Loading...
By creating an account you can:
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
The appeal by the assessee challenges the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Exemptions) dated March 20, 2023, under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 2018-19. The assessee raised several grounds of appeal, primarily arguing that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Exemptions) erred in exercising powers under section 263 for revising the order dated February 13, 2021, and that the conditions mentioned in section 11 of the Act were duly satisfied.
The brief facts of the case reveal that the assessee, a trust registered under sections 12A and 80G, filed its return of income declaring total income at Rs. 8,66,050. The case was selected for complete scrutiny on issues including receipts of trusts, approval under section 80G, and receipt of voluntary contributions. The Assessing Officer completed the assessment on February 13, 2021, accepting the returned income. However, notices under section 263 were issued by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Exemptions), who ultimately passed an order under section 263, leading to the present appeal by the assessee.
Upon reviewing the order of the Assessing Officer, notices issued under section 263, and submissions of the assessee, it was observed that the issues relating to accumulation under section 11(2) of the Act were specifically enquired by the Assessing Officer and duly responded by the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Exemptions) objected on the grounds that the "exact purpose" for accumulation was not specified. However, the assessee had specified the purpose as "charitable purpose" in form 10, and it was noted that the purpose of accumulation cannot be beyond the objects of the assessee.
The Tribunal referred to several judicial precedents, including decisions by the Karnataka High Court and the Delhi High Court, which supported the view that as long as the objects of the trust are charitable, and the purpose mentioned in form 10 aligns with the trust's objectives, the exemption under section 11(2) should not be denied merely due to lack of detailed specification.
In conclusion, the Tribunal found no error in the order passed under section 143(3) of the Act and held that the objection raised by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Exemptions) was not valid for initiating proceedings under section 263. Consequently, the appeal of the assessee was allowed, and the order under section 263 was set aside.
Order pronounced in the open court on August 7, 2023.
The applicant, M/s Lavish Buildmart Pvt. Ltd., sought an advance ruling on whether they are liable to pay tax under RCM on the upfront amount charged by NOIDA Authority as lease premium for a long-term lease of ninety years for commercial infrastructure development.
The applicant argued that NOIDA Authority does not qualify as a Central/State Government, Union Territory, or local authority under the CGST Act. They cited various judgments and statutory provisions to support their claim that NOIDA Authority is not a 'Government' or 'Local Authority' and thus, services provided by NOIDA Authority should not fall under RCM Notification SI No 5 and 5A. They also claimed that the transaction of long-term lease is a sale of land, which is not taxable under GST.
Issue 2: Nature of Long-term LeaseThe applicant contended that the long-term lease is a transaction for the sale of land and should not be treated as a supply of service under GST. They referred to Schedule III of the CGST Act, which states that the sale of land is neither a supply of goods nor services and thus not taxable under GST. They also cited CBIC Circular No 101/20/2019-GST, which clarifies that upfront amounts payable for long-term leases are exempt from GST if determined upfront.
Discussion and Finding:The Authority for Advance Ruling examined whether the issues raised fall under Section 97(2) of the CGST Act. It was found that the applicant, being a recipient of services, does not qualify to seek an advance ruling as per Section 95 of the CGST Act, which implies that only suppliers of goods or services can apply for advance rulings.
The authority concluded that M/s Lavish Buildmart Pvt. Ltd., as a service recipient, does not fall under the definition of a supplier and thus cannot seek an advance ruling.
Ruling:No ruling can be given in the matter as the applicant does not qualify as a supplier under the Advance Ruling provisions.
Validity:This ruling is valid within the jurisdiction of the Authority for Advance Ruling Uttar Pradesh and subject to the provisions under Section 103(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 until declared void under Section 104(1) of the Act.
Issues: (i) Whether a non-scheduled (passenger) permit holder could use imported aircraft for charter operations and whether carriage of group-company personnel, ticketless travel, or one non-remunerative flight violated Condition No. 104 of the exemption notification; and (ii) whether interest was payable on refund of redemption fine, and whether the bank guarantees furnished by the importer were liable to be discharged.
Issue (i): Whether a non-scheduled (passenger) permit holder could use imported aircraft for charter operations and whether carriage of group-company personnel, ticketless travel, or one non-remunerative flight violated Condition No. 104 of the exemption notification.
