Issues: (i) Whether the assessee, being a primary agricultural credit co-operative society having nominal members, was entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) and section 80P(2)(d) in respect of interest income; (ii) Whether the additional ground challenging the jurisdiction of the assessment order was admissible and sustainable; (iii) Whether the additional ground relating to interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C survived for adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee, being a primary agricultural credit co-operative society having nominal members, was entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) and section 80P(2)(d) in respect of interest income?

Analysis: The exclusion of deduction could not rest merely on the presence of nominal or associated members, as the later Supreme Court ruling on primary agricultural credit societies required section 80P to be construed liberally and in favour of deduction where the assessee otherwise fell within the provision. The claim under section 80P(2)(a)(i), however, was distinguished from the facts governing interest on surplus or non-operational deposits, and the interest from short-term investments was not accepted as business income attributable to the eligible activity. At the same time, interest earned on investments with a co-operative bank required factual verification to determine whether the recipient institution fell within the kind of banking company excluded by the statutory scheme, and the matter was therefore sent back for verification on that limited aspect.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) was denied, while the claim under section 80P(2)(d) was restored to the Assessing Officer for verification and reconsideration in accordance with law.

Issue (ii): Whether the additional ground challenging the jurisdiction of the assessment order was admissible and sustainable?

Analysis: The jurisdictional objection was found to be too general and unsupported by any specific material showing absence of authority to frame the assessment. No substantive basis was made out to disturb the assessment on that ground.

Conclusion: The additional ground challenging jurisdiction was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the additional ground relating to interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C survived for adjudication?

Analysis: Since the core issue concerning deduction under section 80P(2)(d) was remitted for verification, the challenge to interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C did not require present adjudication and was treated as having no live controversy at that stage.

Conclusion: The additional ground on interest was dismissed as infructuous.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the limited extent of remitting the claim for deduction on interest income under section 80P(2)(d) for factual verification, while the claim under section 80P(2)(a)(i) and the additional grounds were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A primary agricultural credit co-operative society is not denied section 80P relief merely because it has nominal members, but interest income from investments with a co-operative bank requires factual verification for section 80P(2)(d), while interest from surplus or non-operational deposits is not deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i).

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to interference under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against refusal of interim protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and, in particular, whether the existing contract could be extended on the facts of the case.

Analysis: The contract clause permitting renewal up to a limited period was held to be only an enabling provision and not an enforceable right in favour of the licensee. The parking policy required the Railway Administration, as a general rule, to avoid extension of an existing contract and to ensure a fresh contract before expiry, subject to the stated administrative conditions. The precedent relied upon by the appellant was distinguished because it arose in a different factual and contractual setting and did not involve a clause like the present policy provision. For grant of interim relief, the relevant considerations were prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. The Court found that a new contractor had already been selected, public interest would be adversely affected by granting relief, and the appellant could be compensated monetarily if he ultimately succeeded.

Conclusion: The challenge to the refusal of interim relief failed and no interference was warranted with the order declining extension of the contract.

Issues: (i) Whether the portion of salary/emoluments paid by the appellant directly in Indian rupees to secondees forms part of the consideration/gross amount charged under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 for imported Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency services supplied by Nissan Japan; (ii) Whether the penalties imposed are legal and proper; (iii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether salary/emoluments paid in India by the appellant to secondees form part of the gross amount charged/consideration under Section 67 for MRSA services provided by Nissan Japan.

Analysis: The majority examined the secondment agreement and the overall contractual scheme, applying the inclusive concept of 'consideration' in Section 67 read with contract-law principles and the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Operating Systems. The majority held that where the parties have agreed a consolidated consideration for supply/secondment of personnel and the mode of payment is split at the behest of the supplier (including payments made directly to secondees in India), those payments represent the gross amount charged by the overseas supplier for the taxable service. The agreement's terms (salary structure, supplier's discretion over pay, obligation to reimburse, lien and payroll retention) demonstrate that the payments made by the appellant are part of the agreed consideration and have a nexus with the taxable service; hence they fall within valuation under Section 67. The majority distinguished authorities that exclude unreimbursed costs where there is no contractual charging by the service provider, relying on Northern Operating Systems and a co-ordinate bench decision involving the same supplier and materially similar agreements.

