroneous.

Analysis: Section 9(1) requires the GST rate to be prescribed by Government notification on the recommendation of the Council. Under Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate), the relevant licensing service attracted the rate applicable to like goods involving transfer of title; the applicable rate was 5% for the period up to 31.12.2018. The 18% rate was notified only with effect from 01.01.2019. An administrative circular cannot create a levy or substitute for a rate notification, consistently with Article 265 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The circular could not fix the rate at 18% for the relevant period; the refund was lawfully sanctioned and was not an erroneous refund. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether Revenue could raise, at the second-appellate stage, the grounds that only the supplier could claim refund and that the claim was barred by unjust enrichment.

Analysis: These grounds were not contained in the show-cause notices or adjudication orders and were barred by the show-cause notice limitation in Section 75(7). In any event, the recipient had borne the incidence of tax, furnished the prescribed chartered accountant certificate under Rule 89(2)(m), and reversed the corresponding input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger. The requirements for payment of refund to the applicant under Section 54(8)(e) were satisfied.

Conclusion: Revenue could not introduce those new grounds at the second-appellate stage, and unjust enrichment was not attracted. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The unchallenged and binding advance ruling governed the applicable rate for the disputed period, and the absence of a notified 18% levy preserved the legality of the refund; the demands treating it as erroneous could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an unappealed advance ruling fixes the applicable GST rate under a notification, a subsequent administrative circular cannot displace that binding ruling or create a contrary levy without authority of law.

Issues: Whether an inordinate delay of 1,141 days in filing the appeal was supported by sufficient cause for condonation.

Analysis: The order-in-original had been duly communicated to the appellant in July 2021. Remote working, internal communication failures, subsequent resignation of an employee, and failure to capture the order in the litigation-tracking system did not establish that the appellant was prevented from filing the appeal within the prescribed period. The appellant also remained inactive after responsibility for the matter was transferred in 2022. COVID-19 disruptions could not justify the delay, particularly as normalcy had returned by the time of communication and the appellant had been represented in the adjudication proceedings. Examination of the merits was unnecessary for deciding limitation.

Conclusion: The delay was not supported by sufficient cause and was not liable to be condoned.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings could validly be initiated solely on third-party information without independent inquiry, verification, or application of mind by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires the Assessing Officer to form a reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Information received from another departmental authority may be relevant material, but does not by itself establish the required belief. The material did not demonstrate any independent examination or preliminary verification linking the third-party information to escapement of income in the assessee's case; the recorded reasons therefore reflected only a reason to suspect.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were invalid for want of demonstrated independent application of mind and a legally sustainable reason to believe. The reassessment orders were set aside and the additions deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether estimated income based on rejection of books for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 should be computed at 5% or 2% of sales; (ii) Whether additions of unsecured loans as unexplained cash credits under section 68 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether estimated income based on rejection of books for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 should be computed at 5% or 2% of sales.

Analysis: The 5% estimation for the two years departed from the rate adopted in the original assessment and from the 2% rate accepted for the immediately preceding year on substantially similar facts. Consistency required computation on the 2% basis after rejection of books of account.

Conclusion: The estimated addition for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 is restricted to 2% of sales, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether additions of unsecured loans as unexplained cash credits under section 68 were sustainable.

Analysis: Banking channels, confirmations, returns and repayment documentation established only a paper trail and did not establish genuine creditworthiness or genuineness. The lenders did not comply with repeated summons, their directors had admitted that the entities were accommodation-entry providers, and the assessee failed to produce them for verification. Applying the burden of proof and human-probabilities test, the surrounding evidence outweighed the apparent documentation.

Conclusion: The unsecured-loan additions under section 68 are sustained, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Income estimation for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 must be recomputed at 2% of sales, while the cash-credit additions and related interest disallowance remain undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Banking documentation does not discharge the assessee's burden to prove creditworthiness and genuineness of a cash credit where independent evidence establishes that the creditors are accommodation-entry providers and they fail to verify the transactions.

Issues: Whether a tax demand could be confirmed on a ground not proposed in the show-cause notice, consistently with Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of a demand on a ground different from that specified in the show-cause notice. The DRC-01 proposed tax at 14% on a specified turnover, whereas the subsequent DRC-07 and adjudication order confirmed tax at 9% on a different turnover without confirming the demand originally proposed. The confirmed demand therefore rested on an unnotified ground.

Conclusion: Confirmation of the demand on a ground not proposed in the show-cause notice violated Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and was invalid.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the statutory appeal could be condoned in the circumstances stated by the petitioner.

