Reopening of assessment under Section 147 - Limitation period for reassessment - First proviso to Section 147 - failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts - Explanation 1 to Section 147 - production of books of account or other evidence - Notice under Sections 148 and 149 - Disclosure in return (Schedule EI) and subsequent production of sale deedReopening of assessment under Section 147 - Limitation period for reassessment - First proviso to Section 147 - failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts - Notice under Sections 148 and 149 - Validity of reopening notice issued on 30.03.2021 for Assessment Year 2013-2014 where four year limitation had expired - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the four year limitation for reopening the assessment for Assessment Year 2013 2014 had expired. Reopening after expiry of the four year period is permissible only if any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment by reason of failure of the assessee to make a return or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment, as prescribed by the first proviso to Section 147. The record shows the return for the year contained disclosure of exempted income in Schedule EI. No notice under Section 142(1) or Section 148 was issued within the four year window to justify post limitation reopening on the ground of non disclosure. On the material before the Court there was no finding of failure to disclose such as would bring the case within the proviso permitting reopening beyond four years. Accordingly, the reopening notice issued on 30.03.2021 was held to be beyond the permissible period and unsustainable. [Paras 7, 9, 10]Reopening notice issued after the four year limitation for AY 2013 2014 was invalid in the absence of failure to disclose material facts as required by the first proviso to Section 147.Explanation 1 to Section 147 - production of books of account or other evidence - Disclosure in return (Schedule EI) and subsequent production of sale deed - Whether production of the sale deed and ledger particulars in response to an assessment stage query amounted to non disclosure attracting Explanation 1 to Section 147 - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the record and noted that the assessee had disclosed the exempted income in Schedule EI of the return and, upon request during assessment proceedings, furnished ledger details and the sale deed of the agricultural property. Explanation 1 to Section 147 provides that mere production of books or other evidence from which material could with due diligence have been discovered does not necessarily amount to disclosure; however, the Court held that the sale deed produced in response to a specific request made during assessment proceedings cannot be equated to concealment or mere belated production of 'books of account' that would invoke Explanation 1. The particulars relevant to the claimed exempted income were thus held to have been disclosed to the Assessing Officer, and there was no material on record to conclude that the assessee had failed to disclose fully and truly the material facts necessary for assessment. [Paras 5, 11, 12]Production of the sale deed and ledger particulars in response to the Assessing Officer's specific requisition did not constitute non disclosure under Explanation 1, and therefore did not justify reopening beyond the statutory limitation.Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; the reopening notice dated 30.03.2021 and the order rejecting objections dated 09.03.2022 are set aside as the reassessment for Assessment Year 2013 2014 was beyond the four year period and there was no failure to disclose material facts justifying reopening.

Burden to prove smuggled nature - confiscation of non-notified goods - reliability of laboratory/opinion evidence - local trade opinion versus legal evidence - foreign origin alone not sufficient to prove smugglingBurden to prove smuggled nature - confiscation of non-notified goods - foreign origin alone not sufficient to prove smuggling - Confiscation and penalty sustainability where goods seized in domestic transit are not specified under Section 123 and the Department has not established illegal importation. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that betel nuts seized during inland transit are not goods notified under Section 123, and therefore the legal onus lay on the Customs authorities to prove the smuggled nature of the goods. The adjudicatory authorities relied on opinions and certain investigative findings, but no admissible or cogent evidence was placed on record to establish foreign origin coupled with illegal importation. The Tribunal applied the principle that for non-notified goods confiscation is permissible only upon proof of illegal smuggling and found the Department had not discharged that burden. Consequential factual inferences such as cancellation of GST registration or non-existence of the consignor at an invoiced address were held insufficient, by themselves, to establish that the goods were smuggled into the country. The Tribunal emphasised that where the evidentiary basis for foreign origin is unsatisfactory, confiscation and penalty cannot be sustained. [Paras 4]Confiscation and penalty set aside for want of proof that the betel nuts were smuggled; appeal allowed.Reliability of laboratory/opinion evidence - local trade opinion versus legal evidence - Admissibility and weight of the Arecanut Research & Development Foundation (ARDF) report and local trade opinions in proving country of origin and smuggling. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal reviewed preceding decisions and authorities which cast doubt on the ARDF certificate's reliability and held that an opinion from ARDF or local trade opinion cannot substitute for legally admissible evidence proving country of origin. It noted that the ARDF itself, by responses relied upon in earlier orders, indicated inability to determinatively establish place of origin through laboratory tests; consequently the ARDF report was to be treated as opinion only and not as conclusive scientific proof. The Tribunal reiterated that local trade opinions are not a replacement for legal evidence and that reliance on an unaccredited or non-conclusive test report cannot fulfil the burden on Revenue to show smuggling. [Paras 4]ARDF report and local trade opinions not sufficient to establish foreign origin or illegal importation; such material cannot sustain confiscation.Final Conclusion: Finding that the Customs authorities failed to discharge the legal burden to prove illegal importation of the seized betel nuts and that the laboratory/opinion evidence relied upon was not conclusive, the Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the confiscation and penalty.