Conclusion: The portion of salary/emoluments paid directly in India by the appellant is includible in the gross amount charged/consideration for MRSA services and is taxable; conclusion in favour of Revenue on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalties imposed are legal and proper.

Analysis: Both Members agreed that no suppression with intent to evade was established on the facts; the Tribunal examined the history of litigation and divergent departmental practice and found the issue to be interpretational. The majority therefore concluded that penalties under the Finance Act cannot be sustained.

Conclusion: Penalties are not sustainable; conclusion in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation is sustainable.

Analysis: Both Members found absence of deliberate suppression or concealment amounting to intent to evade; given the complex and unsettled nature of law on secondee valuation during the relevant period, invocation of extended limitation was held improper. The majority limited the demand to the normal period.

Conclusion: Extended period invocation is not sustainable; conclusion in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: On majority view the appeals are disposed by upholding the taxable treatment of the consolidated consideration for imported manpower/secondment services (including amounts paid in India under the contractual split) but the demand is confined to the normal period, penalties are set aside, and any tax attributable to TDS amounts is to be deleted and duty reworked.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a contractual scheme for secondment/ supply of manpower establishes a consolidated consideration for the service and the supplier's terms require or permit a split mode of payment, amounts paid by the recipient directly to secondees in accordance with that contractual arrangement constitute part of the gross amount charged or consideration for the taxable manpower supply service under Section 67 and are includible in valuation for service tax; however, assessment beyond the normal limitation period and penalties require established suppression or intent and cannot be imposed merely because valuation was disputed.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether the Assessing Officer is required to record a formal satisfaction before making a suo moto disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D where the assessee did not itself make any apportionment/disallowance in the return.

2. Whether disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D can exceed the amount of tax-exempt income received by the assessee for the assessment year in question (i.e., whether a notional or formulaic disallowance may exceed actual exempt receipts for AY 2017-18).

3. If applicable, the effect of the Finance Act, 2022 amendment to Section 14A (purporting to permit disallowance notwithstanding no receipt of exempt income) on assessments for pre-amendment years, and whether the amendment operates prospectively.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 - Requirement to record satisfaction before suo moto disallowance under Section 14A/Rule 8D

Legal framework: Section 14A authorises disallowance of expenditure in relation to income which does not form part of total income; Rule 8D prescribes methodology for determining disallowance where direct tracing is not possible. Judicial guidance has addressed whether the AO must record satisfaction before applying apportionment under Rule 8D.

Precedent treatment: The Supreme Court's dictum in Maxopp Investment clarifies that the AO must record satisfaction before applying the theory of apportionment when the assessee itself has apportioned in the return and the AO is rejecting that apportionment; the AO must also examine the nature of loans taken for investments while recording such satisfaction.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court interprets Maxopp to mean the requirement to record satisfaction arises "in those cases where the assessee in his return has himself apportioned but the AO was not accepting the said apportionment." Conversely, where the assessee makes no apportionment/disallowance in the return, the procedural requirement to record formal satisfaction prior to applying Rule 8D is not mandated by Maxopp. The Tribunal observed that in the present facts the assessee offered no disallowance; the AO had recorded satisfaction nonetheless, but recording was unnecessary under Maxopp's test. The Tribunal therefore rejects the assessee's contention that the AO's failure to record satisfaction invalidates the disallowance, because (i) no such recording is required when the assessee has made no apportionment; and (ii) the AO in any event recorded satisfaction in the order.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Maxopp establishes the controlling test: recording of satisfaction is required only when the assessee has itself made an apportionment that the AO disputes. Application of that test to facts where the assessee made no apportionment forms the binding reasoning here. Observations that the AO recorded satisfaction even though unnecessary are explanatory (obiter) to the extent they go beyond Maxopp's requirement.