Analysis: The appellate authority had rejected the appeal as time-barred on the basis that the delay exceeded the period condonable under Section 107(1) of the Goods and Services Tax Act. The appeal memorandum attributed the delay to the serious illness and subsequent death of the proprietor's husband, for whom she was the sole caregiver. The State accepted that the matter could be heard on merits upon compensation by costs.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned, the appellate order rejecting the appeal on limitation was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the appellate authority for a fresh decision on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the notification retrospectively impaired a vested right to export stock acquired but not shipped before its effective date.
(ii) Whether the earlier free-export policy or export tenders created a legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel against the policy change.
(iii) Whether the notification is arbitrary or imposes an unreasonable restriction on trade for want of a separate grace period.
(iv) Whether Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 is invalid for confining transitional protection to exporters holding an Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit.
(v) Whether the licensing authority may indefinitely defer a restricted-export authorisation application pending policy review.

Issue (i): Whether the notification retrospectively impaired a vested right to export stock acquired but not shipped before its effective date.

Analysis: Sections 3 and 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 and Paragraphs 1.05(b) and 2.01 of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 make the policy prevailing on the date of export applicable prospectively. Procurement, payment, storage at port, or possession of stock, without shipping bills, loading, or final export clearances before the effective date, does not create an accrued right to export under the earlier policy.

Conclusion: The notification operates prospectively and does not impair a vested right to export unshipped stock.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier free-export policy or export tenders created a legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel against the policy change.

Analysis: A free classification under the policy is not a clear governmental assurance that the classification will remain unchanged. The statutory framework permits policy amendment in public interest, and export tenders issued by a State undertaking do not amount to an assurance by the Union that export policy will not change. The strategic-resource and national-security rationale supplies an overriding public-interest basis for the regulatory change.

Conclusion: Neither legitimate expectation nor promissory estoppel restrains the policy change.

Issue (iii): Whether the notification is arbitrary or imposes an unreasonable restriction on trade for want of a separate grace period.

Analysis: A general export-policy notification issued under Sections 3 and 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 need not record its reasons on its face where a rational basis exists. Conservation of depleted strategic mineral reserves, national security, and resource planning provide such a basis. The measure regulates exports through licensing rather than imposing an absolute prohibition, and Paragraph 1.05(b) already supplies a defined transition mechanism. Judicial deference is warranted in economic and strategic policy, and the licensing regime bears a rational and proportionate connection to the public-interest objective under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The notification is valid, non-arbitrary, and constitutes a reasonable restriction on trade.

Issue (iv): Whether Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 is invalid for confining transitional protection to exporters holding an Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit.

Analysis: Paragraph 1.05(b) creates a limited exception to the ordinary rule that the policy on the export date governs. An Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit is bank-backed, objectively verifiable, and not readily alterable or cancellable, unlike private purchase orders or other payment arrangements. This provides an intelligible basis for distinguishing qualifying commitments from other commercial arrangements and bears a rational nexus to preventing unverifiable claims for transition. The absence of an Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit on the effective date determines eligibility; no exporter is required to anticipate a future regulatory change.

Conclusion: Paragraph 1.05(b) is constitutionally valid, and exporters without a valid Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit on the effective date are not entitled to its transitional protection.

Issue (v): Whether the licensing authority may indefinitely defer a restricted-export authorisation application pending policy review.

Analysis: Section 3(2) of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 permits export restrictions, but an open-ended freeze on all licensing applications would convert the chosen licensing regime into a prohibition in practice. A restricted-export authorisation application must receive timely, individual, and reasoned consideration after a personal hearing, with due regard to the pre-existing procurement, economic hardship, absence of an alternative domestic market, shipping disruption, and national-security considerations.

Conclusion: The licensing authority cannot indefinitely defer the restricted-export authorisation application solely because a policy review is pending and must decide it by a reasoned order after hearing the applicants.

Final Conclusion: The restrictive export regime and its Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit-based transitional framework remain operative, while the statutory licensing mechanism must be exercised through timely, individual, reasoned consideration.

Ratio Decidendi: A prospective export-policy restriction validly governs unshipped goods, and a transitional exception confined to objectively verifiable irrevocable commitments satisfies reasonable-classification requirements.

Issues: Whether alleged inclusion in one unit's assessment of turnover already taxed in another separately registered unit constitutes a rectifiable mistake.

Analysis: Section 161 permits correction of a mistake where overlapping turnover has resulted in the same turnover being subjected to tax more than once. The departmental records relating to separately registered units must be examined holistically to verify the claimed overlap and ensure that turnover is taxed only once. The alleged overlap requires factual verification through the assessee's computation and the records of both units.

Conclusion: If established, double taxation of the same turnover is a rectifiable mistake. The impugned decision was set aside solely for fresh examination and reworking of turnover on the alleged overlap.

