Validity of Valuation Officer (DVO) report and jurisdiction to value construction - Reference to Valuation Officer under section 142A and power to commission valuation under section 131/section 55A - Admissibility and weight of private valuer's report vis-a -vis DVO report - Principles of natural justice and duty to consider objections and material produced - Remand for fresh adjudication where appellate authority has not considered relevant materialValidity of Valuation Officer (DVO) report and jurisdiction to value construction - Reference to Valuation Officer under section 142A and power to commission valuation under section 131/section 55A - Objection that the DVO lacked jurisdiction and that the DVO report was void ab initio was rejected. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the contention that the Valuation Officer had no powers post-abolition of wealth tax and that the DVO's report was therefore void. It held that the Assessing Officer was empowered to obtain a valuation from the DVO to ascertain fair market value of construction where the value declared by the assessee was lower. The Tribunal followed the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Krishan Kumar Jhamb to the effect that where the private valuer's report suffers grave infirmity (for example, omission of items used in construction) revenue is justified in adopting the DVO's determination based on prescribed CPWD norms. Applying that principle to the facts, the Tribunal held the assessee's objections to the DVO report to be devoid of merit and rejected them. [Paras 10]Objection to the jurisdiction and validity of the DVO report rejected.Admissibility and weight of private valuer's report vis-a -vis DVO report - Principles of natural justice and duty to consider objections and material produced - Remand for fresh adjudication where appellate authority has not considered relevant material - Whether the CIT(A) properly disposed of the assessee's objections to the DVO report and whether the assessment could be sustained without adjudicating those objections - remanded for fresh consideration. - HELD THAT: - Although the Tribunal rejected the jurisdictional challenge to the DVO, it found that the CIT(A) did not advert to, discuss or decide the objections and supporting documents filed by the assessee in relation to the DVO report. Relying on the principle that a quasi judicial authority must consider and record reasons when relevant materials and objections are produced, the Tribunal concluded that the CIT(A)'s order proceeded without discussing the appellant's objections and was therefore in violation of the principles of natural justice. For that reason the matter was directed to be restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication of the value of construction after considering the assessee's submissions and documents and after affording opportunity to the parties. [Paras 11, 12, 13]Matter remitted to the CIT(A) to adjudicate the valuation objections afresh in accordance with law.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal rejected the contention that the DVO lacked jurisdiction and upheld the general validity of a DVO valuation obtained under the Income tax proceedings, but directed remand because the CIT(A) failed to consider and record reasons on the assessee's objections and supporting material; appeal disposed of for statistical purposes and matter restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication of the valuation in accordance with law.

Sale of goods - classification of supply - de-mineralised water versus ordinary treated water - Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD) - exemption under Notification No. 2/2017 - Central Tax (Rate) - binding nature of advance rulingSale of goods - classification of supply - Sale of Goods Act - transfer of property - Classification of the applicant's proposed purchase of raw effluent and sale of resultant products as sale of goods. - HELD THAT: - The Authority held that the applicant's proposed modus operandi - purchasing raw effluent, treating it on its own account and selling the resultant water, salt and other products at market rates - can amount to a sale of goods only if the essential elements of a contract of sale under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court (transfer of property, money consideration and agreement between parties) are satisfied. The Authority therefore ruled that classification as sale of goods is correct subject to the applicant following the procedures and rationale identified in para 4.9, i.e., ensuring that title in goods passes pursuant to a contract of sale and other requirements of the Sale of Goods Act are met. [Paras 4, 5]Classification of outputs as supply of goods is correct, subject to compliance with the Sale of Goods Act requirements and the conditions stated in para 4.9.De-mineralised water versus ordinary treated water - exemption under Notification No. 2/2017 - Central Tax (Rate) - treated sewage/effluent water - Whether the treated effluent water recovered by the applicant is classifiable under heading 2201 and eligible for exemption under Notification No. 2/2017 - Central Tax (Rate). - HELD THAT: - The Authority examined the nature of recovered water and the relevant tariff/explanatory notes. It found that de-mineralised/distilled/conductivity water (classified in chapter 28) is produced by ion-exchange or similar processes and is free from soluble mineral salts, whereas the effluent-treated water in issue is not subjected to such de-mineralisation and contains chlorides, sulphates and similar impurities (as borne out by testing of comparable CETP samples). The Authority noted that heading 22.01 covers ordinary waters, whether or not clarified or purified, and that Notification No. 2/2017 (Sl. No. 99 against heading 2201) exempts water other than specified special categories (including de-mineralised water). Applying the Ministry of Finance clarification that treated sewage/treated water falling under heading 2201 is exempt, and having regard to the purpose and ZLD context (recovery for reuse to prevent pollution rather than manufacture of purified water), the Authority concluded that the effluent-treated water qualifies as ordinary water under heading 2201 and is eligible for Nil rate under Notification No. 2/2017 as amended. [Paras 4, 5]Treated effluent water is classifiable under heading 2201 as ordinary water and is eligible for exemption under Notification No. 2/2017 - Central Tax (Rate) (Sl. No. 99).Final Conclusion: The Advance Ruling holds that (i) the proposed purchase-treatment-sale model can be treated as sale of goods if the applicant complies with the Sale of Goods Act and the conditions set out in para 4.9, and (ii) the treated effluent water recovered by the applicant is classifiable under heading 2201 as ordinary water and is exempt from GST under Notification No. 2/2017 - Central Tax (Rate) (Sl. No. 99).