Conclusion: The requirement to record satisfaction prior to making a suo moto disallowance under Section 14A/Rule 8D does not arise where the assessee has not itself apportioned or offered any disallowance in the return; the AO's disallowance is not invalidated on the ground of lack of satisfaction in such cases.

Issue 2 - Extent of disallowance under Section 14A/Rule 8D relative to actual exempt income for pre-amendment years

Legal framework: Section 14A and Rule 8D provide for disallowance of expenditure relatable to exempt income. Prior to the Finance Act, 2022 amendment, judicial decisions governed whether disallowance could be made in the absence of exempt income or could exceed actual exempt receipts.

Precedent treatment: The Delhi High Court in Cheminvest (and other decisions such as Holcim India) held that if there is no exempt income, there can be no disallowance under Section 14A. Post-amendment judicial consideration (e.g., Era Infrastructure) addressed whether the 2022 amendment is retrospective or prospective.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal notes the assessee received exempt dividends of Rs. 40,750 but the AO computed disallowance at Rs. 17,52,712 by applying Rule 8D percentages to average investments. Relying on Cheminvest, the Tribunal reasons that for pre-amendment assessment years, disallowance cannot be made in the absence of exempt income, and by extension disallowance should be limited to the quantum of actual exempt receipts where such precedent applies. The Tribunal further considers the 2022 amendment but treats it as prospective based on the Delhi High Court's ruling in Era Infrastructure; thus the pre-amendment statutory and judicial framework controls the AY 2017-18 outcome.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - For pre-amendment years, disallowance under Section 14A cannot exceed, and may effectively be constrained by, the amount of actual exempt income received; application of Cheminvest to restrict disallowance to actual exempt receipts constitutes the operative ratio for such years. Observations regarding the inconsistency between Rule 8D formulaic outcomes and actual exempt receipts are explanatory but integral to the holding.

Conclusion: For the assessment year under consideration (pre-Finance Act, 2022), the disallowance computed under Rule 8D cannot exceed the actual exempt income received; accordingly the disallowance is restricted to Rs. 40,750 (the exempt dividend actually received).

Issue 3 - Effect of Finance Act, 2022 amendment to Section 14A on pre-amendment assessment years

Legal framework: The Finance Act, 2022 amended Section 14A to clarify that disallowance may be made notwithstanding no receipt of exempt income during the year. The temporal operation of statutory amendments is governed by principles of prospective/retrospective application and relevant judicial rulings.

Precedent treatment: The Delhi High Court in Pr. CIT vs. Era Infrastructure held that the 2022 amendment is prospective and does not apply to earlier assessment years.

Interpretation and reasoning: Applying the Era Infrastructure ruling, the Tribunal holds the 2022 amendment does not affect AY 2017-18. Therefore, the pre-amendment legal position (as articulated in Cheminvest and related authorities) governs the present assessment year; the amended provision cannot be invoked to justify a larger disallowance for a pre-amendment year.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - The 2022 amendment is prospective and therefore inapplicable to pre-amendment assessment years; reliance on the amendment to sustain disallowance for AY 2017-18 is therefore not permissible.

Conclusion: The Finance Act, 2022 amendment to Section 14A does not apply to the assessment year in question; the disallowance must be determined under the pre-amendment legal position.

Outcome (cross-reference to Issues 1-3)

Cross-referencing Issue 1 and Issue 2: Although the AO recorded satisfaction (Issue 1) and applied Rule 8D to compute a large formulaic disallowance, the pre-amendment jurisprudence (Issue 2) limits the permissible disallowance to the actual exempt income received. Cross-referencing Issue 3 confirms that the 2022 amendment cannot be relied upon to validate a larger disallowance for the pre-amendment year.

Final conclusion: The disallowance under Section 14A/Rule 8D as confirmed by the lower authority is reduced and restricted to the amount of tax-exempt dividend actually received (Rs. 40,750) for the assessment year under consideration; the appeal is partly allowed on that basis.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether delay in filing the appeal of 17 days should be condoned where the assessee was out of station.