Issues: Whether the impugned order could confirm tax proposals for GSTR-1/GSTR-3B reconciliation and excess input tax credit that had already been dealt with in an earlier order under appeal.

Analysis: Legal framework: a later tax adjudication cannot sustain duplicative confirmation of the same tax proposals already determined by an earlier order that is pending in appeal. Comparison of the orders showed complete overlap in respect of the proposals concerning reconciliation of GSTR-1 with GSTR-3B and excess input tax credit claimed in GSTR-3B vis-a -vis auto-populated GSTR-2A.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed insofar as it confirmed the duplicated proposals relating to GSTR reconciliation and excess input tax credit.

Issues: Validity of the approval for reopening and the consequential reassessment where the approval proforma invoked Section 149(1)(b) despite the alleged escaped income being Rs. 7 lakh and approval having been granted by the PCIT.

Analysis: The approval proforma recorded that the proceedings were covered by Section 149(1)(b), applicable to cases beyond three years, while recording alleged escaped income of only Rs. 7 lakh. The approval was nevertheless granted by the PCIT. Applying the principle that statutory safeguards governing reassessment approval require due application of mind, and following the analogous ruling relied upon, the approval was found invalid.

Conclusion: The approval was invalid; the order under Section 148A(d), notice under Section 148, and the consequential reassessment order were quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether cash of Rs. 50 lakh could be assessed as unexplained money under Section 69A where Rs. 44 lakh was supported by bank withdrawals and Rs. 6 lakh was claimed as internal business accruals; (ii) Whether withdrawals from a company's running account constituted deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) despite a sufficient credit balance; and (iii) Whether cash deposits recorded in the cash book during the demonetisation period could be treated as unexplained money under Section 69A.

Issue (i): Whether cash of Rs. 50 lakh could be assessed as unexplained money under Section 69A where Rs. 44 lakh was supported by bank withdrawals and Rs. 6 lakh was claimed as internal business accruals.

Analysis: Section 69A requires the assessee to explain the source of money found. Documentary evidence established withdrawals of Rs. 44 lakh from the stated bank accounts, and no cogent material established that the seized cash had a different source. Once this explanation was furnished, the evidentiary burden shifted to the Revenue. Reliance on an accountant's statement without affording cross-examination did not displace the explanation. As regards Rs. 6 lakh, no enquiry or material demonstrated an unexplained source; the amount was appropriately characterisable as business income rather than unexplained money.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 44 lakh under Section 69A is unsustainable; Rs. 6 lakh is assessable as business income and not as unexplained money.

Issue (ii): Whether withdrawals from a company's running account constituted deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) despite a sufficient credit balance.

Analysis: The account between the shareholder and the company was a regularly maintained running account with a sufficient credit balance in favour of the shareholder. The withdrawals were therefore attributable to that existing credit balance and normal account operations, rather than to a distribution of accumulated profits.

Conclusion: The withdrawals do not constitute deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e), and the related addition is deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether cash deposits recorded in the cash book during the demonetisation period could be treated as unexplained money under Section 69A.

Analysis: The deposits were supported by the cash book, available cash balances, and cash received in the ordinary course of business. No contrary evidence rebutted the recorded availability of cash or established that the deposits were from unexplained sources.

Conclusion: The cash deposits cannot be treated as unexplained money under Section 69A, and deletion of the addition is upheld in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The documented bank withdrawals, established credit balance in the running account, and cash-book evidence sufficiently explain the respective amounts; the additions based on unexplained money and deemed dividend are therefore not sustainable, except for assessment of Rs. 6 lakh as business income.

Issues: Whether the reassessment order was validly revised under Section 263(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for failure to conduct requisite inquiry and verification into the genuineness of purchase transactions.

Analysis: Under Explanation 2(a) to Section 263(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, an assessment order passed without inquiries or verification that should have been made is deemed erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Notices issued to suppliers remained unanswered, and the assessee did not furnish crucial supporting material, including supplier confirmations, evidence of physical movement of goods, and transporter-payment details. No effective follow-up inquiry was undertaken after such non-compliance. Mere issuance of notices did not amount to a concluded inquiry; the unsupported application of a 2% profit rate was neither a plausible view sustainable in law nor a conscious determination of the genuineness of purchases. As no conclusive opinion on the purchase transactions had been formed, revision did not amount to a change of opinion.

Conclusion: The revision under Section 263(1) was valid; the assessment was rightly set aside for fresh assessment of the purchase issue. The finding is against the assessee.