Interim release on payment of duty under protest - release of goods pending adjudication - adjudication of exemption claim - affording opportunity of hearing - detention of imported goods for origin verificationInterim release on payment of duty under protest - release of goods pending adjudication - Direction for provisional release of imported goods on payment of full duty under protest - HELD THAT: - The Court, without adjudicating the merits of the petitioner's claim for exemption, directed provisional release of the detained Gold Dore Bars subject to the petitioner paying 100% of the duty. The petitioner had offered to furnish a bank guarantee and to pay duty under protest; the respondents did not object to that course. The Court therefore ordered that the authority concerned consider the petitioner's request and release the goods upon payment of 100% duty made in accordance with law, and allowed the petitioner thereafter to make the appropriate application for release which the authority shall consider. [Paras 5, 6]Goods to be released by the authority upon payment of 100% duty by the petitioner, payment to be treated as made in accordance with law and without determining the substantive entitlement to exemption.Adjudication of exemption claim - affording opportunity of hearing - detention of imported goods for origin verification - Remand for fresh adjudication of the petitioner's claim for exemption based on Country of Origin Certificate - HELD THAT: - The Court refrained from deciding the substantive question whether the goods originated in Guinea or whether the petitioner was entitled to the claimed exemption. Instead, it directed the respondents to adjudicate the exemption claim in accordance with law after affording the petitioner ample opportunity to be heard. The adjudication was required to be completed expeditiously, preferably within three months from receipt of a copy of the order. [Paras 6]The authority shall adjudicate the exemption claim after opportunity of hearing and expeditiously, preferably within three months from receipt of the order.Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed by directing provisional release of the imported goods on payment of 100% duty by the petitioner; the petitioner may pursue refund/claim of exemption and the respondents are directed to adjudicate that claim after hearing the petitioner, preferably within three months.

Conditions for blocking electronic credit ledger under Rule 86A - Requirement of reasons and procedural compliance before disallowing debit of electronic credit ledger - Distinction between a notice under Rule 86A and proceedings under assessment provisions - Validity of administrative action which is not in prescribed statutory formConditions for blocking electronic credit ledger under Rule 86A - Requirement of reasons and procedural compliance before disallowing debit of electronic credit ledger - Validity of the notice dated 02.12.2022 which blocked the petitioner's electronic input tax credit ledger - HELD THAT: - The Court examined Annexure P2 (notice dated 02.12.2022) and Rule 86A of the CGST Rules which prescribes that the Commissioner or an authorised officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, not allow debit of an amount equivalent to credit in the electronic credit ledger where there are reasons to believe that credit has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible. The impugned communication did not constitute a reasoned order under Rule 86A but was a non speaking intimation calling for an explanation and simultaneously blocking the ITC ledger without complying with the statutory form and procedure. The Court held that such administrative action, when not in the prescribed statutory form and lacking reasons and procedural compliance, cannot be sustained. Consequently, the notice effecting blockage of the ITC account was set aside as being in contravention of the statutory scheme governing blocking of availment of input tax credit. [Paras 8, 10, 12]The notice dated 02.12.2022 blocking the petitioner's electronic credit ledger is quashed being contrary to the statutory provisions and requirements of Rule 86A.Distinction between a notice under Rule 86A and proceedings under assessment provisions - Validity of administrative action which is not in prescribed statutory form - Whether the communications dated 02.12.2022 and 04.11.2023 constituted proceedings under Section 74 or were valid orders under Rule 86A - HELD THAT: - On consideration of the letter dated 04.11.2023 produced during hearing and Annexure P2 dated 02.12.2022, the Court found that neither document amounted to an order under Section 74 of the Act nor did Annexure P2 qualify as a valid order under Rule 86A. The 02.12.2022 communication functioned as a notice calling for explanation rather than a properly constituted order of attachment or blocking under the statutory provisions. Given this lack of statutory character, the communication could not be sustained as a lawful exercise of power to block ITC. [Paras 11, 12]The communications dated 02.12.2022 and 04.11.2023 do not operate as valid orders under Section 74 or Rule 86A and the 02.12.2022 notice is therefore unsustainable.Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed to the extent that the notice dated 02.12.2022 blocking the petitioner's input tax credit account is set aside for being in contravention of the CGST/TSGST enactments; liberty reserved to the State to proceed in accordance with law regarding alleged invalid availment of ITC; no order as to costs.

