Issues: (i) Whether the summons issued under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were liable to be quashed; (ii) Whether the ECIR was liable to be quashed; (iii) Whether a restraint against coercive steps was warranted.

Issue (i): Whether the summons issued under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were liable to be quashed.

Analysis: Section 50 empowers the authorised officers to summon any person whose attendance is considered necessary for giving evidence or producing records during investigation or proceedings under the Act. The power is intended for collection of information and evidence, and a person summoned is bound to attend, state the truth, and produce documents as required. The Court relied on the settled position that such summons do not, by themselves, amount to a formal accusation or prosecution, and Article 20(3) protection is not attracted unless the person is an accused of an offence at the relevant time.

Conclusion: The summons were not liable to be quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether the ECIR was liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The petitioner was not shown to be an accused in the ECIR, the ECIR itself was not placed on record for examination, and the respondent's stand was that no prosecution complaint had been filed against the petitioner. The Court treated the challenge as premature and held that, in the absence of a formal accusation or clear basis to impeach the ECIR, quashing could not be granted at this stage.

Conclusion: The ECIR was not liable to be quashed.

Issue (iii): Whether a restraint against coercive steps was warranted.

Analysis: The Court noted that the petitioner had not been arrested despite repeated summons, that summons under Section 50 are distinct from the power of arrest under the Act, and that the availability of other statutory remedies, including anticipatory bail if occasion arises, weighed against passing a blanket restraint. The Court therefore declined to convert the writ proceedings into a surrogate for anticipatory bail protection.

Conclusion: No order restraining coercive steps was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed on the core prayers for quashing and coercive restraint, but the Court granted limited procedural accommodation by permitting attendance at the Kolkata office on notice, and the matter stood disposed of accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: Summons issued under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 for collection of evidence or information are not liable to be quashed merely because the noticee is not yet an accused, and a writ court will not grant blanket no-coercive protection or quash an ECIR in the absence of a formal accusation and a clear, ripe challenge.

Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit was admissible on capital goods, inputs and refractory items used for fabrication of capital goods and for manufacture within the factory premises, including items embedded in the plant. (ii) Whether the demand could be sustained by invoking the extended period of limitation.

Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit was admissible on capital goods, inputs and refractory items used for fabrication of capital goods and for manufacture within the factory premises, including items embedded in the plant.

Analysis: The items in dispute were shown to have been used in the manufacture of capital goods within the factory, and the record included a Chartered Engineer's certificate supporting such use. Credit cannot be denied merely because the resulting capital goods are embedded, when they are used for manufacture of the finished products. The transfer of the factory as a going concern and the assumption of assets and liabilities also supported the assessee's entitlement to credit in respect of the transferred capital goods and inputs. The refractory items used in boilers and furnaces were likewise connected with the manufacturing process.

Conclusion: The credit was admissible and the disallowance was unsustainable; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand could be sustained by invoking the extended period of limitation.

Analysis: The assessee had filed monthly returns and maintained books reflecting the availment of credit, while the dispute turned on interpretation of the credit eligibility provisions. No material was produced to establish suppression with intent to evade duty. In such circumstances, invocation of the extended period was not justified.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation could not be invoked; this issue is also decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand was set aside on merits as well as on limitation, and the assessee was held entitled to consequential relief according to law.

Ratio Decidendi: Cenvat credit is not to be denied where inputs and materials are used within the factory for fabrication of capital goods required for manufacture, and the extended period cannot be invoked in the absence of suppression when the dispute is essentially interpretational.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether striking off the name of a company under Section 248(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 is sustainable where the company has nil revenue from operations but continues to have recorded assets and liabilities and has complied with statutory filings up to the relevant due date.

2. Whether the Registrar of Companies complied with the requirement under Section 248(6) of the Act to satisfy himself that sufficient provision has been made for realisation of all amounts due to the company and for payment or discharge of its liabilities before striking off the company.

3. Whether restoration of the company's name is just and equitable where the company possesses immovable property and outstanding creditors, despite absence of trading revenue and gaps in later filings.