Analysis: Condition No. 104 required import approval by the competent civil aviation authority and an undertaking that the aircraft would be used for non-scheduled (passenger) services or non-scheduled (charter) services. The expression "air transport service" in the Aircraft Rules was construed broadly to include carriage by air for remuneration, whether by individual seats or by charter, and the notification did not impose a restriction that a non-scheduled (passenger) operator could not conduct charter operations. The regulatory materials and prior binding decisions recognized that a non-scheduled operator could carry out charter operations, including for group companies, and that issuance of passenger tickets was not a condition of compliance. On the facts, a single non-remunerative flight for crew familiarisation did not establish breach of the condition when the overall use was for remunerative operations.
Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee. The exemption condition was held to be satisfied and confiscation, duty demand, interest and penalty based on alleged misuse could not stand.
Issue (ii): Whether interest was payable on refund of redemption fine, and whether the bank guarantees furnished by the importer were liable to be discharged.
Analysis: The Tribunal applied the settled position that, in the absence of a specific statutory provision, interest is not payable on refund of redemption fine paid pursuant to an adjudication order later set aside. Reliance on equitable considerations was rejected for granting such interest. Since the underlying adjudication order was set aside, the bank guarantees furnished in relation to that order were no longer sustainable and had to be discharged.
Conclusion: The issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee and partly against the assessee. Refund of the redemption fine was allowed, but interest on that refund was denied, while the bank guarantees were directed to be discharged.
Final Conclusion: The impugned confiscation and demand order was set aside to the extent of the substantive duty and penalty action, the redemption fine was ordered to be refunded, interest on that refund was declined, and the bank guarantees were released.
Ratio Decidendi: A non-scheduled (passenger) operator may satisfy the customs exemption condition by using the imported aircraft for remunerative charter operations, and absence of ticket issuance or isolated non-remunerative use does not by itself establish breach; however, interest on refund of redemption fine is not payable unless a statute expressly provides for it.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether amounts received from sale of metal/CRC sheets characterized as "defective sheets" fall within the statutory definition of "scrap" so as to attract liability to collect tax at source under section 206C.
2. Whether proceedings and orders initiated and passed under section 206C(6A)/206C(1) and demand of TCS and interest under section 206C(7) are time-barred where taken after four years from the end of the relevant financial year.
3. Whether interest under section 206C(7) and penalty under section 271CA remain leviable where the substantive order under section 206C is quashed as barred by limitation.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Applicability of section 206C to sales of defective/CRC sheets (Legal framework)
Legal framework: Section 206C requires collection of tax at source on sale of "scrap" as defined in the statute - meaning waste and scrap produced by manufacturing or mechanical working which is not usable as such.
Precedent treatment: The Tribunal considered authorities that interpret the scope of "scrap" and whether trading in usable defective sheets amounts to sale of scrap; those authorities have been relied upon by parties in support of differing contentions. (See cross-reference to reasoning on limitation where precedential approach to similar provisions is discussed.)
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal examined the statutory definition emphasizing that "scrap" connotes material not usable as such without further processing and arising from manufacturing/mechanical working. The assessee's case, as recorded, was that the traded items were defective sheets that remained usable as such and not the product of manufacturing scrap; therefore they did not fall within the statutory concept of "scrap". The lower authorities treated the sales as scrap and levied TCS.
Ratio vs. Obiter: The Court did not finally decide the substantive characterization dispute on its merits because the Tribunal disposed of the appeal on limitation grounds (see Issue 2). Accordingly, any observations regarding the characterization of the goods as scrap are obiter in the context of the present decision.
Conclusion: No operative conclusion on the substantive applicability of section 206C to the transactions was reached because the substantive demand was quashed on limitation grounds; thus the question remains unadjudicated in ratio and any comment is non-binding obiter.
Issue 2 - Limitation for initiating proceedings under section 206C (Legal framework)
Legal framework: Section 206C does not prescribe an explicit time-limit for initiation of proceedings to levy TCS/assess defaults; principles of limitation applicable to analogous TDS/TCS proceedings have been considered by higher fora. Where no specific limitation is provided, a reasonable period for initiation has been judicially recognized.