2. Whether a deductee (assessee) is entitled to claim credit for tax deducted at source under section 143(1)(c) where the employer/deductor has deducted TDS from salary but has not deposited the deducted amount to the Government treasury and the same therefore does not appear in Form 26AS.

3. Whether the Revenue can enforce recovery or demand against the deductee in respect of TDS amounts deducted by the employer but not deposited with the Government.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 - Condonation of Delay

Legal framework: Principles governing condonation of delay in filing appeals, requiring sufficient cause for delay.

Precedent Treatment: Applied standard practice of considering reasons and material on record to determine sufficiency of cause.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted a 17-day delay and accepted the explanation that the assessee was out of station and filed the appeal after return; after hearing rival contentions and perusing the record the delay was found to be for sufficient reasons.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - delay condoned as sufficient cause was established on facts.

Conclusion: Delay of 17 days in filing the appeal was condoned and the appeal admitted for adjudication on merits.

Issue 2 - Entitlement to TDS Credit Where Deductor Failed to Deposit

Legal framework: Section 143(1) (specifically clause (c)) which determines the sum payable or refund due after adjustment by "any tax deducted at source"; related provisions referenced include section 205, section 209(1) and section 234B; requirement for claiming TDS credit in returns and reflection in Form 26AS.

Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal followed Coordinate Bench decisions (cited in the judgment) and departmental instructions (CBDT Office Memorandum F.No.275/29/2014-IT (B) dated 11.03.2016) which direct field officers not to enforce demands against deductee for non-deposit by deductor. The Tribunal expressly relied on a Coordinate Bench decision that held credit is available once tax has been deducted at source irrespective of deposit by the deductor.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal analysed clause (c) of section 143(1) and observed that the provision speaks of "any tax deducted at source" without a textual condition that such tax must have been paid to the Government by the deductor. The Tribunal contrasted the express use of the word "paid" in contexts such as advance tax with the absence of such qualifier in respect of TDS in section 143(1)(c), concluding Parliament intended credit to follow deduction, not necessarily deposit. The Tribunal also examined the interplay with section 209(1)(d) and statutory amendments affecting advance tax treatment, but identified a continuing distinction between "tax deducted at source" and "tax deducted and deposited". The CBDT Office Memorandum was invoked as administrative direction reinforcing that demands should not be enforced against deductees where TDS was deducted but not deposited by the deductor. The Tribunal therefore held that the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) erred in denying credit solely because the employer had not deposited the deducted TDS and the amount did not appear in Form 26AS.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Where tax has been deducted at source from salary, the deductee is entitled to claim credit for such tax in computing tax liability under section 143(1)(c) notwithstanding that the deductor failed to deposit the deducted amount with the Government; denial of credit on ground of non-deposit by deductor is not sustainable. Obiter - Observations concerning the interplay with sections 209 and 234B are explanatory of reasoning and supportive but the operative holding concerns construction of section 143(1)(c) and administrative instructions.

Conclusion: The Tribunal set aside the orders denying TDS credit and directed the Assessing Officer to allow credit of the TDS amount which had been deducted by the employer though not deposited, thereby reducing the demand created in the 143(1) intimation.

Issue 3 - Recoverability of Demand Against Deductee for Non-deposited TDS

Legal framework: Section 205 (bar on direct demand), CBDT Office Memorandum (F.No.275/29/2014-IT (B) dated 11.03.2016) reiterating earlier instructions that demands arising from mismatch due to non-deposit by deductor should not be enforced against deductee; principles governing enforcement of tax demands.

Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal followed administrative instructions and judicial decisions that have held that liability resulting from non-deposit by the deductor cannot be fastened on the deductee and that coercive enforcement in such cases is impermissible.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal observed that section 205 bars direct demand in such situations and the CBDT's instruction recognises field practice and directs non-enforcement of such demands. Based on these materials and the legal construction of section 143(1)(c), the Tribunal concluded that the Revenue cannot call upon the deductee to deposit amounts corresponding to TDS deducted but not paid by the employer.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Demand on account of mismatch arising from non-deposit of TDS by the deductor cannot be enforced coercively against the deductee; deductee should not be made liable for the deductor's default in depositing deducted TDS. Obiter - Administrative policy considerations emphasised by the CBDT memorandum.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the demand raised against the deductee on account of non-credit of TDS owing to non-deposit by the employer was not sustainable and directed the AO to allow the credit and withdraw/adjust the demand to that extent.