Section 148A - conduct of enquiry and opportunity before issuing notice under Section 148 - Validity of notice under Section 148 issued after 01.04.2021 without compliance of Section 148A - Violation of principle of natural justice - Maintainability of writ petition despite availability of alternate statutory remedy - Remand for fresh consideration to comply with Section 148A and supply of material relied uponMaintainability of writ petition despite availability of alternate statutory remedy - Violation of principle of natural justice - Writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable notwithstanding availability of appeal under Section 246A, where proceedings are vitiated for failure to follow mandatory procedure and breach of natural justice. - HELD THAT: - The Court applied settled principles that availability of an alternate statutory remedy is a discretionary, not absolute, bar to writ jurisdiction and may be dispensed with where there is a violation of principles of natural justice or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. Observing that the amended scheme under Sections 147-149 and 151 imports mandatory procedural safeguards (notably Section 148A) which were not complied with before issuing the notice under Section 148, the Court found that the omission amounted to a breach of natural justice and justified exercise of writ jurisdiction despite the existence of an appellate remedy under Section 246A. Reliance on authorities recognising exceptions to exclusion of writ jurisdiction was applied to the facts to hold the petition maintainable. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 14]Writ petition is maintainable; alternate remedy does not bar exercise of writ jurisdiction in these facts.Validity of notice under Section 148 issued after 01.04.2021 without compliance of Section 148A - Section 148A - conduct of enquiry and opportunity before issuing notice under Section 148 - Violation of principle of natural justice - Notice issued under Section 148 on 09.06.2021 and consequent reassessment are vitiated for non-compliance with Section 148A and resulting breach of natural justice. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the Finance Act, 2021 amendments (effective 01.04.2021) make compliance with Section 148A mandatory before issuing a notice under Section 148, requiring enquiry (with prior approval where necessary), a show-cause notice, consideration of the assessee's reply and a recorded order under Section 148A(d). Finding that no Section 148A proceedings were conducted before issuance of the Section 148 notice in this case, and that the petitioner's request for materials relied upon was rejected without regard to the amended scheme and subsequent Supreme Court dictum in Ashish Agrawal, the Court concluded that the assessment proceedings were vitiated by breach of natural justice and failure to follow the statutory procedure. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 12, 13]Notice and assessment under Sections 147/148 are set aside as vitiated for non-compliance with Section 148A and breach of natural justice.Remand for fresh consideration to comply with Section 148A and supply of material relied upon - Section 148A - conduct of enquiry and opportunity before issuing notice under Section 148 - Matter is remitted to the revenue authorities to treat the issued notice as if under Section 148A and to proceed afresh complying with Section 148A and the guidance in Ashish Agarwal, including consideration of the assessee's replies and supply of material relied upon where applicable. - HELD THAT: - Having set aside the assessment order, the Court directed that the respondents reconsider the matter afresh by treating the earlier notice as a notice under Section 148A and by conducting enquiry, issuing show-cause notice, considering replies and passing a reasoned order under Section 148A(d) with prior approval of the specified authority where required. The Court expressly remitted the case for fresh decision in accordance with Section 148A and the Supreme Court's decision in Ashish Agarwal to ensure compliance with procedural safeguards and fair opportunity to the assessee. [Paras 15]Assessment order set aside and matter remitted to the authorities for fresh proceedings in accordance with Section 148A and Ashish Agarwal.Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; assessment order dated 30.03.2022 set aside as proceedings under Section 148 were initiated without mandatory compliance with Section 148A, causing breach of natural justice. Matter remitted to the revenue to treat the notice as under Section 148A and to proceed afresh complying with the statutory procedure and the Supreme Court's guidance.

Reopening of assessment - failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts - change of opinion - reasons to believe - reopening under section 147/148 of Income Tax ActReopening of assessment - failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts - reasons to believe - change of opinion - reopening under section 147/148 of Income Tax Act - Validity of the notice issued under section 148 and the order disposing objections where the assessment for the year had been completed more than four years earlier. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that where a notice under section 148 is issued after the four-year period, proceedings under section 147 can be valid only if there is failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. The reasons recorded for reopening relied entirely upon material already available in the assessment record and the agreement produced by the petitioner; there is nothing in the reasons that demonstrates non-disclosure of material facts by the petitioner. A specific query on the capital gain in question was raised during assessment and the petitioner furnished a detailed reply with computation and documents on 31.10.2014; the assessment was thereafter completed under section 143(3). The absence of an express reference to that query in the assessment order does not mean the matter was not considered. The Court found that the Assessing Officer's action amounted to a mere change of opinion, and that such change of opinion does not constitute a valid 'reason to believe' that income has escaped assessment sufficient to sustain reopening after four years. Reliance on the assessment records to re-examine matters already placed before the Assessing Officer, without any foundation of non-disclosure or obscured material facts, does not satisfy the statutory test for reopening under section 147/148. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10]The notice dated 26.03.2019 under section 148 and the order dated 20.11.2019 disposing of objections are quashed and set aside.Final Conclusion: The petition is allowed; the High Court set aside the reopening notice and the order disposing of objections, holding that the reopening was based on a change of opinion and that there was no failure by the assessee to disclose material facts necessitating reopening after the four-year period.

Validity of Rule 96(10)(b) of Central Goods and Service Tax Rules/State Goods and Service Tax Rules - Ultra vires challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Interim relief - prohibition on coercive recovery - Parity with similarly situated petitioners - Adjudication proceedings to continue subject to restraint on coercive measuresValidity of Rule 96(10)(b) of Central Goods and Service Tax Rules/State Goods and Service Tax Rules - Ultra vires challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Interim relief - prohibition on coercive recovery - Parity with similarly situated petitioners - Interim relief was granted by restraining coercive recovery and notice was issued in the challenge to the validity of Rule 96(10)(b). - HELD THAT: - The petition challenges the vires of Rule 96(10)(b) as being ultra vires Article 14. The Court noted that other petitions raising similar contentions have been admitted and interim relief granted. Applying parity with those similarly situated petitioners, the Court issued notice and directed that, while adjudication proceedings may continue, no coercive recovery shall be made against the petitioner pending disposal of the petition returnable on 21.06.2023. The order relied on the Coordinate Bench's order which observed that petitioners deserving parity should be entitled to ad-interim relief and recorded that adjudication may proceed subject to non-coercive restraint. [Paras 3]Notice issued returnable on 21.06.2023; adjudication may continue but no coercive recovery shall be made against the petitioner in the meantime.Final Conclusion: Notice on the petition challenging Rule 96(10)(b) issued returnable on 21.06.2023; interim relief granted restraining coercive recovery while adjudication proceedings may continue.