Disallowance under Section 14A - Rule 8D methodology - Assessing Officer's satisfaction having regard to the accounts - availability of interest-free funds - onus on revenue where assessee makes suo motu disallowance - deletion of disallowance by the Tribunal Disallowance under Section 14A - Rule 8D methodology - Assessing Officer's satisfaction having regard to the accounts - availability of interest-free funds - onus on revenue where assessee makes suo motu disallowance - Validity of the AO's disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D for AY 2011-12 where the assessee had itself made a suo motu disallowance and had interest-free funds exceeding investments - HELD THAT: - The Court upheld the Tribunal's deletion of the disallowance because the Assessing Officer had not recorded any dissatisfaction, after examination of the assessee's accounts, with the correctness of the assessee's claim (including its suo motu disallowance) before invoking the prescribed method under Rule 8D. The record showed that the assessee had available interest-free funds in excess of the investments in the year under consideration, and the AO did not demonstrate that he had examined the accounts to reach a contrary satisfaction. The ratio in Coforge Ltd.[2021 (7) TMI 346 - DELHI HIGH COURT] requires the AO to be dissatisfied having regard to the accounts before applying Rule 8D; mere making of a disallowance without that recorded satisfaction is impermissible. In these circumstances the Tribunal rightly relied on the availability of interest-free funds and the absence of any recorded dissatisfaction to delete the addition under Section 14A/Rule 8D. [Paras 3, 8, 18] Tribunal's deletion of the disallowance u/s 14A read with Rule 8D for AY 2011-12 is upheld. Final Conclusion: Appeal dismissed; no substantial question of law arises and the Tribunal's deletion of the Section 14A/Rule 8D disallowance for AY 2011-12 is affirmed.

Summary order. The Civil Appeal is dismissed and pending applications are disposed of.

Limitation for filing appeal under Section 107 - Special procedure for belated appeals notified by the Central Government - Pre-deposit requirement for admission of appeals - Remand to Appellate Authority for fresh adjudication in accordance with lawLimitation for filing appeal under Section 107 - Special procedure for belated appeals notified by the Central Government - Impugned first appellate orders rejecting appeals as time-barred were set aside in view of the notified special procedure and matters remanded to the Appellate Authority. - HELD THAT: - The Court recognised Notification No.53/2023-Central Tax dated 2 November 2023 which notifies a class of taxable persons who could not file appeals by 31 March 2023 and prescribes a special procedure and time-limit (including submission in FORM GST APL-01 by 31 January 2024). In consequence of that notification the High Court held that the appeals previously rejected solely on the ground of delay cannot stand and directed that the impugned orders be set aside. The matters are remanded to the Appellate Authority to proceed in accordance with law and the terms of the notification, enabling the appellants to avail the special procedure for belated appeals.Impugned appellate orders rejecting appeals as barred by time are set aside and matters remanded to the Appellate Authority to be proceeded with in accordance with law and the Notification.Pre-deposit requirement for admission of appeals - Effect of interim orders on consideration of deposit and refund - Treatment of amounts deposited by petitioners and entitlement to refund while appeals remain pending under the notified procedure. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that petitioners who have deposited the entire amount of tax should have that deposit taken into account by the Appellate Authority while deciding the appeals on merits. Any refund, if payable, is to be subjected to the outcome of the appeal. This reflects the requirement in the notification that specified payments (including admitted tax and a percentage pre-deposit) are conditions for filing under the special procedure and that refunds shall not be granted until disposal of the appeal.Amounts deposited by petitioners shall be taken into account by the Appellate Authority; any refund will be subject to the outcome of the appeal.Final Conclusion: Writ petitions disposed of by setting aside the impugned time-bar rejections in view of Notification No.53/2023 and remanding the matters to the Appellate Authority to proceed in accordance with law and the notification; deposits made by petitioners to be taken into account and refunds, if any, governed by the appeal outcome.