4. The applicability and treatment of coordinate-bench precedents concerning restoration where companies possess assets (distinguishing cases treating "shell" companies or unlawful activity), and whether such precedents compel restoration in the present facts.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Validity of striking off where company has nil revenue but recorded assets and liabilities and prior statutory compliance

Legal framework: Striking off under Section 248(1)(c) is permissible for companies failing to carry on business or operation and not complying with statutory requirements; statutory filings and accounts are material indicia of status as a going concern.

Precedent Treatment: Coordinate-bench decisions have restored companies where audited financials demonstrated substantial movable or immovable assets and the company was not a shell or engaged in unlawful business. Conversely, decisions upholding striking off have emphasized continued non-operation, non-filing and absence of assets/creditors.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal examined audited financial statements showing nil revenue for FY 2016-17 to 2018-19 but noted recorded assets (an immovable property) and liabilities (unsecured creditors of Rs.21 lakhs). The Company had complied with filings up to FY 2016-17 and filings for FY 2017-18 were not yet due as on the strike-off date (08.08.2018). The Tribunal reasoned that absence of operational revenue alone did not establish that the company was not carrying on business or operations where the company maintained substantial assets and liabilities and had not defaulted on all statutory filings as of the strike-off date.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - nil revenue is not determinative of non-operation where demonstrable assets and liabilities exist and requisite filings were current as of the strike-off date. Obiter - observations on the significance of later-filed financial statements (2017-18, 2018-19) as corroborative but not decisive.

Conclusions: The striking off was not sustainable solely on the basis of nil revenue when the company had recorded assets and liabilities and had not failed mandatory filings that were due as of the strike-off date.

Issue 2: Compliance with Section 248(6) - satisfaction regarding provision for realisation and discharge of liabilities before striking off

Legal framework: Section 248(6) imposes an obligation on the Registrar to satisfy himself that sufficient provision has been made for realisation of all amounts due to the company and for payment or discharge of its liabilities before removal of the company's name.

Precedent Treatment: Decisions have required the Registrar to consider existence of creditors, assets capable of realisation and evidence of steps to discharge liabilities before effecting strike-off. Failure to consider these factors has led to restoration orders where assets and creditors existed.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted submissions that unsecured creditors totalling Rs.21 lakhs were reflected in the balance sheet and that an immovable property was owned by the company. The Registrar's reply relied on nil revenue and absence of income tax returns; it did not demonstrate satisfaction that provisions for realisation/payment had been made. The Tribunal inferred that RoC had not adequately satisfied the Section 248(6) requirement prior to striking off, particularly in light of recorded assets and creditors.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Registrar must satisfy himself as required by Section 248(6); absence of such satisfaction where assets/creditors exist renders strike-off vulnerable to being set aside. Obiter - the relevance of income-tax filings as corroborative evidence but not a substitute for a proper Section 248(6) assessment.

Conclusions: The strike-off was defective for failure to demonstrate that the Registrar properly applied the Section 248(6) criterion in the presence of assets and outstanding creditors.

Issue 3: Whether restoration is just and equitable given assets, liabilities and partial compliance

Legal framework: Restoration under Section 421 (appeal context) requires the appellate forum to consider whether it is just and equitable to restore the company's name, taking into account statutory compliance, assets, liabilities and prejudice to creditors or public interest.

Precedent Treatment: Tribunals have restored companies where audited balance sheets evidenced substantial assets and the company was not a sham or engaged in unlawful business; restoration has been refused where the company was a shell or continued to be non-compliant prejudicing creditors or public interest.

Interpretation and reasoning: Applying the precedents, the Tribunal found that the company had complied with filings up to the last due period, possessed an immovable property and had recorded creditor liabilities. The Tribunal distinguished cases treating companies as shells or engaged in unlawful activity, observing that those facts were absent. In balancing interests, the Tribunal regarded restoration as just and equitable subject to conditions (payment of costs, filing of outstanding returns with fees, and reservation of RoC's right to take punitive steps for non-filing), thereby protecting creditors and RoC's enforcement powers.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - restoration is appropriate where company demonstrably possesses assets and liabilities and is not a shell; such restoration may be conditioned to protect creditor and regulatory interests. Obiter - the quantum of costs and specific procedural conditions applied in this instance are discretionary adjuncts rather than binding principles.

Conclusions: Restoration was justified on grounds of assets and liabilities and prior compliance; conditional restoration (costs, filing obligations, RoC's prosecutorial rights preserved) was ordered to balance interests.

