Demand and acceptance of bribe must be proved before presumption applies; acquittal should not be reversed on a reasonable view.
Demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the statutory presumption under Section 20 arises only after foundational facts of acceptance or agreement to accept are proved. Mere recovery of tainted money, without reliable proof of demand and conscious acceptance, is insufficient; on the facts, serious doubt remained because of the complainant's evidence, a retraction letter, and the circumstances of recovery. In appeals against acquittal, interference is limited by the presumption of innocence and the need to respect a reasonable trial court view; the appellate court should not disturb acquittal where two views are possible. The conviction and sentence were set aside and the acquittal restored.
Issues: (i) Whether the prosecution proved demand, acceptance and recovery of illegal gratification so as to attract the statutory presumption under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal on the evidence on record.
Issue (i): Whether the prosecution proved demand, acceptance and recovery of illegal gratification so as to attract the statutory presumption under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Analysis: Demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The statutory presumption under Section 20 arises only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of acceptance or agreement to accept gratification. Mere recovery of tainted money, without reliable proof of demand and conscious acceptance, is insufficient. On the evidence, the complainant's testimony, the documentary letter retracting the allegation, and the surrounding circumstances created serious doubt about demand and acceptance. The alleged recovery from a bag placed on a cot did not establish conscious possession or voluntary acceptance of bribe money by the accused.
Conclusion: The prosecution failed to prove demand, acceptance and recovery of illegal gratification, and the presumption under Section 20 did not arise.
Issue (ii): Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal on the evidence on record.
Analysis: An appellate court may re-appreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal, but it must give due weight to the trial court's view, the presumption of innocence, and the strengthened presumption after acquittal. Where two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should not be disturbed. The High Court failed to notice material weaknesses in the prosecution case and exceeded the proper limits of appellate interference by reversing a reasoned acquittal without sufficient basis.
Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in reversing the acquittal, and its judgment suffered from legal error.
Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were set aside and the trial court's acquittal was restored, leaving the appellant entitled to the benefit of acquittal on merits.
Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution for corruption, the prosecution must first prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification before the statutory presumption can operate, and an appellate court should not reverse a reasoned acquittal unless the view taken by the trial court is perverse or legally unsustainable.