Validity of assessment framed without issuance of notice under Section 143(2) - Non-applicability of Section 292BB to cure complete absence of notice - Deemed service by participation in proceedings - Condonation of delay in re-filing appealCondonation of delay in re-filing appeal - Application for condonation of delay of 430 days in re-filing the appeal - HELD THAT: - Although the delay in re-filing the appeal was substantial, the High Court exercised its discretion to condone the delay in order to take the appeal up for hearing on merits. The court recorded that the delay is condoned and the application is disposed of on those terms. [Paras 2]Delay in re-filing is condoned and the application is disposed of.Validity of assessment framed without issuance of notice under Section 143(2) - Non-applicability of Section 292BB to cure complete absence of notice - Deemed service by participation in proceedings - Whether an assessment order passed under Section 143(3) is rendered defective where no notice under Section 143(2) was ever issued, having regard to Section 292BB - HELD THAT: - Both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal found as a fact that no notice under Section 143(2) was issued before framing the assessment. The revenue relied on Section 292BB, contending that the assessee's participation in proceedings would cure any defect. The Court, applying the principle in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Laxman Das Khandelwal, held that Section 292BB remedies infirmities in the service of a notice that has emanated from the Department but does not cure the complete absence of a notice. Consequently, where no notice under Section 143(2) was issued at all, Section 292BB is inapplicable and the assessment is rendered defective. Having regard to that conclusion, the High Court found no reason to interfere with the orders of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal which had set aside the assessment on that ground. [Paras 17, 18, 19]The assessment framed in the absence of any notice under Section 143(2) is defective; Section 292BB does not validate a complete absence of notice, and therefore no interference is called for with the orders of the lower authorities.Final Conclusion: The application for condonation of delay in re-filing is allowed; on the merits, the High Court affirms the finding that no notice under Section 143(2) was issued and that Section 292BB cannot cure the complete absence of such notice, hence the assessment was correctly set aside by the CIT(A) and Tribunal and the appeal is closed.

Scope of assessment under Section 153A - Incriminating material found during search - Jurisdiction to assess or reassess completed assessments - Abatement of pending assessments on initiation of search - Reassessment under sections 147/148 as alternative remedyScope of assessment under Section 153A - Incriminating material found during search - Jurisdiction to assess or reassess completed assessments - Whether additions can be made under Section 153A in respect of completed (unabated) assessments when no incriminating material is found during the search. - HELD THAT: - The Court applied Section 153A and approved the view of the Delhi and Gujarat High Courts that the jurisdiction conferred by Section 153A is linked to the search or requisition under Sections 132/132A. The second proviso to Section 153A causes only pending assessment/reassessment proceedings to abate; it does not reopen completed/unabated assessments. Consequently, where no incriminating material is found during the search in respect of a completed assessment year, the Assessing Officer does not have jurisdiction under Section 153A to make additions for that completed year by relying on non-incriminating material. The Court emphasised that accepting the Revenue's broader contention would render the proviso and subsection (2) redundant and could result in multiplicity of assessment orders, which is impermissible. The Tribunal's and Appellate Authority's reliance on precedents such as Kabul Chawla and Saumya Construction was held to be correct and applicable to the facts of these appeals. [Paras 6, 11, 12, 13]Additions under Section 153A cannot be made in respect of completed/unabated assessments in the absence of any incriminating material found during the search; the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction under Section 153A is therefore limited in such cases.Reassessment under sections 147/148 as alternative remedy - Abatement of pending assessments on initiation of search - Whether the Revenue is left without remedy if no incriminating material is found during search for a completed assessment year. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that where no incriminating material is found during the search in respect of a completed assessment, the Revenue's remedy is to initiate reassessment under sections 147/148, subject to the conditions prescribed therein. The legislative scheme indicates that Section 153A is not intended to reopen completed assessments absent incriminating material, and saving the power of reassessment preserves the Revenue's remedy where appropriate conditions for reopening are met. [Paras 11]Where no incriminating material is found during a search for a completed assessment year, the Revenue must resort to reassessment under sections 147/148 (if conditions are satisfied); Section 153A does not furnish jurisdiction to reopen such completed assessments in that situation.Final Conclusion: The appeals are dismissed; the Tribunal's and Appellate Authority's conclusion that no additions could be sustained under Section 153A for the completed assessment years 2008-09 and 2009-10 in the absence of incriminating material is affirmed, with reassessment under sections 147/148 remaining the Revenue's statutory remedy where appropriate.