Validity of Rule 96(10)(b) of Central Goods and Services Tax Rules / State Goods and Services Tax Rules - Ultra vires - Article 14 - equality - Interim relief - prohibition on coercive recovery - Adjudication proceedings may continueValidity of Rule 96(10)(b) of Central Goods and Services Tax Rules / State Goods and Services Tax Rules - Article 14 - equality - Notice and adjudication of vires challenge - Petition challenging vires of Rule 96(10)(b) admitted for notice and listed for further hearing. - HELD THAT: - The petitioner challenged Rule 96(10)(b) of the CGST/SGST Rules as being ultra vires and contrary to Article 14. The Court noted that other petitions raising similar vires challenges have been entertained and interim relief granted. Applying parity with those similarly situated petitioners and having considered the order of the Coordinate Bench, the Court issued notice in the present petition and fixed the matter for hearing on 21.06.2023 so that the vires challenge may be adjudicated on merits at the returnable date. [Paras 3]Notice issued; matter listed for hearing on 21.06.2023.Interim relief - prohibition on coercive recovery - Adjudication proceedings may continue - Interim relief in the form of prohibition on coercive recovery granted while adjudication continues. - HELD THAT: - Relying on the Coordinate Bench's reasoning that similarly placed petitioners were granted interim protection, the Court exercised its power to grant ad-interim relief. The Court directed that although adjudication proceedings may continue, there shall be no coercive recovery against the petitioner during the interim period pending the returnable date. This preserves the status quo and affords parity with other petitioners who have been granted similar protection. [Paras 3]Adjudication may proceed, but no coercive recovery shall be made against the petitioner until the next hearing.Final Conclusion: Notice issued returnable 21.06.2023 on the challenge to Rule 96(10)(b); ad interim relief granted restraining coercive recovery while adjudication continues until the returnable date.

Scope of Section 97(2) of the CGST Act - admissibility of advance ruling applications - pending proceedings bar under the proviso to Section 98(2) of the CGST Act - mis-declaration in advance ruling application as ground for non-admissionScope of Section 97(2) of the CGST Act - admissibility of advance ruling applications - The question posed by the applicant does not fall within the categories of questions on which an advance ruling may be sought under Section 97(2) of the CGST Act and therefore is not admissible. - HELD THAT: - Section 97(2) prescribes an exhaustive list of matters on which advance rulings can be sought (classification, applicability of notifications, time and value of supply, admissibility of input tax credit, liability to pay tax, requirement of registration, and whether a transaction amounts to supply). The question submitted by the applicant-whether Compensation Cess paid on purchase of coal that remained as unutilized ITC continues to be available or must be reversed-does not fall within those statutorily enumerated categories. Since the subject-matter of the application is not one of the categories specified by Section 97(2), the Authority is statutorily precluded from admitting or deciding the question on merits and must decline jurisdiction to rule on it. [Paras 4]Application not maintainable and not admissible for advance ruling under Section 97(2).Pending proceedings bar under the proviso to Section 98(2) of the CGST Act - mis-declaration in advance ruling application as ground for non-admission - The application is further not admitable because related proceedings are pending and the applicant mis-declared facts, invoking the proviso to Section 98(2). - HELD THAT: - The proviso to Section 98(2) prohibits admission of an advance ruling application where the question raised is already pending or decided in any proceedings in the case of the applicant. The Authority noted communications from the Directorate General of GST Intelligence indicating an ongoing investigation into alleged excess/irregular availment of Compensation Cess against the applicant and that demand proceedings were imminent. On examination, the Authority also found that the applicant had mis-declared facts in its application. In view of the pending investigative/proceedings and the mis-declaration, the Authority was obliged by the proviso to Section 98(2) to refuse admission of the application irrespective of the merits. [Paras 4, 5]Application not admitable and rejected under the proviso to Section 98(2).Final Conclusion: The Authority rejected the application for advance ruling as not maintainable: the question does not fall within the scope of Section 97(2) and, independently, admission is barred by the proviso to Section 98(2) because related proceedings are pending and the application contained mis-declarations; the Authority therefore refrained from deciding the merits.

Confiscation under Section 130 of the Karnataka Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - penalty and fine consequent to confiscation - substantive remedy under Section 107 of the Karnataka Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - exclusion of time during pendency for computation of limitationConfiscation under Section 130 of the Karnataka Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - substantive remedy under Section 107 of the Karnataka Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - exclusion of time during pendency for computation of limitation - Petition for quashing the order of confiscation was not adjudicated on merits; petitioner granted liberty to challenge the impugned order by availing the remedy under Section 107 and to seek exclusion of time spent in these proceedings for calculating limitation. - HELD THAT: - The High Court noted that a previous writ concerning the same petitioner for different periods had been disposed of with liberty to pursue the substantive remedy under Section 107. Following that approach, the Court declined to decide the merits of the present challenge to the order of confiscation passed under Section 130 and instead disposed of the petition by expressly reserving liberty to the petitioner to invoke Section 107. The Court further observed that the period during which the present writ was pending can be sought to be excluded when calculating limitation for any proceedings under the statutory remedy. All substantive contentions were left open for determination before the competent forum upon initiation of the prescribed remedy.Petition disposed of by granting liberty to challenge the confiscation order under Section 107; time spent in these proceedings may be excluded for limitation purposes; all other contentions kept open.Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed without adjudication on merits; petitioner permitted to pursue the statutory remedy under Section 107 of the Karnataka GST Act, 2017, with liberty to claim exclusion of the time spent in these proceedings for limitation calculations.

Twin conditions for grant of bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act - reason to believe requirement for arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA - application of broad probabilities at the bail stage - relevance of absence of charge sheet in predicate offence to PMLA bail enquiry - cooperation of accused and absence of antecedents as factor for bailTwin conditions for grant of bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act - application of broad probabilities at the bail stage - relevance of absence of charge sheet in predicate offence to PMLA bail enquiry - cooperation of accused and absence of antecedents as factor for bail - Grant of bail to the petitioner under the PMLA subject to conditions - HELD THAT: - The Court applied the statutory twin conditions applicable to bail under the PMLA and the settled principle that at the bail stage the court acts on broad probabilities without weighing evidence as in trial. The investigation discloses allegations of diversion of government funds through a network of entities, and the petitioner was arrested after being examined by agencies. However, the Court noted that (i) no charge sheet has been filed in the predicate FIR registered by CBCID for more than 14-15 months; (ii) there is no material showing funds flowed into the petitioner's account; (iii) searches did not yield incriminating material linking the petitioner to the proceeds of crime; (iv) the petitioner has been cooperative, appeared repeatedly before investigating agencies, and was earlier granted bail in the predicate crime; and (v) it is his first offence and there is no allegation of tampering with evidence or interference. Relying on the approach in the authorities referred to by the parties, the Court concluded that the second limb of the PMLA twin test (that the accused is not likely to commit an offence while on bail) is satisfied on the material on record and that continued incarceration is not justified. The Court therefore exercised its judicial discretion to grant bail, while imposing conditions of personal bond, sureties, regular appearance for investigation and restraint on travel without court permission. The Court did not undertake a trial like appreciation of evidence nor record a final view on guilt; its findings are provisional for the limited purpose of the bail application. [Paras 12, 16, 17, 18]Criminal Petition allowed; petitioner enlarged on bail on furnishing personal bond and sureties and subject to conditions including weekly attendance and prohibition on leaving the country without permission.Final Conclusion: Bail granted to the petitioner under the PMLA on conditions, the Court finding on available material and broad probabilities that continued detention was not justified and that the statutory conditions for bail were satisfied subject to imposed terms.