Issue 4: Application and treatment of coordinate-bench precedents concerning restoration where assets exist; distinction from cases of shell companies or unlawful activity

Legal framework: Tribunal decisions of coordinate benches constitute persuasive guidance; factors such as existence of assets, auditors' reports, and nature of business activity determine applicability.

Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal followed coordinate-bench judgments where restoration was granted on evidence of substantial assets (movable/immovable) and where companies were not shell entities. It distinguished those precedents relied upon by the Registrar and earlier orders where restoration was denied because companies were inactive, had no assets/creditors or were implicated in unlawful activity.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal held that the present facts aligned with precedent restoring companies with assets and liabilities; it rejected the Registrar's reliance on precedents upholding strike-off where absence of assets or evidence of operation prevailed. The Tribunal emphasized factual differentiation - especially ownership of immovable property and recorded creditors - as the basis for following the restorative line of decisions.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - coordinate-bench precedents favoring restoration on an assets-and-liabilities basis are applicable where factual parity exists; factual distinctions may justify different outcomes. Obiter - the broader policy concerns about striking off dormant companies to maintain register integrity, while relevant, do not override case-specific demonstration of assets/creditors.

Conclusions: Coordinate-bench precedents supporting restoration were followed as factually analogous; precedents treating shell or unlawful companies were distinguished on the facts, supporting the order to restore subject to protective conditions.

Final operative conclusion (cross-referenced to Issues 1-4)

The Tribunal set aside the impugned order cancelling the company's name, concluding that nil revenue alone did not justify strike-off where the company had recorded assets and liabilities and had complied with statutory filings up to the relevant due date; the Registrar had not demonstrated satisfaction of the Section 248(6) requirement; restoration was therefore just and equitable, subject to conditioned compliance (payment of costs, filing of outstanding returns with fees) and without prejudice to RoC's rights to initiate further action for statutory non-compliance.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to refund in cash of the duty/Cenvat credit relatable to raw materials and finished or semi-finished goods lying in stock at the time of de-bonding of the 100% EOU.

Analysis: The refund dispute turned on the eligibility of credit taken on inputs and goods covered by the de-bonding process. The department had subsequently dropped the show cause proceedings proposing recovery of the allegedly erroneous refund and had itself accepted that the credit availed on the relevant inputs and stock was allowable under Rule 3(1)(i), (vii) and (via) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. In view of that later adjudication, the challenge to the cash refund no longer survived for consideration.

Conclusion: The refund claim was held to be admissible and the impugned order was set aside in favour of the appellant.

Issues: Whether a members' club was liable to luxury tax under the Delhi Tax on Luxuries Act, 1996 for the assessment years concerned despite its claim of mutuality and notwithstanding the later 2012 amendment.

Analysis: The applicable law was the unamended Act, as the assessments related to periods prior to the 2012 amendment. Under that regime, the Act defined a club as an establishment, treated such an establishment as a hotelier, and imposed tax on the turnover of receipts from the provision of residential accommodation. The challenge based on mutuality did not succeed because the petitioner did not question the validity of the original statutory scheme that specifically extended the levy to residential accommodation in a club. The later insertion of the definition of luxury did not govern the assessment years in question, and authorities based on post-amendment law did not alter the position under the pre-amendment Act.

Conclusion: The club was held liable to luxury tax under the pre-2012 provisions of the Act, and the challenge to the assessment and appellate orders failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the charging statute, as it stood during the relevant assessment period, expressly extends luxury tax to residential accommodation provided by a club, the doctrine of mutuality does not by itself defeat the levy unless the validity of that statutory scheme is challenged.

Issues: Whether the show cause notice demanding differential duty was barred by limitation or premature in the context of provisional assessment and subsequent finalisation of the price list and RT-12 returns.

Analysis: The assessment was initially finalised by the Assistant Commissioner, and the assessee acted on that finalised price list during the relevant clearance period. The later appellate order directing inclusion of JPC Cess did not show any further effective finalisation before issuance of the show cause notice. The notice was issued long after the initial finalisation and, on the alternative footing adopted by the assessee, even before the RT-12 finalisation. In these circumstances, the notice was treated as belated and, on the facts, premature. The plea that Section 11A did not apply to the Revenue in such a situation was rejected, and the reasoning in the cited Supreme Court decision was applied equally against the Revenue.