Setting aside of an order for erroneous factual recording - remand for fresh adjudication after considering filed replies and submissions - right to personal hearing and adequate opportunity before adjudicating authority - consideration of delay in adjudication under section 73(4B) and judicial precedentsSetting aside of an order for erroneous factual recording - The impugned order which recorded that no reply was filed and that the appellant did not appear was set aside. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found on the record that the appellant had in fact filed a detailed reply, additional reply and written submissions, and had appeared for personal hearing on multiple dates. The impugned order mistakenly recorded non-filing and non-appearance. In view of this factual error the order could not stand and was set aside by the Tribunal.Impugned order dated 30.03.2017 set aside on account of erroneous recording that no reply was filed and no personal hearing took place.Remand for fresh adjudication after considering filed replies and submissions - right to personal hearing and adequate opportunity before adjudicating authority - The matter was remitted to the adjudicating authority for fresh adjudication after considering the appellant's reply, written submissions and after affording adequate opportunity of hearing. - HELD THAT: - Rather than deciding the substantive issues itself, the Tribunal concluded that the appropriate course was to remit the case to the adjudicating authority to decide in the first instance. The adjudicating authority is directed to take into account the reply, additional reply and written submissions already on record and to provide the appellant adequate opportunity of hearing before passing a fresh decision. The Tribunal also directed that all endeavours be made to decide the matter expeditiously and, preferably, within four months from production of a copy of this order before the adjudicating authority.Matter remitted to the adjudicating authority for fresh adjudication after considering the replies and submissions and after affording adequate hearing; decision to be endeavoured preferably within four months.Consideration of delay in adjudication under section 73(4B) and judicial precedents - The question of delay in adjudication (reliance on section 73(4B) and the Delhi High Court decision in Swatch Group) was not decided by the Tribunal but left open for consideration by the adjudicating authority. - HELD THAT: - The appellant relied on statutory provision and a High Court judgment to contend that there was undue delay in adjudication. The Tribunal held that this contention can be raised before and considered by the adjudicating authority on remand and did not decide the legal issue itself.Delay issue under section 73(4B) and the cited High Court decision to be considered by the adjudicating authority on remand.Final Conclusion: Impugned order set aside; matter remitted to the adjudicating authority to decide afresh after considering the appellant's replies and submissions and after providing adequate opportunity of hearing, with a direction to endeavour to decide preferably within four months; issues concerning delay under section 73(4B) and the cited High Court decision left open for determination on remand.

Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) - concealment of income - furnishing inaccurate particulars of income - requirement to specify ground for penalty - substantial question of law - condonation of delayCondonation of delay - Application for condonation of delay of 220 days in re-filing the appeal was allowed. - HELD THAT: - The revenue filed an application seeking condonation of a 220-day delay in re-filing the appeal. The respondent stated no objection to condonation. Having regard to the concession and the circumstances recorded, the Court ordered that the delay in refiling be condoned and disposed of the application accordingly. [Paras 1, 2, 3]Application allowed; delay in refiling of 220 days condoned.Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) - requirement to specify ground for penalty - concealment of income - furnishing inaccurate particulars of income - substantial question of law - Whether the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was correctly imposed where the Assessing Officer did not clearly indicate whether it was for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars, and whether any substantial question of law arises. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal had to determine correctness of penalty imposition under Section 271(1)(c). The record showed the Assessing Officer failed to clearly indicate the basis of the penalty-whether for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars. The Tribunal treated the matter as covered by earlier authorities and disposed of cross-appeals accordingly. This Court noted that an identical appeal concerning the same assessment year had earlier been closed on the ground that no substantial question of law arose. In view of those circumstances and the Tribunal's reliance on settled authorities, the Court concluded that no substantial question of law is presented for its consideration and the appeal should be closed. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]Appeal closed as no substantial question of law arises concerning the imposition of penalty under Section 271(1)(c).Final Conclusion: The application for condonation of delay is allowed; the appeal relating to AY 2004-05 is closed as no substantial question of law arises regarding the penalty under Section 271(1)(c).