Section 28(4) of the Customs Act - extended period for recovery where there is collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts - Section 46(4) of the Customs Act - importer's declaration and production of supporting documents in bill of entry - Doctrine of transformation - treaty provisions are not self executing and require domestic enactment to be enforceable - Supremacy of municipal law - state law prevails where domestic statute conflicts with international treaty - Article 24 of AIFTA - dispute settlement/consultation mechanism (not incorporated in DOGPTA Rules, 2009) - Operational Certification Procedures - procedural verification (retroactive check and verification visits) Article 24 of AIFTA - dispute settlement/consultation mechanism (not incorporated in DOGPTA Rules, 2009) - Doctrine of transformation - treaty provisions are not self executing and require domestic enactment to be enforceable - Supremacy of municipal law - state law prevails where domestic statute conflicts with international treaty - Applicability and invocability of AIFTA Article 24 before Indian courts and authorities - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Article 24 of AIFTA, although part of the international treaty, was not reproduced in or transformed into the Customs Tariff (DOGPTA) Rules, 2009 framed by the Indian executive and hence lacks statutory force domestically. Relying on the doctrine that treaty stipulations are not self executing and require legislative transformation to govern rights of subjects, the Court concluded that an omitted provision of the treaty cannot be invoked or enforced in Indian courts. Where municipal law and an international provision are in conflict or the latter is not adopted into domestic law, municipal law prevails. Article 24 of AIFTA is not invocable or enforceable in Indian courts or to restrain exercise of powers under domestic Customs law. Section 28(4) of the Customs Act - extended period for recovery where there is collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts - Section 46(4) of the Customs Act - importer's declaration and production of supporting documents in bill of entry - Competence of customs authorities to proceed under Section 28(4) and to recover differential duty where Country of Origin Certificate and RVC were found to be misrepresented or suppressive - HELD THAT: - The Court accepted the factual findings of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence that the Country of Origin Certificates contained misrepresented Regional Value Content (RVC) and that importers had subscribed to bills of entry with supporting documents. Section 46(4) obliges the importer to declare truth of contents and produce supporting documents; suppression or misrepresentation of facts falls within Section 28(4) permitting recovery within five years. The Court found suppression (including misrepresentation) established on the record and held that invoking Section 28(4) was lawful and within the sovereign statutory scheme. Customs authorities were competent to invoke Section 28(4) read with Section 46(4) and to proceed to recover differential duty and impose consequential measures. Operational Certification Procedures - procedural verification (retroactive check and verification visits) - Section 28(4) of the Customs Act - extended period for recovery where there is collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts - Effect of non observance of time limits and procedural steps in the Operational Certification Procedures on substantive actions under the Customs Act - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the Operational Certification Procedures and their timelines relate to procedural verification under the treaty framework, but such procedural requirements are subordinate to substantive domestic law. Non compliance with procedural time limits in the certification procedures does not automatically invalidate actions legitimately taken under the substantive provisions of the Customs Act. Given the factual findings of misrepresentation and the statutory power in Section 28(4), failure to meet procedural timelines did not render the recovery proceedings without jurisdiction. Breach of procedural timelines in Operational Certification Procedures did not vitiate the customs authorities' substantive exercise of power under the Customs Act. Final Conclusion: The writ petitions challenging the Orders in Original and Order in Appeal were dismissed. The Court upheld the customs authorities' invocation of Section 28(4) read with Section 46(4) of the Customs Act, held that AIFTA Article 24 is not enforceable domestically because it was not transformed into Indian statutory rules, and concluded that procedural lapses under the Operational Certification Procedures do not invalidate valid substantive action under the Customs Act.

Advance ruling - void ab-initio under Section 104 - definition of applicant under Section 95 - misrepresentation of facts / suppression of material facts - rectification of advance ruling under Section 102Advance ruling - definition of applicant under Section 95 - void ab-initio under Section 104 - Competence of the Authority to pronounce the earlier Advance Ruling (UP ADRG-17/2022) where the applicant (NHAI) was found to be the recipient of services/goods and not the supplier authorised to seek an advance ruling. - HELD THAT: - The Authority examined the scope of 'advance ruling' and the meaning of 'applicant' under section 95 of the CGST Act and found on the material before it that M/s National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) is the receiver of the goods/services concerning shifting of transmission lines and not the supplier. Since an advance ruling under section 95 is a decision rendered to an applicant 'in relation to the supply of goods or services ... being undertaken or proposed to be undertaken by the applicant', only a person who is the supplier can validly seek such a ruling. The finding that NHAI was the recipient meant the Authority had no competence to finally decide the questions in UP ADRG-17/2022. Consequentially, the earlier Advance Ruling was declared void ab-initio under section 104, which empowers the Authority to declare a ruling void if it was obtained by fraud, suppression or misrepresentation of material facts or where the fundamental eligibility to seek the ruling was absent. The Authority therefore held that no ruling could be given in the matter and set aside the earlier order accordingly. [Paras 10, 11]Advance Ruling No. UP ADRG-17/2022 dated 08.12.2022 is declared void ab-initio and no ruling can be given in the matter.Final Conclusion: The Advance Ruling issued on 08.12.2022 is void ab-initio because the applicant was the recipient of the services/goods and therefore not competent as an 'applicant' under section 95 to seek the ruling; consequently the earlier ruling is set aside under section 104 and no fresh ruling is given.