Issues: Whether Section 194H applied to incentives directly credited by the principal to retailers, and whether the resulting disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 194H applies where commission or brokerage is paid under a principal-agent relationship. The retailer incentives were directly credited by the principal, while the assessee recorded the gross amount only to reconcile tax deducted at source reflected in Form 26AS. No income accrued to the assessee in respect of the retailer share and no separate commission payment was made by it. The arrangement was therefore on a principal-to-principal basis, without the agency relationship necessary to attract Section 194H. As the obligation to deduct tax did not arise, disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) could not be sustained.

Conclusion: Section 194H was inapplicable, and the disallowance sustained under Section 40(a)(ia) was deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether expenditure can be disallowed under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where tax was deducted at a lower rate or under a different provision, resulting only in a shortfall in tax deduction at source; (ii) Whether interest paid on delayed trade payments is deductible business expenditure.

Issue (i): Whether expenditure can be disallowed under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where tax was deducted at a lower rate or under a different provision, resulting only in a shortfall in tax deduction at source.

Analysis: Section 40(a)(ia) applies to a failure to deduct tax or deposit deducted tax, and not to a mere shortfall arising from deduction under another provision or at a lower rate. Deduction of tax, even if at an incorrect rate owing to a difference in interpretation, does not amount to complete non-deduction; the consequences of any shortfall lie under the provisions governing assessee-in-default.

Conclusion: No disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) can be made for the TDS shortfall. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest paid on delayed trade payments is deductible business expenditure.

Analysis: Interest on delayed payments to trade creditors is compensatory in character and bears an intrinsic nexus with business operations.

Conclusion: The interest expenditure is deductible. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disallowances relating to the TDS shortfall and interest on delayed trade payments cannot be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 40(a)(ia) does not apply where tax has been deducted but at a lower rate or under an incorrect provision, as such short deduction is distinct from complete non-deduction.

Issues: (i) Whether addition under Section 56(2)(vii) based on stamp-duty value could be sustained without a valuation reference after the assessee disputed that value; (ii) Whether the addition of agricultural income required fresh examination on the basis of supporting evidence.

Issue (i): Whether addition under Section 56(2)(vii) based on stamp-duty value could be sustained without a valuation reference after the assessee disputed that value.

Analysis: Section 56(2)(vii) requires a reference to the Valuation Officer where the assessee disputes the adopted stamp-duty value. Although the stamp-duty value was objected to, no reference was made. A valuation report concerning the co-owner reportedly determined a substantially lower fair market value and required verification for its authenticity and applicability.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the addition based on stamp-duty valuation is remitted for fresh adjudication after verification of the relevant valuation report and determination of fair market value.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition of agricultural income required fresh examination on the basis of supporting evidence.

Analysis: The assessee sought to produce evidence of landholding and agricultural activity, which required examination.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the agricultural-income issue is remitted for fresh examination after considering the evidence produced.

Final Conclusion: Both additions require fresh determination by the Assessing Officer after due verification and a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Where stamp-duty value is disputed for purposes of Section 56(2)(vii), valuation must be determined through the prescribed reference mechanism before an addition is sustained.

Issues: Whether the addition for an alleged unrecorded receipt from a share broker could be sustained when the assessee claimed that it represented net commodity-trading proceeds already reflected in the speculative-profit ledger.

Analysis: The gross amount recorded in the speculative ledger and the net amount credited in the bank account required reconciliation through the audited accounts, broker ledger, contract notes, bank statement and related records. The difference between the gross and net figures, without proper factual verification, was insufficient to conclusively treat them as separate transactions. As all relevant supporting documents had not been furnished during assessment, fresh examination was required.

Conclusion: The addition was set aside for fresh examination of whether the bank receipt represented net proceeds of the commodity transaction already accounted for by the assessee.

Issues: Whether a Resolution Professional removed and replaced during a personal insolvency resolution process can maintain appeals concerning directions for convening a creditors' meeting and consideration of a repayment plan.

Analysis: The authority and interest of a Resolution Professional to pursue process-related appeals do not survive removal and replacement. The validity of the removal could be considered only in the separate appeal specifically challenging that order. As the newly appointed Resolution Professional was ready to convene the creditors' meeting, the former Resolution Professional had no subsisting interest in the process-related appeals.

Conclusion: A removed Resolution Professional cannot maintain appeals concerning the personal insolvency process after replacement by a new Resolution Professional.

Issues: Whether Section 15(5)(e) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 is constitutionally valid and whether composition-scheme dealers may opt out consequent upon its invalidity.

Analysis: The constitutional challenge was governed by the earlier Division Bench determination concerning the same provision. That binding determination was applied to the petitioners' claim.

Conclusion: Section 15(5)(e) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 was declared ultra vires the Constitution of India, and the petitioners were permitted to opt out of the composition scheme.