Cross-references

1. Issue 2 and Issue 3 are interrelated: the legal construction of section 143(1)(c) (Issue 2) informs the conclusion on recoverability of demand against the deductee (Issue 3).

2. The CBDT Office Memorandum is treated as binding administrative direction relevant to both entitlement to credit and non-enforcement of demands, and was relied upon alongside judicial authority to reach the conclusions stated above.

Outcome: The petition was disposed of with a direction to the appellate authority to decide the pending appeal and stay application together within the specified time, after hearing the petitioner and considering the material filed, and recovery was stayed until disposal of the appeal.

The core legal questions considered by the Court in these writ petitions are:

• Whether the reopening of assessment under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act) for the Assessment Year 2018-19 was validly initiated in compliance with the amended provisions of the Act effective from 01.04.2021, particularly the requirement to issue notice under Section 148A and conduct proceedings in a faceless manner.
• Whether the reopening proceedings initiated by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (and not in a faceless manner) violated the procedural safeguards introduced by the amendment.
• Whether the procedural irregularity in initiating the reassessment proceedings under the unamended provisions renders the assessment order unsustainable.
• Whether the Revenue's right to proceed further under the substituted provisions remains preserved despite quashing the impugned notices and orders on procedural grounds.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Validity of reopening under amended provisions of the Income Tax Act

Relevant legal framework and precedents: The Income Tax Act was amended effective 01.04.2021 to introduce mandatory procedural safeguards for reopening assessments, including issuance of notice under Section 148A and conducting reassessment proceedings in a faceless manner. This amendment aims to enhance transparency and reduce arbitrariness in reopening assessments.

The Court relied on its earlier batch decision dated 14.09.2023 in W.P. No. 25903 of 2022 and connected matters, where the identical issue was addressed.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the reopening in the instant case was initiated by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer and not through faceless proceedings as mandated by the amended law. This procedural deviation from the statutory mandate was held to be a jurisdictional flaw.

Key evidence and findings: The assessment order dated 25.04.2022 was passed under Section 148A(d) but the procedural requirements under the amended Act were not complied with, specifically the faceless mechanism and issuance of proper notice under Section 148A.

Application of law to facts: Since the reopening did not comply with the amended provisions which are mandatory, the Court found the reopening invalid and the assessment order unsustainable on this ground.

Treatment of competing arguments: The Department contended that apart from the procedural objection, there were other substantive objections raised by the petitioner. However, the Court, following its earlier decision, refrained from adjudicating other issues since the jurisdictional defect in initiating the proceedings was sufficient to quash the assessment.

Conclusions: The Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that the reopening was initiated under the unamended provisions, violating the mandatory procedural safeguards introduced by the amendment effective 01.04.2021.

Issue 2: Preservation of Revenue's right to proceed under substituted provisions

Relevant legal framework and precedents: The Court referred to the Supreme Court's order in the case of Ashish Agarwal, where the Revenue was permitted as a one-time measure under Article 142 of the Constitution to proceed under the substituted provisions.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that while the impugned notices and orders were quashed on procedural grounds, the Revenue's right to initiate reassessment proceedings afresh under the amended provisions remains intact and reserved.

Key evidence and findings: The Court cited paragraphs 37 and 38 of its earlier batch judgment, which clarified that the procedural flaw led to quashing of the notices but did not extinguish the Revenue's substantive right to reassess.

Application of law to facts: The Court's decision to quash the assessment order did not preclude the Revenue from commencing fresh proceedings in compliance with the amended law.

Treatment of competing arguments: The petitioner's contention that the reopening itself was invalid was accepted only to the extent of procedural non-compliance; the substantive right of the Revenue was preserved to avoid injustice and ensure compliance with statutory norms.