Reason to believe - formation of opinion for search and seizure - judicial review of satisfaction note under Article 226 - relevance and nexus of material to detection of undisclosed income - effect of non-discovery of incriminating material on validity of search - protection against consideration of extraneous or irrelevant materialReason to believe - formation of opinion for search and seizure - relevance and nexus of material to detection of undisclosed income - Validity of the formation of opinion to conduct search and seizure under Section 132(1) for the searches dated 20/11/2017 - HELD THAT: - The Court examined whether the authorised income-tax authorities had materials and information giving rise to a "reason to believe" relevant to discovering undisclosed income which could not be unearthed by ordinary procedures. Applying the principles in Laljibhai K. Mandalia and authorities on the meaning of "reason to believe", the Court held that the satisfaction must be based on information/materials with a live nexus to the object of detection and must not be actuated by mala fide or mere pretence. Having reviewed the material produced (including information about alleged bogus long-term capital gains and suppression/inflation patterns noted earlier), the Court concluded that the authorities did possess material which was not extraneous or irrelevant and therefore had reasons to form the opinion to invoke Section 132(1). The Court emphasised that it cannot assess the sufficiency or adequacy of those materials but may test whether the belief was bona fide and free from extraneous considerations. [Paras 16, 17, 19, 20]The formation of opinion for the 20/11/2017 searches was within legal bounds and based on materials having nexus with the object of detecting undisclosed income.Effect of non-discovery of incriminating material on validity of search - judicial review of satisfaction note under Article 226 - Whether absence of incriminating material seized in a search vitiates the legality of the search under Section 132 - HELD THAT: - Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court observed that non-discovery of incriminating material during a search does not itself invalidate the formation of opinion to conduct the search. While absence of seized incriminating material may constrain the Assessing Officer from making additions in completed or unabated assessments (as per Abhisar Buildwell), it does not demonstrate that the antecedent belief was mala fide or a mere pretence. Thus discovery (or non-discovery) upon search and the subsequent fate of assessments are distinct from the question whether the authorities had a bona fide reason to believe prior to conducting the search. [Paras 23]Non-discovery of incriminating material during the searches does not, by itself, render the searches illegal or vitiate the prior formation of opinion.Protection against consideration of extraneous or irrelevant material - reason to believe - Whether prior searches (including 2015 searches) precluded a lawful fresh search in 2017 - HELD THAT: - The petitioners contended that the 2015 searches eliminated any basis for another search in 2017 and that repeated searches amounted to harassment. The Court reviewed the records and the Department's explanation that the 2017 search was directed to distinct concerns (notably alleged bogus long-term capital gains in specific scrips) and that Section 132 imposes no bar on fresh searches even if earlier searches covered some assessment years. Applying the standard that materials relied upon must be relevant and have nexus to detection of undisclosed income, the Court found the 2017 materials were not vitiated as extraneous and thus a subsequent search was not barred merely because an earlier search had taken place. [Paras 4, 13, 14, 24]The existence of earlier searches (including 2015) did not preclude a bona fide and legally founded search in 2017; multiple searches are not per se illegal where relevant material in possession of authorities justifies fresh exercise of Section 132 powers.Final Conclusion: The writ petitions are dismissed. The Court found that the Income Tax authorities had relevant materials and a bona fide "reason to believe" to conduct the 20/11/2017 searches; absence of incriminating material does not vitiate the prior formation of opinion. The dismissal does not affect the petitioners' assessments or appellate remedies under the Act.