Refund of IGST paid on supplies to SEZ units - Zero-rated supply under Section 16(3)(b) of the IGST Act - Requirement of SEZ endorsement as proof of export - Rule 30(4) of SEZ Rules - 45 days endorsement and consequence - Limitation for refund claims under Section 54(1) of the CGST Act - Rule 90(2)/(3) of CGST Rules - scrutiny, acknowledgement and deficiency memo - Directory nature of limitation and duty to assist taxpayers (CBDT guidance)Rule 30(4) of SEZ Rules - 45 days endorsement and consequence - Zero-rated supply under Section 16(3)(b) of the IGST Act - Requirement of SEZ endorsement as proof of export - Whether refund can be denied for delay or perceived inadequacy in SEZ endorsements when IGST was paid and endorsements were ultimately obtained. - HELD THAT: - The court held that where the supplier has paid IGST and the goods have entered the SEZ and an endorsement by the Authorized Officer (AO/SO) has been obtained and furnished for refund, the refund cannot be denied on account of delay in obtaining the endorsement, or on account of technical defects in the endorsement attributable to the AO. Rule 30(4) of the SEZ Rules serves to ensure goods reached the SEZ and to enable raising a demand where no endorsement is forthcoming within 45 days; it does not operate to defeat a bona fide refund claim where tax has been paid and endorsement is eventually produced. The Court noted that endorsements and their date primarily serve as proof of entry into the SEZ and that any delay caused by the AO or any non material irregularity in the form of endorsement are curable and should not prejudice the supplier's substantive right to refund under Section 16(3)(b). The amendment requiring endorsements to state use for authorized operations came into effect prospectively (w.e.f. 01.10.2023) and was not applicable to the supplies in issue. [Paras 14]Findings denying refund on grounds of inordinate delay, inappropriate or incomplete endorsement are set aside and such defects are curable; refund entitlement stands where IGST was paid and endorsement was obtained.Limitation for refund claims under Section 54(1) of the CGST Act - Rule 90(2)/(3) of CGST Rules - scrutiny, acknowledgement and deficiency memo - Directory nature of limitation and duty to assist taxpayers (CBDT guidance) - Whether refund claims were barred by limitation because supporting documents were submitted only at the time of reply/personal hearing. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that Section 54(1) prescribes a two year period for filing refund applications but treated the time limit as directory in nature. Rule 90(2) obliges the proper officer to scrutinize applications within fifteen days and, where deficiencies exist, Rule 90(3) requires issuance of a deficiency memo to enable rectification. If the officer acknowledges the application as complete, it is incorrect subsequently to treat the claim as time barred on account of belated submission of supporting documents. The Court relied on the duty of administrative officers to assist taxpayers (as reflected in CBDT guidance) and noted that the respondent acted contrary to Rule 90(3) by not issuing deficiency memos. The Court also took note of the notification excluding 01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for computation of limitation. On these bases the Court held the respondents' limitation ground unsustainable and set aside the findings rejecting refunds on that ground. [Paras 15]Findings that the refund claims were barred by limitation due to late submission of supporting documents are set aside; the belated production of documents at reply/personal hearing did not defeat claims filed within two years, and deficiency procedure under Rule 90(3) ought to have been followed.Mismatches in Statement-4 and curable defects - Whether mismatch between endorsement dates in invoices and Statement 4 justified rejection where petitioner rectified the defect by filing revised Statement 4. - HELD THAT: - The Court recorded that the discrepancy in endorsement dates for the December 2019 claim was rectified by the petitioner by filing a revised Statement 4 on 28.01.2022 and that the respondent accepted the rectification. The learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Department conceded that the defect was procedural and curable. Accordingly, the mismatch could not sustain denial of refund. [Paras 16]Findings rejecting the refund for mismatch of details are eschewed since the defect was corrected and accepted; refund cannot be denied on that ground.Final Conclusion: Writ petitions allowed; impugned orders of the first and second respondents set aside. The second respondent is directed to process the petitioner's refund applications and issue the refund within 30 days from receipt of a copy of this order; no costs.

Summary order. Application for condonation of delay of 2281 days dismissed; Civil Appeal dismissed; pending applications disposed of.

Cenvat credit on structural steel items used in fabrication of capital goods - Capital goods as including components, spares and accessories - User test for classification as capital goods - Inputs used in the manufacture of capital goods - Ineligibility of credit where items are used for construction of factory shed, building, foundations or support structures for capital goods (clarificatory amendment issue) - Disallowance of credit and concomitant demand, interest and penaltyCenvat credit on structural steel items used in fabrication of capital goods - User test for classification as capital goods - Inputs used in the manufacture of capital goods - Cenvat credit is admissible on Angles, Channels, Beams, Joists, Sheets, Plates, Coils etc., when used in the manufacture/fabrication of furnace equipment, furnace structure, raw material handling system and pollution control equipment. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the issue is settled by higher authority jurisprudence recognizing that steel items worked upon and used in fabrication of capital goods or parts thereof satisfy the "user test" and qualify as capital goods or inputs used in the manufacture of capital goods. The decision noted Vandana Global Ltd., and subsequent tribunal and High Court decisions, and applied the user-test as elucidated by the Apex Court: structural steel items fabricated into support structures become parts/components of the relevant machines and fall within the ambit of capital goods; accordingly duty-paid on such inputs is eligible for Cenvat credit. The Tribunal rejected the departmental disallowance and consequent demand, observing that once the goods are held to be eligible inputs/capital goods the demand and penalty cannot be sustained. [Paras 5, 6]The Angles, Channels, Beams, Joists, Sheets, Plates, Coils etc used in fabrication of the specified capital goods qualify as inputs/capital goods for Cenvat credit and the demand and penalty confirmed in the impugned order are unsustainable; the appeal is allowed.Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: structural steel items employed in fabrication of the furnace equipment, furnace structure, raw material handling system and pollution control equipment are eligible for Cenvat credit; the confirmed demand, interest and penalty are set aside.

Sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - condonation of delay - discretionary jurisdiction to admit appeal or application after prescribed period - bona fides and negligence in limitation pleas - statute of limitation as public policySufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - bona fides and negligence in limitation pleas - Whether the petitioners established sufficient cause for the delay of 288 days in preferring the review petitions. - HELD THAT: - The Court applied the settled principles governing sufficient cause under Section 5, noting that the phrase is elastic but requires explanation that the applicant was prevented by adequate and enough reason from prosecuting the remedy within time. The review petitions were prosecuted by a power of attorney holder; no material was produced to show that the petitioners themselves suffered any incapacity or that the delay was attributable to circumstances beyond bona fide control. The medical condition of the power of attorney holder, as pleaded, was not supported by adequate evidence and did not satisfactorily explain the long delay. The Court held that negligence, lack of bona fides or failure to act with due diligence disentitles the applicant to condonation. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found the explanation inadequate and the claim lacking bona fides, and therefore concluded that sufficient cause was not established. [Paras 16]Sufficient cause not shown; the delay of 288 days is unexplained and the plea lacks bona fides.Condonation of delay - discretionary jurisdiction to admit appeal or application after prescribed period - statute of limitation as public policy - If sufficient cause had been shown, whether the Court should exercise its discretion to condone the delay. - HELD THAT: - The Court reiterated that even upon proof of sufficient cause, condonation is a discretionary relief and must be exercised in view of all relevant facts, including diligence and bona fides of the applicant and the prejudice to the opposite party. The statute of limitation embodies public policy and the accrued right of the decree-holder must not be lightly disturbed. Since the Court found that sufficient cause was not made out, there was no basis to exercise discretion in favour of condoning the delay. Consequently, the discretionary power under Section 5 did not arise for positive exercise in the petitioners' favour.As sufficient cause is not established, discretion to condone delay is not exercised; condonation refused.Final Conclusion: Applications for condonation of delay dismissed; consequent review petitions are dismissed as barred by limitation.

Show Cause Notice under Section 73 - Order under Section 65(6) - Jurisdiction to issue show cause notice - Status quo - Ex parte proceedingsShow Cause Notice under Section 73 - Order under Section 65(6) - Jurisdiction to issue show cause notice - Status quo - Petition challenging the jurisdiction to issue the Show Cause Notice dated 28.09.2023 on the ground that an order under Form GST ADT-02 issued under Section 65(6) on 17.06.2023 precludes initiation of proceedings under Section 73(1). - HELD THAT: - The petitioner contended that since an order had already been passed under Section 65(6) (Form GST ADT-02 dated 17.06.2023), issuance of a Show Cause Notice under Section 73(1) was without jurisdiction and the petitioner therefore had not filed a reply to the Show Cause Notice dated 28.09.2023. The respondents sought time to obtain instructions, including whether any ex parte order had been passed after 28.10.2023. In view of the jurisdictional challenge and pending instructions, the Court refrained from adjudicating the merits and directed interim preservation of the existing position of proceedings arising from the Show Cause Notice. [Paras 6]If no order has been passed on or before 28.10.2023 or subsequently to date, status quo shall be maintained in respect of the proceedings arising from the Show Cause Notice dated 28.09.2023 until the next date of listing.Final Conclusion: Writ petition listed for further consideration; in the interim the Court has directed maintenance of status quo in relation to the proceedings under the Show Cause Notice dated 28.09.2023 (subject to no order having been passed on or before 28.10.2023 or thereafter) and listed the matter on 15.11.2023 for further hearing.

Summary order. Delay condoned; Civil Appeal dismissed for lack of merit; pending applications disposed of.