Precedent treatment (followed): The Tribunal followed established higher-forum jurisprudence holding that, in the absence of a prescribed limitation, a reasonable period for initiating prosecution or proceedings under provisions akin to sections dealing with TDS/TCS is four years from the end of the relevant financial year. That four-year benchmark has been treated as applicable to orders for failure to collect tax at source where no special limitation is prescribed.
Interpretation and reasoning: Applying the four-year reasonable-period principle, the Tribunal computed the limitation from the end of the financial year concerned. For the assessment year in question the four-year period expired before issuance of the show-cause notice and before the order under section 206C was passed. The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's show-cause notice and subsequent order were therefore beyond the reasonable period and lacked legal sustainment.
Ratio vs. Obiter: This finding is ratio decidendi for the adjudication of the appeal because it disposes of the appeal on a pure question of law - the maintainability of the order for want of limitation - and is the operative basis for quashing the demand.
Conclusion: Proceedings and order under section 206C(6A)/206C(1) taken after the four-year period from the end of the relevant financial year are time-barred; the Tribunal quashed the order and demand on that ground.
Issue 3 - Consequences for interest under section 206C(7) and penalty under section 271CA when substantive order is quashed (Legal framework)
Legal framework: Interest under section 206C(7) and penalty under section 271CA are consequential on the substantive establishment of a TCS liability or default.
Precedent treatment: Where the substantive demand or order is set aside as invalid (for example, for being barred by limitation), ancillary demands such as interest and penalties founded on that order lose their legal basis and fall with the principal order.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal observed that, since the substantive order under section 206C was quashed as barred by limitation, the interest levied under section 206C(7) and the penalty imposed under section 271CA had no independent footing and could not survive independently of the principal order.
Ratio vs. Obiter: The conclusion that consequential interest and penalty fall when the principal demand is quashed is part of the operative ratio in so far as it follows directly from the Tribunal's primary finding on limitation.
Conclusion: Interest under section 206C(7) and penalty under section 271CA were dismissed as having no legs to stand once the principal order under section 206C was quashed for being time-barred.
Cross-references and ancillary procedural point
The Tribunal addressed delay in filing an appeal against the penalty and applied the pandemic-period exclusion of time from national jurisprudence to hold there was no delay; this procedural finding enabled adjudication on merits of the penalty appeal without rejecting it on limitation grounds. However, ultimate dismissal of the penalty was on substantive/consequential grounds tied to quashing of the principal order.
Issues: Whether welding electrodes used in the factory for repairs and maintenance are eligible for Cenvat credit as inputs used in or in relation to manufacture.
Analysis: The issue was tested against the inclusive scope of the definition of inputs, which covers goods used in or in relation to manufacture, whether directly or indirectly. The reasoning adopted from the cited authorities treats goods used for repairs and maintenance as sufficiently connected with the manufacturing process where such use is integral to the smooth functioning of production. The authorities relied upon also recognized welding electrodes as inputs when used in relation to manufacture, and the definition was read broadly rather than restrictively.
Conclusion: The denial of Cenvat credit on welding electrodes was not sustainable, and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: Goods used in repairs and maintenance are eligible for Cenvat credit when their use is integrally connected with manufacture and falls within the expanded meaning of inputs used in or in relation to manufacture.
Issues: Whether the refund-related verification in respect of the exporter had to be completed within the stipulated timeline under Circular No. 131/01/2020-GST, and whether continuation of the "risky exporter" alert could be restrained on failure to do so.
Analysis: The governing circular prescribed that verification of the exporter's claim should be completed within 14 working days of furnishing the required particulars, with escalation to the jurisdictional higher authority and completion within the further stipulated period. The admitted position was that verification had not been completed despite the lapse of time. In that situation, the authorities were directed to strictly adhere to the prescribed schedule, and the continued alert marking the exporter as risky was liable to be stayed if verification remained incomplete within the further time granted by the Court.
Conclusion: The verification was required to be completed within the circular timeline, and on failure to do so, the "risky exporter" alert and E.O. remark would stand stayed, without preventing lawful verification thereafter.
TaxTMI