Presumption under section 132(4A)/section 292C - applicability of section 68 to entries recorded in seized documents - benefit of rotation of loans and repayments - acceptance or rejection of seized consolidated financial statements in toto - allocation of income among family/group members in the ratio 60:40 - deletion of additions based solely on confession without corroboration - interest under section 234A - exclusion of period until seized material is handed overAcceptance or rejection of seized consolidated financial statements in toto - allocation of income among family/group members in the ratio 60:40 - Allocation of income discernible from seized consolidated balance sheets between family members and rejection of claim that entire income belonged to deceased - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal, following the coordinate bench, held that consolidated seized statements reflected assets and liabilities of various family members and group companies and that such income could not be exclusively attributed to late Shri Suraj Bhan Gupta. Given the complexity and inability to identify person-wise income from the consolidated documents, the authorities were justified in allocating income between the principal family members. The assessees had earlier agreed before the Company Law Board to divide assets in the ratio 60:40 and the Tribunal endorsed allocation of income in that ratio between Shri S.K. Gupta and Shri V.K./Vinod Gupta. The coordinate-bench approach of treating the seized consolidated statements consistently, and dividing the net discernible income between the key beneficiaries, was maintained. [Paras 21, 22, 26]Income discernible from the seized consolidated statements is not attributable solely to the deceased and is to be allocated between the assessees in the ratio 60:40; grounds contesting this are dismissed.Applicability of section 68 to entries recorded in seized documents - presumption under section 132(4A)/section 292C - Whether entries described as 'loans' in seized records are immune from enquiry under section 68 and whether the assessee must still prove identity, capacity and genuineness - HELD THAT: - While acknowledging the statutory presumption that seized material is to be accepted, the Tribunal held that such presumption does not eliminate the assessee's burden to prove that entries recorded as 'loans' are genuine. The court rejected the contention that mere labelling as 'loan' in seized documents precludes application of section 68. The assessee must establish identity and creditworthiness of lenders and genuineness of transactions; failure to do so justifies additions. Applying these principles, where the assessee failed on the three facets (identity, capacity, genuineness), the additions sustained by the CIT(A) were upheld. [Paras 21, 22, 27, 28, 29]Entries in seized documents described as 'loans' remain examinable under section 68; the assessee must prove identity, capacity and genuineness and failure to do so sustains additions.Benefit of rotation of loans and repayments - acceptance or rejection of seized consolidated financial statements in toto - Whether benefit of rotation (credit for repayments/outstanding opening capital) available on account of continuous entries in seized Kaccha-Pucca registers - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the seized Kaccha-Pucca registers contained continuous financial statements showing recurring opening capital/repayments across years. On the materials, the AO could not deny the rotation benefit where the appellate authority accepted that repayments/continuous opening capital flowed from earlier years. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s allowance of rotation/credit for opening capital was sustained, subject to examination of particular disputed items where identity/genuineness remained unproved. [Paras 26, 34, 35]Benefit of rotation/credit for opening capital and repayments reflected in seized registers granted to the assessee; specific items lacking proof remain added.Deletion of additions based solely on confession without corroboration - Whether addition founded solely on a confession recorded at the time of search can be sustained in absence of corroborative material - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of an addition which rested entirely on a confession on seized paper, observing there was no corroborative material to show the assessee earned trading commission or to trace investment of such alleged income. In absence of independent evidentiary material, additions based solely on such confession were held unsustainable. [Paras 74, 78, 81]Additions based only on confessional notings without corroboration are not sustainable and were deleted.Interest under section 234A - exclusion of period until seized material is handed over - Whether interest under section 234A should be computed excluding the period up to which the assessee was not provided copies of seized material - HELD THAT: - Following the coordinate bench and the Supreme Court precedent cited, the Tribunal accepted the approach that interest under section 234A should exclude the period during which the assessee was not furnished the seized material. The CIT(A)'s direction to recompute interest from the date seized material was handed over to the assessee was upheld as conforming to law. [Paras 63, 64, 65]Interest under section 234A to be recomputed excluding period until seized material was provided to the assessee; direction of CIT(A) upheld.Acceptance or rejection of seized consolidated financial statements in toto - Treatment of interest income discernible from seized consolidated statements and allowance of related deductions (interest paid and bad debts) - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal followed the coordinate bench that where the AO relies on seized consolidated financial statements to assess interest income, the debit entries in the same documents (interest paid, bad debts) cannot be ignored. The AO was directed to allow interest paid to banks and bad debts as deductions, and thereafter recompute net interest income and allocate any remaining income in the 60:40 ratio between the assessees. [Paras 17, 20, 21]Deductions for interest paid and bad debts as per seized documents to be allowed; residual interest income to be recomputed and allocated 60:40 between the assessees.Presumption under section 132(4A)/section 292C - Whether jewellery entries in seized records were fully liable to be treated as undisclosed investment - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted that seized documents should be read in entirety under the statutory presumption, but applied evidentiary scrutiny to the entries. The seized Day Book and annexures showed payments of Rs. 67 lakhs to jewellers with dates consistent with the son's marriage; the CIT(A)'s view that only Rs. 67 lakhs was actually purchased (and so supported by the records) was upheld. The AO's blanket addition based on seized notings without reconciling day-book entries was interfered with. [Paras 42, 43, 46, 47]Addition on jewellery deleted to the extent supported by Day Book entries; CIT(A)'s deletion affirmed.Acceptance or rejection of seized consolidated financial statements in toto - Whether addition on account of alleged undisclosed sale consideration is sustainable when sale deed shows ownership by a partnership and sale fell in another assessment year - HELD THAT: - On perusal of the sale deed and seized consolidated balance sheet, the Tribunal found the impugned property belonged to a partnership firm and sale deed was executed on a date corresponding to a different assessment year. In absence of evidence that the property was owned by the assessee in the relevant year, the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition was sustained. [Paras 49, 51, 52, 53]Addition for alleged undisclosed sale consideration deleted as property belonged to a partnership and sale pertained to another AY; CIT(A)'s order upheld.Acceptance or rejection of seized consolidated financial statements in toto - Whether addition on account of alleged purchase of shares (undisclosed investment) is justified when share transfer never materialized - HELD THAT: - The assessee produced the shareholders' register showing that the shares remained in the name of the putative seller as on the critical date. The AO's addition based on a blank share transfer deed found during search was therefore disbelieved. The CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition was maintained since the transfer did not materialize and no substantive transaction was proved. [Paras 55, 59, 60, 61, 62]Addition on alleged share purchase deleted as transfer never materialized; CIT(A)'s deletion affirmed.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal partly allowed the assessees' appeals for statistical purposes and dismissed the Revenue's appeals. Key outcomes: income from seized consolidated statements allocated 60:40 between the principal family members; seized entries labelled as 'loans' remain examinable under section 68 and require proof of identity, capacity and genuineness; where seized documents disclose both credit and debit entries (interest paid, bad debts), debit entries must be allowed before taxing net income; additions based solely on uncorroborated confessional notings were deleted; specific additions (jewellery, certain property sale, share transaction) were deleted on the facts; and interest under section 234A is to be recomputed excluding the period until seized material was handed over to the assessee.

Most Appropriate Method - Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method - Other method under Rule 10AB - Hard-to-value intangibles - Arm's length price - Price-orientation in transfer pricingMost Appropriate Method - Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method - Hard-to-value intangibles - Arm's length price - Selection of the Most Appropriate Method for benchmarking royalty paid for licence of technical know-how and trademark - HELD THAT: - On the facts, the Tribunal found the intangibles licensed by the AE to be unique, evolving and hard-to-value, and that searches in Royalty-STAT did not yield sufficiently comparable agreements. The Tribunal noted that CUP requires a high degree of comparability and that the two comparables relied upon by the Revenue differed materially in product, technology and contractual features from the assessee's Technical License Agreement. It accepted that RPM, CPM, PSM and TNMM were inapplicable or unsuitable in the circumstances. Applying Rule 10AB and the OECD guidance on hard-to-value intangibles, the Tribunal concluded that where reliable CUP comparables are lacking and intangibles are unique, an alternative price-oriented method falling within Rule 10AB can be the Most Appropriate Method. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the assessee's approach falls within the "other method" under Rule 10AB and that the "other method" is the MAM in the peculiar facts of this case. [Paras 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]CUP is not the MAM; the "other method" under Rule 10AB is the Most Appropriate Method for benchmarking the royalty on the facts of the case.Other method under Rule 10AB - Price-orientation in transfer pricing - Arm's length price - Remand for fresh application of the "other method" and verification of allocation and computation - HELD THAT: - Although the Tribunal accepted the "other method" as MAM, it did not accept the assessee's working as final. The Tribunal directed the TPO to adopt the "other method" and to examine afresh the assessee's substituted working, including identifying costs and profits attributable to manufacturing and sales in the Non-AE segment and determining appropriate allocation to arrive at the royalty component. The Tribunal therefore remitted the computation and verification to the TPO and directed the assessee to substitute its working based on the "other method" for fresh determination of ALP. [Paras 25]Direction to the TPO to adopt the "other method" as MAM and to re-examine and compute the ALP of royalty afresh on the basis of revised workings; assessee to substitute working accordingly.Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes: CUP is rejected as the MAM on the facts; the "other method" under Rule 10AB is held to be the Most Appropriate Method, and the matter of quantification is remitted to the TPO for fresh examination and computation in accordance with the Tribunal's directions.