Dismissal on facts - substantial question of law reserved - delay condonedDismissal on facts - Appeals dismissed on facts - HELD THAT: - The Supreme Court recorded that the appeals were dismissed on facts. The order contains no elaboration of legal principles or reasons beyond the factual dismissal; accordingly the Court concluded the appeals should fail on the factual record before it and refused the substantive relief sought by the appellant.Appeals dismissed on facts.Substantial question of law reserved - Reservation of any substantial question of law for future adjudication - HELD THAT: - Although the appeals were dismissed on facts, the Court expressly left open any substantial question of law that may arise from these matters for agitating in other appropriate proceedings. The Court thereby declined to decide or dispose of any substantive legal question, permitting such questions to be litigated afresh in suitable cases.Any substantial question of law is kept open to be agitated in other appropriate case(s).Delay condoned - Condonation of delay - HELD THAT: - The Court ordered that delay in filing be condoned. This was a procedural grant recorded at the outset of the order and did not affect the substantive dismissal on facts.Delay condoned.Final Conclusion: The appeals are dismissed on facts; delay in filing is condoned; any substantial question of law remains open for consideration in other appropriate proceedings; pending applications stand disposed of.

Show cause notice - proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - FORM GST DRC-01 - FORM GST DRC-02 - FORM GST DRC-01A - denial of opportunity for cross-examination - personal hearing - void ab initioShow cause notice - FORM GST DRC-01 - FORM GST DRC-02 - FORM GST DRC-01A - denial of opportunity for cross-examination - personal hearing - Challenge to the impugned show cause notice dated 14.7.2023 and the consequent proceedings on the ground of non-compliance with prescribed formats and denial of opportunity of cross-examination - HELD THAT: - The Court did not adjudicate the merits of the contentions that the show cause notice is defective for not being in FORM GST DRC-01 or for non-issuance of the summary in FORM GST DRC-02 and details in FORM GST DRC-01A, nor did it decide whether the petitioner was denied the right of cross-examination. Instead the writ petition was disposed of by directing a procedural course: the petitioner was granted an opportunity to file objections to the show cause notice; on receipt of objections the respondent authority is required to consider them after granting personal hearing and to pass an appropriate order strictly in accordance with law. The court thus remitted the controversy for fresh consideration by the authority without expressing any view on the correctness or validity of the show cause notice or the alleged procedural infirmities. [Paras 7]Writ petition disposed; petitioner to file objections within two weeks and respondent to grant personal hearing and decide the matter strictly in accordance with law within 15 days.Final Conclusion: The High Court did not decide the substantive validity of the show cause notice or the alleged denial of cross-examination; the petition is disposed by directing the petitioner to file objections and the authority to hear the petitioner personally and decide afresh in accordance with law within the stipulated time.

Release of detained goods pending adjudication - payment of duty under protest - claim for exemption under duty preference scheme - time bound adjudicationRelease of detained goods pending adjudication - payment of duty under protest - Petitioner entitled to release of imported goods on condition of payment of 100% duty pending adjudication. - HELD THAT: - The Court, without adjudicating the merits of the exemption claim, accepted the petitioner's offer to pay 100% duty under protest and directed the authority to consider the request for release of the goods. The direction was given as an interim measure to alleviate hardship (warehouse charges and market fluctuation) while preserving the petitioner's right to pursue the exemption claim. The Court did not rule on the question whether the goods qualified for duty exemption under the claimed preference scheme.Goods to be released subject to payment of 100% duty by the petitioner within one week from such payment, as an interim measure.Liberty to apply after payment - release of detained goods pending adjudication - Petitioner granted liberty to apply for release after making payment of duty, and such application to be considered by the authority. - HELD THAT: - The Court permitted the petitioner, having paid the 100% duty under protest, to make an appropriate application seeking release of the goods; the authority was directed to consider that application. This preserves the administrative process and does not foreclose the petitioner's right to claim refund or contest the levy in subsequent proceedings.Petitioner may apply for release after payment and the authority shall consider the application.Adjudication of exemption claim - time bound adjudication - Authority directed to adjudicate the petitioner's claim for duty exemption expeditiously and within a specified period. - HELD THAT: - The Court remitted the substantive claim for determination by the competent authority, directing that the issue of exemption under the relevant notifications and the claimed country of origin certificate be adjudicated in accordance with law after affording the petitioner adequate opportunity. The Court prescribed a preferred outer limit of three months from receipt of the order for completion of adjudication, thereby imposing a time bound mandate for administrative decision making while leaving the merits to the authority.Respondents to adjudicate the exemption claim as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months from receipt of the order.Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed by directing interim release of goods on payment of 100% duty under protest, liberty to apply for release after payment, and remand of the substantive exemption claim to the authorities for time bound adjudication (preferably within three months).