Preserved disciplinary safeguard under Article 314 limited interim suspension to the appointing authority; broader rule-making failed.
Article 314 preserved, for former Secretary of State's Services officers continuing in service, the pre-existing disciplinary safeguard that interim suspension pending departmental enquiry or criminal proceedings could be ordered only by the appointing authority, namely the Government of India. Rule 7(3) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, was therefore inconsistent with that preserved right to the extent it empowered another authority to suspend such officers pending enquiry or criminal charge. The rule was held ultra vires Article 314 in that limited respect, and the suspension order made under it was invalid.
Issues: (i) whether Article 314 of the Constitution of India preserved, for former Secretary of State's Services officers who continued in service, the pre-existing right that interim suspension pending departmental enquiry or criminal proceedings could be ordered only by the appointing authority; and (ii) whether Rule 7(3) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, was ultra vires Article 314 insofar as it empowered an authority other than the Government of India to suspend such officers pending enquiry or criminal charge.
Issue (i): whether Article 314 of the Constitution of India preserved, for former Secretary of State's Services officers who continued in service, the pre-existing right that interim suspension pending departmental enquiry or criminal proceedings could be ordered only by the appointing authority.
Analysis: The protected rights under Article 314 were the rights existing immediately before commencement of the Constitution. The expression "changed circumstances" was confined to the constitutional changes brought about by the transfer of power and the commencement of the Constitution, and did not authorise the creation of new rules enlarging the power to suspend. Suspension pending disciplinary proceedings or criminal proceedings was treated as a matter intimately connected with disciplinary matters. On the relevant pre-Constitution position, suspension as an interim measure existed, but for former Secretary of State's Services officers it could be ordered only by the appointing authority, which in the changed circumstances was the Government of India; suspension as a punishment stood on a different footing and remained governed by the penalty rules then in force.
Conclusion: The protected right included the restriction that interim suspension could be ordered only by the appointing authority, and that right was preserved by Article 314.
Issue (ii): whether Rule 7(3) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, was ultra vires Article 314 insofar as it empowered an authority other than the Government of India to suspend such officers pending enquiry or criminal charge.
Analysis: Rule 7(3) authorised interim suspension by authorities other than the Government of India. For officers within the protected class under Article 314, that rule took away the preserved right that interim suspension could be ordered only by the appointing authority. Since the rule altered the protected disciplinary safeguards of those officers, it could not validly override the constitutional guarantee. The order of suspension made under that rule therefore lacked authority.
Conclusion: Rule 7(3) was ultra vires Article 314 to the extent it permitted an authority other than the Government of India to order interim suspension of officers protected by that Article, and the suspension order was invalid.
Final Conclusion: The protected disciplinary safeguard of the former Secretary of State's Services was held to survive constitutional change, and the impugned suspension regime was struck down only to the extent it authorised interim suspension by a non-appointing authority for the protected class.
Ratio Decidendi: A constitutional guarantee preserving pre-existing disciplinary rights for a protected class prevents rule-making from enlarging the authority empowered to impose interim suspension, where that power was previously confined to the appointing authority.