Conclusions: The Court explicitly reserved the right of the Revenue to proceed further under the amended provisions, subject to adherence to procedural safeguards.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

The Court held: "The present Writ Petition stands allowed on the objection of the petitioner that the proceedings have not been drawn in accordance with the amended provision but under the unamended provision which is otherwise not sustainable."

It further observed: "Since the impugned notices and orders are getting quashed on the point of jurisdiction, we are not inclined to proceed further and decide the other issues raised by the petitioner which stands reserved to be raised and contended in an appropriate proceedings."

Additionally, the Court stated: "The right conferred on the Revenue would remain reserved to proceed further if they so want from the stage of the order of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashish Agarwal, supra."

Core principles established include:

• Procedural compliance under amended provisions of the Income Tax Act (post 01.04.2021) is mandatory for valid reopening of assessment.
• Reopening initiated under unamended provisions post amendment is a jurisdictional defect and unsustainable.
• Quashing of assessment orders on procedural grounds does not extinguish the Revenue's substantive right to reassess, which remains preserved subject to compliance with amended procedures.
• The Court will not decide substantive objections once jurisdictional defect is established, leaving such issues to be raised in appropriate proceedings.

Final determinations were that the impugned assessment orders were quashed due to procedural non-compliance with the amended Income Tax Act provisions, and the writ petitions were allowed without costs, with all pending miscellaneous applications closed.

Issues: Whether immediate directions were warranted to address the crop-burning driven air pollution crisis and related remedial measures, including release of source-apportionment data, operation of the smog tower, prevention of open burning of municipal solid waste, and coordinated inter-governmental action.

Analysis: The matter involved a recurring winter pollution emergency affecting public health, with crop burning, delayed sowing practices, inadequate adoption of alternatives, and other contributing factors flagged for urgent intervention. The Court directed prompt stakeholder action, required compliance with the prayers concerning release and publication of real-time source-apportionment data, and ordered reopening and operationalisation of the smog tower. It also directed monitoring against open burning of municipal solid waste, called for a high-level meeting for immediate coordination, and sought further compliance reports on vehicular pollution measures and other related steps.

Conclusion: Immediate regulatory and administrative directions were issued in aid of pollution control and public health protection, and the requested reliefs were substantially granted.

Final Conclusion: The order granted operative environmental directions to curb pollution and to secure coordinated action by the concerned authorities, while keeping the matter pending for further monitoring.

Ratio Decidendi: In a continuing environmental public health crisis, the Court may direct immediate coordinated administrative action and enforce operational compliance to prevent recurring pollution harm.

Outcome: The appeal was dismissed as deemed withdrawn upon settlement under the Sabka Vishwas Legacy Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2019.

Issues: Whether addition made under section 69A on the basis of a diary entry noting "1.45 cash" could be sustained without proof of ownership, actual payment, or corroborative material, and whether the deletion of the addition was justified.

Analysis: The impugned addition arose from a seized diary page containing various jottings, including the entry "1.45 cash". The record did not show that cash of Rs. 1.45 crore was actually found in the assessee's possession during search. The assessee explained the noting as a rough fund-planning exercise and supported that explanation with surrounding facts and documents. The assessment order did not bring material on record to establish the manner of payment, source of the alleged cash, or a linkage between the notings and any undisclosed transaction. For application of section 69A, ownership of unaccounted money is a necessary condition, and the provision cannot be invoked on assumptions that the assessee was "available with" the cash or that the noting represented actual payment. A solitary, unexplained noting in a document, without corroboration, cannot by itself justify the addition.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition was upheld and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in a prosecution under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The application was examined on the basis of the nature of accusation, the punishment prescribed, the absence of demonstrated recovery proceedings or ascertainment of tax or penalty at that stage, the limited criminal history, and the settled principles governing bail. The Court also noted the need to balance personal liberty against the larger interest of the State while refraining from expressing any opinion on the merits of the accusation.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to the applicant.

Ratio Decidendi: In bail matters, personal liberty may be protected where the allegations are yet to be tested, the custodial necessity is not made out, and the relevant bail factors do not justify continued detention.