Conclusion: The demand was held to be unsustainable because the show cause notice was barred by limitation and, on the alternative computation, premature; the impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the impugned order under Section 148A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was vitiated by procedural irregularity for failure to grant a clear seven days' time to file a reply to the notice; and whether the impugned order should be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration after affording opportunity to reply.

Analysis: The petition challenges the order passed under the statutory procedure prescribed by Section 148A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the requisite clear seven days for filing a reply was not effectively granted due to intervening holidays. The issue was examined by reference to the statutory requirement of an adequate, clear period to enable a taxpayer to file a response to a notice under the provision, and by reference to relevant precedent on notice-period compliance. In the factual matrix before the Court, three holidays intervened within the period specified in the notice, and the respondent did not controvert that fact. The impugned order was therefore assessed for procedural infirmity arising from inadequate opportunity to be heard and failure to comply with the statutory timeline requirement.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 6th April, 2023 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the assessing officer to pass a fresh speaking order in accordance with law after giving the petitioner or an authorised representative an opportunity to be heard and after considering the petitioner's reply to the notice. The petitioner is directed to file the reply within two weeks from date, and the assessing officer is directed to pass the fresh order within four weeks from receipt of such reply; in default the impugned order shall revive.

Ratio Decidendi: A proceeding under Section 148A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires that a taxpayer be afforded a clear and adequate period to file a reply to the notice; failure to grant such clear time, including where intervening holidays negate the prescribed period, constitutes procedural infirmity warranting setting aside the order and remand for fresh consideration after affording the statutory opportunity to be heard.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal's final order dated 02.08.2022 contains an error apparent on the face of the record and whether the appellant is entitled to CENVAT credit for inputs consumed in the manufacture of semi-finished goods destroyed in a fire to the extent of Rs. 35,60,087/-.

Analysis: The record shows that the part of the earlier order confirming the demand of CENVAT credit for inputs used in semi-finished goods destroyed by fire required correction to accurately state the appeal's subject-matter and the Tribunal's disposition. On the substantive question, the order addresses entitlement to CENVAT credit for inputs consumed in the manufacture of semi-finished goods destroyed in the fire and specifies the quantification of credit as Rs. 35,60,087/-. The corrections replace misstated paragraphs so that the final order correctly records that the denial of CENVAT credit for the specified amount is set aside and that the appellant is entitled to the said credit.

Conclusion: The application for correction is allowed; the portions of the Commissioner's order denying CENVAT credit for inputs consumed in semi-finished goods destroyed by fire to the extent of Rs. 35,60,087/- are set aside and the appellant is held entitled to CENVAT credit of Rs. 35,60,087/-.

Issues: Whether the provisional attachment order passed under Section 83(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 remained operative, and whether the petition was liable to be disposed of on that basis.

Analysis: The order of provisional attachment had been passed under Section 83(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Under Section 83(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, such an order ceases to operate after the expiry of one year. As the impugned attachment order had already lost its operative force, further examination of whether any fresh order had been passed was not considered necessary for disposal of the petition.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment order was no longer operative, and the petition was disposed of with directions that the petitioner's bank account and immovable property not be interdicted on the basis of the impugned order.

Issues: Whether the ex parte decree should be set aside on the ground of alleged non-service of summons and whether the application filed nearly a decade later was maintainable.

Analysis: The record showed that the plaintiff had taken steps to serve summons at the defendant's last known address, and the correspondence exchanged between the parties established that the defendant was aware of the dispute and the demand for payment. The defendant did not establish that summons had been sent to an incorrect address or that the change of business address had been intimated to the plaintiff. The Court also noted that the application to set aside the ex parte decree was filed after an inordinate delay of about ten years, without an accompanying application to condone delay, and that the plea of lack of knowledge was not supported by specific particulars. In these circumstances, the service of summons could be treated as duly effected and no sufficient cause was made out to unsettle the decree.

Conclusion: The application to set aside the ex parte decree was rightly rejected, and the ex parte decree was not liable to be disturbed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the challenge to the ex parte decree was barred by delay and the allegation of non-service was not made out on the facts.