Condonation of delay - revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 - lack of inquiry versus inadequate inquiry - classification of income as capital gains versus business income - disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D - deduction under Section 35D (pre operative expenses)Condonation of delay - Condonation of delay in filing the appeals - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the petitioner's affidavit and supporting affidavits of the assessee's Chartered Accountant and director explaining a 1526 day delay due to incorrect professional advice. Applying settled principles (Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji and subsequent authority), the Tribunal held the cause bona fide and reasonable, that the assessee had actively pursued alternate remedies and had not obtained any undue benefit by delay. On that basis the Tribunal exercised its discretion to condone the delay and admit the appeals for adjudication. [Paras 3]Delay of 1526 days condoned and appeals admitted for adjudication.Revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 - lack of inquiry versus inadequate inquiry - classification of income as capital gains versus business income - Validity of the Commissioner's exercise of jurisdiction under Section 263 to set aside the assessment - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal analysed the materials called for and the assessment proceedings. It found that the AO had issued notices under section 143(2) and 142(1), obtained and examined details (including purchase/sale particulars, bank statements and computations) and recorded that assessment was completed after verification. Applying the distinction between lack of inquiry and inadequate inquiry (as explained in precedents cited in the judgment), the Tribunal held that the record disclosed at best an inadequate inquiry and not a total lack of inquiry. Consequently, the Commissioner could not validly invoke section 263 merely because he would have taken a different view. The Tribunal concluded that the CIT failed to demonstrate how the AO's order was erroneous and prejudicial to revenue on the question of classification of gains, and therefore quashed the order passed under section 263. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 19]Order under Section 263 quashed; the Commissioner erred in assuming jurisdiction to set aside the assessment on the main issue of classification of gains.Disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D - deduction under Section 35D (pre operative expenses) - Validity of the Commissioner's findings on disallowance under section 14A r.w. Rule 8D and on deduction under section 35D - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner in his show cause had taken up two ancillary issues - that the AO had not properly computed disallowance under section 14A r.w. Rule 8D, and that a deduction under section 35D was wrongly allowed for the sixth year. The assessee's counsel conceded that the CIT's order in relation to these two issues survives. The Tribunal recorded that it was inclined to uphold the Commissioner's findings on disallowance under section 14A r.w. Rule 8D and on disallowance of the section 35D claim, and therefore those aspects of the Commissioner's conclusion were not disputed by the assessee before the Tribunal. [Paras 6, 10]Tribunal inclined to uphold the Commissioner's findings on disallowance under section 14A r.w. Rule 8D and on non allowability of deduction under section 35D.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal condoned a 1526 day delay and admitted the appeals. On merits it held that the Commissioner's exercise of revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 was unsustainable because the assessment showed enquiry and verification (at most inadequate inquiry), and therefore quashed the Section 263 order in respect of the principal contention on classification of gains; consequential appeals arising from the now quashed revision became infructuous and were dismissed accordingly. The Tribunal also recorded that the Commissioner's conclusions on disallowance under Section 14A r.w. Rule 8D and on Section 35D were to be upheld.

Fees for Technical Services (FTS) - "make available" clause - ancillary and subsidiary - business income versus royalty/FTS - Article 12(4)(a) of India Singapore DTAAFees for Technical Services (FTS) - Article 12(4)(a) of India Singapore DTAA - business income versus royalty/FTS - Whether the Management Support Charges received by the assessee are taxable as Fees for Technical Services under Article 12(4)(a) of the India Singapore DTAA or constitute business income not taxable in India in absence of a PE. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied the ratio of its earlier coordinate bench decisions in the assessee's own cases and related precedents concerning centralized/management services. Examining the agreements and the factual matrix, the Tribunal found that the management support/centralized services were predominantly for marketing, publicity, promotion and operational support and were not consideration for use of any intangible under Article 12(3). The payments arose under contracts independent of the license agreements and were not shown to be ancillary and subsidiary to any royalty bearing arrangement. On the authorities relied upon, including prior coordinate bench and High Court rulings, such receipts were held to be business income; in absence of a permanent establishment in India, that business income is not taxable in India. Applying that ratio to the present appeal, the Tribunal deleted the addition treating the charges as FTS. [Paras 4, 5]Management Support Charges are not FTS under Article 12(4)(a); they are business income and the addition is deleted."make available" clause - ancillary and subsidiary - Fees for Technical Services (FTS) - Whether the Management Support Services 'make available' technical knowledge, skill or processes or are 'ancillary and subsidiary' to the license/royalty arrangements so as to qualify as Fees for Included Services under the treaty. - HELD THAT: - Relying on earlier tribunal reasoning, the Tribunal held that the 'make available' limb (Article 12(4)(b)) was not satisfied and that the services could not be treated as 'ancillary and subsidiary' under Article 12(4)(a). The agreements for brand/license and for management support were separate, often with different contractual counterparties, and the management services did not facilitate effective application or enjoyment of any licensed right in the sense required by the treaty or its MoU. The predominant purpose of the arrangements was commercial promotion and operational support, and many of the determinative factors in the MoU (single contract, insubstantiality of service fee, facilitation of application/enjoyment) were absent. Accordingly the management support fees did not qualify as FIS by reason of making available or being ancillary/subsidiary. [Paras 3, 4]The 'make available' requirement and the 'ancillary and subsidiary' test are not satisfied; Management Support Services do not qualify as FIS.Final Conclusion: Applying binding coordinate bench and High Court authorities in the assessee's own case and on similar facts, the Tribunal held that the Management Support Charges are not Fees for Technical Services (neither making available technical knowledge nor ancillary/subsidiary to any royalty arrangement) but are business income; accordingly the addition was deleted and the appeal allowed.

Right to be heard under Section 148A - Show cause notice as statutory opportunity to submit reply - Obligation on Assessing Officer to consider reply before passing order under Section 148A(d) - Remand for fresh consideration of replyRight to be heard under Section 148A - Obligation on Assessing Officer to consider reply before passing order under Section 148A(d) - Remand for fresh consideration of reply - Whether the order passed under Section 148A(d) and the consequent notice under Section 148 could stand without consideration of the assessee's reply to the show cause notice dated 19.05.2022, and what relief should be granted. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that the amended law w.e.f. 01.04.2021 confers a statutory right of being heard by issuance of a show cause notice under Section 148A and imposes a corresponding obligation on the Assessing Officer to consider any reply before passing an order under Section 148A(d). The factual dispute was confined to whether the Assessing Officer received or considered the petitioner's reply submitted after legible foundational material was supplied. Rather than quashing the impugned order and notice outright (which would prolong proceedings already commenced under Section 148), the Court adopted an expedient middle path. The matter was remitted for the limited purpose of enabling the Assessing Officer to consider the petitioner's reply to the show cause notice dated 19.05.2022; if on such consideration the reply is found satisfactory the Assessing Officer is to drop the proceedings and recall the order under Section 148A(d), and if not, he may proceed under Section 148 of the amended Act. The Court further directed that while complying with this mandate the Assessing Officer shall not be influenced or prejudiced by the earlier impugned order and notice.Petition disposed directing the Assessing Officer to consider the reply to the show cause notice dated 19.05.2022 and, on such consideration, either recall the order under Section 148A(d) and drop proceedings if the reply is satisfactory or proceed under Section 148 if not; the Assessing Officer shall not be influenced by the impugned order or notice.Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed of by directing the Assessing Officer to consider the assessee's reply to the Section 148A show cause notice dated 19.05.2022 and thereafter either recall the Section 148A(d) order and drop proceedings if the reply is satisfactory, or proceed under Section 148 of the amended Act if not; no costs.

