Tariff concession eligibility turns on readiness for service connection; withdrawal allowed, but proviso read down for delayed industries.
The tariff concession notification was construed in its scheme and context, so "set up" was not confined to mere formal establishment; it included readiness for commercial use and the grant of service connection. The State could withdraw the concession because it was created by subordinate legislation, and promissory estoppel did not prevent amendment where public interest justified withdrawal. However, the proviso had to be read down to avoid hardship for industries that had substantially complied, had set up their units, and were awaiting service connection due to administrative delay. The appeals succeeded, and individual eligibility was to be examined on the modified construction.
Issues: (i) Whether the expression "set up" in the tariff concession notification meant mere establishment of the industry or required actual service connection for availing the concession. (ii) Whether the State could withdraw the concession and whether promissory estoppel prevented amendment of the Schedule, including whether the proviso required reading down to protect industries that had substantially acted on the concession.
Issue (i): Whether the expression "set up" in the tariff concession notification meant mere establishment of the industry or required actual service connection for availing the concession.
Analysis: The expression had to be construed in the context of the tariff scheme, the cut-off dates, and the fact that the concession was linked to the date on which the consumer was given service connection. The notification did not speak of commencement of production alone, but the scheme made service connection a significant factor for certainty in the grant and continuance of the concession. The Court also recognised that some industries had applied and were otherwise ready, yet were delayed by the Board or other authorities, and that a literal reading could create anomalies between similarly placed consumers.
Conclusion: The expression "set up" could not be confined to a purely formal or mechanical meaning and had to be read in the tariff context with reference to readiness for commercial use and the grant of service connection.
Issue (ii): Whether the State could withdraw the concession and whether promissory estoppel prevented amendment of the Schedule, including whether the proviso required reading down to protect industries that had substantially acted on the concession.
Analysis: The concession was created by statutory subordinate legislation and could be altered or withdrawn by the State. The Court held that promissory estoppel did not bar amendment where public interest justified withdrawal, and that no sufficient foundation had been laid to challenge the reasonableness or validity of the amendment itself. At the same time, the proviso had to be construed so as not to cause undue hardship to industries that had already acted on the concession, had set up their units, and were ready for service connection but were delayed by the administration. In that limited sense, the proviso required reading down to protect accrued claims in hard cases.
Conclusion: The State was entitled to withdraw the concession, promissory estoppel did not defeat the amendment, but the proviso had to be read down to cover eligible industries that had substantially fulfilled the conditions and were awaiting connection due to delay not attributable to them.
Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the matter was sent back for individual examination by the appropriate authority, and the benefit of the tariff concession was to be considered on the modified construction of the proviso.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory concession may be withdrawn in public interest, but a proviso governing eligibility must be construed in its tariff context and read down to prevent denial of accrued benefit to industries that had substantially complied and were ready for service connection but were delayed by the administration.