Ratio Decidendi: Where summons are sent to a defendant's correct last known address and the defendant fails to show a legally sustainable ground of non-service or sufficient cause for a belated challenge, an ex parte decree will not be set aside merely on a vague plea of later knowledge.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail in a money-laundering case having regard to the statutory limitations on bail, the gravity of the allegations, the stage of investigation, and the risk posed by the petitioner's position and influence.

Analysis: The petition was considered in the context of the stringent bail regime under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, together with the general principles governing bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The allegations concerned purchase of teaching appointments by corrupt means, with the investigation still continuing and the matter being at an advanced stage. The Court noted the seriousness of the accusation, the number of affected candidates, the petitioner's position and standing, and the possibility that release at that stage could impact the continuing investigation. The Court also treated the statutory restrictions on bail under the money-laundering law as material while assessing whether bail should be granted.

Conclusion: Bail was refused and the petitioner was held not entitled to release at that stage.

Final Conclusion: The petition was rejected because the Court found that the seriousness of the alleged money-laundering offence, the petitioner's influence, and the ongoing investigation outweighed the grounds pressed for release.

Ratio Decidendi: In a money-laundering prosecution, bail may be refused where the statutory restrictions on release, the gravity of the allegations, and the risk of interference with a continuing investigation make it an unsuitable case for enlargement on bail.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the application for waiver of interest could survive after the underlying tax liability for the relevant periods had been set aside in connected proceedings.

Analysis: The tax liability for the relevant assessment periods had already been taken away by earlier orders passed in the petitioner's favour, and the revenue could not dispute those orders. On that basis, the interest claim, being consequential to the tax liability, could not stand independently once the principal demand itself had ceased to exist.

Conclusion: The challenge to the rejection of waiver of interest succeeded, and the interest liability was held not to survive after the tax liability had been set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the principal tax liability has been extinguished by judicial order, any consequential interest liability cannot survive independently.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was afforded the statutory 15-day period to file objections to the notice dated 04.09.2023 and whether the audit proceedings could be questioned on the ground that the petitioner's registration had already been cancelled.

Analysis: The order records the petitioner's contention that the notice was served only on 14.09.2023, leaving less than the prescribed time to respond, while the respondent was directed to obtain instructions on the actual date of issue and receipt. The order also notices the contention that the petitioner's registration had been cancelled and the audit could not proceed thereafter, along with the further objection regarding completion of the audit within the statutory period. These matters were kept open for further instructions and were not finally adjudicated.

Outcome: No final determination was made on the validity of the notice or the audit proceedings; the matter was directed to be listed again for instructions.

Issues: (i) Whether the penalty orders under sections 271D and 271E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were barred by limitation under section 275(1)(c); (ii) Whether the assessee established reasonable cause under section 273B so as to avoid penalty for acceptance and repayment of cash deposits and loans.

Issue (i): Whether the penalty orders under sections 271D and 271E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were barred by limitation under section 275(1)(c).

Analysis: The limitation under section 275(1)(c) turns on the date on which action for imposition of penalty is initiated, not merely the date of assessment order and not the later date of notice by the competent authority. The relevant reference to the competent authority was made on 01.01.2008, and the period of limitation therefore extended to 31.07.2008. The penalty orders passed on 26.07.2018 were within time on the reasoning accepted by the Court, and the contrary objection was rejected.

Conclusion: The limitation objection failed and was answered against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee established reasonable cause under section 273B so as to avoid penalty for acceptance and repayment of cash deposits and loans.

Analysis: The assessee was found, in practical terms, to be functioning as a banking institution, dealing with members and non-members in the ordinary course of its business and facilitating deposits and repayments through banking channels and account facilities. On that factual foundation, the cash transactions were treated as occurring in the normal course of a bona fide business model, and the conduct was held to constitute reasonable cause for the statutory violations, so as to attract the protection of section 273B. The penalty provisions under sections 271D and 271E were therefore held inapplicable.

Conclusion: Reasonable cause was established and the penalty was not leviable.

Final Conclusion: The assessees' challenges were rejected on limitation but accepted on reasonable cause, with the result that the impugned penalties could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: For penalty under section 275(1)(c), the operative starting point is the initiation of action for penalty before the competent authority, and a bona fide banking-like course of conduct may constitute reasonable cause under section 273B to defeat penalty under sections 271D and 271E.