Transfer pricing comparability - exclusion and inclusion of comparable uncontrolled companies - application of the transactional net margin method (TNMM) - use of public domain information versus information under section 133(6) - adjustments for functional and economic dissimilarity (intangibles, onsite revenue, related party transactions, extraordinary events) - remand to assessing officer/transfer pricing officer for fresh consideration - computation and correction of comparable margins - deduction under section 80G - verification and allowanceTransfer pricing comparability - exclusion and inclusion of comparable uncontrolled companies - adjustments for functional and economic dissimilarity (intangibles, onsite revenue, related party transactions, extraordinary events) - Exclusion from final set of comparables for SWD segment of ten specified companies - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal, following a coordinate-bench decision in Global Logic/Arm Embedded line of authorities, found that the ten listed companies are functionally dissimilar to a captive software development service provider and directed the AO/TPO to exclude those companies from the final set of comparables for the SWD segment. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's functional comparability objections (including absence of segmental data, presence of intangibles, significant onsite revenue, related party transactions and extraordinary events) and held that such dissimilarities render those entities unsuitable as comparables for benchmarking under TNMM. The ground raised by the assessee (ground No. 3.8) was therefore allowed in the terms recorded. [Paras 4]Ten specified companies ordered excluded from final list of comparables for SWD segment.Remand to assessing officer/transfer pricing officer for fresh consideration - use of public domain information versus information under section 133(6) - Inclusion of certain comparables (Akshay Software and Sasken) remitted to AO/TPO for fresh consideration - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the fact that a company did not appear in the TPO's search matrix is not, by itself, a valid reason to exclude it. Following precedent (Prism Networks and coordinate-bench decisions), the Tribunal remitted the issue to the AO/TPO for fresh consideration on the basis of information available in the public domain, directing the AO/TPO to re-examine inclusion applying the prescribed filters and segmental analysis as required. [Paras 7]Comparables remitted to AO/TPO for fresh consideration (allowed for statistical purposes).Computation and correction of comparable margins - application of filters and weighting in margin computation - Re-computation of margins of specified comparables remitted to AO/TPO - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal directed the AO/TPO to compute correct weighted average margins for certain comparables (including CG VAK, Kals, Inteq, Aspire) in line with DRP directions and the Tribunal's observations, and allowed the ground for statistical purposes by remitting the margin computation to the AO/TPO for correction. [Paras 9]Directed recomputation of comparable margins by AO/TPO (allowed for statistical purposes).Transfer pricing comparability - exclusion and inclusion of comparable uncontrolled companies - Exclusion of Infosys BPM Ltd. and Eclerx Services Ltd. from ITeS comparables - HELD THAT: - Relying on coordinate-bench precedent and prior Tribunal reasoning (assessees' own case for AY 2014-15 and other authorities), the Tribunal concluded that Infosys BPM and Eclerx are functionally dissimilar to routine ITeS/back office captive providers because they render diversified, higher value services, possess significant brand/intangible assets and subcontracting/onsite profiles that affect margins. The Tribunal therefore directed exclusion of these two entities from the final list of comparables for the ITeS segment. [Paras 12]Infosys BPM Ltd. and Eclerx Services Ltd. to be excluded from final comparables for ITeS segment.Transfer pricing comparability - application of public domain filters - Exclusion of SPI Technologies Ltd. from ITeS comparables - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal, following a co ordinate-bench decision (NTT Data line), accepted that SPI Technologies is functionally dissimilar (typesetting/KPO like activities, inventories, subcontracting, abnormal growth, related party transactions and intangibles) and directed exclusion from the final set of comparables for the ITeS segment. [Paras 15]SPI Technologies Ltd. ordered excluded from the final list of comparables for ITeS.Remand to assessing officer/transfer pricing officer for fresh consideration - Tech Mahindra Business Services Ltd. remitted to AO/TPO for fresh consideration - HELD THAT: - Applying the approach in NTT Data precedent, the Tribunal remitted Tech Mahindra Business Services Ltd. to the AO/TPO for fresh consideration with direction to the assessee to furnish annual report and for the AO/TPO to apply filters at segmental level; accordingly the ground was partly allowed for statistical purposes. [Paras 18]Tech Mahindra Business Services Ltd. remitted to AO/TPO for fresh consideration (partly allowed for statistical purposes).Remand to assessing officer/transfer pricing officer for fresh consideration - Inclusion of Microgenetics Systems Ltd., Ace BPO Services Pvt. Ltd. and Suprawin Technologies Ltd. remitted for fresh consideration - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted the assessee's submissions that these entities warrant reconsideration (issues included applicability of FY filters, persistent loss filter, functional comparability and availability of data) and remitted the matter to the AO/TPO to re examine inclusion in light of public domain information and Rule 10B/10CA provisions. The ground was allowed for statistical purposes. [Paras 22]Comparables remitted to AO/TPO for fresh consideration (allowed for statistical purposes).Deduction under section 80G - verification and allowance - Claimed deduction under section 80G directed to be allowed subject to verification - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal observed that the assessee submitted donation details and that the AO did not record reasons for disallowance; it directed the AO to verify the documents in accordance with law and grant the deduction if found in order. The ground was allowed for statistical purposes and remitted to the AO for verification and consequential computation. [Paras 23]Directed AO to verify documents and grant deduction under section 80G if in order (allowed for statistical purposes).Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes: the Tribunal excluded several specified comparables for the SWD and ITeS segments, remitted multiple comparability and margin computation issues to the AO/TPO for fresh consideration in light of public domain material and directed verification and allowance of the section 80G deduction; the matter is otherwise remitted for consequential action as indicated.